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ABSTRACT 
When people with learning disabilities are ‗placed‘ in institutional care services, 
they are exposed to a range of interferences with their choices and freedoms.  These 
interferences include the imposition of rules and regimes by institutional authorities, 
surveillance, a loss of private space and encroachments upon bodily integrity such as 
being subjected to restraint, seclusion and sedating medications, and restrictions may be 
imposed over their dealings with others within and outside of the institution.  As Goffman 
and others have argued, the cumulative and pervasive effects of these regimes can be 
monumentally detrimental to self and wellbeing.  These interferences have been found 
across the entire spectrum of care services, even in those which were initially designed 
to replicate the choices and freedoms of living in one‘s own home.   
Various writers have expressed the view that a new statute, the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (MCA), is empowering for people with mental disabilities and some have 
suggested it may be help to ensure such interferences are minimised and occur on a 
more principled basis.  The MCA governs when decisions can be made on behalf of 
people who lack ‗mental capacity‘ in their best interests and when restraint can be used.  
It also contains a framework for detention called the deprivation of liberty safeguards 
(DoLS).  In this thesis, I make the paradoxical sounding claim that the MCA is not an 
‗empowering‘ statute, but that the DoLS contain many elements which make them better 
suited to tackling these types of issues. 
The argument advanced in this thesis is based on ideas from new civic 
republican philosophy (Pettit, 1997; Lovett, 2010).  Republican philosophers identify 
exposure to arbitrary interferences in one‘s choices and freedoms with being in a ‗state 
of domination‘.  They argue that in order to ameliorate states of domination, social power 
must be exercised in accordance with clear and well known principles, which are 
effectively enforced.  By showing how they have been variably interpreted by the courts, 
I argue that the ‗elegant‘ and ‗flexible‘ principles of the MCA do not adequately constrain 
the actions of those empowered under the Act.  For many of the issues of concern in 
institutional placements, the legal principles derived from the MCA are barely developed 
at all. 
I examine four mechanisms of enforcement of the MCA, in addition to the DoLS: 
the Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy Service; litigation in the Court of Protection; 
complaints mechanisms; and regulation by the Care Quality Commission.  I show that 
each mechanism suffers from a variety of shortcomings.  One major problem is a lack of 
independent scrutiny of the substantive outcomes of capacity assessments.  Another is 
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that people with learning disabilities have significant difficulties using the law to challenge 
decisions made under it, and rely upon ‗coat tailing‘ on disputes which break out 
between families and professionals to access justice. 
Despite suffering from significant shortcomings, I argue that the DoLS contain 
several important ingredients that could potentially overcome some of these problems.  A 
potential strength of the DoLS is the ability to address whether or not a person is in a 
service which is appropriate for them, alongside whether their treatment within that 
service is appropriate.  Furthermore, the DoLS can help detainees and their families 
circumvent some of the ‗access to justice‘ issues they would face if they applied to the 
Court of Protection under the main provisions of the MCA.  Nevertheless, as presently 
constructed, the DoLS themselves contain too much scope for arbitrary interpretation 
and application to be a credible solution to the problem of domination. 
I argue that radical reforms are required to address these difficulties.  On the 
basis of the republican critique I have subjected the MCA and the DoLS to in this thesis, I 
argue that reformers must be clear about what interferences are tolerable in the lives of 
people with learning disabilities.  Secondly, there must be appropriate and accessible 
safeguards to enable people with learning disabilities to assert their rights in the face of 
arbitrary interferences.  I argue that efforts at reform founded upon a ‗support paradigm‘, 
associated with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, still 
establish a risk of institutional domination which must be constrained.  Legal reforms 
which have been tried have failed because they have never been responsive to the 
needs and concerns of people with mental disabilities.  Reform efforts must be dedicated 
to the recovery of a legalism that is attentive to their needs and concerns.  I offer some 
suggestions for what a more progressive legalism might look like, based on the lessons 
from the MCA and the DoLS. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
ADASS 
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
AMHP Approved Mental Health Professional. A role under the 
MHA. 
BAILII British and Irish Legal Information Institution 
(www.bailii.org) 
BIA Best Interests Assessor.  An assessor role under the 
DoLS. 
CAFCASS The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support 
Service 
care home Formal care that is provided together with 
accommodation. 
CoPLR Court of Protection Law Reports (Official series 
published by Jordans Publishing) 
CQC Care Quality Commission  
CRPD United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities  
CRPD 
Committee 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities  
CSCI Commission for Social Care Inspection 
deputy A person appointed by the Court of Protection under s16 
MCA to make decisions on P‘s behalf in relation with 
specified matters. 
DoLS Deprivation of liberty safeguards (contained within 
Schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) 
domiciliary 
care 
Care that is provided by an agency to a person in their 
own home; contrast with ‗care home‘. 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EHRC Equality and Human Rights Commission  
EPA Enduring Power of Attorney 
EU European Union 
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
guardianship In England and Wales, ‗guardianship‘ refers to a little 
used regime under the MHA 1983 whereby a person is 
appointed to make some limited decisions regarding a 
person‘s residence and connected welfare issues.  In 
international debates, ‗guardianship‘ usually refers to any 
regime whereby a single person is nominated as a 
person‘s legal representative and empowered to make 
substituted decisions on their behalf. 
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HCC Healthcare Commission 
HRA Human Rights Act 1998 
IMCA Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy, a form of 
statutory advocacy created by the MCA 
IRO Independent Reviewing Officer 
JCHR Joint Committee on Human Rights 
LASPO Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 
legal 
capacity 
Legal capacity has been defined as ‗the capacity to hold 
a right and the capacity to act and exercise the right‘ 
(Cifuentes et al, 2008).  Legal capacity means that a 
person is recognised as exercising legal agency, and is 
distinct from ‗mental capacity‘. 
LGO Local Government Ombudsman 
litigation 
capacity 
Litigation capacity refers to both a person‘s ‗legal 
capacity‘ to litigate – their right to conduct legal 
proceedings without going through a ‗litigation friend‘ – 
and the ‗mental capacity‘ a person requires under 
English law to exercise their legal capacity in connection 
with litigation. 
litigation 
friend 
A litigation friend is a person who is appointed to conduct 
legal proceedings on behalf of a person who lacks 
litigation capacity. They are responsible for instructing 
the person‘s solicitor and counsel according to the 
person‘s best interests. 
LPA Lasting Power of Attorney 
LSC Legal Services Commission 
MCA Mental Capacity Act 2005 
MDA Making Decisions Alliance, an organisation which 
campaigned for the MCA 
MDAC Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, Budapest, Hungary 
mental 
capacity 
‗Mental capacity‘ refers to a person‘s decision making 
ability, and is defined in s2-3 MCA.  Under the MCA, a 
person‘s ‗legal capacity‘ depends upon their ‗mental 
capacity‘.  It has been suggested, in connection with the 
CRPD, that a person should be able to exercise legal 
capacity regardless of their mental capacity. 
MHA Mental Health Act (followed by the appropriate year).  
Unless otherwise specified, ‗MHA‘ refers to the MHA 
1983, as amended. 
MHAC Mental Health Act Commission 
MHLO Mental Health Law Online 
NAA National Assistance Act 1948 
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NGO Non-governmental organisations 
OPG Office of the Public Guardian 
OS Official Solicitor 
P ‗P‘ is a term used in the MCA, DoLS and associated 
legal materials.  P is defined in the Court of Protection 
Rules 2007 rule 6 as ‗any person (other than a protected 
party) who lacks or, so far as consistent with the context, 
is alleged to lack capacity to make a decision or 
decisions in relation to any matter that is the subject of 
an application to the court and references to a person 
who lacks capacity are to be construed in accordance 
with the Act‘.   
PHSO Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 
PRN ‗Pro Re Nata‘ – refers to medication administered as 
required 
QRP Quality and Risk Profile. A measure used by CQC to 
identify higher risk services for more frequent 
inspections. 
SCR Serious Case Review 
SDS Self Directed Support 
SOAD Second Opinion Appointed Doctor under the MHA 
substituted 
decision-
making 
A substituted decision occurs where a person‘s legal 
capacity to make decisions for themselves is supplanted 
by the decision of a third party.  Under the MCA, ‗best 
interests‘ decision making is a form of substituted 
decision making. 
supported 
decision-
making 
Where a person makes a decision with the support of 
others, this is a supported decision.  Under the CRPD, 
people with disabilities should be provided with support 
to enable them to make decisions and exercise their 
legal capacity. 
A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
Deciding what terminology to use is fraught with difficulty in the field of disability 
studies.  As Luckasson (2003) observes, the process of defining and classifying people 
according to disability or diagnosis has significant power effects.  Some campaigners 
and scholars prefer to use ‗person first‘ language such as ‗people with disabilities‘, to 
emphasise personhood first and foremost.  This approach is reflected in the language of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  However, those familiar 
with the British Social Model often prefer the phrases ‗disabled people‘ or ‗disabled 
person‘, to emphasise that people are actively disabled by society.  Some people 
associated with the neurodiversity movement have expressed a preference for this 
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approach, regarding autism or other conditions are central to – and inseparable from – 
their identities (Sinclair, 1999; Winegardner, 2010).  Both phrases are used in this thesis 
interchangeably, because I do not regard the sentiments underpinning preferences for 
person-first and ‗disabled person‘ terminology as incompatible. 
There is also little consensus on the preferred terminology for those whom I have 
called in this thesis ‗people with learning disabilities‘.  Many, especially those involved in 
international debates, prefer the term ‗intellectual disabilities‘.  I have deliberately chosen 
the term ‗learning disabilities‘ in this thesis over ‗intellectual disabilities‘ for two reasons.  
The first is because this is the term used in legal instruments and policy materials in 
England and Wales to pick out this group.  The second is because I have encountered 
the phrase ‗intellectual disabilities‘ being used more broadly than ‗learning disabilities‘, to 
pick out people with other cognitive impairments.  Whilst I share the revulsion of authors 
like Luckasson for the phrase ‗mental retardation‘, I have encountered little to suggest 
the phrase ‗learning disabilities‘ as it is used in England and Wales meets with such 
antipathy.1  I have also used the phrase ‗mental disabilities‘ to refer to a wider group of 
people with cognitive impairments and psychosocial disabilities of all kinds, as much in 
this thesis that concerns mental capacity and mental health law is relevant to them. 
I use the term ‗solicitor‘ throughout this thesis to describe the professional who 
conducts proceedings on behalf of a client, and who may instruct counsel to represent 
them in court.  I recognise, however, that many excellent and able legal representatives 
are legal executives and not solicitors.  I hope they will forgive me for using the term 
‗solicitor‘ to refer to them also, in order to avoid excessive cluttering of the text of this 
thesis. 
REFERENCES AND CITATIONS  
In the main I have used Harvard style referencing for all articles, books and 
reports etc.  However, for case law and statutes I have used guidance from the Oxford 
Citation Standards (OSCOLA).  Please note that for many judgments referenced in this 
thesis, standard citations are not available; information on citation schemes and sources 
of Court of Protection judgments is given in Chapter 3. 
Where paragraph numbers are available for cases or other references, I have put 
them in square brackets; [2], for paragraph number 2. 
  
                                               
1
 American readers may be more familiar with the term ‗learning disabilities‘ being used to 
describe conditions like dyslexia; in England these are more commonly called ‗learning difficulties‘ 
and are distinct from learning disabilities as the phrase is used in this thesis.  Self-advocacy 
organisations like People First, and Cardiff People First, use both ‗learning disabilities‘ and 
‗learning difficulties‘. 
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‗To exercise power over another, in a sort of open 
strategic game, where things could be reversed, that is not evil. 
That is part of love, passion, of sexual pleasure. Let us also 
take something that has been the object of criticism, often 
justified: the pedagogical institution. I  don‘t see where evil is in 
the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing 
more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches  him, 
transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The 
problem is rather to know how you are to avoid in these 
practices - where power cannot not play and where it is not evil 
in itself - the effects of domination which will make a child 
subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or 
put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian 
professor, and so forth. I think these problems should be posed 
in terms of rules of law, of relational techniques of government 
and of ethos, of practice of self and of freedom.' 
 
Foucault (1987: 129) 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
On a series of spring days, several years ago, I tied a rope around the waist of a 
man and took him for a walk.  An agency had sent me to a small care service for adults 
with ‗severe‘ learning disabilities and autism, and this was among the first tasks I was 
given.  My sense of discomfort at being given, and performing, that task has not eroded 
over the years.  I rehearsed counterfactuals: that without the rope he had been known to 
run off towards roads and other risks he was unlikely to understand, and faster than the 
staff.  Without the rope he might ingest inedible, potentially toxic, items that he saw.  
Without the rope, a walk would not be permitted at all.  Yet there was more to holding a 
man on the end of a rope than preventing exposure to these risks: the potential to disrupt 
any freely chosen act of his was ever present.  Every movement of his, every action from 
the point at which the rope was fitted, occurred because it was permitted by the person 
holding it.  The person holding the rope was subject to an expectation to control; one 
might be called to account for any action of his.   
In less extreme forms this awkward power relation of care and control played out 
repeatedly during the years I worked in social care.  It underpinned naggings and 
prohibitions against eating ‗bad‘ foodstuffs; restrictions on the use of private spaces in 
order to prevent people enjoying sexual relations; discouragement or prohibitions of 
drinking and smoking.  In a service operated by an intentional community it underpinned 
a ban on television watching except for specified programs one night of the week (except 
for staff, who could watch anything, at any time).  In another service, it underpinned a 
decision not to let a man purchase a mobile phone with his own money, ‗in case he rang 
people with it‘.  In another, to prevent a man from pursuing his desire to have driving 
lessons.  It underpinned rules that bedrooms must be tidied, institutional timetables 
adhered to, staff directions obeyed.  In many of these services, sociologist Erving 
Goffman‘s (1961: 43) description of life in what he called a ‗total institution‘ rang horribly 
true: 
...minute segments of a person's line of activity may be subjected to 
regulations and judgements by staff; the inmate‘s life is penetrated by 
constant sanctioning interaction from above... The autonomy of the act 
itself is violated. 
Goffman described the effect of this penetrating and constant sanctioning from above as 
‗mortification of the self‘. 
22 
 
In contrast with the dramatic incursions into autonomy which often characterise 
medical interventions, the creeping loss of autonomy in everyday life that is experienced 
in social care settings may seem banal and of lesser importance.  Yet researchers have 
found that loss of control over one‘s environment and routines in social care settings 
makes measurable contributions towards mental illness and depression (Boyle, 2005), 
and declines in alertness, participation and wellbeing (Langer and Rodin, 1976).  The 
cumulative and pervasive loss of freedoms in long term institutional care raises profound 
existential and ethical concerns (Collopy, 1990; Hacking, 2004).  Amanda Baggs 
(2012b), an autism rights campaigner and survivor of several institutions, puts it thus: 
The cause of the problem is a certain exercise of power. Of person over 
unperson. And in order to survive it the inmates have to become as much 
of that unperson as they can manage. And that does violent damage deep 
inside the self, that can be incredibly hard to repair. It‘s violent even when 
it comes with purported love and sweetness and light.  
This thesis is concerned with the problem of domination, and its concomitant assault on 
autonomy and identity, in institutional care for adults with learning disabilities.  Using a 
critique drawn from new republican political philosophy, it examines whether a new law, 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), can help to address this problem. 
1.2 THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DOMINATION 
When the government passed the MCA, it seemed to some of us working in care 
services that it would offer adults with learning disabilities greater control over their own 
lives.  The code of practice states that the Act was intended to ‗empower‘ adults with 
mental disorders and ‗to discourage anyone who is involved in caring for someone who 
lacks capacity from being overly restrictive or controlling‘ (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: 
foreword, [1.4]).  The Act has been widely celebrated as promoting autonomy (Boyle, 
2008a: 303-4; 2008b; Johnston and Liddle, 2007), as ‗empowering‘ (Manthorpe et al., 
2009), ‗restoring power‘ (Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2009), or as protecting or 
enshrining ‗rights‘ to make choices in people‘s lives (Antaki et al., 2008; 2009; Badger 
and Parnell, 2009).  The Care Quality Commission (CQC) has suggested that the MCA 
is ‗the most promising lever yet‘ to eradicate ‗the easy and careless preference for 
restrictive practices‘ which have been an enduring feature of the care of adults with 
learning disabilities (Care Quality Commission, 2012f: 12).  From these perspectives, the 
MCA appeared to have in its sights these penetrating and all encompassing relationships 
of control, to which adults with mental disabilities are all too often subject in the name of 
care.  Yet, this thesis will argue, despite these appearances it is unclear that the MCA 
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has achieved, can achieve, or was even designed to achieve, the resolution of these 
kinds of problems around care and control. 
The MCA establishes a legal framework for interferences with the choices and 
freedoms of adults with mental disorders.  Its first principle – known as the ‗presumption 
of capacity‘2 – requires that people are afforded the same choices and freedoms as 
anybody else unless it is established that they ‗lack capacity‘3 in relation to a particular 
matter.  Under the MCA, any interference with a person‘s choices or liberty that is 
grounded in incapacity must be in that person‘s ‗best interests‘.4 Those making decisions 
about best interests must give consideration to the least restrictive option.5  The Act 
introduced requirements for proportionality and necessity in the use of restraint.6  The 
Act has complex relationships with the common law, public law and human rights law, 
which serve both as sites for its application and shape its interpretation.   
The code stipulates that the Act covers a wide range of issues affecting adults 
with learning disabilities, from decisions about where they live and medical treatments, to 
day to day decisions about how they live their lives.7  However, despite a widespread 
belief that the MCA regulates ‗small acts of care‘ (Stanley and Manthorpe, 2009; Samsi 
and Manthorpe, 2013), its relevance to the kinds of day to day issues that typify the 
creeping loss of freedom and control in institutional life is less clear-cut when one 
examines its mechanisms in detail.  The MCA also contains a framework for detention on 
mental-capacity related grounds, known as the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS).  
Unlike the main provisions of the MCA, the DoLS have proven extremely unpopular and 
have been subject to a range of criticisms.  Yet, this thesis makes the paradoxical 
sounding claim that this framework for detention secures liberty more effectively than the 
main mechanisms of the MCA. 
In its first few years, the MCA has proven to be a remarkably popular Act.  
Criticisms which have been levelled at the Act have tended to focus on problems with its 
implementation or interpretation.  Several studies have raised concerns about 
understanding or application of the statute by care providers (Badger and Parnell, 2009; 
Care Quality Commission, 2011i; 2012d; g; Manthorpe et al., 2011), health and social 
care professionals (Williams, V. et al., 2012; Samsi et al., 2011; Emmett et al., 2012; 
Willner et al., 2011; Donnelly, 2009a;b; Donnelly, 2011) and family carers (Manthorpe et 
                                               
2
 s1(2) MCA ‗A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks 
capacity.‘ 
3 
Through application of the definition given in ss2-3 MCA.
 
4
 Determined by reference to the checklist given in s4 MCA. 
5 
s1(6) MCA 
6 
s6 MCA 
7  
See paragraphs [1.1], [1.8], [1.8], [3.3], [5.58], [6.1], [4.38], [4.60], [5.27] and [5.60] (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007). 
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al., 2009; Manthorpe et al., 2012; Redley et al., 2012; Stanley and Manthorpe, 2009).  
Some, especially those writing in the field of medical ethics, have disputed the 
interpretation of best interests in particular judgments.8  Some have argued that the 
principles for consent to treatment and detention under the MCA are more desirable than 
the Mental Health Act (MHA), and the two schemes should be ‗fused‘ together (Dawson 
and Szmukler, 2006; Szmukler et al., 2011; Szmukler and Holloway, 1998), although 
responses to this proposal are varied (Appelbaum, 2010; Atkinson and Patrick, 2011; 
Burns, 2011; Gledhill, 2010; Padfield, 2011; Robinson, 2011; Skipworth et al., 2012; 
Szmukler et al., 2011).  Some have praised the Act‘s liberal credentials, balanced with 
more protective considerations (Coggon, 2008a; 2008b).   
Overall, criticisms of the structure and principles of MCA have been few and far 
between.  White and Baldwin (2006: 388) criticised the Act for being ‗lengthy and 
cumbersome‘ and ‗quintessentially ―New Labour‖, in that it changes the law very little, but 
redistributes decision-making power to government and the courts‘.  There has been 
surprisingly little commentary on features of the MCA that give health and social care 
professionals considerable powers in contrast with disabled people and their families.  
This may be because it is chiefly people with professional backgrounds who have written 
commentaries on the Act and they are oblivious to, or satisfied with, this state of affairs.9  
Indeed, some medical professionals have complained the Act does not give them 
enough power and have called for a person‘s chosen proxy decision makers to be 
demoted to mere ‗advisors‘ to professionals (Wrigley, 2007).   
Some have complained that the construction of best interests and capacity under 
the Act is too vague, and requires further guidance for particular types of decisions 
(Hope et al., 2009); a criticism with which I concur.  Very few ethicists, medical or social 
work professionals have taken issue with the core concept of the Act: that some people 
lack ‗mental capacity‘ and the decisions of others should be substituted for their own.  
There have been various debates around the best interests standard, with some 
suggesting that it is discriminatory towards disabled people or overly deferent to medical 
opinion (Diesfeld, 2001; Veatch, 2000).  Some critics have pointed out that the ‗capacity 
standard‘ is neither especially scientific nor objective (Veitch, 2006; Banner, 2012b).  
With the exception of Szasz (2005), however, few writing in the traditions of professional 
                                               
8 
In particular, an entire industry appears to have sprung up commentating on the case W v M 
[2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).  Commentaries discuss whether or not a person‘s prior expressed 
views regarding life-sustaining treatment should carry more weight than their perceived quality of 
life, whether a person in a minimally conscious state has any quality of life, and what the resource 
implications of sustaining their life might be (Gillon, 2012; Huxtable, 2012; Jackson, 2012; 
Mullock, 2012; Sheather, 2012b; a).
 
9 
This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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or medical ethics have suggested we should abandon the concept of incompetence 
altogether. 
Perhaps it says a great deal about the culture of care services that the core 
principle of the MCA – that people should be afforded maximum autonomy in 
accordance with their ‗mental capacity‘ – struck me as revolutionary when I first heard of 
the Act, and still strikes many as empowering.  However, for many people in the disability 
rights movement, the MCA does not go nearly far enough.  Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‗CRPD‘, United Nations, 2006a) – 
the right to equal recognition before the law - has provoked heated international debate 
about ‗legal capacity‘.  Article 12 CRPD calls for people to be given the support they 
need to exercise their legal capacity.  Some have interpreted Article 12 to mean that it 
may never be permissible to interfere with a person‘s choices and freedoms on disability 
related grounds in the way the MCA permits (Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011; 
Dhanda, 2006-7; Minkowitz, 2006-7).  Even the more circumspect interpretations have 
suggested that the MCA may not be compatible with the UN CRPD (Bartlett, 2012b; 
Richardson, 2012; Lush, 2012).  The concluding observations of the UN Committee for 
the Rights of persons with Disabilities to date suggest that regimes of ‗substituted 
decision making‘, of which the MCA is one variety, are prohibited by the UN CRPD. 
These CRPD-inspired critiques of the substantive principles which underpin the MCA are 
deeply thought provoking and deserve careful consideration, yet they do not form the 
basis for the reasons the MCA is criticised here.  However, the debates around Article 12 
CRPD will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 4, as the history and aims of the drafters 
of the CRPD form a striking contrast with the origins of the MCA and its surrounding 
claims of ‗empowerment‘. 
1.2.1 A REPUBLICAN CRITIQUE OF THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 
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This thesis accepts at the outset a point that some would heavily contest – that in 
some, very limited, circumstances it is very hard to see how to proceed without a 
mechanism that permits a person‘s present actions or choices to be overridden.  
However, there are two central problems with the way the MCA permits this to occur: 
The central principles of the MCA are very vague, leaving people exposed to 
arbitrary interferences with their choices and freedoms from a wide range of 
actors. 
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Even if the principles were well defined, the machinery for enforcing the principles of 
the MCA is weak, inaccessible and itself subject to arbitrary application. 
Consequently, the MCA permits a proliferation of possible interferences, many of them 
linked to the problems of institutional domination described above, whilst offering few 
realistic avenues to challenge them.  Whilst the MCA is in many ways a protective and 
paternalistic statute, which contains mechanisms designed to limit and constrain risks, 
this thesis argues that it does so in a way which exposes people to a different economy 
of risks, which are less frequently acknowledged. 
Exposure to arbitrary interferences in one‘s choices and freedoms is described 
within new republican political philosophy as a ‗state of domination‘ (Pettit, 1997b; Lovett, 
2010b).  Republican approaches to liberty differ in several important respects from other 
traditional and contemporary approaches to liberty in political philosophy.  Republicans 
are concerned with non-domination, not non-interference.  Interferences with a person‘s 
choices and freedoms, even quite considerable interferences, are acceptable to 
republicans so long as they are principled and not subject to the whims or caprices of 
those exercising power.  For example, republicans would regard children as capable of 
enjoying liberty, albeit that they might be subject to quite considerable interferences by 
their parents and teachers, so long as these interferences were principled and non-
arbitrary (Pettit, 1997b: 119-120).  By contrast, traditional liberal writers have tended to 
exclude children and people with mental disorders 10  from the bounty of the liberal 
project, on the basis that they lack attributes of ‗maturity‘ or rationality (Kant, 1886; Mill, 
1859/2005).  Brennan and Hamlin (2001) contrast ‗liberal liberty‘ as a state of affairs 
which one can in principle enjoy in isolation, since one will be free of interferences by 
third parties, with republican liberty which is an attribute of an institutional structure which 
individuals can enjoy non-dominating relationships.  Contrasts between republican liberty 
and traditional liberalism, as well as certain other important concepts related to liberty, 
will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.  
Contemporary republican theory is closely associated with the work of Philip 
Pettit (1997b: viii), whose inspiration for the idea of freedom as non-domination arose 
from his own experiences of living in a ‗total institution‘: 
...it made sense of my experience when, intending to be a priest, I had 
spent years in establishments that I learned later to describe, in Erving 
Goffman's phrase, as total institutions... [T]hey communicated a sense of 
systematic vulnerability and exposure to the governing will, sometimes 
                                               
10 
Amongst others; Kant (1784) also excluded women from his project of Enlightenment, whilst Mill 
(1859/2005: 13-14) also excluded ‗those backward states of society in which the race itself may 
be considered as in its nonage‘. 
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even making a virtue of the practice... Our formation had tried to cultivate 
unfreedom; it was designed to make students passive, unassertive, 
unsure of where they stood.  Mary Wollstonecraft wrote in the 1790s of 
the way that women's subordination turned them into creatures who 
learned to bow and scrape, and to achieve their ends by ingratiation.  She 
might have been writing of us. 
My own experiences of working in ‗total institutions‘ in social care suggests that people 
with learning disabilities are very often exposed to the whims and caprices of the 
‗governing will‘ in just the way in which Pettit describes.  In Chapter 2 I will review 
research and ‗grey‘ literature which supports this contention, and elaborate on the 
concrete manifestations of this particular form of ‗institutional domination‘ in more detail.  
This thesis considers whether the MCA can cultivate a space of non-domination, where 
adults with learning disabilities can be more certain of where they stand in such settings 
and less subject to arbitrary interferences with their choices and freedoms.  Despite 
having high hopes for the potential of the MCA to do so when I embarked upon this 
research, my conclusion is that – disappointingly – it does not. 
1.3 LEGALISM, DISCRETION AND ARBITRARINESS 
The MCA is merely the latest iteration in a long series of legal efforts to regulate 
the ‗care‘ and control of people with mental disabilities in Madhouses, asylums and other 
institutions which people with mental disabilities have been confined to, which burgeoned 
during modernity.  This ‗turn to law‘ to impose control over the exercise of control is often 
referred to as ‗legalism‘.  A countermovement away from using legal and regulatory 
machinery to constrain the decisions and actions of those exercising control in the name 
of protection is sometimes described as ‗informalism‘.  The history of mental health law is 
sometimes described as cycles, or a pendulum swinging, between extremes of legalism 
and informalism (Bowen, 2007; Fennell, 1996; Gostin, 1983a; Jones, K. 1980; Unsworth, 
1987). 
Two particular concerns have recurred over the centuries regarding institutional 
care, described by Thomas Townsend in a House of Commons report on the conditions 
in Madhouses in 1763 as: 
1. The manner of admitting persons into houses now kept for the reception of 
lunatics; and 
2. The treatment of them during their confinement.  
In these twin foci Townsend intuited that there was a connection between the manner in 
which a person came to live in a particular place and whether or not they could 
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subsequently leave it, and how they were treated whilst confined therein.  These twin 
concerns led to the genesis of two aspects of legalism: efforts to control the arbitrariness 
of admissions to institutions, usually in the form of detention safeguards, and efforts to 
control practices which occurred within those institutions, usually through some form of 
licensing and regulation, or visitation.  Both these elements were established to some 
degree in the Madhouses Act 1774 (14 Geo 3 c 49), which eventually followed 
Townsend‘s report, and both are present to some degree in the MHA 1983 and 
associated health and social care statutes.11   
Legalism reached its zenith with the Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Victoria c 5), but fell out 
of favour during the 20th Century following the Percy Commission‘s recommendations 
for a more ‗informal‘ approach, resulting in the Mental Health Act 1959.  The contrast 
between the two is striking.  Whereas the Lunacy Act 1890 required a judicial order prior 
to the admission of a ‗lunatic‘ to any institution,12 the MHA 1959 placed the judicial 
safeguard after admission, to be triggered by an application to a Mental Health Review 
Tribunal.  Although the 19th century Lunacy Acts made some limited provision for 
‗voluntary‘ boarders in licensed establishments without the need for judicial authority or 
medical certification, this was not widely used (Fennell, 1996).  By contrast, the Percy 
Commission recommended that those who were not objecting to their confinement 
should not be subject to formal powers of detention, resulting in a growing number of 
people who were ‗informally‘ admitted to hospital without any of the safeguards of the 
MHA 1959 (Lord Percy, 1957).  From the Madhouses Act 1774 until the MHA 1959 it 
was an offence for anyone to keep a house for the reception of more than one ‗lunatic‘ 
without a license (Roberts, 1981a: section 1.2.1).  The various licensing authorities from 
1774 until 1959 13  were responsible for visiting establishments and monitoring the 
conditions within.  The MHA 1959 abolished dedicated independent monitoring of mental 
health facilities.  Hale (2011: 1) has described the MHA 1959 as ‗little short of 
revolutionary‘, and comments that ‗the new law was just as liberating for the psychiatrists 
as it was for their patients‘. 
                                               
11 
In particular, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 contains provisions for the regulation of 
health and social care services, including monitoring functions for the MHA and the DoLS. 
12 
Excepting ‗Chancery Lunatics‘, whose care was managed by the Court of Chancery. 
13 
Roberts (1981a) lists these as follows: In London – the Physician Commission (established 
1774); The Metropolitan Commission (established 1828); The Lunacy Commission (established 
1845); the Board of Control (established 1913); the Ministry of Health (established 1946).  For the 
rest of England and Wales, Roberts gives Justices of the Peace as the licensing authorities for 
Madhouses, between 1774-1959.  During the nineteenth century there were also moves towards 
regulation of asylums by poor law medical officers, which the Lunacy Commission perceived as a 
threat to their authority (Bartlett, 1998: 423). 
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By the late 20th century the pendulum had begun to swing back towards 
legalism.14  Growing concern about the rights of mental health patients (Gostin, 1983a; 
b) and a wave of scandals in long-stay mental hospitals (Roberts, 1981b) contributed 
towards calls for better legal and regulatory protections for patients.  The resultant MHA 
1983 ‗represented something of a return to the civil liberties approach‘ (Law 
Commission, 1991: [3.5]).  It re-established a dedicated monitoring body for mental 
health facilities in the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) – whose functions are now 
absorbed into the CQC.  Powers for detention and reception into guardianship – a 
community based form of control – were further restricted under the MHA 1983, and new 
procedural safeguards for consent to treatment were introduced.  The MHA 2007 
amended the MHA 198315; Hale (2011: 12) describes these amendments as ‗broadening 
the scope of possible control over their patients.' 
Contained within these broader swings of the pendulum of legalism regarding 
‗mental health‘ care is a more complex story of the care and control of adults with 
learning disabilities.  This story will be given in more detail in Chapter 2, but its primary 
significance lies in the fact that in general adults with learning disabilities today are not 
subject to formal powers of detention or guardianship under the MHA 1983. 16  The 
majority of adults with learning disabilities in England and Wales in the early 21st century 
live in ‗the community‘, either with their families (38%), in care homes (22%), in 
‗supported living‘ accommodation (16%) or as tenants in accommodation provided by 
local authorities and housing associations (12%), (Mencap, 2011).  This thesis is 
                                               
14  
This thesis will not devote significant space to the history of legalism and mental health 
institutions, however several compelling histories of this period are available.  Roberts (1981a) 
details the history of the various licensing and monitoring conditions for Madhouses and asylums.  
Fennell (1996) describes the history of various aspects of consent to treatment in mental health 
care.  Scull (1977; 1979; 1993) gives a credible Marxist account of the growing use of institutions 
as a form of social control of ‗deviant‘ populations in modernity.  Bartlett (1993; 1998; 1999) 
describes the care of ‗lunatics‘ in Workhouses during the 19th century, and tensions between 
centralised and regional sources of authority over their care.  Boyle (2002) discusses the 
historical development of the diagnosis ‗schizophrenia‘ and attempts to locate the basis of mental 
illness in physiology; she argues that schizophrenia, and by extension many other mental 
disorders, are social constructs.  Castel (1988) examines the rise of psychiatry in 19
th
 century 
France.  And, of course, Foucault (2001/1961) describes the evolution of the concept of 
‗madness‘ through the Renaissance, Enlightenment and modernity and argues that psychiatry 
should be understood as more correctly claiming moral not ‗scientific‘ authority. 
15
 Henceforth, references to MHA 1983 refer to the MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007. 
16 
The NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care (2012e: Table 4) indicates that in 2011-
12 fewer than 1% of detentions under Part II MHA (Compulsory admission to hospital) gave 
learning disability as the primary reason for detention, and fewer than 6% for Part III (Patients 
Concerned in Criminal Proceedings or Under Sentence).  Mencap (2011) estimate that only 
around 1% of people with learning disabilities are accommodated in long-stay healthcare 
services.  Official statistics do not give the proportion of people with learning disabilities subject to 
guardianship under the MHA, but the overall number of people subject to guardianship is 
extremely low – only 331 new cases were recorded in 2011-12 (NHS Information Centre for 
Health and Social Care, 2012d: 4). 
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primarily concerned with the situation of those living in care homes and ‗supported living‘ 
accommodation, as they have considerable ‗institutional‘ qualities.  For these 
populations, an ‗informal‘ approach to care is still preponderant, and the MCA and the 
DoLS represent the most significant recent concessions towards regulating issues 
around confinement and control.   
Situating the MCA within this history of legalism is not straightforward.  By 
creating principles and procedures of sorts for the involuntary admission of people who 
‗lack mental capacity‘ to institutions, and a framework for their treatment within them, the 
Act bears some of the hallmarks of legalism.  However, the MCA was heavily influenced 
by an ‗informal‘ approach to legal regulation from the outset (Law Commission, 1991: 
[4.14]-[4.20]), and consequently contains far fewer of the procedural, juridical and 
regulatory safeguards that characterised the Lunacy Acts and the MHA 1983.  By 
contrast, the MCA‘s associated framework for detention – the ‗deprivation of liberty 
safeguards‘ (DoLS) – does attempt to impose procedural and juridical safeguards 
against arbitrary interferences with liberty.  The parallel development of two legal 
frameworks seeking to impose almost identical substantive principles – one with a 
general absence of ‗formal‘ safeguards, and one with perhaps a superfluity of them – 
offers an opportunity to explore wider issues around the use of law to secure individual 
freedoms. 
Debates about the role of legalism in the care and control of adults with mental 
disorders have accompanied these swings of the pendulum.  Professor Kathleen Jones‘ 
critique (1980) of the ‗legal approach‘ to mental health pits it against an ‗open-textured‘17 
informal approach, which affords professionals maximum discretion in mental health 
care.  She argues that ‗We have to face  the fact that there are some things which the 
Law cannot do‘, and in particular it ‗cannot  prescribe  in  detail for  such  difficult  and  
unhappy  situations‘ as the actual conditions that doctors work in and which patients and 
their relatives experience (p 12-13).  Legal formalism, she argues, has been tried and 
has failed, and the law could not contain or negate the ‗vicious subculture‘ and abuses 
which have occurred because of deteriorating morale and conditions of work in hospitals 
(p14).  Larry Gostin (1983a), a former legal officer for the mental health NGO Mind, who 
was at the forefront of campaigning for the ‗new legalism‘ of the MHA 1983, criticises 
Jones‘ arguments as directed against a legal formalism associated with the Lunacy Laws 
‗that few would support‘ today (p48).  Gostin acknowledges that ‗law has not succeeded 
in trying to prescribe in detail the circumstances in which compulsory psychiatric 
intervention is justified‘ (p48), but counters that: 
                                               
17 
A term which Jones has borrowed from H.L.A. Hart (1961/1997: 127). 
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...where decisions involve the removal of a person's liberty or some other 
right of self-determination, it is no answer to say that the law should not 
control this activity because there are no reliable and consistent factors 
which could govern such decisions. If this were the case, the remedy 
would not be to leave medical discretion unfettered; rather, it would 
suggest that the discretion should not be exercised at all, and certainly not 
under the authority of law. 
This exchange between Jones and Gostin can be seen as a microcosm of wider debates 
around how far law can constrain the discretion of those in positions of authority without 
leading to overly-rigid rules and procedures which cannot prescribe for the particulars of 
real life situations.  It also touches upon important debates about the degree to which law 
can achieve the emancipatory or transformative ends desired by reformers.  These are 
issues which recur throughout this thesis, and their wider theoretical context will be 
described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINES 
This ‗turn to law‘ to impose control over those who exercise control, embodied by 
Gostin‘s ‗new legalism‘ and earlier forms of ‗legalism‘, is endorsed by republican political 
philosophers.  Pettit (1993; 1997a; b) and Lovett (2010a) both identify the ‗rule of law‘ as 
an important ingredient of securing republican liberty.  This is because, in theory at least, 
law can contribute towards: 
 Clearly defined, well known, principles for the exercise of social power; 
 Effective, independent, mechanisms of enforcement for those principles. 
However, the republican quest for non-arbitrariness extends beyond the traditional realm 
of the rule of law, well into the ‗private sphere‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 99).  As an Act which 
purports to regulate down to the microdetails of caregiving, even in informal and non-
state caregiving relationships, the MCA does potentially penetrate the private sphere to a 
quite remarkable degree.  This thesis is concerned with how far republican liberty is 
secured for adults with learning disabilities by the MCA in two important respects: 
1. Reducing arbitrariness in admissions to institutions; 
2. Reducing arbitrariness in interferences with their everyday choices and freedoms 
by institutional authorities. 
In Chapter 2 I give a more detailed discussion of the current predicament of 
adults with learning disabilities in institutional care in England and Wales.  I provide a 
short historical overview of policies aimed at community based living and 
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deinstitutionalisation, and explain the legal status of the different kinds of services people 
with learning disabilities typically live in today.  Drawing from a review of the research 
and ‗grey‘ literature on restrictive practices in care settings I set out a particular range of 
concerns that have been raised in connection with institutional care.  Because these 
concerns are primarily directed towards the arbitrariness of interferences by institutional 
authorities, I call them ‗institutional domination‘.  I then go on to review literature on new 
republican philosophy, exploring some key distinctions with other forms of liberty found in 
political theory.  I explain why republican approaches are especially well suited to 
describing the predicament of people with learning disabilities in institutional care, and 
the republican ‗prescription‘ for addressing this problem.  I also set out some limitations 
of republican approaches.  I then consider a broader literature which critiques the ‗turn to 
law‘ for tackling the oppression of oppressed groups.  I argue that whilst these concerns 
are well founded, there are still reasons for believing we should not abandon legal efforts 
altogether. 
In Chapter 3 I outline a bespoke research method which I have adopted to 
examine the MCA through the lens of republican political theory.  This involved using 
traditional doctrinal methods to examine how far the common law has prescribed clear 
and well known principles for the key elements of the MCA, and then using a range of 
techniques to consider how effectively these principles are enforced.  I describe how I 
have used research interviews, requests made under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 (FOIA) and a series of ‗micro studies‘ of reports by the CQC and ombudsmen to 
look at mechanisms of enforcement.  I consider the limitations of the method I have 
adopted, and discuss why I have not used other research methods which would have 
offered complementary insights into the issues considered in this thesis. 
In Chapter 4 I examine the ‗structural pillars‘ of capacity and best interests under 
the MCA, and question how clear and consistent the principles for their application and 
interpretation are.  I begin by showing how these ‗structural pillars‘ emerged in the 
common law, and how they were built into the MCA during its lengthy passage from the 
Law Commission‘s research onto the statute books.  I question how far these principles, 
and the MCA as a whole, were ever directed towards ‗empowerment‘, and contrast the 
development of the MCA with that of the CRPD.  I then go on to review case law on the 
meaning of ‗capacity‘ and argue that the courts have interpreted it in an arbitrary fashion, 
and various unacknowledged normative criteria have seeped into its analysis.  I then 
consider how far the courts have provided clear and consistent criteria for the kinds of 
interferences that characterise ‗institutional domination‘, which were outlined in Chapter 
2.  I find that although the courts have developed a considerable body of law relating to 
conflicts between families and professionals, there are only a few limited signs of the 
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courts addressing the problems of ‗institutional domination‘ which affect people with 
learning disabilities alone.  I conclude that the MCA has not satisfied the republican 
criteria of providing clear and well known principles to constrain the exercise of 
institutional authority over people with learning disabilities, and significant scope for 
domination remains. 
In order to ameliorate states of domination, republicans require effective, 
independent, mechanisms of enforcement for principles constraining permissible 
interferences.  In Chapter 5 I examine four key mechanisms of enforcement of the MCA 
in close detail, and ask how independently and effectively they enforce its provisions.  
These are: the Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs); applications to the 
Court of Protection to resolve disputes over capacity and best interests; complaints to 
the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO); and regulation by the CQC.  I find that each 
mechanism suffers from a variety of shortcomings, including: a lack of independent 
scrutiny of the substantive outcomes of capacity assessments; problems with accessing 
or triggering various mechanisms of enforcement; and the problems people with learning 
disabilities experience in accessing the Court of Protection without ‗coat tailing‘ on 
disputes which break out between families and professionals.  I argue that this may 
explain why Court of Protection case law is so skewed towards those kinds of disputes.  I 
also argue that radical reforms of the Court of Protection are required to address these 
difficulties.  
In Chapter 6 I examine one final mechanism of enforcement for the principles of 
the MCA: the DoLS.  Despite the unpopularity of the DoLS, I argue that they contain 
several important ingredients that can overcome some of the shortcomings of the 
mechanisms of enforcement described in Chapter 5.  In particular, the DoLS potentially 
provide independent scrutiny of both admission to care services, and the accrued loss of 
freedoms a person may experience within those services.  Consequently, the DoLS are 
better placed than most other mechanisms to address both elements of the problem of 
institutional domination – admission, and treatment - simultaneously.  Furthermore, the 
DoLS can help detainees and their families circumvent some of the ‗access to justice‘ 
issues they would face if they applied to the Court of Protection under the main 
provisions of the MCA.   
However, the DoLS do suffer from several significant shortcomings.  Due to their 
complexity, they are poorly understood and poorly implemented.  There are problems 
with the independence of assessments of capacity and best interests by DoLS 
assessors, and the important role envisaged for IMCAs appears not to be functioning as 
it should.  The evidence suggests that detainees experience serious difficulties 
accessing the Court of Protection to exercise their right to appeal under Article 5(4) 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and some of the reasons for this will be 
discussed.  One key issue underpinning the problems with the DoLS is uncertainty over 
the meaning of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ itself; I argue that the courts have sought to 
constrain the application of the safeguards because of the strain on resources posed by 
legalism itself. 
I discuss the findings of this research in Chapter 7.  I review the reasons given by 
professionals and reformers alike for rejecting legalism as a way of improving conditions 
for people with disabilities in institutional care.  I offer an argument, based on the findings 
of Chapters 4 to 7, for approaching calls to turn away from ‗legalism‘ with some caution.  
On the basis of the republican critique I have subjected the MCA and the DoLS to in this 
thesis, I argue that reformers must address what interferences they are prepared to 
tolerate in the lives of people with learning disabilities18, and how they will be able to 
assert their rights in the face of arbitrary interferences.  I highlight some areas of concern 
around proposals for the reform of legal capacity laws, which are not attentive to these 
issues.  I argue that efforts at reform founded upon a ‗support paradigm‘ still establish a 
risk of institutional domination that must be constrained.  I argue that legalism has been 
tried and has failed because it has never been responsive to the subjectivity of people 
with mental disabilities.  Reform efforts must be dedicated to the recovery of a legalism 
which is responsive to their needs and concerns.  I offer some suggestions for what a 
legalism of the future might look like, based on the critique of the MCA and DoLS 
outlined in this thesis. 
                                               
18
 I do not mean by this that such permissible interferences should be framed in a disability-
specific way; these may be interferences that would be tolerable for any persons. 
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CHAPTER 2 - INSTITUTIONAL DOMINATION  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
One way of thinking about the kinds of oppression that people with learning 
disabilities experience in institutional care services is as a form of ‗domination‘.  
Domination is an idea that is developed in new republican political philosophy, although it 
can be traced back to ideas from classical antiquity (Skinner, 1997), and has some 
important parallels with the idea of the ‗rule of law‘.  Domination is not the only way of 
thinking about the forms of oppression or unfreedom people with learning disabilities 
may experience in care services.  However, I suggest it is a particularly useful way of 
thinking about their experiences for the purposes of evaluating whether the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) can ameliorate their situation. 
The first part of this chapter will set out in more concrete detail which aspects of 
life in care services, which are well evidenced in the research and grey literature, I am 
referring to when I speak of the problems of ‗institutional domination‘.  This section will 
also give some legal and policy background, which is important for understanding the 
kinds of institutions adults with learning disabilities live in today.  The second part of this 
chapter will give a more detailed description of new republican political philosophy.  The 
key elements of domination will be discussed, and republican liberty will be contrasted 
with some other kinds of liberty found in political philosophy which are important, but 
distinct from the kind of liberty under discussion in this thesis.  Finally, in part three, 
some critiques of using legal strategies for social and political transformation will be 
considered.  I will argue that whilst these are important considerations to bear in mind 
when evaluating how effective the MCA is in ameliorating states of domination, they are 
reasons for working to improve legal strategies, not abandoning them altogether. 
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL DOMINATION IN SOCIAL CARE 
2.2.1 THE NATURE OF ‗TOTAL INSTITUTIONS‘ 
Law and regulation have tried to tackle two interrelated concerns associated with 
institutions, identified by Townsend (1763) as: 
- The manner of admitting persons into houses now kept for the reception 
of lunatics; and 
- The treatment of them during their confinement. 
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It is important to recognise that what we mean by an ‗institution‘ may be more complex 
than a type of building or organisation which is designated as such by a licensing and 
regulation authority.  To a very significant degree, the way a person is treated within a 
particular space is what characterises it as an institution. 
Goffman (1961: 17) described a ‗family of attributes‘ which are often found in 
what he called ‗total institutions‘, but none were ‗peculiar to total institutions, and none 
seems to be shared by every one of them‘.19  Total institutions were likely to be a single 
physically and socially bounded space, and there was often a breakdown of barriers 
between different spheres of life such as work, sleep and socialising.  There was usually 
a strongly stratified social hierarchy between ‗staff‘ and ‗inmate‘ groups, with heavily 
restricted social mobility and intercourse between those groups.  Both groups enjoy 
differing and asymmetric rights to resources, spaces, activities and modes of 
communication; there is an asymmetry in the information they hold, and produce, about 
each other.  ‗Inmate‘ groups were often subject to surveillance by staff groups, and staff 
often operated systems of privileges and punishments.   
These properties are found in a surprisingly broad range of environments.  In 
addition to the large psychiatric hospital where he conducted his own ethnographic 
research, Goffman described prisons, army barracks, ships, submarines, boarding 
schools, monasteries, convents and universities with on-campus accommodation as 
having some similar properties.  Other researchers have identified cruise liners (Tracy, 
2000), Disneyland (Ritzer and Liska, 1997) and the situation of women living with 
abusive, controlling and violent partners (Avni, 1991) as displaying many of the 
properties of total institutions.  Researchers writing in other traditions have described the 
way that ‗Activities that form the routines of home‘ can ‗become imbued with the 
institutional logics‘ when people receive home care services (Angus et al., 2005: 163; 
Luken and Vaughan, 1991). 
Although many care services today aspire and claim to be non-institutional in 
character, there may be discrepancies between these claims and the degree to which 
they manifest these characteristics.  At the heart of Goffman‘s analysis is a particular 
family of power relations between a body of staff and those whom the staff act upon.  
This means that understanding whether a person might experience their living 
arrangements as a ‗total institution‘ requires us to look deeper than the philosophies and 
legal structures a form of accommodation claims to adhere to.  It also means that to a 
                                               
19 
‗Total institutions‘ are thus what Wittgenstein (2001: [77], [164], [179]; 1958: 20, 33, 88) called a 
‗family resemblance‘ term, where a word or phrase denotes a set of overlapping features but 
where there is no single ‗essence‘ which uniquely designates  all members of that category. 
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certain extent Townsend‘s problematic is circular: whether or not a person is admitted to 
an ‗institution‘ will depend on the practices in the place where they are living. 
2.2.2 COMMUNITY CARE LAW AND POLICY FOR PEOPLE WITH 
LEARNING DISABILITIES IN THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES 
FROM COLONIES AND CONTROL, TO CARE IN THE COMMUNITY 
The first half of the 20th century saw legislation specifically directed towards the 
care and control of adults with learning disabilities, culminating in the Mental Deficiency 
Acts of 1913 and 1927.  These Acts sought to move adults with learning disabilities out 
of the public asylums into newly established ‗colonies‘, or to subject them to formal 
arrangements for their supervision and ‗control‘ in the community (Fennell, 1992).  A 
primary purpose of segregation in colonies and community-based control was preventing 
people with learning disabilities from procreating; a compromise arrived at after 
eugenicist proposals for mass sterilisations were met with opposition from an unlikely 
coalition of Catholics and civil libertarians (Fennell, 1992; Kevles, 1999; King and 
Hansen, 1999; Larson, 1991).  The 1913 Act required local authorities to ascertain all the 
‗idiots‘, ‗imbeciles‘, ‗feeble-minded persons‘ or ‗moral defectives‘ in their areas, and either 
accommodate them in an institution or else to place them under guardianship or some 
other form of supervision.   
Fennell (1992) writes that guardianship was slow to take off, peaking in 1947 at 
only 4,798 people.  He attributes this peak in the use of guardianship during the 1940‘s 
to a lack of institutional provision and no alternative means – prior to the National 
Assistance Act 1948 – for a local authority to provide payment for care arrangements.  
From the perspective of legalism, the significance of the National Assistance Act 1948 
and later community care statutes20 was the establishment of powers for local authorities 
to pay for accommodation of persons ‗in need of care and attention which is not 
otherwise available to them‘ without the need for a formal admission under mental health 
legislation or entry into guardianship.  It is not entirely clear whether or not people always 
consented to placement in that accommodation. 
During the 20th century there was an increasing policy preference for ‗care in the 
community‘, rather than care in the large healthcare facilities which evolved out of the old 
asylums.  By the 1960‘s there was growing disdain for institutional forms of care, 
prompted by a wave of hospital scandals (Roberts, 1981b) and bolstered by the 
increasingly fashionable writings of Goffman, Foucault and others.  However, for much of 
the century adequate community provision never materialised to replace the old long-
                                               
20
 These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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stay hospitals and colonies, resulting in ‗revolving door‘ admissions to mental hospitals 
(Means et al., 2008: 38).  The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 placed local 
authorities under much stronger duties to assess a person‘s needs for care services.21 
The Act also enabled local authorities to commission care services to discharge their 
community care powers and duties from the independent sector, rather than having to 
provide them directly themselves.   
By the year 2011-12, 93% of all local authority funded residential care for adults 
with learning disabilities was provided by voluntary and for-profit organisations, as was 
89% of home care for all service users.22  There are important policy debates about 
whether or not the ‗privatisation‘ of community care services has led to a decline in 
quality and diversity (Drakeford, 2000; 2006; National Development Team for Inclusion, 
2011).  However, for the purposes of this thesis, the main significance of ‗privatisation‘ of 
care services is that those providers may not be ‗core‘ public authorities in the meaning 
of s6 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).   
The HRA was deliberately designed to accommodate the increasing ‗outsourcing‘ 
of public functions to the independent sector, in the form of ‗functional‘ or ‗hybrid‘ public 
authorities whose ‗functions are of a public nature‘.23  However in a controversial ruling in 
YL v Birmingham City Council24 the House of Lords concluded that in providing care 
services, even those arranged and funded by local authorities, private care providers did 
not exercise ‗functions of a public nature‘ in the meaning of s6 HRA.  This meant that 
residents of those services could not rely upon the s7 HRA mechanism to challenge 
decisions by care providers that violated their rights under the ECHR.  Following an 
outcry over this ruling (JUSTICE et al., 2007; Robins, 2007) 25 , the government 
introduced legislation that made the provision of residential care services functions of a 
public nature in the meaning of s6 HRA, so long as they were arranged under the 
National Assistance Act 1948.26  However, this amendment did not include domiciliary 
                                               
21 
S47 NHS and Community Care Act 1990 
22 
These data were calculated using the following figures taken from supporting tables provided by 
NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care (NHS Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care, 2012c): In 2011-12, local authorities in England arranged 1,698,040 weeks of 
residential care for adults with learning disabilities; of these only 113,980 were provided by in-
house residential care services.  In 2011-12 local authorities in England supplied 188,206,114 
hours of home care to all service users, of these only 20,302,060 were provided through in-house 
domiciliary care services. 
23 
s6(3)(b) HRA 
24[
2007] UKHL 27 
25 
The judgment has also been the subject of extensive academic commentary, with many taking 
the view that the judgment was legally or morally flawed (Carr and Hunter, 2010; Hale, 2009a; 
McDermont, 2010; Palmer, Ellie, 2008a; Palmer, Stephanie, 2007; 2008b; Sanger, 2008; 
Williams, Alexander, 2008). 
26 
s145 Health and Social Care Act 2008 
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care services or residential services arranged under other Acts.27   There have been 
ongoing criticisms (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011a; Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2006; 2007a; 2008a;b; 2010) and repeated legislative efforts to rectify 
this state of affairs, but none have yet succeeded in parliament.28  The MCA and the 
DoLS intersect with the HRA in several important respects, outlined more fully in 
Chapters 4-7.  The lack of traction of the HRA in certain settings means that the potency 
of the MCA and the DoLS themselves may be diluted in services that are not public 
authorities in the meaning of s6 HRA. 
SOCIAL MODELS OF DISABILITY 
During the latter half of the 20th century, policies towards people with learning 
disabilities began to shift away from abhorrent eugenics-inspired policies of ‗control‘, 
towards policies which promoted equality and inclusion.  These were heavily influenced 
by the various developing social models of disability, which are typically broken down 
into three important strands of thought (Dimopoulos, 2010): 
1. Philosophies of ‗normalisation‘ originating from Scandinavian countries, typically 
associated with the work of Wolfensberger (1972; 1980; 1983).  The principle of 
‗Normalisation‘ promotes the acceptance of people with learning disabilities as 
equal citizens and ensuring they enjoy the same opportunities and patterns of life 
as non-disabled adults.  There is a particular focus on de-institutionalisation in 
writings on Normalisation, and having a lifestyle broken down into periods of 
work, leisure and holidays modelled on the lifestyles of non-disabled citizens. 
2. In North America during the 1970‘s a civil rights inspired ‗minority group‘ 
approach to disability took shape.  This focussed on ‗the way in which 
disadvantaged people are portrayed or perceived by the public‘ (Dimopoulos, 
2010).  These approaches emphasised the importance of social inclusion rather 
                                               
27  
For example, it is unclear that residential care arranged under s117 MHA after-care 
arrangements would be covered by this amendment. 
28 
In the parliamentary session 2005-2006, Paul Burstow MP introduced a bill (Care of Older and 
Incapacitated People (Human Rights) Bill) which would have made all care homes public 
authorities in the meaning of s6 HRA, regardless of whether care was privately or publicly funded 
and arranged.  In the session 2008-2008, former JCHR chair Andrew Dismore MP introduced a 
bill (Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Function) Bill) which would have listed ‗the extent 
to which the state, directly or indirectly, regulates, supervises or inspects the performance of the 
function in question‘, ‗the nature and extent of any statutory power or duty in relation to 
thefunction in question‘ and 'the extent to which the state makes payment for the function 
inquestion‘ as specific factors to be considered by the courts when determining whether or not an 
activity was a function of a public nature under s6 HRA.  In the parliamentary session 2011-2012 
Baroness Greengross and Lord Rix introduced an amendment to the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 (amendment 217A) which would have made all domiciliary care services public authorities 
within the meaning of s6 HRA, regardless of whether or not the care was publicly or privately 
funded or arranged.  All three bills and amendments failed to gain parliamentary support. 
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than segregative policies which allowed the conditions of people with disabilities 
to be ignored by society. 
3. In Britain, the newly formed Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 
(1976) declared, as a fundamental principle, that disability was not a medical 
condition located in an individual but ‗a situation, caused by social conditions‘.  
They called for the elimination of the social and attitudinal barriers that 
contributed towards disabling situations, and emphasised the importance of 
giving disabled people control over their own lives.  This evolved into what is now 
often called the ‗British Social Model of Disability‘, with a well known elaboration 
by Mike Oliver (1990a; Oliver, 1990b).   
All three social models have proved enormously influential over the past 
decades, and traces of their distinct approaches can be seen in the UN CRPD.  
Normalisation, in particular, has been described as an ‗evangelical‘ movement ‗with 
associated doctrinal squabbles and schisms‘ (Brown, H and Smith, 1992).  It is 
something of an ‗orthodoxy‘ for social care professionals working with people with 
learning disabilities (Deeley, 2002), although its principles are not always supported so 
enthusiastically by family carers (Heyman and Huckle, 1993; Jingree, Treena and Finlay, 
2011).  Normalisation has also been extremely influential for the government‘s flagship 
policy for people with learning disabilities, Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001; 
2010e)29, which promotes rights, choices, independence and inclusion.  As will be seen 
in later chapters, this can sometimes lead to tensions between families and 
professionals, where families would prefer to care for relatives with learning disabilities in 
their own homes.  A related issue is the extent to which ‗normalisation‘ can be coercively 
imposed upon a person; Wolfensberger (1980) at least appeared to believe that 
‗Normalizing measures can be offered in some circumstances, and imposed in others.‘ 
Whilst the social models of disability have undoubtedly been extremely important 
in political activism relating to disability, these models are not without their critics.  One 
common theme is that they have been too strongly oriented towards the needs of people 
with physical disabilities, and not sufficiently attuned towards adults with learning 
disabilities (Dimopoulos, 2010).  Philosophies of normalisation have been criticised as 
theoretically weak, reflecting the concerns of professionals not people with learning 
disabilities, and insufficiently insensitive to relations of power (Chappell, 1992).  
Normalisation philosophies have also been critiqued for the assumption that being 
‗different‘ was problematic, and that disabled people should conform to the norms of the 
non-disabled population (Morris, J. 1991).   
                                               
29
 For a discussion of the influences on Valuing People see Burton and Kagan (2006). 
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Shakespeare (2006) has written a careful and detailed critique of the British 
Social Model, emphasising that whilst many ‗disabling‘ aspects of a person‘s situation 
can be located in their social conditions, not all can.  Some aspects of disability arise 
from complex interactions between a person‘s impairment and their environment, and 
some functional limitations or aspects of disabled people‘s experiences may not be 
eradicable by environmental and social changes at all. Shakespeare‘s critique has met 
with resistance and controversy in some quarters (Koch, 2008), however some of those 
closely associated with the British Social Model have recognised many aspects of it as 
valid (Sheldon et al., 2007).  Although Shakespeare‘s criticisms of the social model will 
not be taken up in any great detail in this thesis, his concerns potentially have important 
implications for approaches to Article 12 CRPD. It has been suggested that the CRPD as 
a whole, and Article 12 in particular, was drafted on the basis of a populist conception of 
the social model of disability which did not acknowledge important issues raised in 
contemporary critical disability studies (Kayess & French, 2008: 7, 33-4).  This is one 
reason why this thesis has not, as some associated with Article 12 CRPD seem to be 
suggesting, advanced the argument that it is feasible to abolish all interferences with a 
person‘s choices and freedoms that are currently legitimated under the MCA.30 
THE ‗PERSONALISATION‘ OF CARE SERVICES 
In response to lobbying by disabled people‘s organisations, ‗direct payments‘ 
were introduced/ 31  to enable disabled people to purchase care services directly 
themselves, instead of relying on services provided or commissioned by public 
authorities.  This approach is often called ‗self-directed support‘ (SDS).  Meanwhile, 
health and social care practitioners began to develop ‗person-centred‘ philosophies of 
care (Bowers et al., 2007; Brooker, 2007; Kitwood, 1997; Sanderson, 2011).  Person-
centred philosophies of care emphasise the importance of planning support around a 
person‘s own needs and preferences, and not subordinating them to the interests of care 
services.  Person-centred philosophies of care have been criticised for being vague, 
under theorised and the term can sometimes be indiscriminately used ‗for practices that 
serve service providers‘ rather than patients‘ interests‘ (Entwistle, 2012).  For example, a 
service inspected by the CQC described itself as person-centred, yet CQC later found 
that staff were imposing strict rules and regimes, and a system of punishments and 
rewards upon residents (Care Quality Commission, 2010e; 2011d). 
                                               
30
 Although neither do I suggest that if some such interferences continue to be permissible, a 
structure like the MCA should be used to legitimate and regulate them. 
31 
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996; now superseded by ss57-8 Health and Social 
Care Act 2008  
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Both person-centred and self-directed philosophies of care have had a 
considerable influence over official policies of ‗personalisation‘ of care services over the 
last decade (Department of Health, 2005d; 2006c; 2007a; Department of Health and 
Others, 2007; Department of Health, 2010c; 2011d; 2010b) and regulatory standards 
(Care Quality Commission, 2010c).  Person centred philosophies of care are certainly 
more desirable than service-centred care, but they are not necessarily incompatible with 
staff exercising considerable control over a person in their ‗best interests‘. 
SUPPORTED LIVING 
During the 1990‘s community care services were developed further towards 
providing people with learning disabilities with the opportunity to live in their own home 
with support, rather than living in ‗institutional‘ residential care services.  The ‗Reach 
Standards‘ (Gitsham et al., 2001) are generally regarded as paradigmatic of what 
supported living services aspire to, and are as follows: 
 I choose who I live with 
 I choose where I live 
 I have my own home 
 I choose how I am supported 
 I choose who supports me 
 I get good support 
 I choose my friends and relationships 
 I choose how to be healthy and safe 
 I choose how to take part in my community 
 I have the same rights and responsibilities as other citizens 
 I get help to make changes in my life   
The standards are clearly imbued with the principles of equality and inclusion which 
animate all social models of disability.  Although the Reach Standards are not legally 
enforceable they are frequently cited in policy and even regulatory literature (e.g. 
Commission for Social Care Inspection and Healthcare Commission, 2006; Fyson et al., 
2007; Wood et al., 2010; Wood and Greig, 2010).  Supported living services are also a 
central plank of the housing and support options local authorities are expected to provide 
under Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001: 3, 72-73).  Additional streams of 
funding are available for supported living services for adults with learning disabilities in 
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comparison to residential care services.32  However, many of these streams of funding 
are drying up or being used for other purposes in the face of growing cuts to central and 
local authority budgets.33 
In regulatory terms, supported living services are domiciliary care provided to a 
person in their own home, in contrast with residential care homes.34  The legal distinction 
between a ‗care home‘ and supported living is complex, and has resulted in litigation 
where it was found that a domiciliary care agency and landlord were working in concert 
as a single ‗establishment‘, thus bringing them within the regulatory structure of a care 
home and not domiciliary care.35  The status of a service as domiciliary care or a care 
home alters the landscape of interpretation and enforcement of the MCA in several 
respects.  In the first place, domiciliary care services are less likely to be public 
authorities in the meaning of the HRA.36  However, service users should, technically 
                                               
32 
These included the Learning Disability Development Fund, the Independent Living Fund and 
money from the Supporting People program.   
33
 The Learning Disability Development Fund and Supporting People funding is not ringfenced, 
and there is evidence that council‘s increasingly spend non-ringfenced funds for social care on 
non-social care activities (Dunning, 2011b; a).  The Independent Living Fund provided additional 
funding to support disability-related costs for people living in their own homes, in recognition that 
some people‘s support needs incurred especially high costs.  The Fund closed to new applicants 
in 2010, and the government are consulting on its closure to existing applicants and redistributing 
the funds to local authorities without any ringfence (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012; 
Gheera, 2012). 
34
 Under s3 Care Standards Act 2000 ‗an establishment is a care home if it provides 
accommodation, together with nursing or personal care‘ (emphasis added), and was distinct from 
domiciliary care where accommodation was provided by a separate entity to the care provider.  
The Health and Social Care Act 2008 replaced the regulatory regime of the Care Standards Act 
2000, but did not repeal the Care Standards Act altogether.  The term ‗care home‘ is not found in 
the Health and Social Care Act 2008, although the registration requirements for services which 
provide ‗residential accommodation, together with nursing or personal care‘ are distinct from 
those which just provide home care (r2 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated 
Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 2010/781).  The Care Standards Act 2000 distinction between a 
care home and domiciliary care has been formally retained for the deprivation of liberty 
safeguards (s17 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Consequential Amendments No.2) Order 
2010 SI 2010/813).  Throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‗care home‘ to refer to 
accommodation provided ‗together with‘ support, and domiciliary care to refer to care which is 
provided in a property which, at law, is regarded as a person‘s own home. 
35 
In Alternative Futures the Court of Appeal found that services which had sought to re-register 
from care homes to a separate landlord and domiciliary care agency could still be a single 
‗establishment‘, despite being two separate organisations.  The tribunal hearing looked at a large 
range of possible reasons why the two organisations should be considered a single 
establishment, including doubts over the validity of a tenancy of a person who lacked capacity to 
contract, and whether or not they had exclusive possession of their property and could exclude 
care staff.  However, the Court of Appeal merely confirmed that the two organisations could be a 
single establishment, but gave no guidance as to what factors should be taken into consideration 
and did not endorse the lower court‘s reasons for coming to this conclusion.  Alternative Futures 
Ltd v National Care Standards Commission [2002] EWCST 111(NC); R (Moore) v Care Standards 
Tribunal [2004] EWHC 2481 (Admin); R (Moore) v Care Standards Tribunal [2005] EWCA Civ 
627.  See also recent guidance issued by CQC (2011g: 2) on the distinction between care homes 
and supported living, and discussion paper by Voluntary Organisations Disability Group and 
Anthony Collins Solicitors (2011). 
36 
Because of the ruling in YL v Birmingham City Council, see earlier discussion.
 
44 
 
speaking, enjoy rights as tenants that care home residents would not.  Difficulties have 
arisen around the legal status of tenancies for people in supported living services who 
are considered to lack the mental capacity to enter into them.37  Although such services 
must be registered with the CQC,38 the regulator is prohibited from using their powers of 
entry and inspection for premises ‗used wholly or mainly as a private dwelling‘.39  This 
means that, in contrast with hospitals and care homes, supported living services are not 
subject to any site inspections or visitation by the CQC.  The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) and Cynthia Bower, former chief executive of the CQC, have 
described ‗non-institutional‘ care, which is delivered ‗behind closed doors‘ in people‘s 
own homes, as inherently more difficult to regulate (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2011a: 88; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2011: 49). 
Although supported living services are closely linked to de-institutionalisation 
programs, and should - technically speaking – afford people considerable rights as 
tenants or owners of their properties, they have not always lived up to the aspirations 
embodied by the Reach Standards.  Kinsella (2008) was heavily involved in developing 
supported living services, but has complained that its principles have too often been 
crudely translated into ‗give people a tenancy, deregister and get Supporting People 
funding in‘.  He comments that ‗Too much of what goes today as Supported Living is 
relabelled Residential Care.‘  Fyson, Tarleton and War (2007) found that supported living 
services often manifested institutional practices more closely associated with residential 
care than the Reach Standards.  For example, staff did not always appreciate the 
significance of working in a person‘s own home: some held keys to the property, 
designated particular rooms as ‗their‘ offices, and imposed rules and restrictions on 
residents in these services.  In response to safeguarding alerts about their own 
supported living services, Family Mosaic (2012: 9) described ‗alarming evidence to show 
that the practices and attitudes generally associated with institutionalisation that were 
embedded in the old long-stay institutions, have not disappeared with the advent of 
community care‘.  They concluded ‗The reality is institutionalisation and the processes 
associated with it don‘t only occur in residential settings.‘  Duffy (2012: 7) has expressed 
similar views, commenting that ‗we'd knocked down the walls - we‘d moved people into 
the community - but we'd taken the institution with us'. 
In 2006 the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) and the Healthcare 
Commission (2006) reported finding serious abuse of around one hundred adults with 
learning disabilities in Cornish supported living services.  The abuses found in these 
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See, in particular, the rulings of the Upper Tribunal in Wychavon District Council v EM [2011] 
UKUT 144 (AAC)  and Wychavon District Council v EM (HB) [2012] UKUT 12 (AAC).
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The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 2010/781 
39 
s62(4) Health and Social Care Act 2008 
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services mirrored the kind of institutional abuse scandals in healthcare services such as 
Winterbourne View hospital in Bristol – the subject of a recent scandal revealed by 
undercover reporters for BBC Panorama (Flynn, 2012; Kenyon, 2011).  The police report 
linked the abuse in Cornish supported living services to the lack of any regulatory 
scrutiny of those services (FOIA #2).  The Mental Health Act Commission (‗MHAC‘, 
2008b: [3.33]) described it as ‗a serious matter of concern that any learning disability unit 
that does not detain patients under the Act may still be relatively free of regular external 
visitation with the focus and methodology that the MHAC applies to its visits to detained 
patients.‘  These settings have been developed around the ideals of home, which is 
clearly laudable.  But there is a reluctance to legislate or regulate for ‗home‘ 
environments and ‗private‘ life, and that makes power relations in these settings much 
harder to scrutinise or hold in check. 
INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND THE ‗TUTELARY RELATIONSHIP‘ 
There is a tendency to associate care in the community and ‗personalisation‘ with 
a shift towards decarceration and deinstitutionalisation.  However, Fennell (1996) 
emphasises that ‗what is described as community care may in fact be care in an 
institution, albeit smaller and not designated as a hospital‘.  Unsworth (1991) observed 
that in this ‗post-carceral‘ era in the socio-legal history of mental disorder, the bond 
between the ‗tutelary relationship‘ and the institution began to dissolve, and these 
relations of control were de-legalised as the fashion for informalism took hold.  I suggest 
a slight adaptation of Unsworth‘s argument.  That ‗the institution‘ tends to follow the 
tutelary relationship, and they can be extremely difficult to break apart.  What has been 
decoupled over the last fifty years is not the tutelary relationship from the institution, but 
the tutelary relationship and the institution from any source of formal legal authority, and 
associated legal and regulatory controls. 
2.2.3 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
INSTITUTIONS 
A review of the research and grey literature reveals various clusters of concern 
around ‗institutional‘ practices across a variety of health and social care settings where 
adults with learning disabilities often live.   
INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT 
Most people choose where they live and who they live with, within varying 
constraints, but people with learning disabilities are often ‗placed‘ in a service.  Various 
concerns have been raised about the nature of these placements.  Following widespread 
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public outcry after the abuse at Winterbourne View, there has been a growing focus on 
‗out of sight, out of mind‘ placements of people with learning disabilities in assessment 
and treatment centres.  There is a general consensus that community placements are 
more appropriate, and that long-term use of healthcare settings should be phased out 
(Department of Health, 2012b; d; Mencap and Challenging Behaviour Foundation, 
2012a; National Development Team for Inclusion, 2011; Rob Greig and other 
signatories, 2011).  Research has also demonstrated that grouping together people with 
learning disabilities and ‗challenging behaviour‘ is associated with detrimental outcomes 
for residents and the quality of staff interactions (Mansell and Beadle-Brown, 2004).  A 
significant proportion of ‗safeguarding alerts‘ about adults with learning disabilities give 
the alleged perpetrator as ‗other vulnerable adult‘; these may well be other residents in 
group homes (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2011a; Series, 
2011a). 
Concerns have also been raised about adults with learning disabilities being 
placed at long distances from their families and home communities  (Edwards et al., 
2012; Mansell, 2007; Mencap and Challenging Behaviour Foundation, 2012b; Rob Greig 
and other signatories, 2011).  As many as 30% of adults with learning disabilities are 
estimated to be placed ‗out of area‘ (Mansell, 2007), rising to 60% for people from the 
London area (Whelton, 2009).  The EHRC (2010) has expressed concern about the lack 
of scrutiny of people living in these placements.  The Royal College of Psychiatrists has 
described people placed far from their families and home communities as amongst the 
most socially excluded people in the UK (Edwards et al., 2012).  The Department of 
Health (2012d: [3.11]) has acknowledged that out of area placements can ‗cause real 
harm to individuals by weakening relationships with family and friends and taking them 
away from familiar places and community‘, ‗damage continuity of care‘, that they mean 
‗putting people into settings which they find stressful or frightening‘ and they ‗damage 
mental health or increase the likelihood of challenging behaviour‘.  The Department has 
reiterated that out of area placements should only occur where there are ‗clear and 
compelling reasons‘ and has committed to monitoring them, but has not legislated for 
any restrictions on their use. 
Placement in care services can sometimes give rise to tensions between families 
and professionals.  Several researchers have described how parent carers in particular 
often want their sons and daughters to remain living at home with them, rather than 
moving out into residential care or ‗supported living‘ accommodation (Bowey and 
McGlaughlin, 2005a; Bowey and McGlaughlin, 2005b; 2007; Jingree, Treena and Finlay, 
2011; Williams, V. and Robinson, 2001).  Oulton (2009) has suggested that family carers 
exhibit a general mistrust of the abilities of others to care for their relatives.  This may be 
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because family carers can be more risk averse than health and social care professionals 
(Heyman and Huckle, 1993; Heyman et al., 1997; Heyman, 1995; Oulton and Heyman, 
2009).  However, it also seems reasonable to suggest that family carers are more 
sceptical about the opportunities, and more sensitive to the risks of abuse in formal care 
services, than the professionals who tend to commission such services.  It is known that 
a slightly higher proportion ‗safeguarding‘ alerts concerning vulnerable adults relate to 
paid care workers, not relatives (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 
2012b). 
INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND REGIMES 
Rules and regimes are a key defining characteristic of institutional life.  They are 
central to the ‗mortifying‘ aspects of institutions (Goffman, 1961), which contribute 
towards depression and decline in wellbeing (Boyle, 2005; Langer and Rodin, 1976).  
This is an area of concern across all kinds of services catering for people with learning 
disabilities.   
In national studies, regulators have reported concerns about the imposition of 
‗institutional‘ rules and regimes on people with learning disabilities in healthcare settings 
(Care Quality Commission, 2009a; 2012b; f; Healthcare Commission, 2007b).  These 
restrictions and regimes manifested in all aspects of people‘s lives.  For example, they 
included ‗rigid routines with meals, drinks and snacks only being available at set times, 
and people being expected to be in their bedrooms at certain times of the day‘, ‗written 
rules... that people were not allowed to converse over the fence with people in the 
service next door‘, and staff speaking to residents in a ‗direct and authoritarian‘ manner 
(Care Quality Commission, 2012b: 29). 
Earlier national audits by the Healthcare Commission and CQC only considered 
these practices in healthcare settings, which are only used by a tiny minority of people 
with learning disabilities.  The most recent national audit, however, also incorporated 
residential care settings (Care Quality Commission, 2012b).  Similar restrictions were 
found in residential care to healthcare settings, including restrictions on ‗access to 
various communal rooms, kitchens, the person‘s own bedroom (whether locking people 
out of their bedrooms during the day, or insisting on a general and often early bedtime), 
and to the gardens or outdoor space‘ and ‗about when a patient or resident might have a 
drink or a snack, or go for a cigarette‘.  These rules and restrictions were found to 
contribute towards considerable stress amongst residents (Care Quality Commission, 
2012f). 
No national audit of supported living services has ever been conducted, despite 
the Cornwall care scandal; this is most likely to be because the regulator has no powers 
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of entry or inspection for these services.  However, Fyson, Tarleton and War (2007) 
found rules and restrictions being imposed by staff in supported living services.  The 
following extract is from Family Mosaic‘s (2012: 15-16) report on ‗institutional‘ 
characteristics which they found springing up in a minority of their own supported living 
services: 
...staff were working in an institutional way... [T]here were strict routines in 
place denying people any choice or control. This included set times for 
getting up, eating and going to bed. In one scheme a customer‘s so-called 
challenging behaviour was managed by telling them where they had to 
stand in a room. In another scheme, a customer who kept taking her 
clothes off had them put on back-to-front to stop her undressing. Finally in 
a third scheme, access to toilets and kitchens were being controlled by 
staff... In another scheme the staff team would talk over the customers, 
gossip was rife and staff had an obsession with housework. So while the 
home was immaculate, the customers were ignored. Some of the cases 
were clearly abuse and staff were immediately suspended and dismissed. 
Concerns about institutional practices can occur in any kind of setting, although the 
limited available evidence suggests they may be less common in supported living. 
There is an increasing policy drive towards ensuring adults with learning 
disabilities enjoy more ‗choice and control‘ over their lives.  However, research suggests 
that their enjoyment of choice is tightly bounded by those choices that are acceptable to 
providers and commissioners of care services.  For example, Hollomotz (2012: 1) writes 
that ‗a person may be free to choose activities at their day centre, but they may have 
limited control when deciding whether to attend the service in the first place‘ and 
describes the ‗mundane choices‘ available to people as ‗tokenistic‘.  Using conversation 
analysis (Sacks, 1992), Antaki et al (2008) have found that whilst staff often appear to be 
giving choices, they often lacked the communication skills to do this in a meaningful way.  
Some choices, for example offering people an opportunity to use the bathroom, could 
reflect institutional imperatives and be actively disempowering (Finlay et al., 2008b).  
Finlay et al (2008b: 358) note that staff ‗are answerable to other agendas which often 
conflict with the choice agenda‘ and conclude that because staff will always have an 
interactional advantage through their knowledge and verbal fluency, ‗Disempowerment is 
woven into the fabric of social care‘.  Some have argued that ‗empowerment‘ within care 
services is an illusion, because power is always ‗on loan‘ by staff (Dowson, 1997; 
Jingree, Treena and Finlay, 2008).  This connects with republican concerns that the 
withdrawal of choice and control is ever-present, may be arbitrary and at the discretion of 
institutional authorities. 
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CHOICE AND CONTROL OVER WHO PROVIDES CARE, AND HOW 
Carework is highly relational; care workers are not ‗fungible‘ entities and care 
work cannot be reduced to task completion (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996; Clement, 
1996; Dunn et al., 2008; Ellis, 2004; Fyson and Cromby, 2012; Herring and Foster, 2012; 
Morris, A., 2010; Stefan, 1992-1993).  Unsurprisingly, therefore, a core concern of the 
disabled people‘s movement has been a person‘s ability to choose who supports them, 
and on what terms.  Control over how one is supported, and by whom, is a central plank 
of the independent living movement and direct payments are a preferred means of 
achieving this (Jolly, 2009; Morris, J., 2004; Shakespeare, 2000). The rights to choose 
‗how I am supported‘ and ‗who supports me‘ are built into the Reach Standards, and are 
central to government policies of personalisation (Department of Health, 2005d; 2006c).   
Empirical studies show broadly positive experiences of personal assistance (Spandler, 
2004). 
Models of personal assistance invert the power relations implicit in institutional 
care: a person may choose their own staff, set the goals the staff support them to work 
towards, choose who supports them with which tasks, and decide where and how they 
are supported in them (Ratzka, 2004).  Direct payments have been found to shift power 
relations between service users and care staff away from traditional service provision 
models (Leece, 2010).  Concerns about oppression and exploitation in personal 
assistance are typically centred on how staff are treated, rather than service users, as 
staff often experience limited job security, low wages and long working hours 
(Shakespeare, 2000). 
The majority of people with learning disabilities use traditional residential care or 
domiciliary care services, although around 24,000 are in receipt of direct payments (NHS 
Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2012h).  When people live in residential 
care it may be extremely difficult for them to influence staff recruitment, rotas, and who 
supports them for particular tasks.  Even in supported living services, Fyson, Tarleton 
and War (2007: 38) commented that ‗We did not come across any examples of services 
in which the decision about who to receive support from was an entirely free choice for 
tenants‘.  There are no clearly established regulatory or legal standards that entitle a 
person to request that a particular care workers does, or does not, support them in a 
particular task – or at all.  This may be problematic where a caregiving relationship 
breaks down, or was never established, or where people have particular preferences for 
care and support from a person of a particular gender, age, or cultural background.   
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RESTRAINT, SECLUSION AND SEDATION 
Restraint and seclusion represent extreme, physical, forms of control exercised 
over people with learning disabilities; unhappily neither is especially rare in services for 
people with learning disabilities.  Restraint is defined by s6 MCA as the use, or threat of 
use, of force ‗to secure the doing of an act which P resists‘ or restricting ‗P's liberty of 
movement, whether or not P resists‘.  ‗Mechanical restraint‘ is a term sometimes used to 
describe forms of restraint which employ environmental features or equipment, such as 
tethering a person to an environmental feature or their wheelchair, or use of rails to keep 
them in bed.  Seclusion is not defined by the MCA, but the MHA code of practice defines 
it as ‗confinement of a patient in a room, which may be locked‘, and cautions against 
using euphemistic language to mask its use (Department of Health, 2008a: [15.43]).  
‗Sedation‘ is the use of psychoactive medications which have the effect of sedating or 
tranquilising a person; this is also sometimes termed ‗chemical restraint‘ (Commission for 
Social Care Inspection, 2007: 8).  Sedating medications are sometimes administered pro 
re nata (PRN), which means ‗as and when required‘, by care staff – giving them 
substantial control over a person‘s mood and mental state. 
Restraint is reported to be used in roughly 50% of services for people with 
learning disabilities (Deveau and McGill, 2009; Sturmey, 2009b).  Concerns about its 
unnecessary, excessive and inappropriate use are repeatedly raised in national studies 
of services for people with learning disabilities (Care Quality Commission, 2009a; 
Healthcare Commission, 2007b), and its potential for misuse and overuse is a live policy 
issue (Stubbs et al., 2009; Sturmey, 2009a).  In its most recent audit of learning 
disabilities services, the CQC (2012b) found that only 71% of residential care services, 
61% of assessment and treatment centres and 54% of secure units were compliant with 
regulatory standards for restraint (Emerson, 2012: 9).  Restraint is sometimes used by 
staff with little or no training (Deveau and McGill, 2009; Matson and Boisjoli, 2009; 
Murphy et al., 2003).  Studies on the frequency of the use of restraint suggest it is not 
employed as a measure of last resort (McGill et al., 2009).  In a rather exotic 
demonstration that the need for restraint can be highly contingent upon the mental state 
of staff and not necessarily those it is practised upon, studies found that teaching staff 
‗mindfulness meditation‘ could reduce its use (Singh et al., 2009). 
Restraint can cause physical injury, and even death (Murphy et al., 2003; Parkes 
et al., 2011; Weiss, 1998; Williams, D., 2009).  In their national audit of healthcare 
services the Healthcare Commission (2007b) reported that 10% of services for people 
with learning disabilities used ‗mechanical restraint‘.  The MHAC have previously 
expressed concern that forms of ‗mechanical restraint‘ which are explicitly prohibited by 
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the MHA code of practice (Department of Health, 2008a: [15.31]), including tying people 
to features of their environment, are still practised in the care of older people and people 
with learning disabilities (Mental Health Act Commission, 2005; 2008b; 2009b).  The use 
of seclusion has also been a source of concern in regulatory reports on both healthcare 
and residential care services for people with learning disabilities.  However, it was not 
always recognised as such, and appropriate safeguards and checks are not always 
implemented (Care Quality Commission, 2012b; f; g). 
There are serious concerns about the use of sedating anti-psychotic medications 
in social care.  In a study of their use on dementia patients, Banerjee (2009) found they 
brought no benefit to the patient in 80% of cases, they carried serious risks to health and 
wellbeing, and their use was linked to a lack of skills for non-pharmacological support for 
behavioural disorders in dementia.  Harding and Peel (2013) have described the 
‗overwhelmingly‘ negative effects of these medications on people with dementia from the 
perspective of carers.  It is estimated that 80% of healthcare services for people with 
learning disabilities use PRN medications to manage behaviour (Healthcare 
Commission, 2007b; Sturmey, 2009b).  There are no official estimates for their use in 
residential care or supported living settings, but studies have found that use of sedating 
antipsychotic medications ‗increases dramatically‘ among older people upon entry into 
residential care services (Maguire et al, 2013).  The Healthcare Commission (2007b) 
recommended that services focus on using alternative methods to manage behaviour, 
rather than relying on medication.  CQC (2009a: 24) has expressed concern that PRN 
medication was being used ‗as a form of restraint‘, but this issue does not appear to 
have been considered in their most recent audit of learning disabilities services (Care 
Quality Commission, 2012b). 
PRIVACY 
A loss of ‗privacy‘ may be understood as exposure of certain intimate details of 
our lives to the surveillance or control of others.  In care settings, concerns around 
‗privacy‘ often revolve around bodily integrity, enjoyment of private spaces, private 
enjoyment of one‘s possession and enjoyment of relationships with others without 
intrusion or interference by staff.  Clearly these concerns overlap with several other 
areas discussed here. 
Twigg (1999; 2000b; a; 2004) has described carework as a form of bodywork, 
and Lanoix(2009) has described ‗how a person‘s relationship to her own body can be 
undone to the point where she might feel it is no longer her body‘ as a result of 
institutionalized practices by caregivers.  Institution survivor Amanda Baggs (2012a) has 
written that: 
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Disabled people are far more likely than others to have others behave 
invasively with us, ranging from subtle to violent. People teach us from 
our earliest years onward that such invasion is normal, natural, and 
something we should accept without complaint. We have to have the 
means to say no. 
Goffman identified the surveillance of service users by staff as a key 
characteristic of total institutions, and it is often described in reports and descriptions of 
modern institutional life.  In the extreme example of the abuse in Cornish supported living 
services, it was found that providers had installed CCTV in people‘s own homes to 
enable them to monitor a wider area with fewer staff (Commission for Social Care 
Inspection and Healthcare Commission, 2006).  Vincent (2010: 47) voluntarily admitted 
herself to various psychiatric institutions in the USA to write a journalistic book about her 
experiences, and wrote that being watched is ‗a soft violation that grows into a harder 
one with every passing day‘.   
Consideration of private spaces appears frequently in CQC reports, often around 
whether or not care staff knock on peoples‘ bedroom doors before entry,40or repeated 
exhortations to provide lockable spaces for possessions (Care Quality Commission, 
2011e; 2012f). Several writers in the ‗geographies of care‘ tradition have described how 
staff come to exercise control over spaces and resources through institutionalised 
practices (Conradson, 2003; Dovey, 2005; Liaschenko, 1994; Milligan, 2010; Wiles, 
2003).  Hollomotz (2009) has described how some people with learning disabilities in 
group homes are not allowed to spend time in private with their partner, driving their 
sexual activity into isolated public or semi-private spaces. 
The recording and sharing of intimate information about service users is a 
common feature of ‗formal‘ care settings, in part perpetuated by regulatory and legal 
demands.  In their report on institutional practices, Family Mosaic (2012: 30) comment 
that 'Life may become - or feel - altogether more public, with staff discussing matters 
related to a person‘s wishes or care needs in front of others.' 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER RELATIONSHIPS WITH FRIENDS AND 
FAMILY 
Institutional life can make it extremely difficult to forge, or maintain, relationships 
with people outside of the institution.  As discussed earlier, out of area placements can 
be extremely damaging to relationships between people with learning disabilities and 
their families.  Where people are moved between services, or are unable to enjoy 
meaningful access to the community, it can be difficult to develop or maintain 
friendships.  In their national audit of healthcare settings, the Healthcare Commission 
                                               
40 
See study B2 in Appendix B. 
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(2007b) found that half of people in those services had never received a visit from friends 
or family, and only 11% had received a visit in the last month.  Difficulties may be 
exacerbated by institutional controls imposed over modes of communication.  The CQC 
(2012f: 19) found healthcare and residential care services for people with learning 
disabilities imposing ‗blanket rules‘ on the use of mobile phones, restrictions on the 
length of time spent on the telephone, or bans on the use of computers or the internet.  
Sometimes service-provided telephones did not work or could not be used in privacy.  
The MHA code of practice calls for hospitals to ‗make every effort to support the patient 
in making and maintaining contact with family and friends by telephone and to enable 
such calls to be made with appropriate privacy‘ (Department of Health, 2008a: [16.3]).  
However, the CQC (2010f: 47) has encountered blanket bans on the use of mobile 
phones for people detained under the MHA.   
One sad but striking finding of the Healthcare Commission (2007b) was that ‗Very 
few people had friendships apart from those with paid staff‘ (p35).  Friendships can be a 
valuable and enriching part of everybody‘s lives; people with learning disabilities are no 
different (Chappell, 1994; Knox and Hickson, 2001).  However, adults with learning 
disabilities often have difficulties forming friendships (Chappell, 1994) and report that this 
as an area of concern to them (McVilly et al., 2006).  Poverty, transport difficulties and 
the absence of emotional and practical support can hinder the development of 
friendships and contribute towards loneliness (Nunkoosing and John, 1997; Whitehouse 
et al., 2001).  Too often ‗community integration‘ – an oft-espoused ideal for people with 
learning disabilities – is understood as ‗activities‘, not relationships with individuals in the 
community (Myers et al., 1998).  The feelings of social isolation experienced by people 
with learning disabilities increases feelings of a lack of self-worth, and can contribute 
towards behaviour regarded as ‗challenging‘ or ‗problematic‘ by others (Heyman et al., 
1997).  Talk of helping people with learning disabilities develop and maintain friendships 
with people outside of the institution, however, appears only rarely in official policy and 
regulatory literature. 
ABUSE 
Abuse is defined in No Secrets, the government‘s official policy on ‗safeguarding 
vulnerable adults‘, as ‗a violation of an individual‘s human and civil rights by any other 
person or persons‘ (Department of Health and Home Office, 2000: [2.5]).  Clearly, 
therefore, many issues in the foregoing discussion will constitute forms of abuse.  No 
Secrets describes several categorises of abuse.  ‗Physical abuse‘ includes ‗hitting, 
slapping, pushing, kicking, misuse of medication, restraint, or inappropriate sanctions‘. 
‗Sexual abuse‘ includes rape and other non-consensual sexual acts.  ‗Psychological 
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abuse‘ includes emotional abuse, threats of harm or abandonment, humiliation, 
harassment and isolation.  Also described are ‗financial or material abuse‘, ‗neglect and 
acts of omission‘ and ‗discriminatory abuse‘.  A breakdown of official statistics on 
‗safeguarding‘ referrals for ‗vulnerable adults‘ (NHS Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care, 2011b) reveals that safeguarding alerts for people with learning disabilities 
are most likely to relate to physical abuse, then neglect, financial abuse, psychological, 
emotional/psychological and then sexual abuse.  People with learning disabilities are the 
group with the highest number of safeguarding alerts relating to sexual abuse (Series, 
2011a). 
All these forms of abuse have been found across all kinds of care services for 
people with learning disabilities.  Each decade, it seems, is rocked by one or more major 
abuse scandal, from Ely Hospital in the 1960‘s (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Ill – Treatment of Patients and other irregularities at the Ely Hospital, 
1969), Longcare‘s residential care services in the 1990‘s (Buckinghamshire County 
Council, 1998), Cornish healthcare and supported living services in the mid 2000s 
(Commission for Social Care Inspection and Healthcare Commission, 2006) to the most 
recent in this succession of scandals – the abuse of adults with learning disabilities at 
Winterbourne View hospital in Bristol (Flynn, 2012; Kenyon, 2011).  Each of those 
scandals reported staff hitting, slapping, pushing and kicking residents, and inappropriate 
use of restraint and seclusion.  Many of them found strong evidence of sexual abuse – 
although successful prosecutions rarely followed because of prosecutorial concerns 
about the reliability of witness testimony by victims with learning disabilities (FOIA #2).  
Several involved financial abuse, and all involved emotional abuse, neglect and 
discriminatory abuse.   
Whilst these cases certainly give cause for concern, those issues which are often 
recognised by safeguarding bodies and the public as a form of abuse represent only an 
extreme end of a broader spectrum of systematic exclusion, discrimination and human 
rights violations of people with learning disabilities.  Sexual assault, hitting, slapping and 
name calling tends to catch the public eye, whilst placements far from home, bans on 
using the telephone, early bedtimes and limits on the number of cigarettes smoked or 
snacks consumed tend not to.  Yet all often represent unnecessary and inappropriate 
interferences with the rights of people with learning disabilities, which would be unlikely 
to be tolerated by the general population.  Concerns in the policy and grey literature 
about involuntary placement, the imposition of rules and regimes, practices which 
impinge upon privacy, and the use of sedation, seclusion and restraint, reflect a belief 
that these practices do not conform to any principles which are, or should be, accepted 
as ‗good practice‘.  These are not critiques of interferences per se which people with 
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learning disabilities might be subject to in care services, they are critiques of their 
excesses, their arbitrariness and their unprincipled nature.  That is to say, these are 
concerns of a republican nature. 
2.3 THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION AND THE NEW 
REPUBLICANISM 
To recap, philosophers writing in the new republican tradition hold that a person 
is ‗dominated‘ to the extent that they are subject to arbitrary interferences with their 
choices and freedoms.  Republican liberty is distinct from what Isaiah Berlin (1958) 
termed ‗negative liberty‘ – freedom from the interferences of others.  Negative liberty can 
be discerned in many traditional liberal writings, including works by J.S. Mill (1859/2005), 
Bentham (1843) and even the jurist Sir William Blackstone (1765-1769).  By contrast, 
republicans hold that interferences do not deplete liberty, so long as those interferences 
are non-arbitrary.  Furthermore, republicans hold that a person can be dominated even if 
they were only subject to potential, and not actual, interferences.    Pettit (1993; 1995; 
1997a; b; 2002; 2003; 2007; 2008b; a; 2009; 2012) has written extensively on the 
subject of republican liberty, and he derived inspiration from writings on liberty found in 
classical antiquity (Skinner, 1997).  These writings cast liberty in opposition with being a 
slave, where a person was subordinated to the will of another.  Importantly, a slave could 
enjoy an existence relatively free of actual interferences, through tactics of obedience 
and deference.  Lovett (2010b) writes that ‗political liberty might better be understood as 
a sort of structural relationship that exists between persons or groups, rather than as a 
contingent outcome of that structure‘. 
Examples of domination found elsewhere in the republican literature include 
(Pettit, 1997b: 57): 
...the husband who can beat his wife for disobeying his instructions and 
be subject, at most, to the mild censure of his neighbours; the employer 
who can fire his employees as whim inclines him and hardly suffer 
embarrassment for doing so; the teacher who can chastise her pupils on 
the slightest excuse or pretence at excuse; the prison warder who can 
make life hell for inmates, and not worry much about covering her tracks... 
To these examples we might add: those working in the caring professions insofar as they 
exercise arbitrary power over care service users.  Because republican liberty is 
concerned with a structural relationship, it matters not whether care workers are, as 
individuals, well meaning or act in accordance with personal or institutional values and 
principles.  The issue is that if they did not, there would be little likelihood of redress.  
The fundamental point about republican liberty is that people should not be reliant upon 
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the goodwill or good judgment of others; there should be principles to guide judgement 
and structural safeguards against bad faith and poor judgments.  As Lovett (2010b) puts 
it, liberty is not enhanced by making our master a better person, but by making him less 
of a master. 
One interesting characteristic of republican liberty is that a person can be subject 
to de-centralised domination, whereby their options are ‗more or less equally dismal‘ in 
any setting (Lovett, 2010a: 52-3).   Lovett gives the example of a slave who may move 
from master to master, but will always experience domination in any of those 
relationships.  For our purposes, it is important to recognise that whilst a person might be 
removed from a setting where they are subject to recognised abuses, they might still be 
dominated where they are moved to if the structural protections against such arbitrary 
interferences remain just as weak.  It also means that a person might potentially be 
dominated across a variety of institutions which make up their ‗care plan‘ if the 
protections in, for example, their care home and college or day centres are equally weak. 
2.3.1 NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF 
DOMINATION: DEPENDENCY AND IMBALANCE OF POWER 
In Lovett‘s (2010a) lengthy analysis of domination, he spells out various 
necessary, but insufficient, elements of domination besides exposure to arbitrary 
interferences.  One of these is a relationship of dependency between the person who is 
being dominated and those dominating them.  Lovett defines dependency as a 
relationship with ‗high exit costs‘, which could include significant physical or financial 
losses if the dependent party tried to leave that relationship, but it could also include 
emotional or psychological losses.  This is one reason why republican policy 
recommendations may emphasise the importance of social welfare provision, to ensure 
a person is not excessively dependent upon a spouse or employer for financial security 
(e.g. Pettit, 2002).  Lovett also emphasises that perceived high exit costs can contribute 
towards dependency; the critical issue is that a person would feel unable to ‗exit‘ that 
relationship. 
People with learning disabilities will often be reliant on support from some source 
or another to help them live their lives.  This means they are very likely to experience 
relationships with those that support them as having ‗high exit costs‘.  In many situations 
the physical or practical means of ‗exiting‘ those relationships may lie under the control 
of others. In some cases physical control may be exercised to prevent a person leaving a 
particular placement and hence the particular set of relationships of dependency within it.  
In other cases, people may not be able to leave a care service if they are reliant on 
commissioners to make alternatives available and ‗best interests‘ decision makers to 
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approve those choices.  Insofar as a person is unable to exercise control over where 
they live, is unable to leave that place, they have been surrendered to a set of 
relationships that contain at least one key ingredient of domination.  The act of 
‗placement‘ of a person in a care service is not only potentially an arbitrary interference 
in itself, but also exposes people to further risks of domination within that service.  It is 
striking how in all the reports and commentaries on recent abuse scandals in care,41 
almost none have discussed this one common feature: the residents were unable to 
escape their abusers as a result of their de facto or de jure confinement. 
A second necessary but insufficient condition for states of domination is an 
imbalance of power between two people or groups.  Lovett (2010a: 75) prefers a 
definition of social power from Weber (2002) as ‗the probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance‘.  Lovett 
emphasises, however, that an imbalance of power is not in itself a form of domination as 
it does not necessarily bring in train the arbitrary exercise of that power.  Lovett believes 
that many theorists of power haven mistakenly conflated imbalances of power and 
domination.42  He identifies two main forms of social power: 1) raising or lowering the 
costs and benefits of particular options, and 2) influencing a person‘s preferences over 
those options.  To these, I suggest, we should add that a person might be ‗enabled‘ to 
adopt certain options through practical support, or ‗disabled‘ from selecting certain 
options by denying or removing the supports they rely upon.  For the purposes of 
understanding domination in the context of caregiving relationships, attentiveness to 
power as opposed to interferences may be more useful.  A person who is reliant on 
others to support them in their everyday lives may experience the potential for the 
arbitrary withdrawal of support as a form of domination as much as the potential for an 
arbitrary active interference.  
2.3.2 CONSTRAINING ARBITRARINESS WHILST PROVIDING FOR 
DISCRETION 
The critical issue for republicans is that the arbitrariness of the exercise of power 
is constrained.  The republican prescription for addressing the problem of domination is 
for the exercise of social power to be constrained by clear and well known principles, 
                                               
41  
On Cornwall (Commission for Social Care Inspection and Healthcare Commission, 2006; 
Healthcare Commission, January 2007), on Winterbourne View (Bhaumik and Patterson, 2011; 
Bryan, 2012; Department of Health, 2012b; d; Emerson, 2012; Flynn, 2012; Mencap and 
Challenging Behaviour Foundation, 2012b; a; Rob Greig and other signatories, 2011; Rosenbach, 
2011). 
42 
Lovett includes Foucault in that category but this may be somewhat shallow reading of his 
works as Foucault does distinguish between power and domination, albeit that domination is 
slightly differently defined than in republican philosophy (Foucault, 1987; 1994b; Heller, 1996).   
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which are effectively enforced.  However, providing clear and well known rules and 
principles to guide the exercise of power is notoriously problematic, a common theme in 
writings on the rule of law (Bingham, 2010; Dicey, 1885; Hart, H.L.A., 1961/1997; 
Dworkin, 1977; Lord Hewart of Bury, 1929; Waldron, 1989).  Sainsbury (1992: 296) 
stresses that discretion is a much broader concept than most people realise, and is 
‗endemic‘ in welfare decision making.  Discretion – understood as areas where legal 
actors enjoy choices (Hawkins, 1992) – is an area where moral, political, and 
social forces influence law‘s interpretation (Holmes, 1963).  Even rule-based law may 
comprise elements of uncertainty, requiring considerable interpretation (Solan, 2012). 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whilst emphasising the 
importance of precision and foreseeability in the rule of law, has acknowledged that 
‗whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity‘43.  Any rules 
and principles laid down for those exercising power will need to afford them sufficient 
discretion to avoid injustice in the particular case, yet that discretion must be sufficiently 
constrained to avoid injustice through arbitrary and unequal treatment of alike cases.  
Furthermore, rules and principles must be responsive to social change.44  Golder and 
Fitzpatrick (2009: 79) describe this as law ‗constantly opening itself to new possibilities, 
new instantiations, fresh determinations‘.  This is why ‗living instruments‘ like the ECHR45 
and welfare or best interests jurisdictions are explicitly linked to ‗changes in our 
understanding of the natural world, technological changes, changes in social standards 
and, perhaps most important of all, changes in social attitudes‘.46  Yet that process of 
responding to change inevitably results in some temporary disturbances, and the 
potential for arbitrariness – in the short term at least. 
Republicans are not deaf to the concern that the eradication of arbitrariness 
through the mechanical application of rules could lead to injustice in itself.  Pettit (1997b: 
175) recognises that ‗having a dedicated, detailed rule for every situation‘ could deny all 
possibility of fitting action to the needs of particular cases.  The republican solution to the 
dilemma of allowing for discretion without excessive arbitrariness is to turn to procedural 
justice and mechanisms of appeal and review (Lovett, 2010a: 100; Pettit, 1997b: 65).  
Discretionary decision makers must be ‗exposed to sanction in the event of using that 
discretion in a way that is not properly controlled by non-sectional interest and 
judgement‘ (Pettit, 1997b: 65).  Lovett (2010a: 96) describes this as an agent remaining 
‗answerable to a common‐knowledge understanding of both the goals and aims it is 
                                               
43 
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (App No 6538/74) [1979] ECHR 1 [49] 
44 
See The Sunday Times v United Kingdom [49], ‗the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances‘.   
45
 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1 [31] 
46
 Re G (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1233 [33], see also J v C [1970] AC 668, 722 
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meant to serve, and the means of achieving those goals and aims it is permitted to 
employ‘.  This emphasis on procedural justice accords with ECtHR jurisprudence which 
emphasises that ‗Whenever discretion capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a 
Convention right... is conferred on national authorities‘ procedural safeguards ensuring 
that any measures of interference are fair, and which afford due respect to the person‘s 
interests, will be especially important.47 
Republicans recognise that the existence of ‗mere normative standards‘ is on 
their own will be insufficient to ameliorate states of domination – normative standards 
must be ‗meaningfully backed by some sort of enforcement mechanism‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 
97).  This echoes ECtHR jurisprudence that the rights should be ‗practical and effective‘, 
not ‗theoretical and illusory‘.48  Republicans also emphasise that ‗effective constraints 
must be external to the power wielding persons or groups themselves‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 
100).  This echoes the principle of natural justice that nemo iudex in causa sua49 and 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on Articles 650 (the right to a fair trial) and 5(4)51 (the right to 
court review of the lawfulness of detention).  Unsurprisingly therefore, republicans regard 
law as a central means by which republican liberty can be secured (Pettit, 1997b: 173).  
However, few republicans have examined in close detail precisely how law might be 
enforced.  Most seem to think primarily of ‗self-starting‘52 mechanisms like litigation which 
require a person to recognise that their rights have been infringed and take action to 
‗invigilate‘ interferences which breach accepted principles (e.g. Pettit, 2008b).  These are 
especially problematic for people with disabilities, for reasons which I explore more fully 
below and in Chapters 5 and 6.  In this thesis I also include mechanisms which are not 
‗self-starting‘ such as non-directed advocacy and regulation. 
                                               
47 
Buckley v The United Kingdom (App no 20348/92) [1996] ECHR 39 [76]; see also Glass v UK 
(App no 61827/00) [2004] ECHR 103; (2004) 39 EHRR 15 and X v Finland (App no 34806/04) 
[2012] ECHR 1371 for further comments on the importance of procedural safeguards, such as an 
application to the court or an independent opinion, where Article 8 rights were engaged.  Several 
recent cases which have considered the importance of procedural safeguards for deprivation of 
legal capacity proceedings will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
48 
Airey v. Ireland (App no 6289/73) [1979] ECHR 3; (1980) 2 EHRR 305 [24] 
49 
Meaning ‗no-one should be a judge in their own cause‘.  For the leading English case on the 
common law principle, see R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256; [1923] All 
ER Rep 233. 
50 
Pullar v UK (App no 22399/93) [1996] ECHR 23 [3] 
51 
See, for example, Hutchison Reid v UK (App no 50272/99) [2003] ECHR 9; (2003) 37 EHRR 9 
[64] 
52
 I have borrowed this term from Donnelly‘s (2010: 86) excellent book, where she comments 
‗actions in tort are inherently self-starting; they require an individual to initiate proceedings. This is 
something which patients who are most in need of mechanisms for empowerment may find most 
difficult to do.'  
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2.3.3 NON-DOMINATION AND NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES 
Running through republican philosophy is a fault line over how far the substantive 
content of the normative principles constraining the exercise of power is relevant to 
whether or not a person is dominated.  Pettit (1997b) argues that the normative 
principles of the ‗republic‘ must have been derived through deliberative democratic 
means, and there must also be some constitutional mechanism for groups affected by 
laws to challenge their authority.  By contrast, Lovett (2010a) argues that non-domination 
is secured so long as arbitrary power is effectively constrained by well known rules – no 
matter what their substance.  Choosing a quite extreme example, he argues that even 
the Nazi‘s Nuremberg laws which prohibited European Jews from entering certain 
professions would not have been procedurally arbitrary, and hence not a form of 
domination.  Lovett comments ‗I argue that domination is a very bad thing. But it is by no 
means the only bad thing.‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 118-9).   
For the purposes of this thesis, I will engage with Lovett‘s ‗thin‘ or formal version 
of republicanism.  This is not because his is morally or politically preferable to Pettit‘s 
democratic and welfare-oriented republican ideals – clearly it is not if the Nuremberg 
laws would be tolerated.  However, the question of constraining arbitrary power is 
analytically distinct, and requires different research methods, from the historico-political 
question of whether or not normative principles were democratically derived, and the 
ethico-empirical questions of whether or not they are discriminatory or contribute towards 
the welfare of citizens. 
This fault line between ‗thick‘ and ‗thin‘ conceptions of non-domination has some 
analogies with debates over the rule of law.  Scholars such as Dicey and Raz hold that 
the rule of law has no necessary substantive content, whereas Unger, Dworkin and the 
late Lord Bingham hold that it does (Bingham, 2010; Craig, 1997).  In a well known 
exchange the legal positivist H.L.A. Hart (1958) crossed swords with Lon Fuller (1958) 
over the relationship between law and morality.  Hart maintained that law and morality 
were wholly separate.  Fuller‘s response was that law itself ‗must represent a human 
achievement‘ and was not ‗a simple fiat of power or a repetitive pattern discernible in the 
behavior of state officials‘ and that ‗even bad laws, have a claim to our respect‘ (p632).  
In later writings Fuller (1969: 162) put his case for an internal morality of law thus: 
...legal morality can be said to be neutral over a wide range of ethical 
issues. It cannot be neutral in its view of man himself. To embark on the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules 
involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can 
become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following 
rules, and answerable for his defaults. 
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Fuller‘s argument appears very close to Lovett‘s in certain respects.  Even if 
particular laws are ethically immoral in their substance, there is a residual morality in the 
rule of law itself.  Rundle (2009a; 2012) applies Fuller‘s arguments to the Nuremberg 
laws.  She argues that the earlier Nuremberg laws formalised de facto discrimination that 
was already taking place, and at least provided some stability, and ‗a space within which 
agency, albeit highly and unjustly circumscribed, could be exercised' (Rundle, 2009b: 97; 
see also Arendt, 1965).  However, later Nazi laws underwent a qualitative shift whereby 
the Jewish subject experienced decreasing expectations ‗that he or she would be subject 
to predictable treatment by those in power‘ (Rundle, 2009b: 67).  She argues that Fuller‘s 
critique of the Nazi laws is best understood as directed towards ‗the level of uncontrolled 
administrative discretion that it empowers‘ (Rundle, 2009b: 56).   
This thesis can best be understood as a critique of the MCA along similar lines to 
Rundle and Fuller‘s critique of the later Nuremberg laws; that its principles afford so 
much uncontrolled discretion to those exercising authority over adults with learning 
disabilities that the MCA violates the internal morality of law itself.  This critique echoes 
one made by Lewis (2012a), that ‗guardianship regimes... lack vital elements of the rule 
of law that we should not grace this system of commands as law‘.  This is not to say that, 
like the Nuremberg laws, the MCA is not also open to critique from other political or 
ethical perspectives – for example that it is discriminatory, or that it does not in practice 
promote the welfare of people with mental disabilities, as many contemporary criticisms 
connected with the CRPD make of it.  These are important ethical, political and empirical 
questions, but they are not questions which are specifically addressed here.  My purpose 
here is to subject the MCA to a critique on its own terms – as a piece of legislation that 
purports to impose the rule of law on the kinds of control exercised in the context of care. 
2.3.4 CONTRASTS WITH OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF ‗LIBERTY‘ 
A few other distinctions between republican and other important understandings 
of liberty must be spelled out before proceeding to discuss criticisms of the republican 
strategy.  Firstly, as noted above, republicans strive to constrain the arbitrariness of 
interferences – not the quantity.  This means that, as Lovett (2010b) notes, republican 
liberty is compatible with: 
...living in a community where our lives are regulated down to the tiniest 
detail, but always in strict accordance with commonly-known, non-
arbitrary rules and procedures. Although we enjoy extensive freedom from 
arbitrary power, we have hardly any freedom of individual choice. 
Lovett observes that ‗Most would not want to live in such a community‘, and suggests 
that we do place some independent value on non-interference, i.e. negative liberty, as 
62 
 
well as liberty as non-domination.  I shall refer to the possibility of living in a community 
where one‘s life is regulated down to the tiniest detail as ‗hyperregulation‘.  Importantly, 
even if the MCA did provide clear and well enforced principles for interferences in the 
fine detail of people‘s lives, hyperregulation would still be a possible outcome.  Whether 
or not this is acceptable is a complex question, which would clearly require consideration 
of the substance of the rules and the context within which they were applied.  This is not 
attempted in this thesis, although some examples of where hyperregulation might still be 
tolerated are discussed in the final chapter. 
Republican liberty also differs from ‗capabilities‘ approaches that stress the 
degree to which people enjoy ‗real‘ substantive freedoms, such as bodily health, bodily 
integrity, use of the senses, imagination and thought, emotions and attachments, 
practical reason, affiliations with others, play and control over one‘s environment 
(Nussbaum, 2000).  By contrast, Pettit (1997b: 94-7) considers that liberty is 
‗conditioned‘ but not ‗compromised‘ by a lack of such opportunities.  Capabilities 
approaches are derived from writings on international development and are closely 
associated with the work of Amartya Sen.  They are increasingly cited in connection with 
disability rights (Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011; Crowther, 2007; 2010; Dhanda, 
2003-4; 2006-7; Entwistle, 2012; Gombos and Dhanda, 2009; Mitra, 2006; Nussbaum, 
2006; 2009; Stark, 2009; Stein, 2007).  In this thesis I depart from Pettit‘s view that 
republican liberty is merely ‗conditioned‘ by a lack of opportunities to enjoy substantive 
freedoms.  As Arnardóttir and Quinn (2009) write, the civil and political rights of people 
with disabilities are closely intertwined with economic and social rights; examples of this 
will be given in this thesis.  However, capabilities approaches have been critiqued as 
insufficiently sensitive to relations of dependency, power and hegemony (Dean, 2009), 
and in the sphere of disability as being insufficiently sensitive to needs for self-
determination (Bérubé, 2009). 
In a recent work Sen (2010: 306) helpfully sets out how republican and 
capabilities approaches are complementary, but distinct.  He describes three scenarios 
for people with disabilities: 
Case 1: Person A is not helped by others, and she is thus unable to go 
out of her house. 
Case 2: Person A is always helped by helpers arranged either by a social 
security system in operation in her locality (or, alternatively, by volunteers 
with goodwill), and she is, as a result, fully able to go out of her house 
whenever she wants and to move around freely. 
Case 3: Person A has well-remunerated servants who obey – and have to 
obey – her commands, and she is fully able to go out of her house 
whenever she wants and to move around freely. 
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In the first case, the person would enjoy no substantive ‗capabilities‘.  In the second the 
person is free in a ‗capabilities‘ sense but not in a republican sense because their 
enjoyment of those capabilities is contingent on the goodwill of others.  In the third case 
the person enjoys both capabilities and republican freedom, as their capabilities are 
resiliently secured against the arbitrary decisions of others.  This thesis will not explore in 
depth whether people with learning disabilities enjoy all the substantive capabilities 
enumerated by Sen and other authors.  However, Sen‘s capabilities + republicanism 
approach appears more suited to exploring problems of domination in social care than 
Pettit‘s concept of ‗conditioned‘ liberty, as it recognises that people may be dominated 
through the threat of arbitrary withdrawal of support as much as active interferences. 
One last form of ‗liberty‘ must be distinguished from republican liberty.  Berlin 
(1958) famously distinguished between ‗negative liberty‘ – liberty as non-interference – 
and ‗positive liberty‘ – which meant something more like freedom from inner constraints.  
Positive liberty is closely linked to what is often meant by ‗autonomy‘, that is to say self-
mastery or self-government.  Autonomy is a highly prized virtue in Western society and 
is, as Hacking (2004: 283), observes, ‗astonishingly endemic to our religions and views 
of life‘.  An emphasis on guiding our behaviour through consciously selected principles 
for conduct can be discerned in writings as diverse as Kant (1886/1998) and the later 
thought of Foucault (1987; 1994b).  Yet republican liberty is not synonymous with 
autonomy or positive liberty (Lovett, 2010b; Pettit, 1993; 1997b).  Republican liberty is 
concerned with the arbitrariness of outer constraints, and although the term ‗autonomy‘ is 
often used carelessly to mean something more like freedom from outer constraints this is 
not the predominant use philosophers have put it to (Buss, 2008; Freyenhagen, 2009).  
Republican liberty can, at best, clear a space where any external interferences one is 
subject to by other people are predictable, where there is no value in ‗bowing and 
scraping‘ to others, and where one‘s own personal autonomy can flourish. 
2.4 CRITIQUES OF THE ‗TURN TO LAW‘ 
The ‗turn to law‘ for social transformation in general, and the emancipation of 
people with mental disabilities in particular, has been criticised for a range of reasons.  At 
their heart, the critique is that legal strategies – including rights-based strategies – do not 
rupture the status quo, and will often re-inscribe or retrench inequalities and oppressive 
power relations.  For example, Rosenberg (2008) has famously described the ‗turn to 
law‘ for social change as a ‗hollow hope‘.  He argues that the nature of legal rights are 
too limited, the courts are not sufficiently independent from the legislature and the 
executive, and they lack the power to implement their decisions.  Some campaigners 
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have turned away from using law to advance disability rights, arguing that it is too easily 
co-opted for other ends (Oliver and Barnes, 2006).  Several authors describe rights-
based strategies for social transformation as ‗paradoxical‘ (Brown, W., 2002; Douzinas, 
2007; Scott, 1996).   
From this perspective, republican strategies are at best naïve and ineffective, and 
at worst they are potentially damaging in themselves.  Lobel (2006: 939) calls this 
category of concerns ‗cooptation‘ and describes cooptation as ‗a process by which the 
focus on legal reform narrows  the  causes,  deradicalizes  the  agenda,  legitimizes  
ongoing  injustices,  and  diverts  energies  away  from  more  effective  and  
transformative  alternatives.‘  Some of these concerns will be outlined here but, following 
Lobel, I argue that despite the risks of cooptation there are reasons for persisting with 
the kinds of legal strategies envisaged by republicans. 
2.4.1 THE COLONIZATION OF LAW BY ‗DISCIPLINARY POWER‘ 
Mental health law is a category of law that is intended to hold in check a form of 
power that Foucault (1977) referred to as ‗disciplinary‘.  The work of disciplinary agents 
is informed by norms derived from the human sciences, such as criminology, 
psychology, sociology.  Such agents are vested with authority to make judgments in 
accordance with these norms; Foucault (1977: 204) complained that in modernity: 
The judges of normality are present everywhere.  We are in the society of 
the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‗social 
worker' judge.   
The task of the mental health professional, social worker, or even care workers, is to 
label and interpret a person according to disciplinary discourses and forms of knowledge, 
and apply disciplinary techniques to bring their behaviour and circumstances into 
accordance with disciplinary norms.  There is clear overlap between Foucault‘s writings 
on disciplinary power and Goffman‘s (1961: 22) observation that total institutions are 
‗forcing houses for changing persons; each is a natural experiment on what can be done 
to the self‘. 
It is often observed that instead of law, and mental health law in particular, 
holding the power of disciplinary agents in check, law can itself become ‗colonised‘ by 
disciplinary power (Bartlett and Sandland, 2007: 347; Hunt and Wickham, 1994; 
Wickham, 2002).  Critical legal scholars have observed that law often tends to absorb 
and reinforce the authority of medical expertise and knowledge, and can act as a ‗rubber 
stamp‘ on the acts of disciplinary agents.  Fennell (1986: 36-37) has described how - far 
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from law and psychiatry existing ‗in a relationship of mutual antagonism‘ - law in fact 
resolves the legitimacy problem that psychiatry faces in the absence of patient consent.   
In a very worthwhile commentary, sadly too complex to recount in great detail 
here, Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009) have a more nuanced take on the relationship 
between disciplinary power and law as a mutually ‗enabling relay‘ (p27).  Law, they 
argue, needs disciplinary power to provide acceptable ‗scientific‘ and ‗objective‘ seeming 
norms to inform its decisions, and law relies upon disciplinary agents to implement its 
edicts.  Meanwhile law validates the norms of disciplinary power and masks the inherent 
instabilities and insufficiencies of the truth claims of the human sciences.  Furthermore, 
by seeming to act as a restraint on disciplinary power, and sometimes reigning in its 
most egregious excesses, law gives the quotidian acts of disciplinary agents a veneer of 
legitimacy; it leaves the centre unchallenged.  Golder and Fitzpatrick also emphasize 
that whilst, in modernity, law is highly interrelated with disciplinary power, this 
relationship is contingent and not essential.  Law‘s perdurance rests in its ability to adapt 
to and absorb new and emerging forms of power – it is always incipiently other than it is.  
Accordingly, therefore, we should be alert to the possibility that law will reveal openings 
to other forms of power, and their associated agencies, discourses and knowledge 
claims, which may not be disciplinary in character. 
2.4.2 ACCESSING AND USING THE MACHINERY OF LAW 
Wendy Brown (2002: 423) writes that ‗rights differentially empower different 
social groups, depending on their ability to enact the power that a right potentially 
entails‘.  Commenting on Gostin‘s rights-based legal strategy for mental health patients, 
Rose (1985: 212-4) points to the way legal strategies unequally empower according to 
who is able to exercise those rights, exacerbating the disadvantaged position of those 
without support and advocates.  Repeat players who are familiar with the legal system 
become more adept at using it to secure their interests, and their interests will 
consequently shape the development of the law (Galanter, 1974).  Several authors have 
expressed concern that people with disabilities, being less able to access the law, are 
unable to ‗bend‘ it to respond to their concerns (Mladenov, 2012; Russell, 2002).  There 
is a danger that the concerns of people with mental disabilities will be invisible in the 
canon of law, or subordinated to the interests of others, because of inequalities in 
access.   
Brown also draws attention to the reality that rights ‗cannot be adjudicated in 
abstraction from the bureaucratic juridical apparatus through which they are negotiated‘.  
Using this apparatus ‗may subject us to intense forms of bureaucratic domination and 
regulatory power even at the moment that we assert [our rights] in our own defense‘ 
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(Brown, 1995: 121, fn41; cited by Golder, 2011).  Luban (1994: 2621) describes litigation 
as ‗expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-consuming, perhaps all-
consuming.‘  Republicans rarely address in any great detail the practical difficulties of 
navigating legal machinery, nor the possibility that these difficulties may be greater for 
some sections of the population than others.  Yet this must be regarded as an essential 
element of any empirical analysis of the problem of domination.  Consequently this thesis 
will pay careful attention to the accessibility of the legal and regulatory machinery for 
enforcing the MCA, and the potential for forms of domination to emerge within this 
machinery itself. 
2.4.3 LAW CREATES NEW POWER RELATIONS, WHICH MUST 
THEMSELVES BE CONSTRAINED 
Legal strategies for social transformation are often discussed in the context of 
‗rights‘, and ‗rights‘ are often conflated with limiting the powers of the state and checking 
the decisions and acts of the executive (e.g. O‘Cinneide, 2012).  Yet, as Ivison (2007) 
and Souter (2008) point out, rights do not merely rein in power, but can also act as 
conduits for power, creating new power relations and therefore new potential for 
emergent forms of domination.   
A good example of this from the cannon of rights is protecting ‗vulnerable‘ 
citizens – usually children or people with disabilities – from harms inflicted by themselves 
or others.  A right to protection brings with it a concomitant duty upon the state to act, 
typically upon both the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator of harm.  Republican 
approaches place a great deal of emphasis on the state‘s ability to constrain the arbitrary 
interferences of private actors, as well as the executive.  Republicans endorse, for 
example, the use of children‘s ‗rights‘ to protect them from arbitrary interferences by their 
parents and teachers (Pettit, 1997b).  Yet in doing so, they potentially ‗introduce new 
(legal) forms of domination into the community‘ (Ferejohn, 2001: 88-9).   Lovett (2010b) 
writes that republicans need to be ‗on guard against the introduction of new forms of 
dependency and arbitrary power through those very laws and policies designed to 
enhance individual freedom‘. 
2.4.4 THE IMPLIED LEGAL SUBJECT 
Inscribed at the heart of law is a set of beliefs about the nature of legal subjects 
themselves.  Such beliefs are typically closely aligned to a particular view of Man found 
in post-Enlightenment, liberal philosophy.  Writers as diverse as the feminist scholars 
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Joan Wallace Scott (1996) and Wendy Brown (2002), and the ‗conservative liberal‘53 
Lord Hoffman (2009) have observed that rights based strategies tend to presuppose a 
moral and political philosophy of man as a self-reliant, rational and unencumbered agent.  
For Fuller (1969: 162), a view of man as ‗a responsible agent, capable of understanding 
and following rules, and answerable for his defaults‘ is central to the morality of law itself, 
and a departure from that morality ‗is an affront to man‘s dignity as a responsible agent.‘  
Yet clearly this is a philosophy of man which sits uncomfortably with the very concept of 
‗incapacity‘; it threatens that incapacity – whatever that means – potentially subverts the 
very logic and morality of law itself. 
Presumptions about the abilities of legal subjects are built into the machinery of 
law.  This means that without adaptation to take into account a broader range of legal 
subjects, legal strategies will be substantially weakened for those who do not meet 
prevailing expectations of the legal subject.  Self-starting mechanisms of law 
enforcement presume that legal subjects are able to identify when their rights are 
violated and are willing and able to defend them.  Non-directed mechanisms of 
enforcement have important potential, but they may also serve to filter out beliefs and 
behaviours which are disruptive to ordinary legal processes, rather than solely serving to 
overcome access to justice difficulties.  The machinery of law needs careful calibration to 
ensure the voices of those with differing needs, abilities, perspectives and ways of being 
in the world are not excluded from justice. As several authors have noted, it will  be 
impossible to secure the civil and political rights of people with disabilities without 
attending to their economic , social and cultural rights (Arnardóttir and Quinn , 2009; 
Mladenov, 2012; O‘Cinneide, 2009). 
Fyson and Cromby (2012: 1-2) observe that a view of man as ‗endowed with 
reason and conscience‘54 is inscribed into almost all human rights instruments.  Yet, they 
argue, this presumption is not met for people with learning disabilities and they call for a 
more ‗relational‘ understanding of autonomy.  Quinn (2011b) has also argued that the 
cognitive essentialism that underpins common conceptions of law and justice is 
problematic for people with mental disabilities; he terms this the ‗myth of the masterless 
man‘.  Quinn also calls for a more relational understanding of personhood to inform our 
ideas around law and justice.  Indeed, ‗relational autonomy‘ is a common trope in 
writings on Article 12 CRPD (e.g. Dimopoulos, 2010; Gooding, 2012; Francis and 
Silvers, 2010; Silvers, 2011; Silvers and Francis, 2009; Bach and Kerzner, 2010).  The 
difficulty is that what is meant by ‗relational autonomy‘ is often not well cashed out.  One 
senses that what Quinn and those writing in connection with the CRPD might have in 
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mind could be quite different to writers such as Fyson and Cromby, Dunn (2008) and 
Herring & Foster (2012), who do not appear to advocating for disabled people to enjoy 
greater choice and control in their lives or critically engaging with the concept of 
‗incapacity‘.  Holroyd (2009: 321) has observed that philosophies advocating ‗relational‘ 
approaches to autonomy ‗cannot play one of autonomy‘s key normative roles: identifying 
those agents who ought to be protected from (hard) paternalistic intervention‘.  Whilst 
they may represent an important step towards a more inclusive legal subjectivity, they 
also threaten to cloud some important distinctions that have a bearing on liberty and 
domination.  The influence of relational approaches, and the complex legal, ethical and 
metaphysical questions they generate, can be observed in the case law of the MCA, 
explored in Chapter 4. 
2.4.5 SHOULD WE ABANDON LEGAL STRATEGIES? 
Despite these rather pessimistic writings on the emancipatory potential of law, 
almost none of the authors cited here have discounted that legal and rights-based 
strategies could play some kind of limited emancipatory role for oppressed groups.  
Perhaps the least optimistic of all, Brown (2002: 431) writes that ‗rights for the 
systematically subordinated tend to rewrite injuries, inequalities, and impediments to 
freedom... Yet the absence of rights in these domains leaves fully intact these same 
conditions'.  Even whilst critiquing rights as the ‗credo of the middle classes‘, Douzinas 
(2007: 33) observes that: 
Every time a poor, oppressed, tortured person uses the language of rights 
- because no other is currently available - to protest, resist, fight, she 
draws from and connects with the most honourable metaphysics, morality 
and politics of the Western world.   
Despite arguing that rights-based strategies are non-progressive, Rose (1985: 
214-5) concedes that they might useful for symbolic ‗guerrilla‘ assaults on particular 
practices or institutions, because of their appeal to Western social and political ‗common 
sense‘.  Fennell (1986: 59), responding to Rose, acknowledges that the rights of mental 
health patients may be limited, but comments that legal strategies have the potential to 
‗open up areas of the psychiatric system to scrutiny which might otherwise remain 
hidden ...and require those who operate the system to reflect on and justify what they are 
doing‘.  Even Foucault, with his anarchic leanings, has obliquely suggested in interview 
that ‗rules of law‘ may have a part to play in reducing ‗the effects of domination which will 
make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put a student 
under the power of an abusively authoritarian professor, and so forth‘ (1987: 129).  Pettit 
(1997b: 177) is adamant that 'For those who suffer oppression, criticism of the rule of law 
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as ‗bourgeois justice‘ or ‗liberal legalism‘ can only be perceived as naive or heartless, or 
both‘. 
Even if one takes a pessimistic view of legal strategies, as Lobel (2006) observes 
one cannot ‗opt out‘ of law itself in our society.  Statutes, case law, rules and regulations 
will continue to develop with or without the input of reformers; the alternative to legal 
strategies for reform is that reform and law develop in opposing directions.  Furthermore, 
without law the alternative suggestions for constraining domination in hitherto ‗private‘ 
and unregulated relationships are extremely limited.  These critiques of the ‗turn to law‘ 
are important reality checks and qualifiers on the perhaps-too-optimistic republican 
prescription for the problems of domination.  However, we should be cautious of allowing 
them to play into conservative rhetorics of deregulation, the inevitability of inequity and 
injustice, and demands for unconstrained authoritarian power. 
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis considers how far the MCA and the DoLS help to secure freedom 
from institutional domination for adults with learning.  Republican theorists identify two 
key ingredients for securing republican liberty:  
 Clearly defined and well known principles setting out permissible interferences 
with people‘s choices and freedoms by those in a position to interfere; 
 Effective and independent mechanisms for enforcing those principles.    
For the problem of institutional domination, the critical question is how far the MCA 
reduces arbitrariness in admissions to institutions and in interferences with people‘s 
everyday choices and freedoms by institutional authorities. 
There is no tradition of ‗empirical‘ testing of republican hypotheses.  There are, 
however, a range of research methods which could be used to consider whether the 
MCA satisfies the republican prescription for the problem of institutional domination.  In 
common law jurisdictions, case law is a primary means by which legal principles are 
developed and expanded or refined, and so doctrinal research methods play a central 
role in exploring how clearly the MCA defines principles for permissible interferences in 
institutional care.  However, republican approaches also question how well the law is 
disseminated to its subjects and understood by them.  Republicans consider both legal 
and extra-legal mechanisms of enforcement to be important, evoking more ‗socio-legal‘ 
research questions (Cotterrell, 2002). 
Inevitably, it would not be possible to cover all these aspects of the MCA in a 
single thesis.  Instead, this thesis confines its ambitions to: 1) providing a preliminary 
mapping of the principles the courts have developed from the MCA which relate to the 
problems of institutional domination described in Chapter 2; and 2) exploring some of 
the main mechanisms by which it was envisaged the MCA would be enforced.  Some 
of the concerns about the ‗turn to law‘ will also be considered along the way where they 
help to explain how the law has fallen short of some progressive aspirations.  This is by 
no means intended to be an exhaustive republican analysis of the MCA, but simply a 
starting point for one way of critiquing the Act. 
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3.2 PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF POWER BY 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 
In Chapter 4 I use doctrinal methods to consider how far the common law has 
developed principles related to the MCA which could constrain the kinds of arbitrary 
interferences which affect adults with learning disabilities in institutional care.  By 
structuring this doctrinal analysis according to the areas of concern drawn from the 
literature review, rather than those areas which are most ‗active‘ in case law, it became 
apparent that there are many areas of concern where the law falls silent.  From a 
republican perspective, these gaps and silences are of great significance – they are 
areas where the principles for interferences of a particular nature are not well 
developed, and consequently where law is not constraining the risk of arbitrary 
interferences.  Through exploring various access to justice issues in later chapters, I 
am able to show how various filters may make some issues more or less likely to come 
before the courts.  Consequently, I am able to describe how accessibility issues shape 
the evolution of legal principles, whilst certain matters are filtered out of the legal 
sphere. 
3.2.1 LIMITATIONS FOR ANALYSES OF JUDGMENTS OF THE 
COURT OF PROTECTION  
A doctrinal analysis of rulings from the Court of Protection presents significant 
methodological difficulties.  Publication of a judgment is at the discretion of the 
presiding judge.55 Many judgments are delivered ex tempore, and only a very small 
proportion of cases result in a published judgment or law report.  Publication of 
information about a case without the permission of the presiding judge is a contempt of 
court.56  I have written elsewhere about the difficulties for the Court of Protection in 
balancing litigants‘ Article 8 ECHR rights to private life and the growing demand for 
greater transparency in the court‘s practices (Series, 2012d).  In that article I show that 
there are even judgments that appear to have been of legal significance and have been 
relied upon in subsequent cases, that have not yet been published.  I endorse 
arguments made by Munby LJ (2010) and Sir Nicholas Wall (2012) for the routine 
publication of anonymised judgments unless there is compelling evidence that to do so 
would jeopardise the wellbeing of litigants or the fairness of proceedings. 57   For 
research purposes the following points should be born in mind: 
                                               
55 
r91 Court of Protection Rules 2007 
56 
s12(1)(b) Administration of Justice Act 1960 
57
 Similar arguments might also be inferred from Lord Neuberger‘s (2012) recent keynote 
address, entitled ‗No Judgment – No Justice‘. 
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 The cases analysed here do not form a complete record of the work of the 
Court of Protection; it may well be that there are unpublished cases which 
would be relevant to the problems of institutional domination. 
 During the course of my research I have encountered unpublished cases, or 
additional information about cases that have been published, which I would 
like to be able to discuss.  However, it would be a contempt of court to 
publish this information in this thesis. 
 Issues related to institutional domination may well be considered by the 
courts, yet not emerge in the judgment. 
Even where judgments are published, dissemination is a real problem with 
decisions from the Court of Protection.  To help the reader locate any judgments I 
describe in this thesis, and understand why I have sometimes adopted unorthodox 
citation schemes, the following information may be of assistance: 
 There is, now, an official series of Court of Protection Law Reports 
(COPLR)58, but there can be significant delays between the appearance of a 
judgment in the public domain and its publication there.  As my institution 
does not subscribe to the COPLRs, I have only rarely used their citation 
scheme.59 
 For reasons which are unclear, the British and Irish Legal Information 
Institute (BAILII) 60  publishes only a very small proportion on Court of 
Protection judgments on its website.61  Wherever possible I have tried to 
use the neutral citation number for a judgment if it is given in the transcript, 
however these cases do not necessarily appear on the BAILII website, nor 
on Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. 
 The best source for obtaining judgments from the Court of Protection is an 
independently run website called Mental Health Law Online (MHLO). 62  
Where no neutral citation is available, I have used the MHLO‘s own, new, 
citation scheme to help locate the judgment. 
 Some cases for which there is no published judgment are reported in the 
widely read Court of Protection newsletter published by barristers at 39 
                                               
58
 Published by Jordans Publishing, Bristol.  There is a consolidated volume of the COPLR for 
cases falling between 2008-11, and subsequent updating volumes for more recent cases. 
59 
There are a few exceptions to this where I have only been able to locate cases in the COPLR 
in my copy of the consolidated volume. 
60 
www.bailii.org 
61 
For example, it published only 20 for the year 2011, despite the Court of Protection issuing 
thousands of property and affairs orders and hundreds for care and welfare.
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Essex St.63  When a case is not reported anywhere else I have given a 
reference to the relevant edition of the newsletter where it is described. 
The record is incomplete and fragmentary, yet in itself this is a key finding.  
Republicans require that the principles governing permissible interferences are not only 
clear, but also that they are well known.  A perfectly clear ruling cannot address the 
problem of institutional domination, unless it is in the public domain and effectively 
disseminated.  The methods of disseminating Court of Protection judgments give real 
cause for concern from a republican perspective. 
3.2.2 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR 
DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS 
Although the volume of published judgments is low in contrast with the number 
of cases being heard, there were still a considerable amount to contend with.  I used 
two methods to organise these materials.  Each judgment was stored in reference 
management software (Endnote X5) and categorised with key terms which referenced 
key themes in the research, for example ‗restraint‘ or ‗medication‘.  Some areas of law 
were extremely complex, with many emergent themes and issues; in particular the 
DoLS and ECtHR rulings on legal capacity.  To trace important themes and ideas 
through these areas I uploaded judgments onto the qualitative research software 
NVivo, and carefully coded each judgment for issues, arguments and legal reasoning.  
This proved to be an extremely useful technique for exploring the complexities 
of these areas of law.  To give one example, the meaning of deprivation of liberty 
(discussed in Chapter 6) for people who ‗lack capacity‘ is fast evolving.  After coding 30 
Court of Protection and ECtHR judgments I developed 188 ‗nodes‘, of which 31 related 
to reasons considered by a court why a person might, or might not, be considered to be 
deprived of their liberty.  This made it easy to see which themes were dominant in the 
courts‘ reasoning, and to bring up examples of these.  
3.3 MECHANISMS ENFORCING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MENTAL 
CAPACITY ACT 2005 
Clearly it would be impracticable to survey all the mechanisms which might be 
used to enforce the MCA, and all the details of their operation in practice.  I chose to 
focus on five key mechanisms: Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs); 
litigation in the Court of Protection; complaints to the LGO; regulation of care services 
by the CQC; and the DoLS.  I selected litigation in the Court of Protection because it is 
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the key mechanism established by the MCA for determining legal questions about 
capacity and best interests.  I chose IMCAs because their role was created by the MCA 
in response to concerns about the lack of accessible mechanisms for enforcing the 
MCA.  Similarly, I included DoLS because they are a mechanism for enforcing the 
principles of the MCA created by the statute itself.  I included complaints mechanisms 
because they are mentioned as a means of dispute resolution in several places in the 
MCA code of practice (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [10.37], [15.19]-[15.21], [15.30]-
[15.32]).  I included regulation of care services by the CQC because regulation has 
always been a key element of legalism, and because the CQC has a statutory 
obligation to ‗protect and promote the rights‘ of peopled who are deprived of their liberty 
under the MCA.64 
I also undertook research on enforcement of the MCA through disciplinary and 
professional regulation mechanisms, and the enforcement of the MCA through the 
criminal law.65  Interesting though these findings were, a decision was taken to exclude 
them from the thesis for reasons of space and parsimony. 
3.3.1 RESEARCH INTERVIEWS 
Early on in the research, before deciding on a theory to apply or area of focus, I 
interviewed several social care practitioners to understand what issues were of 
particular interest or concern for those working regularly with the MCA.  To understand 
the purpose of these interviews, it is helpful to give some background for how the 
project arose.  The project was funded by the European Social Fund (ESF).66  The ESF 
funding arose out of a development project in Cornwall which recognised it as one of 
the most deprived areas of the European Union.67  The ESF helped to fund a Cornish 
satellite campus for Exeter University,68 to improve rates of higher education in the 
County.  Funding for a small number of postgraduate studentships was included, of 
which mine was one.  The projects were very loosely defined; mine was entitled 
‗Medico-Legal Questions of Capacity and Consent with especial reference to the Care 
of the Elderly & Mentally Impaired', but had few further specifications or constraints.  
This gave me considerable freedom, but meant that it took some time for me to select 
which of several possible avenues for research I would pursue. 
These early interviews could (very) loosely be described as ‗grounded‘ in 
approach (Charmaz, 2004; 2005), and helped to supplement and guide the early 
stages of the literature review and doctrinal research.  I began by identifying key 
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s4(1)(d) Health and Social Care Act 2008 
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Either via the accused relying upon the ‗general defence‘ under the MCA, or the offence of ill-
treatment or neglect under s44 MCA. 
66 
Dossier no. 09099NCO5 
67 
More information about this project is available here: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/esf/ 
68 
The campus also includes University College Falmouth. 
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professionals working with the MCA and with people with learning disabilities in 
Cornwall, and approached them via their institutions for interview.  I also used snowball 
sampling, where participants suggested another person who would have another 
important perspective on the MCA.  These early interviews were with social workers, 
lay advocates, a care home manager, a CQC inspector and people who provided 
training on the MCA and the DoLS.   
These early interviews were wide ranging and open textured.  For each 
interview I prepared a very loose set of questions about how the MCA related to a 
person‘s area of work, what they felt worked well, and where they felt there were 
difficulties.  Depending on the participant, interviews focussed on the relationship of the 
MCA to: adult safeguarding, community care assessment and commissioning, person-
centred care planning, direct payments, care home inspection, and advocacy for 
people with learning disabilities and carers.  The interviews gave me a sense of how 
these different areas interlinked, and how some concerns resonated across all areas.  
Although it was not a source of data for this thesis, some participants were kind enough 
to allow me to attend training courses on safeguarding, community care law, advocacy, 
welfare benefits and human rights for care workers to develop my understanding of 
these areas. 
Interviews each took between 1-2 hours, and took place in a person‘s 
workplace, in a room at the university, or at a neutral location such as a café – 
depending on participants‘ preferences. At the end of each interview I gave participants 
a small gift of chocolates or biscuits as a token of my gratitude for them giving up their 
time.  I took notes and made audio-recordings.  Recordings were not transcribed in full, 
but I listened back to them to check the accuracy of my notes.  In the rare cases where 
I used a quotation I took it from the audio-recording rather than my notes.  One 
interview, with the CQC inspector, was conducted by telephone for practical reasons.  
In this interview I only took notes, but I sent them the minutes to check and amend for 
accuracy.  This method had the benefit of enabling the person to add additional 
thoughts which came to them at a later date, and for them to clarify areas of uncertainty 
which remained in my notes.  It was a method I came to use for later interviews 
(discussed below).  Although notes were taken for each interview they were not 
systematically coded as the purpose was to gain a sense of which areas my research 
could be directed towards, not to develop a theory of the field as a whole. 
Inevitably, many areas with important research potential emerged, and my 
selection reflected where my personal interests coincided with areas of concern for 
participants.  I decided not to pursue research into the relationship between capacity 
and Direct Payments, which was an issue raised by many participants.  The DoLS 
were raised as an area of confusion and concern by several social workers, the care 
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home manager and the CQC inspector.  A common theme was the degree of 
restrictions people with learning disabilities live under.  A second area of concern 
expressed by almost all participants was a perceived lack of scrutiny of the care of 
people with learning disabilities and accessible mechanisms they could use to assert 
their rights.  Many participants made reference to the abuse of adults with learning 
disabilities in Cornwall (Commission for Social Care Inspection and Healthcare 
Commission, 2006) when making this point, no doubt because the scandal was both 
recent and local.  These became the two key themes I pursued in my research: to what 
extent does the MCA proscribe, or even produce, the restrictions that people with 
learning disabilities live under, and to what extent are they able to use the law to 
challenge them? 
 
Later on, when the research was better established, I used further interviews to 
answer particular questions which I could find no answers to in the research literature, 
through doctrinal or other methods.  For example, I interviewed members of DoLS 
teams to ask for examples of how they used conditions in DoLS authorisations.  I 
asked IMCAs what they did if they felt a person wished to challenge a best interests 
decision but the IMCAs themselves agreed with it.  I contacted judges, solicitors and 
the Official Solicitor to ask specific questions about court processes and procedures.  
These interviews were semi-structured; I would work through set of questions I had 
prepared specifically for that interview, but often interviewees would often alert me to 
other issues which I then took away to research.  By the end of the research, the 
sample of people interviewed looked like this: 
Table 1 Professional role and gender of interview participants 
 Professional role of interview participants 
Number of 
professionals 
interviewed 
Later interviews 
Solicitors 3 
Judges 4 
The Official Solicitor 1 
IMCAs 3 
Earlier interviews 
CQC compliance inspector 1 
DoLS assessors or managers 3 
Social workers (other than DoLS) 1 
Workforce trainers in mental capacity, 
human rights or ‗person centred care‘ 
4 
Care home manager 1 
Advocates (other than IMCAs) working 
with people with mental disabilities or 
3 
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family carers 
Gender of 
interview 
participants 
Male 9 
 
Female 15 
TOTAL 
 24 
 
For these later interviews, I took field notes instead of audio-recordings.  Two 
were conducted over the telephone.  I would then write minutes of what was said, and 
send it back to the participant for them to check and amend as appropriate.  As the 
purpose of these interviews was to find out specific information about the workings of 
MCA-related procedures, I was not concerned with capturing an accurate record of 
conversational exchanges, 69  but rather an accurate record of how they viewed a 
process as working.  A small number of participants, all judges, preferred an ‗off the 
record chat‘ rather than the interview being cited as a source of data.  These interviews 
were nevertheless extremely useful for guiding me towards other sources of 
information to answer any questions I had which I could then cite in the research. 
Because the sample of participants from any given group was small, it was 
difficult to generalise from their experiences.  Consequently, relatively few references 
are made in the body of this thesis to these interviews.  Quotations are generally used 
sparingly to illustrate and enliven the text rather than provide evidence of a particular 
feature of the operation of the Act.  An exception to this is where a particular interview 
participant was a sufficient authority on a particular matter (for example, the Official 
Solicitor on the workings of his office), or for a small number of matters where no other 
sources of information were available. 
3.2.2 ANALYSIS OF REPORTS OF REGULATORS AND 
OMBUDSMEN  
Although case law has a particular significance from a legal perspective 
because it lays down a precedent, the MCA has been interpreted and enforced via a 
range of bodies other than the courts.  For this thesis, I have also looked at reports by 
the LGO and the CQC.  I undertook a number of ‗micro-studies‘ of reports by both 
bodies, to explore how they have interpreted and applied the MCA with reference to 
care services. 
I used the LGO‘s search engine to identify all their published decisions which 
related to the MCA.70  Using the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) I was also 
able to obtain copies of unpublished investigations relating to the deprivation of liberty 
                                               
69 
I did not use a research method – such as Conversation Analysis (Sacks, 1992), for example 
– where preservation of an accurate transcript of the exchange is essential.   
70 
See Appendix B, Study B5.  
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safeguards.  A brief summary of all LGO reports I was able to locate which referenced 
‗mental capacity‘71 is given in Appendix B, and these reports are discussed in the body 
of the thesis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
For the CQC, I undertook small ‗audits‘ of inspection reports I downloaded from 
the CQC‘s website.72  One study looked at how often CQC inspectors reported findings 
relating to the MCA, the DoLS and associated concepts.  The second study looked at 
how inspectors gained information about the experiences and perspectives of people 
with learning disabilities using residential care services.  The methods used for these 
studies are reported in more detail as Study B1 and Study B2 in Appendix B, and I 
draw from their findings in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.3.3 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 
In addition to research interviews I also made extensive use of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 (FOIA) to obtain additional ‗grey‘ literature, consultation 
responses, policy materials, or statistical or other unpublished quantitative data on the 
practical implementation of various mechanisms.  The FOIA is an increasingly 
important tool in the academic armoury (Bourke et al., 2012), and was absolutely 
indispensible in carrying out this research.  I also found the FOIA useful to follow up 
claims made by interview participants that would benefit from independent verification, 
or to assess the extent to which particular problems were more widespread than the 
participant‘s own experience. 
Although data obtained under the FOIA is publicly obtainable it is not – usually 
– in the public domain in any easy to access form.  Nor is there any standardised 
method of citing a request made under the FOIA, so far as I am aware.  Consequently, 
I have presented some of the data I obtained under the FOIA in appendices to this 
thesis, so the reader can confirm for themselves that it supports the arguments I am 
making.  I have also created a referencing system in order to refer to particular FOIA 
requests I made when these form the basis of arguments or assertions in the body of 
this thesis.   
The details of each request are given in Appendix A, including the name of the 
body the information was requested from, the dates of when the request was made and 
the information was supplied, details of the substance of the request and any issues 
arising from it.  In many cases I made the requests via third party websites or they were 
published by the institution I requested the data from.  I have provided the URL link to 
that information where available.  In some cases I have placed documents or data in a 
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I included in my searches related concepts like ‗consent‘, ‗best interests‘, and ‗capacity‘ as 
often the term ‗capacity‘ is used without specific reference to the MCA or ‗mental‘ capacity.
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public folder on my ‗Dropbox‘ account73, and I have given the URL to this folder so that 
it can be freely accessed over the internet.  In a small number of cases I have also 
used data collected using the FOIA by other persons than myself.  In some cases this 
was data collected via third party websites which I happened across whilst searching 
for materials – in which case the URL is provided.  In other cases, it was data collected 
by journalists or researchers which they kindly shared with me by email – in which case 
I have attributed its provenance to them accordingly in the FOIA table in Appendix A. 
So, for example, (FOIA #1) relates to the first entry in the table in Appendix A, 
which is a request made by myself to the Office of the Public Guardian on 6th June 
2012, who responded on 20th June 2012.  The substance of the request was 
‗Demographic data on people with deputies or active LPAs; Number of complaints by P 
about his LPA and deputy, number of investigations proceeding from those complaints.‘  
The request was made by email.   
3.5 OTHER APPROACHES, NOT ADOPTED IN THIS THESIS 
As discussed in Chapter 2, both Pettit and Lovett recognise that there are other 
sources of normative principles which might constrain the exercise of power than law, 
and other – social – means by which those principles might be enforced.  As such, they 
would doubtless have sympathy with legal pluralism in socio-legal scholarship 
(Cotterrell, 2006; Ehrlich and Isaacs, 1922).  It is acknowledged that the normative 
ordering endorsed by the MCA runs in parallel to, and intersects with, several other 
normative orderings found in society relating to the care and control of adults with 
learning disabilities.  For example, some parent carers have expressed anger with the 
MCA, ‗which assumes an adult with learning disabilities can make his or her own 
decisions unless it is proved otherwise‘ (Monckton, 2012).  Adults with learning 
disabilities are sometimes infantilised as people who ‗will stay a child for ever‘ (Reilly, 
2012), a discourse which legitimates control by analogy to parental authority over 
young children rather than by reference to ‗incapacity‘.  Exploring and understanding 
how these non-legal discourses of control intersect with the MCA is an important 
endeavor, but unfortunately it is one which lies beyond the scope of this thesis.   
Early on in this doctoral research I undertook a series of interviews with care 
workers and family carers which explored discourses around autonomy, risk and 
protection, and examined these through the lens of ‗legal consciousness‘ (Silbey, 
2008).  The findings were striking, but as I wanted to focus first on the interpretation 
and enforcement of the MCA through more central legal channels I took the decision to 
exclude this material from the thesis.  This thesis is already very long and detailed, and 
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the inclusion of this material would have required extensive additions in order to do 
justice to both the research method and the findings.  They could have formed an 
entirely separate thesis.  Hopefully these interviews will form the basis of a future, 
separate, publication. 
Consequently, although this thesis acknowledges that the MCA does not 
represent a unique source of principles influencing the control of adults with learning 
disabilities, and does not claim that more formal legal and regulatory channels are the 
sole means by which the MCA is interpreted and enforced, these remain the focus of 
this thesis.  Despite an important trend towards research on the ‗informal‘ workings of 
law, and law‘s wider effects on society and individuals, I believe there is still a case for 
examining its more central machinery alongside.  There is a developing empirical 
literature on the implementation of the MCA – mostly generated by researchers with 
medical, social policy or social work backgrounds.  There is also a developing medical 
ethics literature on the MCA.  However, the Act‘s central mechanisms and procedures 
remain under-theorised. 
Early socio-legal scholarship focused on the ‗gap‘ between ‗law on the books‘ 
and ‗law in action‘ (Pound, 2010; Sarat, 1985).  This research identifies a significant 
gap between the MCA ‗on the brochure‘ as an instrument of empowerment, and the 
ways in which the law‘s machinery can be put to practical use by disabled people. 
There is, I believe, much to be learned about the MCA, and attitudes towards legalism 
itself, from studying its development, its mechanisms and the ways in which various 
bodies have interpreted and applied it. 
3.6 RESEARCH ETHICS 
In accordance with university guidelines, I applied to the Research Ethics 
Committee for all aspects of this research which ‗involved human participants‘.  Based 
on advice from the ethics committee, I did not seek approval for any ‗formal‘ 
correspondence with public officials (including, but not limited to, FOIA requests), but 
all interviews were subject to the University‘s ethical research review procedures.  In 
line with guidance from the Economic and Social Research Council (2012) and the 
Socio-Legal Studies Association (2009), all research participants were given an 
information sheet and the opportunity to consider and ask questions about 
participation.  Information sheets covered issues about the funding of the research, the 
nature of the project, data protection and any limitations on the confidentiality which 
could be guaranteed in connection with a safeguarding protocol I developed (discussed 
below). 
For some interview participants there were particular issues around 
confidentiality and anonymity which had to be addressed. I produced a separate 
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information sheet for judges, and I also corresponded by email with the Official Solicitor 
(OS) and some other participants whose identities might be difficult to disguise to 
ensure they were aware of this risk.  Written consent on a consent form was sought 
from participants at the beginning and end of all the early stage interviews.  Where an 
interview was conducted via telephone I did this via post and also sought express 
verbal consent.  For interviews with judges and solicitors I took consent via email, after 
having sent them detailed information about the issues I would like to discuss, the use 
the information would be put to, and receiving their feedback on the form of interview 
they felt most comfortable with.  I also took verbal consent before any interviews. 
The research also raised challenging ethical questions around what would 
happen if safeguarding concerns emerged during the interview and whether it would be 
appropriate to breach a participant‘s confidence in such circumstances.  I developed a 
protocol for such scenarios after consulting with my supervisor, the local authority 
safeguarding team and the ethics committee.  For research in health and social care 
settings, it is commonly assumed that breach of confidence is required where 
‗safeguarding‘ concerns are raised, but research based in a university carries no clear 
expectations to that effect.  It was challenging to balance participants‘ expectations of 
confidentiality against potential harm to others.  The protocol specified that breaking a 
participant‘s confidence would only be contemplated after the matter had been 
discussed with them and it was felt that they did not understand or feel inclined to 
address particular concerns, or where a person was in real and immediate danger.  
The information sheet and consent form carried information to this effect, and it was 
conveyed verbally prior to taking consent.  Fortunately this problem never transpired. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE STRUCTURAL PILLARS 
OF THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although one can never ‗read off‘ the purpose of a law, it is instructive to 
contemplate the origins of the MCA to understand the social and legal framework it 
emerged from, and to appreciate what concerns, and whose, it responded to.  Whilst 
the MCA is often presented as an instrument of emancipation, a way to ‗empower‘ 
adults with mental disabilities and to help them reclaim more ‗autonomy‘, it is hard to 
discern this goal from the developments in its earlier history.  In support of my claim 
that the MCA was not primarily geared towards empowerment, I offer a short 
description of the development of Article 12 CRPD - the right to equal recognition 
before the law.  The CRPD is of more significance than a mere biographical contrast to 
the MCA, however, the UK is legally bound to implement its provisions under 
international law, and it is increasingly influential in the interpretation of ECHR case law 
on legal capacity.  Furthermore, many themes in the literature associated with the 
CRPD, such as ‗relational autonomy‘ and ‗independent living‘ are increasingly 
appearing in MCA case law, and so it is useful to examine how this legal instrument 
deals with these. 
4.1.1 THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH DISABILITIES 
In Beijing in 2000 a conference of international and national disability rights 
NGO‘s issued a call to arms, to ‗strive for a legally binding international convention on 
the rights of all people with disabilities to full participation and equality in society‘ 
(Disabled Peoples International et al., 2000).  The ‗Beijing Declaration‘, as it is known, 
sought the ‗Elimination of discriminatory attitudes and practices, as well as information, 
legal and infrastructural barriers‘ which contributed to the exclusion of disabled people 
from full participation in society.  The CRPD represented the culmination of decades of 
work by disability rights campaigners (Quinn et al., 2002), lengthy and sometimes 
heated negotiations between disabled people‘s organisations and state parties, and it 
was a treaty that spoke directly from and to the experiences of disabled people.  The 
influence of the ‗British‘ social model of disability (Oliver, 1990a; Oliver, 1990b) is 
discernible in the definition of disability adopted by Article 1 CRPD: 
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with 
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various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society 
on an equal basis with others. 
Copious provisions addressing equality and non-discrimination are imbued with the 
ideals of North American ‗civil rights‘ and Scandinavian ‗normalisation‘ models of 
disability. 
Several elements of the CRPD might be regarded as tackling the segregation 
and containment of disabled adults in ‗total institutions‘.  Article 3 calls for ‗Full and 
effective participation and inclusion in society‘, whilst Article 19 CRPD establishes a 
right to independent living which it defines as: 
...the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where and with 
whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live 
in a particular living arrangement. 
Article 14 CRPD prohibits deprivation of liberty on disability related grounds, whilst 
Article 17 endows a right to respect for ‗physical and mental integrity on an equal basis 
with others‘.  Of most direct relevance to this thesis, Article 12 CRPD calls upon state 
parties to ‗recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life‘.  Article 12 requires state parties to provide the 
support people need to exercise their legal capacity and ensure there are safeguards 
on any such measures which: 
...respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of 
conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to 
the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are 
subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body.74 
Articles 12, 14 and 17 CRPD were among the most contentious during the 
drafting of the CRPD (Dhanda, 2006-7; Lawson, 2006-7; Minkowitz, 2006-7), and their 
interpretation is still a matter of dispute.  Debates around Articles 14 and 17 are, in 
many respects, merely situation-specific elaborations of the core issue underpinning 
disputes around Article 12: whether it is ever acceptable to override a person‘s legal 
rights to self determination on disability related grounds.   Article 12 is said to be ‗the 
most revolutionary of the new norms articulated in the CRPD‘ (Minkowitz, 2006-7), to 
represent a ‗paradigm shift‘ (Bach and Kerzner, 2010; Centre for Disability Law & 
Policy, 2011; Dhanda, 2006-7; 2011; Equal Rights Trust, 2008; European Disability 
Forum, 2009; Maina, 2009; World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, 
2011b; a), and to lie at the core of the CRPD (Quinn, 2011b).  Some interpret Article 12 
to prohibit all forms of ‗substituted decision making‘ on disability related grounds 
(Dhanda, 2011; Minkowitz, 2006-7), although not everybody agrees with this 
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interpretation.75  However, on the basis of their first five state reports,76 the CRPD 
Committee77 appears to interpret Article 12 as requiring the replacement of all laws 
permitting substituted decision making with provision for supported decision making 
(United Nations Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2012b; 2011b; a; 
2012c; a).   
Legal academics (Bartlett, 2012b; a; Richardson, 2012) and a senior Court of 
Protection judge (Lush, 2012) have suggested that Article 12 CRPD creates obligations 
that may conflict with the MCA, the MHA  and potentially the ECHR as well (Fennell 
and Khaliq, 2011).  Article 12 caused the most problems for state parties in ratifying the 
CRPD (Equal Rights Trust, 2008).  Several countries around the world are attempting 
to reform their legal capacity laws to bring them in line with the CRPD.  In the Republic 
of Ireland, a bill78 that is very similar to the MCA has met with widespread opposition 
from civil society groups, many of whom argue it is not compatible with Article 12 
CRPD (Age Action Ireland et al., 2012; Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011; 
Houses of the Oireachtas Committee on Justice Defence and Equality, 2012; Quinn, 
2012).  In India the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment is sponsoring a draft 
bill79 that closely resembles many provisions of Article 12 CRPD, and contains radical 
provisions for new arrangements for supported decision making.  Sadly it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine in any great detail what would be a ‗correct‘ or workable 
interpretation of Article 12 CPRD. 
Several debates and discussions around Article 12 have implicated ‗incapacity‘ 
as a legal mechanism which facilitates the institutionalisation of disabled people 
(Hammarberg, 2012; Human Rights Brief, 2012; Lewis, 2011; 2012b; Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human rights, 2012; Parker, 2011; Quinn, 2011b).  Tracing out some 
of the connections between ‗incapacity‘ under the MCA and institutionalisation is a 
central goal of this thesis.  The CRPD is also increasingly used as an aid to 
interpretation in ECtHR80 and domestic81 case law.  Although Article 12 CRPD has yet 
                                               
75 
In particular, the UK government appears not to regard Article 12 as prohibiting substituted 
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to make an appearance in domestic case law, it was recently influential in two 
important and recent rulings on incapacity and institutionalisation: Stanev v 
Bulgaria82and D.D. v Lithuania83.  Doubtless sooner or later the UK will have to grapple 
with the compatibility of the MCA and Article 12 CRPD in some legal or diplomatic 
arena. 
4.1.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
Bersani distinguishes between three ‗waves‘ of the disability movement for 
people with learning disabilities: the first wave represented the voice of professionals, 
the second the voice of carers and the third the voice of people with learning disabilities 
themselves (Bersani, 1996; Wehmeyer et al., 2000).  If the CRPD is an instrument of 
the third wave, the MCA must be regarded as primarily an instrument of the first wave, 
with some substantial influence of the second and very little from the third.  Whilst the 
founding of the CPRD was a call to arms from disabled peoples‘ organisations to 
establish a treaty to promote rights and freedoms, the germ for the MCA was a series 
of court cases where the medical and legal establishment sought to protect 
professionals who wished to interfere with their choices and freedoms.  Whatever the 
post-legislative sales-pitch for the MCA, in the case law and literature which preceded it 
one finds little talk of ‗empowerment‘, ‗equality‘, ‗inclusion‘ – the primary impulse for the 
creation of the MCA was a legal framework which would permit interferences in order 
to protect, to control. 
THE DECLARATORY JURISDICTION 
In response to concerns that guardianship under the MHA 1959 was 
paternalistic, sexist, outdated and afforded guardians excessive and ill-defined powers 
(Law Commission, 1991), the MHA 1983 significantly curtailed the powers of 
guardians.84   A redefinition of mental disorder also meant that people with learning 
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disabilities who were not ‗abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible‘85 were not 
eligible for guardianship, or detention, under the MHA.  The effect of these restrictions 
on the use of guardianship was that, in the words of the Law Commission (1991: [3.5]), 
‗There was no longer any machinery for assuming responsibility for every aspect of a 
completely incapacitated person's life‘.  The case of Re F. (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation)86 established that there were no longer any legal powers to consent to 
medical procedures on behalf of people who lacked the capacity to give or refuse 
consent themselves.  Consent to medical treatment was not an ‗essential power‘ of 
guardians, and the ancient parens patriae jurisdiction of the court had been abolished 
several decades before.87   
On paper at least, the situation was that substituted decision making on behalf 
of people with mental disabilities had been abolished for a wide variety of decisions, 
and in particular for health and welfare decisions.88  What happened next should be a 
salutary lesson for those seeking to abolish all forms of substituted decision making 
who would rely upon the common law to provide solutions for situations of risk and 
crisis.  In Re F the House of Lords, finding that there was no lawful authority to consent 
to a sterilisation operation on behalf of a woman with learning disabilities, invoked the 
common law doctrine of necessity.  They found that if an act of care or treatment was 
in the ‗best interests‘ of a person who lacked the mental capacity to consent to it, then 
a defence of ‗necessity‘ was available for acts of care and treatment.  Doubtless few 
today would regard sterilisation of a disabled woman as ‗necessary‘,89 but such is the 
flexibility of the ‗great safety net which lies behind all statute law and is capable of filling 
gaps left by that law‘.90   
During the years that followed the ruling in Re F, until the MCA came into force, 
the courts heard a series of cases under what became known as its ‗declaratory 
jurisdiction‘ concerning mental capacity and best interests.  In order to show who 
sought to make use of the declaratory jurisdiction and the kinds of issues which were 
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came to be considered justiciable under the court‘s new ‗best interests‘ jurisdiction, I 
have grouped them as follows: 
1. Applications from medical professionals, concerned about liability for 
carrying out – or failing to carry out – medical treatments without capable 
consent.  Proposed treatments included blood transfusions,91 termination of a 
pregnancy, 92 haemodialysis, 93  experimental treatments, 94 , an emergency 
caesarean section 95  and naso-gastric feeding of anorexia patients. 96 
Applications from health professionals were also successful in securing 
declarations that reasonable force could be used to administer treatments97 and 
that patients could be denied access to their personal files98 where it was in 
their best interests.  Declarations regarding capacity and best interests were 
also sought by medical professionals regarding inaction, to the effect that a 
patient had capacity to refuse treatment.99  Similar declarations were sought in 
respect of prisoners on hunger strikes.100  In some cases applications were 
made to the court for declarations that cessation of life-sustaining treatment,101 
or refraining from life-saving treatment, 102  was in the best interests of an 
unconscious patient, and hence lawful.   
2. Applications from family members, seeking declarations that particular 
medical treatments would be in a person’s best interests.  After Re F 
several cases came from mothers seeking declarations that it was in the best 
interests of their sons103 or daughters104 for them to be sterilised.  In Re Y 
(Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation)105, the parents of a ‗severely mentally 
handicapped‘ woman applied to the court seeking a declaration that it was in 
her best interests to undergo an invasive and painful operation in order to 
donate bone marrow to her sibling, who would otherwise be very likely to die. 
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3. Applications by a family member to resolve a dispute with other family 
members over a person’s welfare. In Re C (Mental Patient: Contact)106 C‘s 
mother sought a declaration granting regular access to her daughter, which she 
said was being obstructed by her father.  The court found that this potentially 
engaged tortious acts through restricting C‘s freedom, and therefore the court 
could make such a declaration.  In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court's 
Jurisdiction)107 the court was asked whether a man who had suffered a stroke 
should return to live with his estranged wife, or with his common law partner.  
This ruling, and later cases concerning where an adult should live,108 saw the 
court establish a declaratory jurisdiction for the lawfulness of wider welfare 
questions than potentially tortious acts.  Some have questioned what authority 
the court was purporting to exercise in these cases (Bartlett, 2008: [2.19]). 
4. Applications from local authorities, often in dispute with family members, 
regarding the welfare of an ‘incapable adult’.  In Re F (adult patient)109 the 
Court of Appeal found that there were no longer any statutory110 or parens 
patriae powers that could be used to prevent the return of a young woman who 
had just turned 18 from local authority care to her parents, where there were 
concerns around inadequate care and sexual abuse.  The Court of Appeal 
found that the only option available to the court was to make a ‗best interests‘ 
declaration, relying upon the doctrine of necessity, regarding residence.  In Re 
S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life)111 Sheffield City Council 
sought a declaration from the court that it was in S‘s best interests that he live in 
council provided accommodation, and contact with his father be restricted.  
Munby J found that the court could act as a ‗surrogate decision maker‘ for S 
and choose between living with his father or in council provided accommodation 
on his behalf.  In Re Z (Local Authority: Duty)112 a local authority sought an 
injunction to prevent a husband assisting his wife, who had cerebella ataxia, 
from travelling to a clinic in Switzerland for the purpose of assisted suicide.  
They failed to secure the injunction as the court found that Z had the mental 
capacity to make the decision herself. 
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5. Applications to the court by adults with disabilities to prohibit a particular 
treatment, by asserting that they have the mental capacity to refuse to 
consent to it.  In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)113 a man with 
paranoid schizophrenia applied to the court for an injunction against amputation 
of his gangrenous leg.  The court heard medical evidence that without the 
amputation C would almost certainly die, but found – through the application of 
a ‗functional test‘ of capacity – that C had capacity to make the decision to 
refuse treatment.114 In Re W (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)115 a man 
was found competent to refuse treatment for a leg wound and possible ensuing 
septicaemia which would lead to his death. In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust116, 
the court found that a woman who had suffered spinal damage resulting in 
tetraplegia had the mental capacity to refuse ongoing life sustaining treatment.  
In Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment)117 the OS appealed on behalf of a 
woman who had lost consciousness against the administration of a blood 
transfusion which she had previously refused on religious grounds.  The court 
found that she had lacked the capacity to do so, having been subject to ‗undue 
influence‘.  
6. Applications made to the court by adults with disabilities to assert their 
autonomy in respect of other welfare issues.  In one published case, Re V 
(A Minor) (Injunction: Jurisdiction)118, a disabled young man applied to the court 
to seek a declaration that upon reaching majority age he was entitled to choose 
where he lived, and injunctive relief restraining his mother from impeding his 
freedom to choose.  He was concerned that his mother did not respect his 
autonomy in making this decision. 
There are several striking characteristics of these cases.  The first is that the 
vast majority of them concerned medical treatment, not matters of care and welfare in 
community settings.  The largest group of cases were brought by medical professionals 
seeking protection from liability for particular acts or omissions.  A small proportion 
came from family members either seeking some kind of treatment, often quite 
controversial treatments, or to resolve disputes with other family members.  The use of 
the declaratory jurisdiction by local authorities in dispute with families, and relatives in 
dispute with each other, was also tentatively established.  The use of the court by 
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disabled people seeking to assert their rights to self-determination was minimal.  
Questions around involuntary placement in social care institutions, or restrictions within 
institutional life, are virtually absent.  It was in these cases, with their focus on one-off - 
largely medical - decisions that the ‗structural pillars‘ (Dimopoulos, 2010) of the 
functional test of capacity and the concept of best interests were developed. 
AN EMPOWERING STATUTE? 
Alongside the development of the declaratory jurisdiction, the Law Commission 
began a lengthy program of research aimed at closing the ‗legal lacuna‘ for lawful 
authority to make decisions on behalf of people deemed to lack capacity (Law 
Commission, 1989; 1991; 1993a; b; c; 1995).  Their research was prompted not only by 
these court cases, but also by a Law Society discussion paper that expressed concern 
about the lack of powers to intervene in what would today be called ‗adult safeguarding‘ 
matters (Letts, 1989).  The Law Society emphasised that the legal lacuna extended far 
wider than the healthcare matters that dominated the courts.  The approach adopted by 
the Law Commission built upon the ‗structural pillars‘ established under the declaratory 
jurisdiction and reflected a preference for ‗informality‘ of approach to the care and 
treatment of people with mental disabilities (Law Commission, 1991: [4.14]-[4.20]).  The 
focus of the architects of the MCA – courts and Law Commission alike – was thus 
primarily protective and paternalistic.  A related focus was to provide a means of 
resolving disputes over care and welfare within and between families and 
professionals.  This ‗social protection‘ impetus, which inspired the MCA, is identified as 
a ‗disempowering‘ framework by disability campaigners associated with the CRPD 
(Minkowitz, undated; Mladenov, 2012: 5).  Unlike the drafters of the CRPD, the drafters 
of the MCA were not primarily animated by concerns of social exclusion, paternalism 
and institutionalisation.  
On one view, therefore, the MCA was never meant to be an ‗empowering‘ act at 
all; it evolved to facilitate paternalistic interferences not to limit them.  Yet this view is 
not entirely fair if one looks at what was occurring in the wider social field at this time.  
Although the formal powers of guardians had been significantly curtailed by the MHA 
1983, and were little used before that (Fennell, 1992), the MCA did not enter a social 
field where people with mental disabilities were free of paternalistic interferences, 
coercion and control.  Such acts were no doubt occurring, but largely occurred outside 
of any legal framework.119  Bartlett and McHale (2003) contend that the novelty of the 
legal lacuna during the years of the declaratory jurisdiction ‗was largely illusory‘: 
concerns arose because of ‗a set of cultural changes, both within and without law‘, 
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whereby decisions that were previously considered to be private family matters 
became legally salient.  There were, as Hale (2009b: 113) notes, no clear principles 
governing what could be done in informal settings, and no obvious procedures for 
resolving doubts and difficulties.  A key function of the MCA was making such 
decisions legally salient, providing principles for interferences and a mechanism for the 
resolution of doubt and dispute. 
By 2002 several disability organisations 120  formed the influential ‗Making 
Decisions Alliance‘ (MDA) to lobby the government to introduce mental incapacity 
legislation, and to increase public awareness of the need for it.121  They suggested 
some amendments 122  and pushed for the inclusion of advocacy provision, which 
resulted in the creation of Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs).123  The 
homepage on the MDA‘s website stated ‗it‘s a basic human right to be able to make 
your own decisions and yet millions of people are discriminated against and their right 
to make their own decisions is ignored everyday because of a lack of comprehensive 
legislation to protect this right.‘124  How did an Act which would facilitate substituted 
decisions in the absence of any statutory authority to do so come to be seen as 
protecting people‘s rights to make them? 
One answer is that it wouldn‘t; that the idea of the MCA as ‗empowering‘ or 
promoting autonomy (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: foreword, [1.4]) 125  is at best 
muddled wishful thinking, at worst a cynical sales pitch from first and second wave 
groups who would be given authority and protection by the Act.  Yet republicanism 
does offer one perspective on how the MCA might, if not ‗empower‘, at least ameliorate 
states of domination: by providing clearer and principles for the exercise of paternalistic 
authority and a means to challenge it.  The MCA might be most sympathetically 
understood as an effort to regulate hitherto unregulated, but actually occurring, 
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 The following organisations were MDA members: 
Action on Elder Abuse; Age Concern England; Alzheimers Concern Ealing; Alzheimer's Society; 
Beth Johnson Foundation; Carers UK; The Centre for Policy on Ageing;  Cloverleaf Advocacy; 
Consumer Forum; Different Stokes; The Down's Syndrome Association; Foundation for People 
with Learning Disabilities; Headway; Help The Aged; Horsham Gateway Club; Independent 
Advocacy Service; Kent Autistic Trust; Leonard Cheshire; Mencap; The Mental Health 
Foundation; Mind; Motor Neurone Disease Association; The National Autistic Society; North 
Staffordshire Users Group; The Oaklea Trust; Patient Concern; Powerhouse; The Relatives and 
Residents Association; Respond; Rethink; Rett Syndrome Association (UK); St Clements 
Patients Council; Scope; Sense; Skills for People; The Stroke Association; Turning Point; 
United Response; WITNESS. 
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Information on the MDA kindly supplied by Toby Williamson, who co-chaired the MDA.  
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For examples, whereas the Law Commission (1995: 195) had recommended that a person 
should not be regarded as unable to understand information relevant to the decision, if they 
would be able to understand an explanation of it ‗in broad terms and simple language‘, the MDA 
(2003) recommended support for non-verbal communication as well, and consequently s(2) 
MCA references  ‗visual aids or any other means‘ of supporting understanding. 
123 
The IMCA service is discussed in Chapter 5. 
124 
The website is no longer online, but an archived version was kindly shared with me by Toby 
Williamson. 
125 
See Chapter 1 for references making this claim. 
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exercises of social power.  One might draw parallels with arguments that the early 
Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, by legislating for de facto discrimination which was 
already occurring, at least stabilised the predicament of Jewish subjects.126  Like the 
Nuremberg laws example, one can reserve criticism for the abhorrent substance of 
those laws, yet still agree that if power is being exercised in such a fashion then it is 
better that it is done in a predictable and stable way. 
The restrictive powers that are exercised in social care - confinement, coercion, 
control – did not wait for law to give them permission, they were already being 
exercised; the MCA attempted to impose some checks and limits on what was already 
occurring.127  Yet for this republican and rule of law argument to be sustainable, the 
MCA must provide clear principles for any interferences which it permits, and they must 
be effectively enforced.  This chapter will address the first part of that question by 
exploring how clear the principles of the ‗structural pillars‘ of the MCA are in respect of 
the problems of institutional domination of adults with learning disabilities.  The next 
two chapters will address how effectively these principles are enforced. 
The MCA has been praised for its ‗elegance‘ (Bowen, 2007) for providing, in a 
few short paragraphs of statute, a set of principles which can be deployed across an 
almost limitless set of legal questions.  Yet elegant and flexible principles inevitably 
require considerable interpretation in order to be applied to real life scenarios, and 
herein creeps the risk of arbitrariness.  On a republican view, discretionary powers are 
permissible only so long as an agent ‗remains answerable to a common knowledge 
understanding of both the goals and aims it is meant to serve, and the means of 
achieving those goals and aims it is permitted to employ‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 96; see also 
Pettit, 1997b: 65).  In this section I will explore how case law, other influential soft-law 
materials such as reports of the LGO, and Serious Case Reviews (SCR) 128  have 
fleshed out the structural pillars of the MCA.  I will consider whether these have 
provided ‗clear principles‘ for particular issues connected with institutional domination 
of adults with learning disabilities. 
4.2 THE ‗GENERAL DEFENCE‘ 
There are four main mechanisms through which the MCA permits acts or 
decisions to be made on behalf of people who lack capacity in their best interests: 
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This example is given by Lovett (2010a) and Rundle (2009a; 2012) and discussed at greater 
length in Chapter 2. 
127 
This point is reminiscent of Foucault‘s observations that power comes ‗from below‘ and does 
not ‗emanate‘ from a ‗central point‘ such as the sovereign (Foucault, 1976: 93).
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Serious Case Reviews are often conducted by local authority social services departments 
‗safeguarding‘ boards following a serious untoward incident which affected a person who used 
social care services.  SCRs are not compulsory, but they are regarded as good practice.  They 
are usually written by independent experts, and seek to ‗learn lessons‘ rather than apportion 
blame (Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 2010). 
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1. Through the ‗general defence‘ of s5 and s6 MCA; 
2. Through Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPA) documents, whereby a 
person (the ‗donor‘) gives another person (the ‗donee‘) powers to make 
certain decisions on their behalf; 
3. By a single welfare order of the Court of Protection under s16 MCA; 
4. Through the Court of Protection appointing a deputy under s16(2) MCA 
with powers to make particular decisions on behalf of a person. 
Data obtained under the FOIA from the Office of the Public Guardian129 (OPG) 
revealed that a very low proportion of LPA‘s are registered by younger individuals.130  
This suggests that LPAs tend to be used by older people rather than people with 
developmental disabilities reaching adulthood; many adults with learning disabilities 
might never be regarded as having the capacity to make an LPA at all.  Deputyships for 
personal welfare matters are very rarely used.131  Consequently, the most likely source 
of authority for the vast majority of personal welfare decisions affecting adults with 
learning disabilities is the ‗general defence‘ of s5-6 MCA. 
The general defence provides that:  
5(1) If a person (―D‖) does an act in connection with the care or 
treatment of another person (―P‖), the act is one to which this section 
applies if– 
(a) before doing the act, D takes reasonable steps to establish whether 
P lacks capacity in relation to the matter in question, and  
(b) when doing the act, D reasonably believes–  
(i) that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter, and 
(ii)   that it will be in P's best interests for the act to be done. 
(2) D does not incur any liability in relation to the act that he would not 
have incurred if P– 
(a) had had capacity to consent in relation to the matter, and 
(b) had consented to D's doing the act.132 
Protection from liability extends only as far as the person‘s consent would have done 
had they the capacity to consent, or refuse consent, to the act.133  The provisions for 
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A body established by the MCA to register and supervise the activities of LPAs and deputies.
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In the months of April and May 2012 only 0.22% of LPA‘s were registered by individuals 
under the age of 29, and fewer than 3% under the age of 50 (FOIA #1).
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s16 MCA was drafted to discourage the use of deputyships.  The Court of Protection 
appointed only 106 welfare deputies in 2010, and 112 in 2009 (Judiciary of England and Wales, 
2010; 2011).  .
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s5 MCA ‗Acts in connection with care or treatment‘
 
95 
 
restraint are more stringent.  Restraint is defined as the use, or threat of use, of ‗force 
to secure the doing of an act which P resists‘ or restriction of ‗P's liberty of movement, 
whether or not P resists‘.134  In order to rely upon the ‗general defence‘ for acts of 
restraint, an agent must additionally reasonably believe that it is necessary to restrain P 
in order to prevent harm to P.135  The act of restraint must also be ‗a proportionate 
response to ...the likelihood of P‘s suffering harm, and ...the seriousness of that 
harm‘.136  The general defence cannot override the operation of an advance decision137 
or decisions made by a deputy or donee of an LPA within the scope of their 
authority.138   
Almost all the provisions in the general defence turn on what D ‗reasonably 
believes‘; an objective proportionality criterion is only engaged by acts that amount to 
restraint.  In ZH v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 139  the police 
attempted to rely upon the common law doctrine of necessity to defend a suit brought 
by a young man with autism under torts of trespass and Articles 3140, 5141 and 8 ECHR.  
The police had restrained him in a swimming pool where he was on a school trip and 
locked him in a police van in wet clothes on a cold day, but had not complied with the 
requirements of the MCA.  The court held that ‗where the provisions of the Mental 
Capacity Act apply, the common law defence of necessity has no application‘.142  The 
judge also held that in order to satisfy the ‗reasonable belief‘ requirements of the MCA 
it was not necessary to be aware of the Act, or to have it in mind at the time, but a 
person must ‗reasonably believe at the material time ...the facts which determine the 
applicability of the Mental Capacity Act‘.143 
4.3 PRINCIPLES RELATING TO CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
The statutory principles for the assessment of capacity are contained within 
ss1-3 MCA, and can be summarised as follows: 
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s5(4) MCA provides that ‗Nothing in this section excludes a person's civil liability for loss or 
damage, or his criminal liability, resulting from his negligence in doing the act.
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s6(4) MCA
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s6(2) MCA
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s6(3) MCA
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s5(4) MCA; provisions relating to advance decisions found in ss24-6 MCA.  See also s4(6)(a) 
MCA which requires that best interests decision makers must have regard to ‗any relevant 
written statement made by him when he had capacity‘, which may include advance decisions.
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s6(6) MCA – unless action is required to provide a person with life-sustaining treatment or to 
prevent a serious deterioration in P‘s condition whilst a decision respecting any relevant issue is 
sought from the court (s6(7) MCA).
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[2012] EWHC 604 (QB)
 
140
 The right to freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 
141
 The right to liberty and security of the person 
142
 ZH v The Commissioner of Police  for the Metropolis, [44].  Please note that this case is said 
to be subject to an appeal (Ruck Keene et al., 2013).
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Ibid, [40] 
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 A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success.144 
 A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because 
he makes an unwise decision.145 
 A person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.146 
This impairment or disturbance may be permanent or temporary.147 
 Incapacity cannot be established merely by reference to a person‘s age, 
appearance, a condition of his or an aspect of his behaviour ‗which might 
lead others to make unjustified assumptions about his capacity.‘148 
 A person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable– 
a) to understand the information relevant to the decision 
i. Including information about the ‗reasonably foreseeable 
consequences‘ of deciding one way or another, or failing to 
make the decision.149 
ii. Even though an explanation of it was given to him in a way 
that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple 
language, visual aids or any other means).150 
b) to retain that information, 
i. but the fact he is able to retain it for a short period only does 
not prevent him from being regarded as able to make the 
decision151 
c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or 
d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign 
language or any other means).152 
The MCA code of practice, although not the statute, describes a ‗two-stage test 
of capacity‘ (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: 41).  Assessors must first ascertain 
whether or not a person has an impairment or disturbance of the mind or brain (the 
‗diagnostic‘ criterion) and then assess whether this impairment or disturbance causes a 
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s3(1) MCA – the ‗functional‘ test 
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person to be unable to understand, retain, use or weigh the information relevant to the 
decision or communicate it (the ‗functional test‘).   
Although functional approaches were felt to be an improvement on tests of 
capacity that turned on a person‘s status or the outcome of their decision (Law 
Commission, 1991: [2.43]), they have been subject to growing criticism.  Dhanda 
(2006-7: 445-6) argues that the process of identifying those who lack capacity ‗will 
render the capacity of all persons with disability open to question‘.153  Lewis (2011: 701-
2) writes that functional tests make it ‗all too easy for practitioners to attach a label of 
incompetence to a person with whose decision they disagree‘.  These translate into 
republican concerns: firstly, that capacity assessment is in itself an interference that 
must be subject to clear constraints, and secondly that the assessment process may 
not adequately constrain the outcomes reached by assessors, leaving people 
potentially subject to idiosyncratic interpretations and capricious interferences.  To 
consider whether the MCA does constrain when capacity should be assessed and the 
outcome of that assessment, case law on both these issues will be explored. 
4.3.1 CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AS AN INTERFERENCE IN ITSELF 
The MCA takes a ‗decision-specific‘ approach to capacity, meaning that a 
person‘s mental capacity to make a decision may potentially fall to be assessed across 
a wide variety of matters affecting them, and repeatedly.  Although decision specificity 
is regarded as one of the more progressive features of the MCA, as in theory it allows a 
person to retain control over some aspects of their lives even if they lose it in others, it 
does make heavy demands upon a person to offer themselves up to multiple 
assessments of their capacity.  These assessments do not come ‗free‘; they represent 
a significant interference with a person‘s ordinary rights to privacy and autonomy.  
Butler-Sloss LJ once stated that a mentally competent person may refuse consent ‗for 
any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all‘154, yet the process of sorting 
out the competent from the incompetent necessarily requires a person to offer up their 
reasons for making a decision to scrutiny.   
Morgan and Veitch (2004)155 have suggested that capacity assessments do not 
assess a person‘s ability to make a decision – manifestly the person usually has made 
a decision, and it its outcome which has triggered the capacity assessment in the first 
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A similar point is made by Banner (2012a: 22), who writes that whilst one of the key 
principles of the MCA is the presumption of capacity, ‗in day-to-day practice, it is likely that 
patients may be routinely assessed for capacity purely in virtue of having a chronic or fluctuating 
condition that affects their mind or brain.‘ 
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Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426 [17]
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 No page numbers are available for this reference; the quotation was taken from a version 
that was online (http://kirra.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLRev/2004/6.html) but which appears 
to have been taken down. 
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place.  Instead, they assess ‗whether the person making that decision can construct a 
convincing case why he or she reaches the standard of the ‗ability‘ that law expects in 
such circumstances‘.  Sociological, neuroscientific and psychological research 
suggests that people often make decisions on the basis of emotions and construct 
post-hoc rationalisations to justify those decisions afterwards (Broome et al., 2012; 
Damasio, 2008; Gigerenzer, 2008).  If this is correct, then some people with reduced 
verbal fluency and abilities to rationalise may find it harder to convince others of the 
case for their decision, whilst still making decisions on largely the same – emotional 
and intuitive – basis as the rest of the population. 
Being assessed may be experienced as invasive and disempowering, HH 
Judge Hazel Marshall (2012) observes: 
Consider the implications of taking a test, where you are judged by 
standards you know nothing of, you have no idea what are or are not the 
'right‘ answers, and the result of not passing may well be to have control 
of your own affairs to destiny removed from you. 
Unlike jurisdictions that permit detention in order to conduct an assessment of 
capacity,156 a person cannot be compelled to undergo a capacity assessment (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: [4.59]).  According to HH Judge Hazel Marshall (2012) at 
least, a refusal to undergo an assessment is not evidence of incapacity, and may even 
be evidence of capacity.  Yet in reality, it seems quite possible that poor co-operation 
or outright resistance to being assessed could contribute to a finding of incapacity, 
adding an indirectly coercive dimension to assessment.157 
Under the MCA the question of when capacity should not be questioned and 
assessed lies unanswered.  Even where a diagnosis of a mental disorder is absent, 
social care practitioners have been criticised in SCRs for not assessing capacity (Coe, 
2010; Flynn, 2011; McAteer, 2010).  In X and Y v Croatia158 the ECtHR held that the 
instigation of formal deprivation of legal capacity proceedings can itself be a significant 
Article 8 interference, and should be initiated not ‗on  the  basis  of  general  statements  
but  only  on  the  basis  of specific facts‘.159  However, the vast majority of capacity 
assessments under the MCA are not connected with formal deprivation of legal 
capacity proceedings, 160  but are decision-specific and connected with the general 
                                               
156 
For example, Serbia, Russia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan and the Czech Republic (Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre, 2006; 2007c; a; d; b). 
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 See, for example, the case of Baker Tilly v Makar [2013] EWHC 759 (QB). 
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(App no 5193/09) [2011] ECHR 1835 
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X and Y v Croatia, [107] 
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The closest domestic analogy to the deprivation of legal capacity proceedings which occur in 
jurisdictions still operating systems of plenary and partial guardianship is likely to be deputyship 
under the MCA.  Despite the name, guardianship under the MHA is a less apt comparator, as 
the powers of deputies – especially in relation to financial matters and medical treatment - are 
potentially far greater and rest on a specific finding of ‗incapacity‘. 
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defence outside of court proceedings.  And whilst it seems likely that Article 8 is 
engaged by assessing a person‘s capacity, very often that assessment would be in 
pursuit of one of the legitimate aims by which Article 8 is qualified.161  The majority of 
capacity assessments are triggered by some kind of risk or threat to a person‘s welfare 
(Emmett et al., 2012; Williams, V. et al., 2012: [2.1]-[2.4]), which might well involve ‗the 
protection of health or morals‘ or securing to a person other aspects of their ECHR 
rights.  Meanwhile, whilst there are few restrictions on when capacity can be called into 
question, social care practitioners are coming under growing pressure to assess in a 
wide variety of situations. 
4.3.2 WHEN SHOULD CAPACITY BE ASSESSED?  
The MCA simply requires that mental capacity be assessed in order to rely 
upon the general defence; it contains no freestanding obligation to undertake acts that 
would require the defence.  Ironically, although the MCA provides a defence for 
paternalistic acts, the direction of travel of case law and other interpretations of the 
MCA is towards capacity assessment becoming a requisite part of a defence for 
omissions to act.  In particular, where a person is in danger of making a decision that 
may result in some harm to them, that danger is known to social care professionals, 
and there is a possibility that they might lack mental capacity, there is a growing 
expectation that care workers will assess their capacity and make best interests 
decisions which could mitigate those risks.  This is not, yet, a clear-cut legal obligation, 
but I suggest that this is only a matter of time.  Regardless of whether it is a legal duty 
or not, the SCRs and LGO reports discussed below suggest that keeping a person‘s 
capacity under review is already regarded as part of the role of social services and 
failure to do so may be maladministration. 
ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY ARISING UNDER THE DUTY OF CARE 
The ‗duty of care‘ can take on an almost mythological status in social care 
settings, where it is often invoked to describe any perceived duty – legal or otherwise, 
lawful or otherwise – connected with caregiving.162  In strict legal terms, those providing 
care or other services may have a common law ‗duty of care‘ that requires them to 
‗take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
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 These are: ‗the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others‘ (Article 8 (2)). 
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Several researchers have found that the ‗duty of care‘ is used to describe paternalistic 
impulses, and care workers have found it difficult to square with those aspects of the MCA 
which permit a person to refuse care or take risks (Finlay et al., 2008a; Jingree, Treena and 
Finlay, 2008; Jingree, Treena, 2009: 86; McDonald et al., 2008: 33; see also Boyle, 2011: 371).
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would be likely to injure your neighbour‘163, yet that duty is not unbounded.  For a duty 
of care to arise, the damage must be foreseeable, there must be a relationship of 
sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant, and the court must regard it to 
be ‗fair, just and reasonable‘ to impose a duty of care in light of policy considerations.164  
In relation to professional negligence, professionals will be held to the standard of a 
responsible body of opinion within that profession.165 
In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) Lord Goff observed that a doctors‘ duty of 
care might come into conflict with the torts of trespass: 
If they administer the treatment which they believe to be in the patient's 
best interests, acting with due skill and care, they run the risk of being 
held guilty of trespass to the person, but if they withhold that treatment, 
they may be in breach of a duty of care owed to the patient.166 
The patient‘s capacity operates as a gatekeeper between these antinomous legal 
obligations.  Where a person has capacity and refuses treatment, the duty of care does 
not require a doctor to commit trespass; where a person lacks capacity, the tort of 
trespass does not prevent a doctor giving treatment in accordance with the duty of 
care.  This reasoning was confirmed by the House of Lords in Tomlinson v Congleton 
Borough Council & Ors167 where Lord Hoffman stated that: 
A duty to protect against obvious risks or self-inflicted harm exists only 
in cases in which there is no genuine and informed choice, or in the 
case of employees, or some lack of capacity, such as the inability of 
children to recognise danger (British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] 
AC 877) or the despair of prisoners which may lead them to inflict injury 
on themselves (Reeves v Commissioner of Police [2000] 1 AC 360).168 
Later cases affirmed that a duty of care to protect against ‗obvious risks or self inflicted 
harm‘ exists only where there is a lack of ‗genuine and informed choice‘.169 
Schwehr (2010: 46) writes that where a relationship of sufficient proximity and a 
‗voluntary assumption of risk‘ exists, ‗the more incapacitated the person, the more 
responsibility lies with the authority‘.  There have not – as yet – been any rulings that 
have found that social care practitioners were negligent for failing to protect a person 
who lacked mental capacity from some foreseeable harm which resulted from a choice 
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Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583.  Although, see also 
Bolitho (Deceased) v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, where Lord Browne 
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Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Lord Bridge (p1) 
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Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 39; [2006] 1 WLR 953, [12]; 
Evans v Kosmar Villa Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1003; [2008] 1 WLR 297 [39]-[41].
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that they made.170  However, it does not seem impossible that such a case could arise.  
Solicitors have been sued for negligence for failure to detect alleged mental incapacity 
to litigate when their clients have claimed that this resulted in them accepting 
disadvantageous compensation settlements.171  If solicitors can potentially be found 
negligent for failure to detect mental incapacity and prevent some foreseeable harm to 
their client, then it seems reasonable to suggest that social care practitioners might 
also.   
ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY ARISING UNDER POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
CONNECTED WITH ECHR RIGHTS 
Over the past decades successive ECtHR rulings have imposed upon states 
positive obligations to take steps to protect individuals‘ ECHR rights (Mowbray, 2004).  
These have included obligations under Article 2 to protect against risks to life,172 and 
obligations under Article 3 to take ‗reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which 
the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge‘ of ‗children and other vulnerable 
persons‘, including ill-treatment by private individuals.173  In Dodov v Bulgaria174 the 
ECtHR held that states‘ duties to regulate public health institutions and their staff, and 
provide remedies for negligence, were increased ‗where patients' capacity to look after 
themselves is limited‘.175  Nevertheless, the ECtHR has not, as yet, found any positive 
obligations that directly require a person‘s mental capacity to be assessed if they wish 
to commit an act or make a decision which might result in them coming to some harm. 
Domestically, under the HRA, the courts have often considered the extent of 
positive obligations arising under the ECHR through the lens of capacity.  In the arena 
of family law, the courts have found that social workers removing the child of a woman 
with learning disabilities with her consent violated her Article 8 rights as they had not 
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 Mandelstam (2009b: [8.12.2]) writes that ‗The courts have ... a track record of trying to 
protect local authorities and the NHS from certain types of negligence case, by holding that the 
local authority or NHS body did not have a duty of care in the first place.  This means that even 
if there is ostensible carelessness, it is irrelevant because there is effectively no duty of care to 
breach‘.  The ruling of the Court of Appeal in X & Anor v London Borough of Hounslow [2009] 
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authority‘s duty of care in the context of social care. 
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Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889.  See also: Dunhill v Burgin [2012] 
EWCA Civ 397, Dunhill v Burgin [2011] EWHC 464 (QB), Dunhill v Burgin [2012] EWCA Civ 
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v Slovakia (App no 8227/04) [2009] ECHR 1282 on failure to properly investigate and prosecute 
non-consensual sexual acts, including where the victim did not physically resist.
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considered her consent ‗in the light‘ of the MCA.176  Hedley J concluded that ‗Every 
social worker obtaining such a consent is under a personal duty (the outcome of which 
may not be dictated to them by others) to be satisfied that the person giving the 
consent does not lack the capacity to do so.‘177   
In Re Z (Local Authority: Duty), the case concerning assisted suicide heard 
under the declaratory jurisdiction178, Hedley J found that ‗in the context of a person of 
full capacity, whilst the right to life is engaged, it does not assume primacy ...over rights 
of autonomy and self-determination‘.179   Hedley J spelled out local authorities‘ duties to 
‗investigate the position of a vulnerable adult to consider what was her true position 
and intention‘ and to ‗consider whether she was legally competent to make and carry 
out her decision and intention‘.180  In effect, a duty to assess a person‘s capacity arose 
out of a local authority‘s positive obligations under Article 2.  Munby LJ interpreted this 
duty rather more expansively in A Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor181 as ‗a duty at 
common law to investigate the circumstances of a vulnerable adult whose welfare is 
seriously threatened by the act of another.‘182  Thus there appears to be a common law 
duty, arising out of positive obligations under the ECHR, for local authorities to 
‗investigate‘ a person‘s competence if their welfare is threatened by a third party.  This 
common law duty also accords with binding guidance in No Secrets, which requires 
local authorities ‗to investigate and take action when a vulnerable adult is believed to 
be suffering abuse‘.  This guidance describes a ‗vulnerable adult‘s‘ capacity as ‗the key 
to action‘ as ‗if someone has ‗capacity‘ and declines assistance this limits the help that 
he or she may be given‘ (Department of Health and Home Office, 2000: [1.5], [6.21]). 
Although it related to a healthcare setting, the ruling in Rabone & Anor v 
Pennine Care NHS Foundation183 suggests that the courts may be willing to find an 
‗operational obligation‘ to protect a person from self-inflicted harm where there is 
reason to doubt their capacity.  An earlier case had found that Article 2 ECHR imposed 
an ‗operational duty... to take steps to prevent a (detained) patient from committing 
suicide... if they know or ought to know that there is a real and immediate risk of her 
doing so‘.184   In Rabone the Supreme Court found that a similar operational duty 
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existed in respect of voluntary patients.  Dyson LJ held that the difference between 
voluntary and detained mental healthy patients was ‗in many ways more apparent than 
real‘, as their ability to ‗make an informed choice to remain in hospital‘ may be 
compromised and they might in any case ‗be detained if she tried to leave‘.185  This was 
contrasted with the situation of a ‗capable‘ patient in a physical healthcare setting,186  
as a psychiatric patient‘s ‗capacity to make a rational decision to end her life will be to 
some degree impaired‘.187   In her judgment, Lady Hale wrote that the operational 
obligation arose because Melanie Rabone was admitted to hospital with the purpose of 
preventing her from suicide, ‗Her mental disorder meant that she might well lack the 
capacity to make an autonomous decision to take her own life‘, and the MHA granted 
hospitals powers to prevent her from leaving where she might do so.188   
Reasoning by analogy, therefore, it seems arguable that if a person is under the 
care of the local authority, the purpose of that care is to prevent some ‗real and 
immediate risk‘ which the authority knows or ought to know about, and the person lacks 
the mental capacity to make decisions about that risk, an obligation arises to use the 
MCA to protect them from that risk.  Barristers for the Rabone family have argued that 
this operational obligation could be owed to ‗any vulnerable person for whom any 
public authority has assumed responsibility, whether they were in hospital or not‘ 
(Solicitors Journal, 2012).  The potential for operational obligations to arise for local 
authorities is, however, uncertain.  It may depend on what being ‗under the care‘ of the 
local authority means – does it mean merely that they have assessed a person, that 
they directly provide services for that person, or that the person is in local authority 
arranged residential care?  Does the obligation arise for the local authority, or the care 
provider, especially given that not all care providers must have regard for the ECHR 
because of the HRA189?   
 
Whether or not a broad reading of positive obligations arising from the ECHR is 
sustained in court, a number of reports by the LGO and SCRs have given them a very 
expansive gloss.190  Several published reports by the LGO and the Parliamentary and 
Health Services Ombudsman (PHSO) also detailed deaths or serious illnesses or 
injuries which the ombudsmen linked to a lack of capacity on the part of a person to 
understand their care needs.  For example, the LGO was critical of care staff who failed 
to open windows and prevent a woman with dementia from overdressing and over-
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exercising in hot weather, resulting in a hospital admission.  Care staff had told 
investigators that the woman‘s wishes had to be taken into account, and the LGO 
found maladministration on the part of the local authority for failing to carry out risk 
assessments and communicating ‗to care workers the limits of Mrs Nash‘s capacity‘.191   
In another case a woman alleged that her brother, who had a history of detention under 
the MHA, had ‗lived in squalor and pain‘.  A nursing advisor for the Ombudsmen 
criticised care workers and the community mental health team for cultures that 
emphasised a person‘s ‗right to live in the way they chose‘ (Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman and Local Government Association, 2011).  More details of these 
and other similar cases relating to capacity are given in Appendix B. 
Although they are not a source of legal authority, SCR‘s offer insights into how 
social services authorities understand and interpret their professional roles.  In a recent 
SCR into the murder of ‗Adult A‘, Flynn (2011: 12.23) writes 
...whilst the Mental Capacity Act 2005... presumes individuals to have 
capacity, this does not and should not mean that professionals are 
exempt from asking challenging and searching questions in relation to 
individuals who are making problematic choices. The presumption of 
capacity does not exempt authorities and services from undertaking 
robust assessments where a person‘s apparent decision is manifestly 
contrary to his wellbeing. 
Similar themes resonate in other SCRs (e.g. Bardsley, 2009; Coe, 2010; Flynn, 2007; 
McAteer, 2010).  The legal source of obligations to ‗ask challenging and searching 
questions‘ about a person‘s capacity to make problematic choices is not spelled out in 
these SCRs.  It may be thought to originate from local authorities‘ obligations under the 
ECHR and HRA ‗to take reasonable steps to safeguard individuals from abuse or life 
threatening events is in breach of Articles 2 and 3‘ ECHR (Flynn, 2011: 12.25).  As 
noted, this has not (yet) been firmly established in case law, but it seems reasonable to 
expect that the courts might make such a ruling in the future, especially if social care 
professionals are acting under the belief that such obligations already exist. 
DISCUSSION 
The expectation that social care practitioners will be alert to ‗problematic 
choices‘ and ‗ask challenging and searching questions‘ about the capacity of people 
with mental disabilities may contribute to the ‗constant sanctioning interaction from 
above‘ identified by Goffman (1961: 43).  As one advocate192 who worked with people 
with learning disabilities who was interviewed for this research put it: 
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How many people with learning disabilities can just walk out the door 
without somebody monitoring what they‘re up to... how often can they 
just go, wherever they want to go, whenever they want to go?  Go on 
holiday wherever they want to go, live wherever they want to live... Have 
sex whenever they want to have sex?  You know, anything that they 
want to do? ... The system has to be shown to be protecting them, but to 
protect them, their freedoms will be impinged so that the system will be 
shown to have made sure that they‘re not going to get themselves in 
trouble.193 
As discussed in Chapter 2, republicans tolerate interferences, even quite considerable 
interferences, so long as they are directed towards ameliorating domination and do not 
create new forms of domination themselves.  From a republican perspective, much will 
depend on how far the arbitrariness of capacity assessments themselves are 
constrained.  If, as Kapp (2002) has suggested, capacity assessments can be vague 
and arbitrary, then there are reasons to believe that protective interventions premised 
upon incapacity are in danger of delivering people to new forms of domination. 
4.3.3 HOW SHOULD MENTAL CAPACITY BE ASSESSED? 
The outcomes of capacity assessments are potentially sensitive to a range of 
factors in how they are conducted and interpreted.  This introduces a risk of 
arbitrariness unless these factors are suitably constrained.  This section considers 
several factors that may well affect outcomes, and discusses whether or not they are 
suitably constrained by the common law.  At base, the criticism of capacity 
assessments in this section is that although the MCA was explicitly designed to be 
‗functional', driven by processes not outcomes (Law Commission, 1991: [2.43]-[2.44]), 
the case law viewed as a whole does not reflect this.  Instead, it looks as if outcomes 
do heavily influence courts‘ determinations of whether or not a person has mental 
capacity, even when very similar processes appear to be at work.  Because this is not 
explicitly acknowledged, the principles guiding decisions are not clearly articulated. 
This leaves assessors with tremendous scope to pick and choose elements of 
decisions that support the outcomes they prefer. That is to say, the arbitrariness of 
capacity assessments is fostered by the rulings, not constrained. 
WHO SHOULD ASSESS CAPACITY? 
For all the efforts to define capacity in individualistic and ‗cognitive‘ terms (e.g. 
Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988; Cairns et al., 2005; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1995; 1997; 
Sullivan, 2004; Palmer et al., 2004; Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011), at base 
assessment ‗must be recognised as a personal encounter between two people‘ 
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(Donnelly, 2009b: 477-8).  Stefan (1992-1993: 766-7) describes competence194 as ‗a 
value judgment arising from an individual's conversation or communication with 
individuals in positions of power or authority‘.  She argues that competence is all too 
often regarded as an internal characteristic when in fact it may simply reflect a failure of 
communication.   
The social and interpersonal dimensions to capacity assessment means that it 
very much matters who conducts them.  Baggs (2011) has described her frustration at 
being judged incapable by a person who barely knew her, and how her resultant anger 
at this appraisal was used as further evidence of her incapability.  Yet the MCA 
requires any person who wishes to rely upon the general defence for some act of care 
or treatment to assess it, without regard to the quality of their relationship with the 
person.  Assessors are constructed by the Act as fungible entities, as if - to borrow 
from Foucault (2001/1961: 239) – the only authority an assessor needs is ‗the authority 
that is his for not being mad‘.  By offering few tools to respond to the varying quality of 
relationships between assessor and assessed, the MCA may not be able to constrain 
any arbitrariness of outcome which results from this factor. 
Research on mental capacity and best interests decision making processes in 
health and social care found that decisions tended to be made jointly, as part of a 
team, rather than through identifying a sole decision maker with overall responsibility.  
Williams, V., et al (2012: [4.2]) argue that greater clarity is needed in the code of 
practice over who is responsible for making decisions.  For certain kinds of decisions 
about capacity – chiefly those taken within the formal confines of the Court of 
Protection‘s declaratory powers195 and capacity assessments under the DoLS – it will 
be straightforward to identify a single capacity assessor.   
Yet the vast majority of decisions in care are not made under these formalised 
structures; any person who might potentially need to rely upon the general defence will 
need to have complied with the capacity assessment and best interests requirements 
of ss1-6 MCA.  As the public authorities listed as defendants in the smattering of cases 
where the general defence has been invoked demonstrates, it may not necessarily be 
a ‗natural person‘ who relies upon the general defence.196  In such circumstances, and 
where multiple organisations work to arrange and deliver care in tandem, it is easy to 
see how the identity of which individual is responsible for assessing capacity can 
become uncertain.  The answer is likely to be fact specific, and related to the seniority, 
professional status and level of participation in the relevant act of the various 
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individuals involved.  The courts have even criticised local authorities for care 
providers‘ failure to consider the mental capacity and best interests of people whose 
rights were infringed.197 
Although legally the responsibility for assessing mental capacity lies with those 
directly associated with a particular act of care or treatment, they may seek guidance 
from third parties.  The MCA code of practice endorses obtaining a professional opinion 
from a medical or social work professional for ‗more complex decisions‘ (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: [4.42]).  Application forms for the Court of Protection require 
evidence of incapacity to be completed by ‗a registered medical practitioner, 
psychologist or psychiatrist‘ or in some cases a speech therapist, occupational 
therapist or similar (Court of Protection, undated).  However, except where a case 
concerns deprivation of liberty, 198  neither case law nor statute imposes any 
requirements for a ‗clinical‘ or medical assessment. Recent domestic199 and ECtHR200 
rulings have reiterated that in formal deprivation of legal capacity proceedings it is for 
the judge – not a doctor – to make a final assessment of capacity.  Nevertheless, the 
‗medicalisation‘ – or at least ‗professionalisation‘ – of capacity assessment appears to 
have been a deliberate result of including a diagnostic threshold in the functional test 
(Law Commission, 1991: [3.11]). 
The medicalisation of mental capacity brings mixed blessings.  On the one 
hand, clinical assessments appear to have strong inter-rater reliability (Cairns et al., 
2011a; Okai et al., 2007), which seems desirable from the perspective of reducing 
arbitrariness.  On the other, these assessment tools are calibrated ‗by the judgement of 
an expert clinician, not a perspective-neutral measure of psychological functioning‘ 
(Banner, 2012b: 1040).  They risk imposing a medicalised model of capacity that sits in 
tension with supported decision making models of legal capacity inspired by the social 
model of disability and Article 12 CRPD.  A preference for ‗professional‘ assessments 
reinforces concerns, outlined in Chapter 2, that law cannot act as an effective restraint 
against disciplinary power and becomes colonised by disciplinary discourses and 
norms.  Despite a veneer of scientific respectability and objectivity, mental capacity 
assessments measure phenomena ‗of a moral and social order‘ (Foucault, 2001/1961: 
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258), which have an inherently normative dimension (Banner, 2012b; Charland, 2001; 
Freyenhagen, 2009; 2013; Holroyd, 2010).   
It would be unfair, however, to suggest that the courts only ever act as a rubber 
stamp on professional opinion.  The courts have, for example, criticised reliance on 
psychometric tests 201  and a lack of expert knowledge of the MCA itself. 202   Most 
strikingly, in CC v KK and STCC Baker J concluded that a person had mental capacity, 
even though both experts and a social worker were unanimous that she did not.  It is 
unusual, however, to see the courts take such a muscular approach to capacity 
assessment, prying into the black box of clinical judgment, but nevertheless this case 
shows that it can happen. 
It has sometimes been suggested that those with personal knowledge – rather 
than ‗professional‘ knowledge – might be better situated to understand a person‘s 
communication and intentions (Bach and Kerzner, 2010).  This approach would appear 
to favour the involvement of family carers in divining capacity over disciplinary 
professionals.  Yet there is little in the disability rights literature to suggest that families 
are a preferable source of authority over disabled people to professionals – the target 
is authority itself.  Capacity assessment unavoidably involves affording an assessor 
group power and authority over the assessed; republicanism offers no clear answers 
over who that group should be, it simply suggests that the way they exercise that 
power should be suitably constrained. 
SUPPORTS FOR CAPACITY 
A central requirement of Article 12 CRPD is that state parties provide access to 
the support people ‗may require in exercising their legal capacity‘.  This is generally 
interpreted to mean that people must be given the support they need to make (legally 
salient) decisions.  The MCA states that ‗A person is not to be treated as unable to 
make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken 
without success‘.203  Later provisions emphasise that a person should be given support 
to understand the information relevant to the decision ‗in a way that is appropriate to 
his circumstances‘.204   The role of support in decision making raises a number of 
complex and profound legal and metaphysical questions, not all of which can be 
addressed in any great detail here.  Regarding the CRPD, one important question is 
whether support will always be sufficient to enable a person to make a decision, as 
some seem to suggest (Dhanda, 2006-7; Inclusion Europe, 2008; International 
Disability Alliance, undated; Minkowitz, 2006-7; World Network of Users and Survivors 
                                               
201 
Verlander v Rahman [2012] EWHC 1026 (QB); (2012) MHLO 49 [51]
 
202 
SC v BS [2012] MHLO 78 (COP) 
203 
s1(3) MCA
 
204 
s3(2) MCA 
109 
 
of Psychiatry, 2011a), or whether there are a residue of cases where ‗substituted 
decisions‘ remain necessary.205  A second dimension of these debates is the extent to 
which Article 12 permits forms of support and substituted decisions that conflict with a 
person‘s expressed wishes and preferences.206   
These debates are extremely important, but they are not explored in any great 
detail here.  The MCA makes provision for support only up to a point; a person must 
still be able to satisfy the ‗functional test‘ or else a substituted decision will be made in 
their best interests.  Consequently, the following questions are relevant when 
considering support arrangements under the MCA: 
1. What forms might ‗support‘ take? 
2. At what point does a person require so much support to make a decision (or 
decisions), that they are no longer regarded as making a capacitous 
decision for themselves? 
3. What distinguishes support from a third party for making a decision from 
‗undue influence‘, which may mean they lack the mental capacity to make 
that decision? 
4. Might support ever be provided that conflicts with a person‘s wishes and 
preferences, and thus may be regarded as an interference in itself? 
Clear and consistent answers to those questions will be essential for constraining the 
potential for arbitrary and idiosyncratic assessments regarding support arrangements 
and capacity. 
The MCA itself gives no examples of what forms support might take beyond 
ensuring information is provided to a person by the most appropriate means possible.  
The code of practice provides some practical suggestions for addressing a person‘s 
communication needs, including the provision of communication equipment, time to 
learn new communication systems, or specialist professional support (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: [3.11]).  Regarding retention of information, the code 
suggests that ‗Items such as notebooks, photographs, posters, videos and voice 
recorders can help people record and retain information‘ [4.20].  An example of support 
for mental capacity from case law includes providing a person with sex education so 
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that they might understand the requisite information for the capacity to consent to 
sex.207   
Some of the literature on Article 12 CRPD appears to endorse much more 
involvement of third parties than merely providing a person with accessible information 
and memory aids.  This is best encapsulated by Francis and Silvers‘ (2010) proposed 
model of ‗assistive thinking‘, in which the support provided by ‗trustees‘ to help people 
make decisions is likened to a ‗prosthetic‘ (see also Silvers, 2011; Silvers and Francis, 
2009).  In support of such arrangements it is often emphasised that all people rely on 
others when making important decisions (European Disability Forum, 2009; Lewis, 
2011; Quinn, 2012), that the individualistic models of autonomous decision making are 
‗sociologically counterfactual‘ (Lewis, 2011: 703).   There is some empirical support for 
the idea that our decision making abilities are contingent upon good quality 
relationships of trust (Broome et al., 2012).   
Relationships of support to facilitate decision making are not well researched 
under the MCA.  Boyle (2008b: 534) writes that in terms of implementation, the MCA‘s 
‗provisions for support are insufficient for promoting self-determination‘.  However, 
there is some evidence that sometimes the involvement of an IMCA can help a person 
to attain the threshold of mental capacity (Townsley & Laing, 2011; Williams, V. et al, 
2010).  The case law associated with the MCA has taken some tentative steps towards 
recognising such ‗relational‘ elements of decision making, but the courts have not 
developed a clear and consistent way of distinguishing support for capacity from 
evidence of incapacity, and in some instances the influence of third parties on decision 
making is taken to deplete capacity. 
 
The case V v R208 offers the strongest support yet for recognising ‗relational‘ 
elements of capacity.  The court considered whether V, a young woman who had 
suffered brain damage after being hit by a car, had the capacity to litigate for 
compensation proceedings.  V‘s mother gave the following evidence regarding V‘s 
reliance upon her to make decisions about the court case: 
I have been asked to think about what V would do if she was asked by 
her solicitor to make a decision in the case and I was not available to 
advise her. I believe that V would just agree to whatever was being 
proposed or had been advised. She doesn‘t question or analyse issues 
or advice herself and, as discussed in a number of the medical reports, 
often acts impulsively.209 
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According to V‘s mother, ‗she and not the claimant would make any material 
decision.‘210  The court, observing that there was no suggestion that V would be left to 
make decisions without the support of her mother, concluded that it was ‗not satisfied, 
on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant is unable to use and weigh information 
as part of the process of making litigation decisions‘.211  
In holding that V had litigation capacity, the court appeared to strongly endorse 
the kinds of support arrangements Francis and Silvers and others had in mind.  
However, a later judgment - Verlander v Rahman212 - raised analogous issues yet the 
court came to the opposite conclusion regarding a person‘s financial capacity: 
On the basis of the above information it cannot properly be said that the 
Claimant is managing her own money.  She is only doing that, and 
making decisions in relation to it, with the substantial assistance of her 
mother.  Even if it were to be the case that she participates in the 
decision to pay individual  bills and then carries that out and obtains the 
receipts, the guiding person in making the decision is her mother.213 
Unhappily Verlander v Rahman made no reference to the decision in V v R to enable 
us to distinguish the reasoning in these cases.  The processes and support 
arrangements for capacity in both cases appear to be the same, but the issues could 
be distinguished in terms of outcomes.  In V v R any decisions about litigation would go 
through V‘s solicitor, who would be able to flag up any concerns to the court.  However, 
there would be few such checks to prevent Verlander spending her money unwisely.  
Without clearly articulating why support can enhance V‘s litigation capacity, yet is 
evidence of Verlander‘s financial incapacity, it is hard to avoid the view that the 
different treatment of support in these two cases is predicated on outcomes and not 
processes. 
 
In V v R the outcome of V‘s decisions around litigation appear to be almost 
entirely determined by her mother‘s views, rather than V‘s own.  In V v R the court 
appeared to regard this as a positive and supportive arrangement, but other cases 
exist where the influence of a third party over a person‘s decision making is held to 
deplete capacity, and is often described as ‗undue influence‘.  Under the declaratory 
jurisdiction the courts considered whether various decisions were invalid as a result of 
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‗undue influence‘, including medical treatment decisions,214 the execution of a will,215 
the posthumous destruction of a man‘s frozen sperm,216 and the capacity to consent to 
marriage.217  Subsequent to the passing of the MCA, the courts have continued to hear 
cases regarding ‗undue influence‘ even where people are said to have ‗mental 
capacity‘ under the inherent jurisdiction.218 Under the MCA, several interesting cases 
have arisen where the influence of a parent is thought to be stifling the development of 
a person‘s independent decision making abilities.  In these cases, the courts have 
sanctioned significant interventions to disrupt these relationships, on the basis that this 
interference will enhance a person‘s capacity. 
In A Primary Care Trust v P219 the Hedley J found that P lacked the mental 
capacity to decide whether or not to remain living with his mother as a result of the 
‗cumulative force‘ of his epilepsy, his learning disability, and: 
...the enmeshed relationship that he has with AH which severely 
restricts his perspective in terms of being able to think about his future... 
his inability... to visualise any prospect of having a different view to his 
mother on any subject that matters and his inability to understand what 
the other aspects of the argument may be in relation to his expressed 
wishes simply to return and live undisturbed with his mother.220 
There were additional concerns that P‘s mother had interfered with the medication 
regime for his epilepsy in the belief that it was causing Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.  
Cessation of his medication had resulted in increased seizures and an emergency 
hospital admission for P.  Hedley J approved care arrangements which amounted to a 
deprivation of liberty and carried significant constraints on his contact with his mother, 
despite it being P‘s wish to remain living with her.221  It was hoped that ‗by prising him 
out of his current relationship, significantly curtailing contact and thereby allowing 
space for the development of a new experience‘ P would regain capacity to make 
decisions.222 
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In the important Court of Appeal ruling in K v LBX223, it was common ground 
that L lacked the mental capacity to decide whether or not to continue living with his 
father and brother, or whether to move into ‗independent living‘ accommodation.224   K 
was said to be happy living with his father and brother,225 but professionals expressed 
concern ‗that L was in an environment in which he could not articulate his own wishes, 
as opposed to what he perceived to be the wishes of his father.‘226  Part of the High 
Court‘s decision that it would be beneficial for him to leave home was a belief that it 
‗would enable him to either regain capacity, or enable him to make informed choices 
and decisions‘.227   
 
Relationality is thus a complex area of capacity assessment.  On the one hand, 
the courts have regarded the support a person receives from a third party as 
contributing to capacity.  Yet in other cases, reliance on support is regarded as 
evidence of incapacity.  In yet further cases, the courts have taken steps to remove a 
person from a relationship where the influence of a third party is regarded as depleting 
capacity – even when the person concerned expresses no desire to be so removed.  
To return to our questions at the outset, the courts have delivered conflicting decisions 
regarding when support enhances mental capacity and when it is evidence of mental 
incapacity.  The courts do appear to be treating certain relational dependencies as 
depleting capacity – more akin to undue influence than support arrangements – but 
have not articulated any clear principles to distinguish dependency that amounts to 
undue influence from that which amounts to support.  And finally, the courts have been 
prepared to sanction major interventions in a person‘s relationships and living 
arrangements for the improvement of a person‘s mental capacity.  Without clear criteria 
to help distinguish ‗support‘ from ‗undue influence‘, there is a danger that those making 
such decisions – including professionals as well as the courts – may import a dislike or 
suspicion about a third party into their assessments of capacity on an arbitrary basis. 
These cases also have important implications for the support paradigm 
endorsed by the CRPD.  In their writings on ‗assistive thinking‘, Francis and Silvers 
have little to say about the possibility of ‗undue influence‘ from supporters.  A core 
requirement of Article 12(4) CRPD is that measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity are free of undue influence; yet there is little in the CRPD to help us identify 
what ‗undue influence‘ looks like in situations like this.  Remarkably, the literature 
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related to Article 12 which is most enthusiastic about relational autonomy, ‗shared 
personhood‘ and supported decision making does not explore this issue (e.g. Bach and 
Kerzner, 2010; Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011; Dhanda, 2006-7; Lewis, 2011).  
These judgments, however, do suggest that there are sometimes grounds to be 
concerned that support itself may become a form of domination. 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD? 
As the information relevant to the decision will be highly context specific, the 
MCA does not define precisely what information needs to be understood for the 
purposes of the functional test of capacity.228  Macur J cautioned in LBL v RYJ229 that ‗it 
is not necessary for the person to comprehend every detail of the issue‘ and ‗all 
peripheral detail‘ so long as they can ‗comprehend and weigh the salient details 
relevant to the decision to be made‘.  However, given that capacity assessors might 
enjoy considerable latitude in setting the parameters of what needs to be understood, 
this is an area with clear potential for arbitrary decisions that will affect the outcome of 
capacity assessments. 
In a large ethnographic study about the capacity of dementia patients to make 
hospital discharge decisions about their care and residence, Emmett et al  (2012) 
found worrying evidence that capacity assessments often focussed on a person‘s 
general awareness levels, not whether or not they understood the information relevant 
to the particular decision.  They found examples of people‘s mental capacity regarding 
whether or not to move into a nursing home being ‗assessed‘ without assessors ever 
explicitly discussing such a move with them.  Assessors would also make reference to 
a person‘s failure to appreciate information that was not obviously relevant to the 
decision in hand.  Emmett suggests that it may be especially difficult to provide clarity 
over what risks and other matters a person needs to understand for decisions about 
care and residence, where the nature of the risks may be less clear and predictable 
than in healthcare decisions. 
These issues arose in the case CC v KK & STCC.  The case arose under the 
DoLS, and took the form of a challenge by KK to assessments which had found that 
she lacked the capacity to decide to leave the care home, where she was unhappy, or 
to return to live in her bungalow.230  Assessors had asked KK to describe the options as 
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she understood them, but at no point had the local authority provided any information 
as to what support would in fact be available to KK if she were to return home.  
Consequently, capacity assessors had concluded she was unrealistic about the risks of 
a return home, and the resources available to mitigate those risks; yet neither they nor 
she knew what support would in practice be available.  Baker J criticised assessors for 
basing capacity assessments on a ‗blank canvass‘ of what KK already knew. 231  
According to Baker J, supporting a person to make a decision requires that they are 
provided with information about the options, and associated support and risks,232 and 
are not to be expected to generate this information themselves.  Baker J stated that KK 
should have been provided with details of the ‗complete package of support that would 
or might be available‘ for a return home in order to assess her capacity.   
This guidance seems eminently sensible, yet it may be a challenge to reconcile 
with community care law.  Public law rulings suggest that local authorities are not 
obliged to generate alternative offers of support if they believe they cannot meet a 
person‘s eligible community care needs or if they exceed the cost of meeting their 
needs in other ways.233  This means that assessing a person‘s mental capacity to 
choose between institutional care and some alternative, typically a return home, will be 
problematic if local authorities believe that a person‘s assessed eligible needs can only 
be met (or be met most economically) in an institutional setting.  The interface between 
care planning and a person‘s capacity to assume the risks of a care plan which local 
authorities regard as inadequate needs further attention. 
 
In cases about the capacity to consent to sex and marriage, the courts have 
tried not to set the test of capacity too high ‗lest it operate as an unfair, unnecessary 
and indeed discriminatory bar against the mentally disabled.‘234  Yet, if the bar is set too 
low, local authorities and courts cannot use the MCA to intervene in sexual 
relationships that give them cause for concern.  These tensions have played out in a 
debate about whether the requisite capacity to consent to sex and marriage requires 
understanding of issues around the partner in the relationship (‗person-specific‘ mental 
capacity) or is generic to the act (‗act-specific‘ mental capacity).  Person specificity 
gives public authorities greater flexibility to intervene in particular relationships where 
they have cause for concern, whilst allowing acceptable relationships to continue.  
Several judges have expressed discomfort with the idea of the state exercising this 
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level of control over a person‘s private life.  In Sheffield City Council v E & Anor235 
Munby J asked: 
Can it seriously be suggested that the court has the right to vet E's 
suitors, to decide that X is suitable but that Y is unsuitable, to select who 
E is to marry? The answer to that question, in my judgment, is that the 
court quite clearly has no such role.236  
At the time of writing the test of mental capacity to consent to marriage was considered 
act-specific and not person-specific,237 but the test of mental capacity to consent to sex 
is still somewhat unsettled (Richards, 2012).  The most recent case, A Local Authority v 
H, affirmed the ‗act specific‘ approach taken in D Borough Council v AB and other 
cases238 – but these in turn conflicted with D County Council v LS.239  
The mental capacity to make decisions about contact with friends and family 
members has also been held to have person-specific elements.240  In CYC v PC and 
NC241 Hedley J considered the capacity of a woman with mild learning disabilities to 
decide whether to resume married life.  Her husband‘s sentence for criminal offences 
against his previous wives was shortly due to expire.  The woman, PC, did not accept 
her husband‘s guilt, and an expert assessor concluded that ‗Given her learning 
disability, her unwillingness to examine the issue of his guilt and her overwhelming 
desire to re-establish that relationship‘. 242   Hedley J expressed concern that the 
assessment had not separated out PC making an unwise decision from incapacity,243 
but independently he concluded that PC was unable to understand the risks NC posed 
to her or weight them up.244  Hedley J eschewed the debate on whether or not capacity 
was person- or decision-specific, saying that it would depend upon the specifics of the 
case.245 
In these concerns around person and act specificity, the courts very explicitly 
consider the impact of the way capacity is framed upon the relationship between 
individuals and their private lives, and the state.  Far from being an internal, neutral, 
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construct – capacity in these debates is very clearly political.  They also reflect a wider 
tension around the way mental capacity is defined, between reasonably clear and 
narrow principles which (in this case) set thresholds low – reducing the possibilities for 
paternalistic intervention – or broader, more flexible, criteria which can be applied in a 
wider range of situations, but which increase the risk of arbitrary interventions.   
‗INSIGHT‘ AND UNWISE DECISIONS 
Several commentators have remarked on the potential for doctors to find that 
patients lack mental capacity on grounds that they lack ‗insight‘ into their condition 
(Allen, 2009; Banner, Natalie F., 2012b; Holroyd, 2010; Szasz, 2005).  Allen (2009) 
cites Munby LJ as endorsing the position that capacity requires insight: 
If one does not ‗believe‘ a particular piece of information then one does 
not, in truth, ‗comprehend‘ or ‗understand‘ it, nor can it be said that one 
is able to ‗use‘ or ‗weigh‘ it. In other words, the specific requirement of 
belief is subsumed in the more general requirements of understanding 
and of ability to use and weigh information.246 
One might foresee problems arising where people simply do not share their doctor‘s 
view of their diagnosis and treatment options, or a social care professional‘s 
assessment of their care needs and the value of a particular care plan. 
Empirical studies in health and social care suggest that capacity assessors are, 
indeed, influenced by how far person agrees – or has ‗insight into‘ – their assessment 
of their needs.  Owen et al (2009) conducted a study of patients‘ mental capacity to 
consent to psychiatric admission, and analysed associations with their diagnosis and 
‗insight‘ into their condition.  They found that psychotic disorders and manic episodes of 
bipolar affective disorder were highly associated with both incapacity and lack of 
insight, but in patients with non-psychotic disorders such as depression, incapacity 
could exist alongside insight into their condition.  However, a study by Elbogen et al 
(2006) found that psychiatrists place greater value on ‗insight‘ than other psychologists 
and social workers, who were more likely to endorse respect for autonomy.   
In social care settings, Williams, V., et al (2012: 6, 123) found evidence that 
sometimes ‗lack of capacity equated to the fact that a person could not understand or 
admit to their own care needs.‘  The authors recommended that the MCA code of 
practice be updated to provide guidance on ‗The distinction between ―lack of insight‖ 
into one‘s own care needs, and lack of decision making capacity‘ (p17).  In their study 
of hospital discharge decisions, Emmett et al (2012: 5) found that ‗Where assessors did 
not agree with patients' decisions, they were prone to interpret the decision as lacking 
insight and, thus, the decision maker as lacking capacity.‘ 
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There is a danger that a lack of insight into a person‘s care needs is conflated 
with a person being prepared to tolerate the risks of unmet needs.  CC v KK, discussed 
above, was one such case.  Assessors felt that KK did not recognise the risks attached 
to a return home,247 or if she did she understood them only ‗superficially‘248 and was not 
able ‗able to hold complex concepts in her mind in order to weigh risks and benefits 
and to make informed choices regarding her future.‘249  The ‗complex concepts‘ that KK 
was apparently unable to hold in mind were not spelled out by assessors.  Baker J 
commented upon: 
...a danger that professionals, including judges, may objectively conflate 
a capacity assessment with a best interests analysis and conclude that 
the person under review should attach greater weight to the physical 
security and comfort of a residential home and less importance to the 
emotional security and comfort that the person derives from being in 
their own home.250 
This danger is supported by Williams, V., et al‘s (2012: 6, 123) research, which 
described the collapsing together of mental capacity and best interests as a ‗concertina 
effect‘.  Emmett et al (2012: 5) also found that ‗best interests‘ and ‗risks‘ were 
prominent factors in capacity assessment. 
Unusually, KK gave oral evidence to the court, in which she declared: ‗If I die on 
the floor, I die on the floor. I‘d rather die in my own bungalow, I really would',251  
suggesting she had a vivid appreciation of the risks attached to her decision.  The court 
found that she did not lack insight so much as evaluate the risks and advantages of a 
return home differently to professionals.  The courts are not, however, always so 
expansive in their acceptance of a person‘s tolerance of risk or unhappy outcomes.  
Anorexia is often given as an example of situations where normative valuations about 
how a person should weigh the options may creep into capacity assessment (Banner, 
2012b; Freyenhagen and O'Shea, 2013; Holroyd, 2010).  The case Re E (Medical 
treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1)252 was a good example of this.  The court found that E 
lacked capacity to make decisions about treatment as her: 
...obsessive fear of weight gain makes her incapable of weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages of eating in any meaningful way... For E, 
the compulsion to prevent calories entering her system has become the 
card that trumps all others. The need not to gain weight overpowers all 
other thoughts.253 
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And yet, an alternate way of constructing E‘s decisions was available to the court, but 
was not given any serious consideration.  Anorexia is a very serious condition with a 
significant mortality rate (Attia, 2010).  E had attempted treatment for her anorexia 
many times in the past,254 her parents and her medical team supported her request not 
to undergo further force feeding treatment.255  The proposed treatment was estimated 
to have a 20-30% chance of success,256 and was likely to be extremely distressing to 
E.  In view of those considerations, it seems reasonable to suggest that E was not so 
much choosing not to eat, as making a choice to ‗die with dignity‘257 having considered 
the trauma and poor prognosis of the proposed treatment options.  Such a choice 
must, surely, be within the range of reasonable decisions a person with such a poor 
prognosis might make.  The case of E is a good example of how framing the decisions 
at the core of capacity assessments differently could give rise to different outcomes.  
The power to frame the decision lies within the control of the assessor – and is a key 
potential source of arbitrariness in their decision making. 
 
There is growing empirical evidence that mental capacity assessments are 
used to secure outcomes that assessors perceive to reduce risks or be in a person‘s 
best interests.  The courts and researchers have described this as illegitimately 
conflating incapacity with ‗unwise decisions‘.  Yet picking these apart may not be as 
easy as some would hope.  In several places in this chapter I have argued that the 
courts have adopted outcome based approaches to capacity in various respects.  Yet 
in a way, this is unavoidable – function must be read off from outcomes at some point, 
and outcomes must therefore be categorised according to whether they indicate ‗good‘ 
or ‗bad‘ function. 
However much it is dressed up in ‗neutral‘, ‗cognitive‘ and medicalised 
language, mental capacity assessment is inherently and unavoidably normative 
(Banner, 2012b; Charland, 2001; Freyenhagen and O'Shea, 2013; Holroyd, 2010).  
From a republican perspective this is not necessarily problematic in itself, but 
republicans and others would call for transparency over the kinds of normative 
principles being applied.  Clear and transparent principles for mental capacity 
assessments are essential if a person is to be able to challenge them.  In republican 
terms, the danger of pseudo-cognitive ‗mental‘ capacity assessment is that evaluative 
commitments are ‗smuggled in‘ without discussion.  Freyenhagen and O‘Shea (2013: 
26) comment: 
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The main danger of such opacity [in the evaluative commitments of the 
MCA] is arbitrariness and undue discretionary authority in mental 
capacity assessment, which places assessors in positions of 
dominance, threatening the assessed individual‘s freedom, even if 
assessors exercise their powers responsibly.  
There is a real danger in eschewing the development of clear and principled 
tests of capacity, out of what Hedley J described as ‗an instinctive impatience simply to 
bring about the desired result whatever, which, if it stood alone, would simply be an 
unwise decision.‘258  This ‗instinctive impatience‘ to bring about the desired result is 
sometimes understandable when one examines the facts of the particular case, and 
when one has faith in the judgement of the person making the decision.  But the wider 
structural effects are unacceptable.  It has lead to a range of unprincipled 
contradictions in the common law on mental incapacity: from the influence of third 
parties on decision making, to the degree to which a person must ‗understand‘ the risks 
posed by undesirable persons for the purposes of sex or contact with them, and the 
degree to which a person must understand and agree with professional appraisals of 
the risks of care and treatment refusal.  If, as I have suggested, there is no 
straightforward guidance that can be provided to disentangle incapacity from ‗unwise 
decisions‘, it would be more acceptable from the perspective of legal certainty to be 
upfront about the range of risky or unsettling outcomes we are prepared to tolerate.  It 
is, furthermore, difficult to see how intervening to prevent these outcomes could be 
justified exclusively for people with disabilities and not all persons at risk.  This would 
place people with disabilities, professionals and courts alike on a more secure footing, 
although it would require us to abandon the myth that the MCA is value-neutral. 
THE ‗PROTECTION IMPERATIVE‘ 
The expansion of a ‗best interests‘ jurisdiction into care and welfare issues 
established new tools, which could be used for protective purposes, and which 
endowed social care practitioners with ‗fresh solutions and new responsibilities‘ (Hewitt, 
2000: 202).  In his ruling in CC v KK and STCC Baker J made the following 
observation: 
...there is a risk that all professionals involved with treating and helping 
that person – including, of course, a judge in the Court of Protection – 
may feel drawn towards an outcome that is more protective of the adult 
and thus, in certain circumstances, fail to carry out an assessment of 
capacity that is detached and objective.259 
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The vagueness in the way incapacity is defined, coupled with what Baker J and Ryder 
J call the ‗protection imperative‘,260 is in danger of creating a slide towards low and 
variable thresholds for incapacity and hence for interferences in best interests. 
Although in part the ‗protective imperative‘ stems from what Ryder J observes 
to be ‗a human response to the need to protect‘ a vulnerable person261 there are also 
social and legal reasons why social care practitioners may be drawn towards adopting 
a lower incapacity threshold.  I have outlined above a growing tendency in case law, 
LGO reports and SCRs to criticise social care practitioners for harms which befall a 
person as a result of risky choices they were later deemed to lack the mental capacity 
to make.262  Although we have not yet seen a case in social care where practitioners 
have been found negligent or to have breached a person‘s human rights by failing to 
‗identify‘ their incapacity to make some unwise decision and act accordingly, it was 
earlier argued that it does not seem impossible that such a case might occur.  
Meanwhile the media, whilst on the one hand being extremely critical of social care 
professionals for ‗interfering‘ in people‘s lives (Beckford, 2011; Butterworth, 2010; 
Kenber, 2011a; b; Reid, 2011; Taylor, 2011), can also be also extremely critical of 
courts and professionals alike for failing to override a person‘s choices where some 
harm later befalls them (Burnett, 2011; Wimbledon Guardian, 2011; Monckton, 2012). 
Gareth Owen, a psychiatrist, has suggested that the caring professions find the 
MCA difficult because it allows for tragedy.  ‗People can genuinely feel that something 
that is unfolding [that] is going to have an unhappy ending‘ and we need, he suggests, 
‗to develop a 'tragic wisdom' that is ‗willing to allow that there are endings that are not 
necessarily happy‘ (Cooper, 2011).  Owen makes reference to Aristotle‘s Poetics, 
which argues that tragedies are characterised by a reversal of fortunes arising from a 
person‘s Hamartia, their mistake.  Tragedies are, according to Aristotle, characterised 
by both seriousness and dignity.  Yet it seems the public itself might not be ready to 
entertain the tragic wisdom of the dignity of risk, of accepting Hamartia, just yet.  
Operating within a climate of only limited tolerance of risk, social care 
practitioners may themselves experience uncertainty over when it is acceptable to 
allow a person to make a harmful choice.  In such circumstances, a person would want 
to have a robust assessment to fall back on, to demonstrate that the person had the 
mental capacity to make the choice and was prepared to accept the risks.  Yet, when 
the criteria for mental capacity are flexible and poorly defined, it is understandable – 
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albeit not desirable - that an assessor might feel safer employing a more conservative 
threshold.  The main effects of arbitrary thresholds in distinguishing incapacity from 
unwise decisions will be felt by those being assessed.  However, even care 
practitioners may experience anxiety and fear of arbitrary criticism around the 
assessment of mental capacity and the public‘s conflicted desires for freedom from 
interferences and harm at the same time. 
4.4 PRINCIPLES RELATING TO ‗BEST INTERESTS‘ 
Once it has been established that a person lacks capacity, any act done or 
decision made on their behalf must be in their best interests. 263   Section 4 MCA 
provides a lengthy ‗checklist‘ of issues that best interests decision makers must 
consider and people whom they must consult where reasonable practicable.  Best 
interests decisions will be compliant with s4 MCA if decision makers reasonably believe 
‗that what he does or decides is in the best interests of the person concerned‘.264  The 
considerations and consultation duties are as follows: 
 Decision makers must not make assumptions about what is in a person‘s 
best interests ‗merely‘ on the basis of their age, appearance condition or 
aspects of their behaviour.265   
 They must consider whether it is likely that P will gain or regain the capacity 
to make the decision himself in the future.266   
 They must ‗so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the 
person to participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as 
possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him.‘267   
 They must consider, so far as reasonably ascertainable, ‗the person‘s past 
and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written 
statement made by him when he had capacity)‘, any beliefs or values ‗that 
would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity‘, and ‗other 
factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.‘268   
 Decisions about life-sustaining treatment must not be ‗motivated by a desire 
to bring about his death.‘269 
 So far as reasonably practicable, they must consult with anyone named by 
P ‗as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on matters of 
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that kind‘, ‗anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his 
welfare‘, and ‗any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the 
person‘, and ‗any deputy appointed for the person by the court‘.270   
Despite the quite elaborate procedural requirements of s4 MCA, the broad 
scope for interpretation and different ‗weighing‘ of considerations means best interests 
is more akin to a ‗standard‘, ‗whose elements are insufficiently determined by 
language‘, than a legal rule (Solan, 2012: 466).  The checklist does not prioritise any 
particular considerations or perspectives.  The courts often draw up a ‗balance sheet‘ 
to weigh up different considerations,271 and the approach under s4 MCA is sometimes 
described as ‗objective‘ in contrast with substituted judgments approaches whereby the 
Court tried to divine the decision which the patient would have made if competent.272  
Coggon (2008a: 219) argues that the flexibility of best interests under the MCA ‗allows 
for differences in values, and is thus ...appropriate in a pluralist liberal system.‘  
However, as discussed with the definition of mental capacity itself, flexibility can all too 
easily stray into arbitrariness without the guidance of clear and well known principles.  
Given the significance of the issues which may hinge upon the outcome of best 
interests decision, it is important from a republican perspective that parameters which 
may lead to different outcomes are suitably constrained.  In this section I review how 
far ‗best interests‘ case law has provided clear and consistent principles to guide the 
kinds of interferences which characterise ‗institutional domination‘. 
4.4.1 GENERAL BEST INTERESTS PRINCIPLES 
Before considering specific areas of concern, a few recurring general issues in 
best interests case law will be reviewed.  The first is the weight and importance that 
should be attached to P‘s wishes and feelings.  HH Marshall J has held that wherever 
P‘s wishes are not ‗irrational‘, ‗impracticable‘ or ‗irresponsible‘ this ‗effectively gives rise 
to a presumption in favour of implementing those wishes‘.273  However, Lewison J held 
that this ‗may have slightly overstated the importance to be given to P's wishes‘, 
observing ‗The only imperative is that the decision must be made in P's best 
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interests‘.274  Munby LJ considered this issue at length in ITW v Z & Ors275, saying that 
P‘s wishes and feelings were always a ‗significant factor‘ although there was no a priori 
weight attached to them, which would always be case-specific and fact-specific.276  
However, he observed that the following factors would be influential in determining how 
much weight to attach to P‘s wishes and feelings: 
 ‗the degree of P's incapacity, for the nearer to the borderline the more 
weight must in principle be attached to P's wishes and feelings‘;277 
 ‗the strength and consistency of the views being expressed by P‘; 
 ‗the possible impact on P of knowledge that her wishes and feelings are not 
being given effect to‘;278 
 ‗the extent to which P's wishes and feelings are, or are not, rational, 
sensible, responsible and pragmatically capable of sensible implementation 
in the particular circumstances‘; 
 ‗crucially the extent to which P's wishes and feelings, if given effect to, can 
properly be accommodated within the court's overall assessment of what is 
in her best interests‘.279 
Munby LJ‘s guidance is doubtless helpful in expanding the best interests balance sheet 
to cover important considerations, but these principles are not determinative guidance 
for any given case.  A related consideration impacting upon best interests may be how 
far a person‘s expressed wishes and preferences are regarded as authentically theirs.  
For example, in K v LBX the influence of his father on his ability to articulate his own 
wishes meant that his wishes would hold less weight for determining his best interests. 
A second theme that recurs through much ‗welfare‘ case law is the balancing of 
‗happiness‘ and ‗risk‘.  In Local Authority X v MM and KM Munby LJ warned that: 
...we must avoid the temptation always to put the physical health and 
safety of the elderly and the vulnerable before everything else... 
Physical health and safety can sometimes be bought at too high a price 
in happiness and emotional welfare. The emphasis must be on sensible 
risk appraisal, not striving to avoid all risk, whatever the price, but 
instead seeking a proper balance and being willing to tolerate 
manageable or acceptable risks as the price appropriately to be paid in 
order to achieve some other good – in particular to achieve the vital 
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good of the elderly or vulnerable person's happiness. What good is it 
making someone safer if it merely makes them miserable?'280 
This passage has been cited frequently in case law,281 and in an extra-curial 
speech Munby LJ added to it this passage: ‗And if this is where safeguarding takes us, 
then is it not, in truth, another form of abuse – and, moreover, abuse at the hands of 
the State?' (Lord Justice Munby, 2012b).282  The difficulty is that describing excessive 
paternalism as potentially another form of abuse does not help to define the line across 
which ‗physical health and safety has been bought at too high a price in happiness‘.  
The statement is very helpful for decision makers and courts seeking to make less risk 
averse decisions that promote emotional welfare, but it does not offer especially clear 
guidance about the risks that can be tolerated. 
4.4.2 BEST INTERESTS AND THE PROBLEMS OF DOMINATION IN 
SOCIAL CARE 
The problem of institutional domination can be broken down into two 
interconnected sets of issues: 
1. The decision to place a person in an institution, and whether or not they can 
leave it, as an interference in itself. 
2. The interferences with a person‘s choices and freedoms which they may be 
subjected to within an institution. 
These issues are interconnected in a variety of ways.  Firstly, as argued in Chapters 1 
and 2, whether or not we recognise a place as an ‗institution‘ will to some extent 
depend on the degree to which residents‘ everyday choices and freedoms are eroded 
by staff in that setting.  Secondly, whether or not it is in a person‘s best interests to 
place them in an institution will depend upon perceptions of the conditions within that 
institution.  Thirdly, the conditions within an institution will become more restrictive if a 
decision has been taken to prevent a person from leaving it.  Fourthly, where a 
population cannot exercise choices over where they live, and whether they can leave, 
they are more ‗dependent‘ and hence more at risk of domination according to 
republican philosophers.283     
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4.5 INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT: MENTAL CAPACITY, PUBLIC LAW 
AND BEST INTERESTS 
In Chapter 2 various concerns around involuntary placement were described.  
These included placements far from a person‘s family and home communities which 
were damaging to family relationships; people so placed were described as amongst 
the most socially excluded people in the UK.  There were also concerns about people 
being placed in inappropriate accommodation of various kinds, including in group 
homes if they had ‗challenging behaviour‘.  Empirical research also suggests that 
tensions can arise between families and professionals over involuntary placements, 
especially where professionals are influenced by ‗normalisation‘ approaches which 
advocate adults with learning disabilities moving out of the family home into 
‗independent‘ accommodation. 
Understanding the legal mechanics of ‗involuntary placement‘ in England 
requires some understanding of the public law powers and duties of public authorities 
to provide care services, and how these intersect with the MCA.  Unfortunately this is 
no mean task in a field which, as Jackson J recently put it, is ‗not legally coherent and 
bristles with intricate regulation‘284.  This discussion will only give an overview in the 
broadest terms.285  The entire field of community care law will shortly be re-codified by 
the Draft Care and Support Bill (2012), which clarifies many uncertainties in the law but 
leaves the essentials unchanged (see: Law Commission, 2008; 2011).  
Although the detail is often highly complex, the basics of community care law 
are simple.  A local authority must conduct an assessment of the community care 
needs of any person where it appears to them that they might be eligible for services 
which a local authority may provide. 286   Authorities are entitled to consider their 
resources when they decide what level of needs they are prepared to meet in their 
area.  However, if a person‘s assessed needs meet this threshold then the authority 
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must meet them through the provision of care services, regardless of the cost.287  The 
government attempted to homogenise the process of defining ‗eligible‘ needs by 
introducing binding guidance – euphemistically entitled ‗Fair Access to Care Services‘ - 
which distinguished between ‗low‘, ‗moderate‘, ‗substantial‘ and ‗critical‘ levels of need 
across several domains (Department of Health, 2003a; updated in: Department of 
Health, 2010c).  Authorities can decide whether to meet ‗low‘, ‗moderate‘, ‗substantial‘ 
or ‗critical‘ needs.288  Assessors must identify which of a person‘s ‗presenting needs‘ 
are eligible for community care services by reference to the threshold adopted by their 
local authority. 
Although all eligible needs must be met, authorities have considerable 
discretion in how they might choose to meet them, and they must also have regard for 
the ‗best value‘ way to discharge their powers and duties.289  Authorities are obliged to 
‗take all reasonable steps to reach agreement with the person and, where they think it 
appropriate, any carers of that person, on the community care services which they are 
considering providing to him to meet his needs‘ (Department of Health, 2004: [2.3]).  
However, if an authority makes a ‗reasonable offer‘ of a service which would meet a 
person‘s eligible needs then they are not obliged to offer a person a different service 
which would have greater resource implications.290 As ‗public functions‘ under s6 HRA, 
assessment and the provision of support must be compatible with a person‘s ECHR 
rights.  The authority might offer support to enable a person to continue living in the 
family home if that is where they currently are, 291  or it might make an offer of a 
placement in a supported living service292 or a residential care home.293  In a small 
proportion of cases, a person‘s needs might qualify as ‗health‘ not ‗social care‘ and so 
be commissioned through the NHS as ‗continuing care‘.294 
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Where a person is already receiving care services the authority must conduct 
reviews of their care needs.295 At these reviews the authority may decide to make 
available an alternative offer of a different way of meeting a person‘s eligible needs.  In 
some cases, this may mean that a person may have to move from one setting to 
another because assessors have changed their view of their needs, or of how they 
might be met.296  But the local authority is under no automatic obligation to make 
available offers of alternative support arrangements simply because a person does not 
like the service they are receiving.  In this way, public law may shape the availability of 
‗alternatives‘ which in turn influence whether or not a person is ‗free to leave‘ a 
particular setting.  This is highly relevant to the question of whether or not they are 
deprived of their liberty, discussed in Chapter 6. 
The intersection between community care law and the MCA is complex, 
sometimes contentious and is still evolving.  Local authorities making ‗best interests‘ 
decisions on behalf of people they deem to lack the capacity to make decisions about 
their care arrangements appear to be relying upon ss5-6 MCA; it is very rare that 
formal authority in the form of a court order or welfare deputyships is sought.297  The 
combination of the MCA and local authorities public law powers and duties to provide 
community care services, appears to have created a remarkably potent, yet informal, 
mechanism for involuntary placement in community care institutions.298 
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4.5.1 BEST INTERESTS, AND THE TENSION BETWEEN FAMILY 
LIFE AND ‗NORMALISATION‘ 
A recurrent theme in Court of Protection case law is whether it is in the ‗best 
interests‘ of people with learning disabilities to live with their families or in some form of 
institutional accommodation.  Sometimes this takes the form of whether or not a person 
should leave the family home,299 in other cases it concerns whether or not they should 
move back to live with them.300  As most of these types of cases occurred after the 
HRA came into force, these questions are typically considered by the courts through 
the lens of Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect for home, family and private life.   
Sedley LJ established in Re F (adult patient) that Article 8 did not prohibit the 
state from intervening in family life where there were serious concerns that ‗other 
individuals, however closely related and well-intentioned‘ could ‗create or perpetuate 
situations which jeopardise their welfare.‘ 301   In Re S (Adult Patient) (Inhererent 
Jurisdiction: Family Life), Munby LJ found that different elements of Article 8 could 
come into conflict.  A parents‘ right to family life might be engaged by their desire for 
their adult son or daughter to remain at home with them, but the desire of competent 
sons or daughters‘ to leave home and exclude their parents from their ‗inner circle‘ was 
protected by their Article 8 right to private life.302  In respect of adults who lacked 
capacity, however, Munby LJ made the following statement: 
I am not saying that there is in law any presumption that mentally 
incapacitated adults are better off with their families: often they will be; 
sometimes they will not be. But respect for our human condition, regard 
for the realities of our society and the common sense to which Lord 
Oliver of Aylmerton referred in In Re KD, surely indicate that the starting 
point should be the normal assumption that mentally incapacitated 
adults will be better off if they live with a family rather than in an 
institution - however benign and enlightened the institution may be, and 
however well integrated into the community - and that mentally 
incapacitated adults who have been looked after within their family will 
be better off if they continue to be looked after within the family rather 
than by the State.303 
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This passage has been quoted in a large number of cases on best interests,304 often as 
an authority for a general preference for placements in the family home over 
‗institutional‘ care.  Statements endorsing family over institutional placements can be 
found elsewhere in Court of Protection case law.  In P & Q v Surrey County Council, 
Wilson LJ stated that if a person was ‗is living with her parents or other members of his 
natural family in their home, she is living – in that respect – the most normal life 
possible‘.305  Hewitt (2012) finds ‗something special – something almost mystical‘ about 
family life in these remarks.  Yet there are uncomfortable infantilising overtones to the 
assumption that it is ‗natural‘ for adults with learning disabilities to remain living in the 
parental home, an assumption which would be unlikely to hold for non-disabled adults.  
The right of adult children to personal development outside the family home espoused 
by Munby LJ was discussed only in connection with competent adults.306 
A contrasting view of what living arrangements are more desirable for adults 
with learning disabilities comes from the principles of normalisation, that disabled 
people should be free to live their lives ‗on the same terms as others in society‘ (Perrin 
and Nirje, 1985; cited in Deeley, 2002: 21), outlined in Chapter 2.  Early decisions 
which found that it was not in a person‘s best interests to remain living their families 
involved exposure to abuse307 or neglect,308 but in recent years the courts have also 
began to regard the opportunity to experience ‗independent living‘ as in itself a factor in 
determining best interests.  In A Primary Care Trust v P, discussed above, there were 
serious concerns about P‘s mother not adhering to the medication regime for his 
epilepsy.  However it was also held that if he remained with his mother he would never 
experience ‗the making of a true choice about independence‘309 and a move would ‗free 
him from the dominating effects of an obsessive and smothering relationship‘.310  In K v 
LBX, also discussed above, L‘s father invoked Munby LJ‘s ‗starting point‘ assumption 
that ‗mentally incapacitated adults will be better off if they live with a family rather than 
in an institution‘.  In favouring a move to supported living arrangements the judge at 
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first instance311 had relied upon the following passage from an unreported case by 
Roderic Wood J: 
It does seem to me, with the greatest of respect to Munby J, that I 
should record that in my more recent experience of such cases it is very 
much the approach when dealing with incapacitated adults that whilst in 
many cases the family may be the providers of care and nurture for such 
adults, there seems to me to be a philosophical and practical shift 
towards ensuring as greater degree of independence in living 
arrangements as is possible. 
The OS argued on behalf of L that ‗adults should be assisted to have the 
greatest control over their lives consistent with their disability, and to have the same 
opportunities as anyone else‘, including opportunities to live independently ‗according 
to the adult's wishes.‘312  Perhaps surprisingly, given the use to which Munby LJ‘s 
passage has been put, the Court of Appeal was ‗far from convinced that Munby J‘s 
decision in Re S did in fact establish a formal starting point‘ regarding how a judge 
should approach the question of best interests, rather than ‗what would be many 
people‘s natural reactions‘.313  Black LJ reiterated Munby LJ‘s observation that Article 8 
ECHR contained an ‗inherent conflict‘ between the ‗right to personal development‘ and 
relationships with the outside world in private life and the right to family life.314  The 
Court of Appeal‘s judgment did not establish ‗independent living‘ as a new starting 
point, but concluded that a person‘s welfare was the paramount consideration and that 
‗A balanced consideration of all the circumstances and attention to what is required by 
Article 8 is all that is required.‘315  It was found to be in L‘s best interests to experience 
‗independent living‘. 
 
It appears from these judgments that over the last decade there has been a 
slow shift in the ideological influences on best interests decisions concerning family life 
and ‗independent living‘.  This is a good example of the ‗labile existence‘ of law 
described by Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009: 77, 82), and the responsiveness of welfare 
jurisdictions to ‗changes in social attitudes‘.316  Yet whilst it might be thought desirable 
that ‗normalisation‘ philosophies have come to influence best interests case law, the 
use of ‗independent living‘ in these cases is somewhat paradoxical.  Independent living 
is a central plank of the modern disability rights movement, yet its meaning in these 
cases appears to have become conflated with those services which are called 
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‗supported living‘ (e.g., Law Commission, 2011: [4.9]).  As noted in Chapter 2, 
supported living services can take on highly institutional characteristics.  By contrast, 
independent living as conceived by disability rights campaigners emphasises the 
importance of a person being able to exercise choice and control over his or her 
everyday activities and the form of support they receive (Independent Living Institute, 
2013; Mladenov, 2012; Morris, J., 1994; Morris, J., 2004).  Article 19 CRPD, the right to 
independent living, specifies that disabled people should enjoy ‗the opportunity to 
choose their place of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal basis 
with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living arrangement‘.  This element 
of choice of living arrangement would appear to be contradicted in cases like A Primary 
Care Trust v P where a move to ‗independent living‘ is imposed upon a person.317  
Despite growing domestic commentary on the ‗social and economic‘ side of Article 19, 
surprisingly little has been devoted to the ‗civil and political‘ elements of independent 
living which are linked to legal capacity (e.g.  Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2012; 
Office for Disability Issues, 2011). However, the link between legal capacity and 
independent living has been drawn at an international level (Centre for Disability Law & 
Policy, 2011; Lewis, 2011; Parker, 2011). 
As Nussbaum (2009: 332) notes, often in the context of cognitive disability, civil 
and political rights can be more controversial than social and economic rights.  As 
these cases suggest, the relationship between legal capacity, choice and independent 
living can be complex and contested, especially where a person‘s choices may be 
heavily influenced by third parties.  From some perspectives, these cases might be 
regarded as evidence of what Quinn (2009: 217) calls a ‗textual toehold‘ in the CRPD 
which can be used to dilute more radical interpretations of the treaty.  Yet if disability 
campaigners are uneasy with the use of ‗independent living‘ and ‗supporting capacity‘ 
to justify interventions which override a person‘s wishes and preferences, they will 
need to provide much more detailed and practical guidance and commentaries for 
situations like A Primary Care Trust v P and K v LBX. 
From a republican perspective, the shift from the ‗starting point‘ of a preference 
for care in the family home to these later ‗normalisation‘ influenced decisions are 
notable for the temporary instability they created around the interpretation of Article 8 in 
these cases.  Such instabilities are inevitable if ‗welfare‘ jurisdictions and human rights 
law are to be ‗living instruments‘ which respond to social change.  However, they do 
create a greater risk of arbitrariness through opening up unanticipated shifts in 
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permissible interferences.  It is important that such shifts of interpretation are widely 
and clearly communicated to those exercising power and those affected by it if this 
temporary arbitrariness is to be as limited in duration as possible. It is, therefore, 
deeply troubling that the earlier rulings that influenced the Court of Appeal in K v LBX 
were not published. 
Republicans might, however, take a more sympathetic view of state intervention 
in these cases.  In A Primary Care Trust v P the local authority expressed concerns 
about ‗the dominating effects of an obsessive and smothering relationship‘318, and in K 
v LBX about ‗concern had been expressed that L was in an environment in which he 
could not articulate his own wishes, as opposed to what he perceived to be the wishes 
of his father‘.319  Both cases suggest that local authorities were acting to remove people 
from settings where they might be ‗dominated‘ by family carers, a concern which would 
be looked upon approvingly by republican theorists.  However, we must be careful 
about too readily assuming that state action to remove a person from one place of 
domination enhances liberty; it is equally possible that such persons are subjected to a 
form of ‗decentralised‘ domination (Lovett, 2010a: 52-3) where they are subject to 
arbitrary interferences wherever they live.  We should be especially cautious of this, 
since these ‗normalisation‘ inspired interpretations of Article 8 and best interests 
appear to set a much lower threshold for intervention than older cases where there was 
a background of physical abuse or neglect.   
4.5.2 BEST INTERESTS AND RESOURCES 
One developing area of the complex interface between the MCA and public law 
is the extent to which additional resources must be made available for decisions in a 
person‘s best interests.  The received wisdom is that the MCA, and by corollary the 
Court of Protection, cannot require a public authority to provide treatment or services 
which it is not already required to do under public law.320  This issue has a parallel in 
child welfare proceedings, where Lady Hale held in Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond-
upon-Thames London Borough Council321 that ‗Family courts have no power to conjure 
up resources where none exist.‘322  This means that although the MCA requires best 
interests decisions to be made with additional consideration of the least restrictive 
option, in practice best interests decision makers may have to select from an 
unattractive set of options, all of which might be quite restrictive of a person‘s rights 
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and freedoms.  One consequence of ‗focusing only on the options available on the 
day‘, as Bartlett (2012a: 842) has observed, ‗is that it creates no impetus for change‘.  
A cynic might observe that the MCA creates a remarkably friction-free mechanism to 
insert people into care services which those with capacity might, reasonably enough, 
object to – so long as those services remain the best of the available alternatives.  
Where support for a person to remain living with family or in their own home carries 
significant cost implications, limited resources may increase the probability that the 
MCA will be used to place them in an institutional setting. 
However, the interface between the MCA and public law may not be quite so 
simple as these readings would suggest.  Decisions made under the MCA will often 
represent a significant interference with a person‘s human rights, particularly their 
Article 8 rights to respect for home, family and private life.  Efforts to leverage 
additional community care resources out of local authorities using positive obligations 
under Article 8 have tended to meet with only limited success.  In R (Bernard) v London 
Borough of Enfield323 a local authority was found to have failed to discharge its positive 
obligations to restore a woman‘s dignity under Article 8 when it failed to act upon a 
community care assessment which identified eligible needs.  However, the 
circumstances of Bernard were quite extreme; the local authority had failed to provide 
any assistance to help Mrs Bernard access the bathroom, with the result that she was 
frequently forced to soil her clothes and floors of their home.  In more recent cases – 
most notably R (McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea324  - the 
courts have been less inclined to find that positive obligations to make available 
additional community care resources arise out of Article 8.   
Often the interferences permissible under the MCA can raise unusual human 
rights questions which would not arise in respect of adults who are said to have mental 
capacity.  For example, several cases have concerned people who are said to lack the 
capacity to consent to sexual relations – and so local authorities have put in place care 
arrangements which involve a high degree of monitoring and control in order to prevent 
a person from having sex.325  Such arrangements are likely to incur greater costs than 
care plans which did not involve such a high degree of surveillance and control.  The 
use of restraint can also engage human rights considerations, and sometimes 
alternatives to particular forms of restraint in order to avoid a breach of a person‘s 
human rights may have cost implications.326   
In Local Authority X v MM & KM Munby J held that MM lacked the capacity to 
make decisions about contact with her boyfriend, but not to consent to sex with him.  
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Consequently, Munby J held that if the local authority were going to restrict his access 
to her in her home, they must make available an alternative space – he suggested a 
hotel room - where she could enjoy private time with him.  The local authority retorted 
that they were under no public law obligation to provide service users with facilities to 
enable them to enjoy sexual relations.327  Munby J endorsed the following argument, 
relying upon R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department328: 
...if the local authority seeks to interfere in – indeed, control – her life by 
saying where she must live, by placing her on her own somewhere 
where KM is not even allowed to visit her, and by controlling KM's 
access to her, then, says Mr Sachdeva, the situation is very different. 
The local authority is by its own acts creating a situation where, if a 
breach of Article 8 is to be avoided, the local authority must take certain 
positive steps – specifically, steps to enable MM to continue, in an 
appropriate and dignified way, her sexual relationship with KM.329 
It would appear that positive obligations to make available additional resources may 
arise where the acts of a public authority give rise to an interference with a person‘s 
rights.  Such acts may be more likely to occur where public authorities are empowered 
to intervene in a person‘s best interests. 
Disputes around resources linked to the MCA can sometimes arise over 
whether or not public authorities are obliged to support a person to remain living in their 
own home or with family, even if this attracts additional costs.  Article 19 CRPD 
contains a socio-economic element whereby states are expected to make support 
available for people with disabilities to live in the accommodation of their choosing on 
an equal basis with others.  However, as with all socio-economic elements of the 
CRPD, states are only obliged to undertake this ‗to the maximum of its available 
resources‘.330  Similar qualified rights may arise under Article 8 ECHR.  For example in 
the case R (Gunter) v South Western Staffordshire Primary Care Trust331 Article 8 was 
held to carry ‗considerable‘ weight to provide support for a person to remain living with 
their family.332  However, interests protected by Article 8 will always be qualified with 
respect to public resources, as the ‗economic well-being of the country‘ constitutes one 
of the legitimate aims for interferences.   
In recent years several NGOs have attempted to build upon the ECtHR‘s 
tentative concession in Botta v Italy333 towards positive obligations under Article 8 to 
provide support for people with disabilities, towards an obligation to provide 
community-based, non-institutional living arrangements for people with disabilities 
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(Cojocariu and Duffy, 2010; Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2009).  Whilst the 
ECtHR has conceded that a person should not ‗automatically‘ be detained as a result 
of community based alternatives334, they have so far declined to examine the Article 8 
issues raised in these cases and hence the associated matter of positive obligations.335  
Consequently, the degree to which human rights may be used to ward off institutional 
admissions in a person‘s ‗best interests‘ is still an uncertain and evolving area of 
domestic and Convention law.  
4.6 INSTITUTIONAL DOMINATION IN THE COURTS 
The first aspect of the problem of institutional domination is a person‘s trajectory 
into a service and inability to leave it.  Where a person has been placed in a setting 
through a concatenation of public authorities‘ community care powers and the MCA a 
person becomes highly dependent upon their relationship with that care provider.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, increased dependence on a relationship is a risk factor for a state 
of domination, but much will depend on the extent to which they are exposed to 
potential arbitrary interferences with their choices and freedoms.  Insofar as they exist 
in a relationship which they are unable to leave, which exposes them to such 
potentially arbitrary interferences, a person is dominated.  Having considered how a 
person might come to be placed in an institutional setting, I will now consider how far 
the courts have articulated clear criteria for when the interferences of concern in 
institutional settings are permissible.  I focus primarily on how far MCA case law has 
constrained such interferences, but because of the MCA‘s complex relationships with 
other areas of law, not least human rights law, I have also looked at some important 
cases which are not explicitly about ‗capacity‘. 
  
4.6.1 INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND REGIMES 
Central to Goffman‘s (1961: 43) much lauded analysis of ‗total institutions‘ and 
their mortifying effects was the imposition of institutional rules and regimes, whereby 
‗minute segments of a person's line of activity may be subjected to regulations and 
judgements by staff; the inmates life is penetrated by constant sanctioning interaction 
from above‘.  Empirical studies and reports reviewed in Chapter 2 described a range of 
examples of this phenomenon, including institutions dictating when residents must 
wake up, wash, go to bed, restrictions on food choices – or an absence of food 
choices, restrictions on smoking, on going out, who they may talk to, when they may 
(or must) be in their own bedroom, etc.   
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As discussed above, the primary mechanism which gives the MCA legal 
traction in community care settings is the general defence.  For a defence to become 
relevant, it might be thought that there must be some kind of ‗offence‘ for it to be 
invoked against.  In several places the MCA code of practice suggests that the Act 
applies as much to everyday decisions like what a person wears or eats for breakfast, 
as ‗major‘ decisions around care and treatment (Lord Chancellor‘s Office, 2007).336  
However, it is not entirely clear what kind of offence a person would be committing if 
they ignored the apparent requirement to apply the Act to everyday decisions.  The 
MCA does not contain any independent right to autonomy, whatever its admirers claim; 
to identify why interferences which do not accord with the MCA are unlawful, we must 
look elsewhere. 
The early case law which established the ‗structural pillars‘ of the MCA were 
concerned with potential violations of tort law.  In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
Lord Goff found that the doctrine of necessity protects ‗the relative or friend or 
neighbour who comes in to look after [a man who has had a stroke], will commit no 
wrong when he or she touches his body.‘337  Yet the torts of trespass do not quite grasp 
the nature of the problem regarding institutional rules and regimes, concerned as they 
are with violations of bodily integrity or interference with a person‘s possessions.  They 
address only situations where physical interferences occur,338 not the effect of systems 
of rules and sanctions which a person might obey out of fear of being reprimanded or 
simply out of institutionalised deference to authority.  The torts of trespass, with their 
tendency to focus on the particular act, seem ill equipped to tackle the cumulative, 
long-term and pervasive impact of living under authoritarian institutional regimes. 
The ECHR rights offer a more promising avenue to render the imposition of 
institutional rules and regimes into serious justiciable issues.  The domestic courts and 
ECtHR have considered some extreme rules and regimes in some prisons339  and 
hospitals340 through the lens of Article 3 ECHR, considering whether or not they were 
‗inhuman or degrading‘.  However the unfortunate ruling in Herczegfalvy v Austria341, 
which found that ‗a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as 
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inhuman or degrading‘342, makes it very difficult to tackle measures which purport to 
have a therapeutic purpose.  Bartlett (2013 [forthcoming]) writes that the ruling has 
‗created considerable difficulties‘343 in bringing litigation about care and treatment within 
institutions for people with mental disabilities under Articles 3 and 8.  In the recent case 
Stanev v Bulgaria, the ECtHR found for the first time that conditions in a social care 
facility violated Article 3, pointing to the inadequate heating, poor sanitation - with 
toilets ‗in an execrable state‘, insufficient food and the duration for which residents were 
exposed to these conditions.  The ECtHR also commented that the failure of the home 
to return the same clothes to same people after laundering ‗was likely to arouse a 
feeling of inferiority in the residents‘.344  This suggests that Article 3 can be used to 
tackle acts that individually might not amount to especially serious torts or crimes, but 
whose cumulative and long-term impact can amount to a violation of a most 
fundamental human right.  However, because of the ruling in Herczegfalvy it may be 
more difficult to use Article 3 to unpick rules and regimes which take on a purported 
therapeutic aim. 
Article 8 ECHR potentially has greater utility for tackling the kinds of rules and 
restrictions of concern in social care today because threshold of severity for engaging 
Article 8 is substantially lower than Article 3.345  Being a qualified and not an absolute 
right the courts may be more willing to find violations, as a measure can thereby be 
restricted subject to justification, but not prohibited altogether.  However, remarkably 
few cases have tested whether rules and restrictions in care services violate Article 8 
ECHR and those which have are rather disappointing.   
In R (N) v Secretary of State for Health 346  detained patients brought 
proceedings under s7 HRA against Nottinghamshire Health Care NHS Trust and the 
Secretary of State for Health, challenging a ban on smoking at Rampton Hospital.  
They argued that Article 8 protected individuals against interferences by the state in the 
privacy of their home, and that ‗their life, detained in a hospital like Rampton, can be 
equated to life at home‘.347  Lord Clarke and Moses LJ found that the smoking ban did 
not ‗have a sufficiently adverse effect on a patient's physical or moral integrity‘348 to 
engage Article 8.  They further held that a secure hospital ‗is not the same as a private 
home and the distinction is of significance‘.349  They said that ‗The degree to which a 
person may expect freedom to do as he pleases and engage in personal and private 
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activity will vary according to the nature of the accommodation in which he lives.‘350 
Observing that Article 8 protected not merely a person‘s physical home but their ‗inner 
circle‘ of social relations and activities,351 the Court of Appeal went on to say that: 
Any intrusion within that inner circle is offensive. It is the fact of intrusion 
into the home which offends, irrespective of the importance of the 
activity which an individual seeks to pursue within the home. But that 
inner circle, whilst not destroyed, is significantly penetrated by reason of 
the very fact that a person is confined within a secure hospital. The 
patient does not lose all right to a private life but the nature of that life 
and the activities which he may pursue are seriously restricted and 
always overlooked. No patient can choose freely what he eats or drinks. 
That is not simply because restrictions can be justified, but more 
fundamentally because of the nature of the institution in which he eats 
and drinks. Even if, pace Baroness Hale, a person may do as he 
pleases in his own home, no-one can expect such freedom when 
detained in a secure hospital.352 
The ruling in R (N) v Secretary of State for Health is a troubling one.  Their 
Lordships suggest that the protection offered by Article 8 may be diluted if a person 
lives in institutional accommodation. Inevitably shared accommodation brings in train 
compromises which may interfere with a person‘s rights to private life, but insofar as 
Article 8 is engaged they must still be proportionate, in pursuit of a legitimate aim and 
necessary in a democratic society.    Yet the majority‘s analysis did not require such 
justification: Article 8 was not even engaged by the ban and they held that a person 
must expect such interferences ‗not simply because restrictions can be justified‘ but 
because of their status as detained patients.  In this passage the Lord Clarke and 
Moses LJ displayed significant reluctance to scrutinise the kinds of measures that 
might be imposed in institutional life.  Keene LJ‘s dissenting judgment took a very 
different approach, and one which would be far more helpful for unpicking the kinds of 
concerns which animate this thesis.  For him, smoking was a ‗greatly valued‘ pastime 
for many people and so deserved the protection of Article 8, 353  including in an 
‗institution where he or she resides for a substantial amount of time‘.354  Observing that 
other mental hospitals had not found it necessary to impose such a ban, and that this 
specific ban had no parliamentary endorsement, Keene LJ found that it violated Article 
8.355 
In the Scottish case Lyons v Board of the State Hospital356 a detained patient in 
the State Hospital sought judicial review of the hospital‘s introduction of a policy which 
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prohibited visitors from bringing food for patients, restricted patients from ordering food 
from outside services except one takeaway meal per month, and introduced a pricing 
policy in the hospital shop to encourage healthy food purchases.  Lady Dorrian found 
that the policy had been introduced unlawfully on procedural grounds, and so did make 
not any findings regarding the Article 8 issues raised by Lyons.  However, she did 
discuss the Article 8 and was critical of the ruling of Lord Clarke and Moses LJ in R (N) 
v Secretary of State of Health, saying that it came: 
...close to saying that the rights of a prisoner or the inmate of a high 
security hospital are limited merely and automatically as a result of their 
confinement, whereas the position ought to be that the prisoners retain 
their rights under article 8, interference with which requires to be 
justified.357   
In respect of Lyons‘ claim regarding the hospital food policy, she said: 
This case does not simply deal with a trivial aspect of everyday life. For 
inmates of the state hospital, the freedom to receive food parcels from 
visitors and to make purchases from an external source are some of the 
few areas in which they may exercise some sort of personal autonomy 
or choice. I have reached the conclusion that a person's right to choose 
what they eat and drink is a matter in respect of which article 8 is 
engaged. If that choice is interfered with, it must be justified.358 
Elsewhere, the dissenting judgments of judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Laffranque in 
Stanev v Bulgaria argued that the ECtHR ought to have considered factors which 
contributed towards ‗institutionalisation syndrome‘ under Article 8, in addition to 
considering the horrendous conditions in the Pastra Care home which contributed 
towards violations of Article 3.   
As things stand, the ruling in R(N) is ‗good law‘ in England and Wales; Lady 
Dorrian‘s obiter remarks, the dissenting voices of Keene LJ and the European judges in 
Stanev have no binding authority.  With growing numbers of dissenting voices 
expressing concern about institutional rules and restrictions, one can only hope that US 
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg‘s remark that ‗dissents speak to a future 
age‘ holds true.359  From a republican perspective, the Court of Appeal‘s refusal to find 
Article 8 engaged by the smoking ban in R(N) does not bode well for use of the law to 
limit the arbitrary imposition of institutional rules and regimes.  Furthermore, by finding 
that such restrictions are to be anticipated ‗because of the nature of the institution‘, the 
courts have ‗left unquestioned and hence reinforced‘ the exercise of disciplinary power 
within institutions, leaving such restrictions inscribed ‗in the very nature of things‘ 
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(Golder and Fitzpatrick, 2009: 64).  This ruling will directly affect psychiatric detainees, 
but it may have wider repercussions in other kinds of institution.  Although Lord Clarke 
and Moses LJ distinguished psychiatric detention from care homes and private 
homes360 the finding that smoking in itself did not warrant protection may be applied 
across other settings, and the reasoning may well leach into other prohibition and 
restrictions in everyday life.  The reasoning of Lady Dorrian, which recognises that 
seeming ‗trivial‘ freedoms like choices over food should be all the more treasured and 
protected for more restricted populations, is surely far to be preferred from the 
perspective of the problems of institutional domination. 
The following example, adopted by the CQC and EHRC (2011a: 43) to illustrate 
Article 8 in their guidance, suggests these bodies would prefer a much lower threshold 
for engagement than that adopted in R(N): 
I remember the day I moved her in, telling the manager all the things my 
mum liked and disliked. She especially disliked sugar in her tea. The 
first time I visited, the staff were serving afternoon tea.  I noticed they 
put two sugars in every cup. I said to the member of staff, ―My mum 
doesn‘t take sugar‖, to which she replied, ―It doesn‘t matter – she won‘t 
know anyway‖. 
The CQC and EHRC continue to describe these types of ‗everyday‘ issues as engaging 
Article 8 – regardless of the disdainful approach of the English courts.  In Chapter 5 I 
will describe how the CQC is in some respects better equipped than the courts to 
address certain kinds of pervasive and cumulative restrictions in institutional life.  
However, the CQC‘s actions in tackling such interferences are constrained by various 
factors - including limited powers to inspect supported living services, and address 
commissioning decisions – and in enforcing such interpretations the regulator would 
surely benefit from the greater clarity and authority that could be afforded from a court 
ruling on these matters. 
 
In the meantime, what does this mean for the MCA?  Almost no published Court 
of Protection cases explore these aspects of institutional life through the lens of best 
interests.  Several consider whether or not such restrictions might amount to 
deprivation of liberty,361 but they do not test whether the restrictions themselves are 
justifiable with reference to mental capacity, best interests and the HRA.  The issue 
does not appear to be that the Court of Protection is disdainful of such matters in the 
manner of R(N) – at least, they are not dismissive of it in published judgments – rather 
these matters seem not to be coming before the Court.  This ‗silence‘ on the 
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relationship between capacity, best interests and institutionalising rules and restrictions 
might be a result of a number of factors linked to access to justice.  These are explored 
at greater length in Chapter 5, but in essence people with mental disabilities will require 
considerable support, in particular from litigation friends, to bring litigation in the Court 
of Protection at all.  If potential supporters share the view that such matters are ‗trivial‘, 
are not really matters to trouble a court with, or that it is not in a person‘s best interests 
to pursue costly, lengthy and stressful litigation for anything but the most serious 
welfare disputes, then potential challenges may be filtered out at an early stage.  
Funding such challenges may also be a problem.362  Furthermore – and unlike the 
prisoners and restricted patients who brought analogous challenges against prison and 
hospital regimes – residents in care services are much less likely to be in contact with 
legal advisors, and to have experience of asserting their rights in court. 
This suggests that despite the claims of the MCA code of practice to legislate 
for ‗day to day‘ matters, and the hopes of the CQC (2012f) that the MCA represents a 
‗promising lever‘ to tackle ‗blanket rules‘, they have had little traction within the 
machinery of the law to date.  The MCA appears to have taken on a status more akin 
to guidance in relation to these everyday issues – there is little evidence of it being 
used in court by a person who is subject to some arbitrarily imposed rule to ‗invigilate‘ 
it.  There are some aspects of life within an institution which generate a flicker of legal 
interest, discussed below, but the question of institutional authority to impose rules and 
restrictions of its choosing on adults with learning disabilities lies unchallenged by law.  
For the moment, at least. 
4.6.2 CHOICE AND CONTROL OVER WHO PROVIDES CARE, AND 
HOW 
Philosophies of self-directed support (SDS), independent living and personal 
assistance emphasise the importance of a person being able to choose who they are 
supported by, and upon what terms.  This is typically contrasted with traditional models 
of welfare and institutional provision, whereby those commissioning and providing 
support services largely dictate the terms upon which a person receives support.  In 
legal terms, mental incapacity significantly undermines the logic of SDS, independent 
living and personal assistance.  Direct payments are a primary means by which ‗true‘ 
personal assistance can be achieved.  Yet a person who lacks the mental capacity to 
manage their direct payment can receive one only through a ‗suitable person‘363, and it 
will be that person – often a family member – who will exercise choice and control over 
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who provides care, not the service user themselves.  Schwehr (2010) has expressed 
concern that ‗personalised‘ care plans may ‗contract out‘ risks to third parties where a 
person lacks capacity, including safeguarding risks, risks of failure to discharge 
community care duties effectively, and the risks of becoming an employer.   
Around 24,000 adults with learning disabilities receive support through direct 
payments (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2012h), but data is 
unavailable on the number of those which are managed by a ‗suitable person‘.  The 
majority of people with learning disabilities using publicly funded services receive 
support through local authority arranged residential care or domiciliary care (NHS 
Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2012h).  As noted in Chapter 2, in such 
services people may experience very limited opportunities to influence employment 
and staff scheduling practices by the provider.   
Although it represents a diminished form of choice and control in contrast with 
models of personal assistance, a person might still be able to refuse support with a 
particular task or from a particular person.  In domiciliary care, for example, service 
users might refuse to allow care staff access to their property, although the legal rights 
of care home residents to refuse staff access to their rooms are diminished relative to 
domiciliary care users.  Greig (2009) writes that: 
In a residential care home, a person has no right to control who enters 
their house or personal room. They have no right to decline support from 
particular staff, let alone the overall provider. 
Strictly speaking this will not be quite true; residential care providers are bound by 
regulatory standards to respect the privacy of residents.364   Some residential care 
providers will also be public authorities in the meaning of s6 HRA365, and will be 
required to respect privacy in accordance with Article 8.  However, I have been unable 
to find any evidence that Article 8 has been used in the courts to assert a ‗right to be 
left alone‘ in the context of care provision.  Service users would also often be able to 
rely upon the torts of trespass to person and property in order to refuse consent to be 
touched, or for their possessions to be used, for the purposes of a particular task.  
These are, it is acknowledged, very limited ways of exercising choice and control over 
who provides support and how, and often this will leave service users with a Hobson‘s 
choice of support from a person or at a time which is not of their choosing or none at 
all. 
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Nevertheless, a person who is deemed to lack mental capacity may not even 
enjoy these, diminished, rights to choice and control over who supports them, in what 
tasks and how.  Control will be limited insofar as the MCA provides care staff with a 
defence for non-consensual access to one‘s property, to touch one‘s body or handle 
one‘s possessions.   This passage from G v E, A Local Authority & F366 demonstrates 
the extent to which a person – even a person with their own tenancy – may lose control 
over what support staff do on their property, to their body and possessions: 
Staff at Z Road exercise what the Official Solicitor describes as 
complete control over E's care and movements, and over assessments, 
treatment, contacts and residence... [T]he concrete situation is that E is 
currently confined to Z Road except when he is escorted to school or on 
visits or activities, and has no space or possession that is private or safe 
from interference or examination... E is unable to maintain social 
contacts because of restrictions placed on access to other people, 
including family members, and a decision has been made by the local 
authority that he will not be released into the care of others, or permitted 
to live elsewhere, unless such a move is considered appropriate. In 
assessing whether he is at liberty, it is also important to note that E has 
been prescribed Haloperidol, a neuroleptic medication, to reduce his 
agitation and more challenging behaviour. He has no control over the 
administration of that medication.367 
Clearly, E‘s experience of support is very far from the ideals of independent living and 
personal assistance – although ironically he does live in the kind of supported living 
service which is often taken to equate to ‗independent living‘.  In obiter remarks in this 
case, Baker J commented that it seemed unlikely that E did hold a ‗real‘ tenancy given 
that he lacked capacity to enter into any such agreement and: 
...the circumstances of E's occupation preclude any tenancy ever being 
granted, since staff have unrestricted access to his room and provide 
necessary services, so that there has not been, and cannot be, any 
grant of exclusive possession.368   
The extent to which a person‘s lack of capacity to agree a tenancy and inability to 
exclude care staff from their property were posited as factors which might render a 
‗supported living‘ service a de facto unregistered care home in the Alternative Futures 
cases, but this was not considered determinative by the court.369   
The courts have been reluctant to find that mental incapacity renders supported 
living services‘ registration status unlawful.  This is understandable, given that 
registration failures may be indictable criminal offences370 and there are substantial 
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financial gains to service users for using such services.371  However, it does confirm 
that mental incapacity substantially limits a person‘s ability to exercise control over who 
supports them and how, as well as diminishing control over their immediate personal 
environment.  These matters have tended to come before the courts in the context of 
regulators challenging a services‘ registration status or in considering whether or not a 
person is deprived of their liberty.  There is little evidence of any claims being brought 
in the Court of Protection or by way of s7 HRA which seek to assert service users‘ 
rights to exercise greater choice and control over who supports them and how.  This 
might be thought surprising, given how fundamental this is to the goals of the disability 
rights movement.  One reason may be that those who would be most likely to be able 
to assert these rights and bring such a challenge are already able to use direct 
payments to achieve these ends.  Consequently the common law has supplied few 
principles indicating how far a person using traditional care services, or with impaired 
mental capacity, may enjoy rights to control over their home and support arrangements 
which are central to ideals of independent living and personal assistance.   
4.6.3 RESTRAINT 
Given that CQC recently expressed concern about the use of restraint in 30-
50% of services for people with learning disabilities (Emerson, 2012), remarkably few 
published Court of Protection judgments have considered its use.  The use of restraint 
often hovers in the background for questions of whether or not a person is deprived of 
their liberty,372 or it might be endorsed to enable the delivery of a particular intervention 
which the court finds is in a person‘s best interests.373  Section 6 MCA requires that the 
use of restraint be proportionate, necessary and in a person‘s best interests – but 
statute and code offer scant guidance on how this should be interpreted in practice.  
The ruling in ZH v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis confirmed that s6 
MCA had supplanted ‗necessity‘ as a defence for the use of restraint, and reiterated 
that ‗where practicable‘ would-be restrainers should consult with a person‘s carers and 
use restraint only as a last resort.  However, only one published374 case to date has 
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considered a particular form of restraint in a care setting through the lens of best 
interests. 
The decision in C v A Local Authority (Re C) has given some of the clearest, 
and best, guidance on the use of restraint in care settings.  C was 18, had learning 
disabilities and autism, and lived in a residential school operated by the charity Scope.  
C often preferred not to wear any clothes, and in response to this the school had taken 
to confining him to a padded blue room without any toilet.  His mother alleged that he 
would urinate and defecate and smear his faeces in the room, and that there was 
‗frequently an acrid and pungent smell of faecal matter in the vicinity‘.375 The school‘s 
psychologist regarded C‘s desire not to wear any clothes as difficulties understanding 
‗acceptable social boundaries‘.376  However experts instructed by the court identified 
that C experienced extreme haptic sensitivity and might feel ‗the equivalent of 
neurological pain at certain times when his skin is touched and his desire to be naked 
is a form of tactile defensiveness‘.377   
Ryder J held that ‗It would be unacceptable for C as an incapacitated child to be 
secluded or restrained without reference to best practice guidelines‘.378 Consequently 
best interests decision makers must consider best practice guidance around restraint 
and seclusion ‗not least so as to determine whether any less restrictive options are 
available‘. 379   In this particular case the expert evidence held that best practice 
guidance concerning seclusion was contained in the MHA 1983 code of practice 
(Department of Health, 2008a), a conclusion which Ryder J said ‗no doubt has 
implications for other young people with serious learning disabilities who are in 
residential care.‘380   
Through this clever device, the sparse, flexible and ambiguous provisions of s6 
MCA were coupled to much more detailed and appropriate ‗best practice‘ guidance.  
Best practice guidance will, of course, differ depending upon the person and their 
circumstances, and it will change over time as new guidance is produced and other 
guidance falls out of favour.381  Although best practice guidance, and even the MHA 
code of practice,382 is not legally binding, this ruling potentially gives them much greater 
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legal force in social care settings where heretofore the use of restraint has been 
regulated only by the vagaries of the common law and potentially quite idiosyncratic 
interpretations of ‗necessity‘ and ‗proportionality‘ under s6 MCA. 
The judgment is also interesting for displaying the complex ways in which the 
general defence interacts with hierarchies of responsibility and control.  The case 
began as a judicial review against the local authority seeking a mandatory order for an 
appropriate care plan and damages for breach of C‘s Article 3, 5 and 8 rights under the 
HRA.  The court ruling found that C had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty by the 
school‘s actions, 383  but although the school did not escape censure, Ryder J 
recognised that the very need to use the ‗blue room‘ for seclusion arose because the 
local authorities‘ care plan was itself inadequate.  The judgment endorsed a detailed, 
and no doubt very costly, package of care which would provide C with a flat of his own, 
a closed garden area where C could be naked and a dedicated team of 15 members of 
staff to provide 3:1 staffing.384  Recent reports suggest that C is thriving in this new 
environment (Irwin Mitchell Solicitors, 2012).   
The case is a telling example of the relationship between the need for the use 
of restraint and a person‘s wider social and physical environment; a finding which 
would be predicted by the social model of disability.  This has significant implications 
for approaches to the meaning of deprivation of liberty, discussed in Chapter 6, which 
hold that a person is not deprived of their liberty if they are subject to restrictions which 
are the ‗inevitable corollary of his various disabilities‘.385  It is gratifying to see in C v A 
Local Authority a judgment that acknowledges the complex interrelationship between a 
person‘s needs, rights and their social and physical environment.  
4.6.4 MEDICATION 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the widespread use of sedating anti-psychotic 
medications to manage behaviour in care services is a live policy issue for people with 
mental disabilities, including people with learning disabilities.  They carry significant 
risks to health and wellbeing, and may be used where staff lack skills in non-
pharmacological support for ‗challenging behaviours‘.  Very often when people with 
mental disabilities are administered such medications in community care settings, they 
will be considered to lack the capacity to consent to use of such medications.  In 
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contrast with the MHA requirements for treatment for mental disorder for people who 
lack capacity,386 the MCA contains a dearth of procedural safeguards on their use.   
Former Minister for Social Care, Paul Burstow, has expressed the view that 
inappropriate prescription of these medications may constitute the crime of ‗wilful 
neglect‘, 387  and that doctors could be jailed for this (Ross, 2011).  Certainly this 
surprising view is not borne out by any formal guidance or case law.  However, given 
that over-use of these medications represents a very serious welfare issue and area of 
political anxiety, it is surprising that no cases have been brought before the courts in 
order to challenge their use.  One reason may be that once a person is so sedated, the 
likelihood of their being able to object sufficiently to give rise to a challenge of any kind 
is reduced.  This is one reason why some psychiatrists have called for the 
administration of such medications to be considered ‗Serious Medical Treatment‘ 
requiring an IMCA referral (Branton et al, 2009). 
Medications are sometimes mentioned in passing as potentially affecting a 
person‘s capacity,388 or forming part of the analysis of whether or not they are deprived 
of their liberty,389 yet whether or not their use is in a person‘s ‗best interests‘ has yet to 
be considered in any published judgment of the Court of Protection.  The ruling in C v A 
Local Authority suggests that their use must be in accordance with best practice 
guidance, although it is unclear what might constitute the most authoritative guidance 
for their use for adults with learning disabilities in community care settings.  Given that 
the evidence suggests they often harm a person‘s welfare, it would be useful to have 
some strong guidance from the courts on when such medications are, and are not, in a 
person‘s best interests. 
4.6.5 PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 
Concerns around privacy in care settings revolve around bodily integrity, 
enjoyment of private spaces, private enjoyment of one‘s possessions, and enjoyment 
of relationships with others without intrusion or interference.  Several of these issues 
have already been discussed above, and issues around contact with others outside the 
institution will be discussed below.  One further area which deserves mention is the 
question of surveillance of care service users by staff.  This was a defining 
characteristic of institutions picked up on by Goffman, and has been raised as an area 
of concern by regulators and institutional ‗survivors‘.   
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People who are deemed to lack the capacity to make decisions around risks 
encountered in everyday life are likely to be subject to fairly high levels of supervision 
within care services to ensure they do not come to harm.  This is linked to the 
protective obligations of those providing and arranging care, discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  Given that many people with a wide range of mental disabilities will fall into 
this category, human rights and mental capacity case law is remarkably silent upon this 
issue.  There are few judgments setting out when surveillance represents an excessive 
interference in a person‘s life.  The recent ruling in J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1)390 
may, however, represent an emergent trend in that direction.   
The facts of the case were fairly extreme.  It concerned a man called 
‗George‘391 who was diagnosed with ‗childhood autism, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
dissocial personality disorder, mixed anxiety disorder and paedophilia‘.392  George had 
an unfortunate compulsion to write letters describing his fantasies of sex with children 
and leave them in public places, as well as other ‗sexually deviant behaviour‘.393  As a 
result of George‘s behaviour, he was ‗from time to time strip-searched... his 
correspondence is monitored... his telephone conversations listened to‘. 394   These 
interferences, Mostyn J observed, clearly engaged George‘s Article 8 rights.395  Mostyn 
then noted that ‗The first requirement of Article 8 is that the curtailment must be "in 
accordance with the law"‘, which in turn meant it must have a basis in law, the legal 
measure must ‗be accessible to the person in question‘ and the consequences of the 
legal measure must be predictable.396  All of these principles are, of course, basic 
elements of the rule of law and republican approaches to liberty.  Mostyn J went on to 
observe that even though the basis of permissible restrictions in national law has been 
interpreted remarkably liberally in the context of the MHA397, ‗there are no equivalent 
detailed procedures and safeguards stipulated anywhere for persons detained 
pursuant to orders made under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.‘398   
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Mostyn J went on to issue an important judgment which required a detailed 
policy setting out the circumstances in which George, and his room, could be searched, 
and his correspondence and communications monitored. 399   The NHS Trust was 
responsible for reviewing the policy on an annual basis, and scrutinising monthly 
reports and incident forms regarding its applications; and – perhaps most remarkably – 
the CQC agreed to: 
‗a) Seek advice from an appropriate expert, including an expert in 
human rights, as to the care of George; and 
b) Specifically case track George during the course of any compliance 
review and shall ensure that any material allegations of abuse of George 
at the Y Care Home are raised with the relevant safeguarding 
authority.‘400 
Mostyn J went on to bemoan the lack of guidance from Parliament, the Executive or 
CQC for these types of restrictions, where they occur in private care homes rather than 
hospitals which detain patients under the MHA.401 
 
Mostyn J‘s judgment in J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1) represents a truly 
remarkable break with the ‗informal‘ approach taken to restrictions and interferences 
with the rights of people in community based care services under the MCA.  Although 
the restrictions George was subject to were extreme, and for quite unusual reasons, a 
high level of surveillance and physical interventions are not so unusual in care 
services.  As will be discussed in Chapter 6, debates are currently currently raging 
around whether those people with mental disabilities who are subject to round the clock 
supervision and control by care staff, frequent use of physical restraint and 
administration of mood-altering medication, are deprived of their liberty.  The absolute 
dearth of detailed policy guidance on such high levels of restriction and intrusions into 
privacy for these people would surely engage the concerns Mostyn J outlined in 
connection with George.  The case‘s wider consequences for commissioning bodies, 
regulators and the Executive could be significant, and are likely to be hotly disputed.402   
4.6.6 INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
FAMILY AND FRIENDS 
Local authorities and care services can exercise considerable control over the 
sexual, familial and friend relationships of care service users.   Often such restrictions 
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are associated with deprivation of the person‘s liberty, although such restrictions are 
also regarded as having independent implications for Article 8 rights to ‗establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings.‘ 403   The degree to which such 
restrictions require court authorisation, or can even be authorised under the DoLS, is 
as yet unclear.404  Nevertheless, a comparatively large number of these cases have 
come before the Court of Protection and resulted in published judgments.  This is an 
area of high activity in MCA case law. 
The use of court‘s declarations regarding whether or not contact is in a person‘s 
best interests was carved out early on under the declaratory jurisdiction.  In Re C 
(Mental Patient: Contact)405 the high court made a best interests declaration that the 
mother of an adult who lacked capacity should permit contact with her father, where 
she had been obstructing it.  In Re D-R (Contact: Mentally Incapacitated Adult) the 
court held that there was no presumption of a right to contact for the parent of an adult 
child; the court had to assess whether or not contact is in the person‘s best interests.  
In Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction)406 the Court of Appeal issued a declaration that F 
should have only limited contact with her family.   
Following the passage of the MCA, in Re GC407 Hedley J found that the state 
should not intervene in a person‘s enjoyment of private life unless continuance of it was 
clearly inconsistent with their welfare.  He adopted a balance sheet approach.  Later on 
in A Primary Care Trust v P, discussed above, Hedley J rejected the Primary Care 
Trust‘s (PCT) call to suspend all contact between P and his mother,408 saying that 
would be ‗a manifest breach of Article 8(1)‘409.  However, Hedley J did set out a fairly 
detailed ‗general approach‘ to contact between P and his mother, which gave guidance 
but did not amount to a specific order.410  This guidance included the frequency411 and 
duration of visits and phone calls from P‘s mother to him,412 and a preference for ‗light‘ 
rather than ‗heavy‘ supervision of face to face visits,413 albeit with provision to terminate 
visits.414 
In some rare cases, such as A Council v X415, the court has endorsed the 
termination of contact between a person and their relative altogether.  In A Council v X 
                                               
403 
Niemietz v Germany, [29] 
404 
See the comments of Ruck Keene et al  (2013: 5) regarding the case J Council v GU & Ors 
(Rev 1). 
405 
[1993] 1 FLR 940 
406 
[2001] Fam. 38; [2000] 3 WLR 1740 
407 
[2008] EWHC 3402 (Fam)
 
408 
[86] 
409 
[59]
 
410 
[2009] EW Misc 10 (EWCOP); [2009] CoPLR Con Vol 956 [88] 
411 
[83] 
412 
[82] 
413 
[84] 
414 
[86] 
415 
[2010] EWHC B10 (COP) 
152 
 
the court emphasised that practical obstacles, such as finding a neutral location where 
visits could take place, should not be a barrier to contact.  However, in that case it was 
held not to be in Y‘s best interests to have contact with her daughter as she no longer 
recognised her, and the daughter was said to be unable ‗to contain herself, even for an 
hour, without the risk of her becoming confrontational or abusive‘.416  Termination of 
contact between a person and their relative without considering whether or not 
supervised contact could be permitted, or where a provider or authority have been 
guided solely by the wishes of capacitous relatives and not come to an independent 
considered view of a person‘s best interests, is likely to violate the person‘s Article 8 
rights.  In City of Sunderland v MM & Ors417 the court found that this breached not only 
the rights of the person who lacked capacity, but also of a partner who was prevented 
by a care home from visiting her for two years. 
Usually public authorities seek to limit or terminate contact on the basis of 
‗safeguarding‘ allegations.  A question therefore arises as to how well evidenced such 
allegations must be for the Court of Protection to endorse such significant interferences 
in people‘s Article 8 rights.  In LBB v JM, BK and CM418 the local authority took the view 
that an intervention, which might potentially breach Article 8, would require the factual 
basis of concerns to be established - an approach which Hedley J ‗broadly‘ 
endorsed.419  However, he noted that the MCA did not include ‗threshold‘ provisions 
equivalent to those under the Children Act 1989, and – as they were not intended by 
parliament – these should not be imported by the court.  Nevertheless, he held that ‗If 
there is a contested factual basis it may often be right... that that should investigated 
and determined by the court.‘420  Barristers Ruck Keene, Butler-Cole, Norris and Allen 
(2012b: 97) observe that: 
...it can be easy for a local authority to assume that a history of 
suspicious  incidents  and  safeguarding  alerts  will  translate  easily  
into  declarations restricting  or  banning  contact,  when  in  reality  the  
process  is  much  more  complicated. 
However, as DJ Marin observed in WCC v GS, RS and J421 fact finding hearings can 
be lengthy, ‗eat up the court's  pressed resources‘ and are expensive in terms of the 
time of social workers and professionals who must give evidence to the court.422  For 
example, the case HN v FL and Hampshire CC423 resulted in a four day fact-finding 
hearing.  Although LBB v JM, BK and CM appeared to suggest that the court‘s 
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intervention might be necessary for such cases, the above cited barristers note that in 
their ‗collective experience of numerous cases‘ the courts often took a more ‗pragmatic 
approach‘ (p113). 
Published cases concerning restrictions on contact with sexual partners are 
markedly less numerous than those relating to family members.  They have typically 
arisen where a person is regarded to lack the capacity to consent to sex – a complex 
and contested test, discussed above – and where public authorities have therefore 
sought to prevent that person from having sexual relations with others.  As noted 
earlier, in D Borough Council v AB and A Local Authority v H adults with learning 
disabilities who were said to lack the capacity to consent to sex were deprived of their 
liberty by care regimes designed to prevent them from having sexual relations.  It is 
never explicitly discussed in these judgments why a local authority and care provider 
must take active steps to prevent a person from having sexual relations where they 
lack capacity to consent to it. It might be thought obvious that they should, given that 
sex with a person who lacks capacity to consent to it is a criminal offence.424  Such 
reasoning is never made explicit in these cases, and there is no authority establishing a 
positive obligation to prevent sexual relations with a person who lacks mental capacity.  
Nevertheless, it would be surprising if a court found that it was not in their best interests 
to prevent them from being the victim of a sexual offence, but it might also be thought a 
surprising outcome to deprive a person of their liberty in order to prevent them from 
becoming the victim of a crime. 
It is possible that a person may pass the test of capacity to consent to sex, 
which is deliberately engineered to set a comparatively low threshold, 425  yet be 
considered to lack the mental capacity to make decisions around contact with a person.  
The case Local Authority X v MM and KM, discussed earlier in the context of positive 
obligations to make available resources to support a person‘s sexual relationship, was 
one such case.  The case is precedent for a person who has the capacity to consent to 
sex having a right arising under Article 8 to be supported in continuing a sexual 
relationship, even if contact with the sexual partner is closely controlled by those 
arranging and providing their care. 
LB Hammersmith and Fulham v MW (Re MW) appears to be the sole published 
case (to date) considering a person‘s capacity to consent to contact with a friend.  In 
that case the local authority sought an in junction prohibiting JC from visiting his 
childhood friend, MW, at home.  MW had a diagnosis of a ‗borderline mental 
impairment‘ and a schizoaffective disorder.426  He had previously been detained under 
the MHA and was currently under restriction and supervision on a Home Office 
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license 427  for an index offence of stabbing an elderly couple. 428   He had been 
discharged from hospital in the past but had been readmitted following ‗irregularities‘ in 
his attendance at a day centre which was associated with JC being in his house.429  A 
tribunal later discharged him on condition than an injunction be sought which would 
prevent JC from visiting MW.430  The basis for this seems primarily to have been 
general suspicions, held by MW‘s doctors, that JC was a bad influence on MW, joining 
him in spending lots of money and raising concerns about MW‘s lithium regime which 
was regarded as jeopardising MW‘s compliance with it.  The judgment is strikingly 
paternalistic in tone and deferent to medical opinion regarding JC‘s bad influence and 
rejecting his concerns about the medication. 
Notably the judge in Re MW does not go to the considerable lengths to 
establish the concerns of the doctors on a factual basis, as occurred in many cases 
concerning contact with families, nor was Article 8 mentioned at any point in the 
judgment.  This is disappointing, as invoking Article 8 would have shifted the court‘s 
attention to how proportionate the order was, and whether a companion order could 
have been made requiring MW‘s relationship with JC to be supported in other ways, 
rather than the court merely ‗hoping‘431 it would continue.  One wonders whether a case 
would have been brought to court at all seeking judicial authority to restrict contact 
between friends had it not been a specific requirement of the tribunal, and had JC not 
been a man clearly capable of opposing the order.  Where care providers and 
authorities take a dubious view of more fragile friendships, which require support to 
maintain and where those friends are unlikely to be able to challenge such restrictions 
themselves, one wonders whether an application to court to consider the issues would 
be made at all.  On the basis of the rather shallow treatment of human rights and 
friendship in Re MW, and the scarcity of such cases, one suspects that actively 
imposed restrictions on friendships and failures to support their maintenance may be 
an area where providers and authorities enjoy considerable unconstrained and 
unscrutinised discretion. 
4.7 DISCUSSION: BEST INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONAL LIFE 
This analysis of capacity and best interests case law shows that far from 
providing leverage against ‗institutionalising‘ practices, the MCA may in fact precipitate 
and facilitate them in several respects.  The test of capacity introduced by the MCA is 
in itself an interference, and a relatively unconstrained one at that.  Public authorities 
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and care providers operate in a climate of tremendous uncertainty regarding the extent 
of their obligations to protect people who may lack capacity from harmful choices.  This 
may, as Baker J noted in CC v KK, lead to the MCA being used in a risk averse fashion 
to override ‗unwise‘ decisions which might result in some harm befalling a person.  This 
‗protection imperative‘ can be regarded as prompting a range of interferences, from 
surveillance of a person‘s everyday activities, the erosion of their rights to bodily 
integrity and exclusive possession of their properties, through to the decision to place a 
person in ‗institutional‘ services in the first place.  The MCA, through its 
interrelationship with public law powers to provide services, creates a facility to slide 
people into institutional services in their best interests.  This mechanism has almost 
none of the checks and balances associated with formalised approaches to substituted 
decision making such as detention and guardianship.432 
Once in those care services people with learning disabilities may find it very 
difficult to leave them should they wish to do so.  This is in part because it requires 
public authorities to make available alternative placements using their public law 
powers, and in part because it remains subject to their demonstrating the capacity to 
make such a decision.  In republican terms, this places them in a relationship of 
dependency with very high exit costs; a necessary (but insufficient) ingredient of 
domination.  In Chapter 2 I outlined evidence that within those services people with 
learning disabilities experienced considerable arbitrary interferences by institutional 
authorities with their everyday choices and freedoms; I called this ‗institutional 
domination‘.  In this chapter I showed that the courts had provided few clear and well 
known principles to constrain such interferences.   
There are considerable uncertainties in how capacity should be assessed, 
leaving capacity assessors able to use the test in flexible and arbitrary ways.  This is no 
critique of assessors themselves; where the courts and the code have delivered 
conflicting and contradictory guidance – if they have provided guidance at all - they can 
do little else but, as a collective, apply it arbitrarily.  In a climate of such uncertainty 
over the distinction between an unwise decision and an incapacitous one, who can 
blame assessors if they often opt for the risk averse option? 
For the vast majority of issues raised in the disability rights, regulatory and 
policy literature, summarised in Chapter 2, the courts have offered limited, or 
inadequate, principles for permissible interferences.  This is especially so for 
institutional rules and regimes and the use of sedating medications, issues which are 
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well established areas of concern.  However, there are some potentially promising 
seeds of change.  A growing number of dissenting judgments from a variety of sources 
have expressed dissatisfaction with judicial efforts to retract scrutiny from 
institutionalising practices.  CC v KK has led the way in providing more detailed 
guidance on how capacity assessment should be approached, although more would be 
welcome.  The ruling of Mostyn J in J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1) neatly encapsulates 
the precise concerns which animate this thesis: that users of community care services 
are subject to quite considerable interferences with their privacy and liberty, 
interferences for which there is a dearth of policy or legal guidance and safeguards.  
The case may have more radical implications than has, perhaps, yet been appreciated.  
The ruling in C v A Local Authority established a neat mechanism whereby – should 
the Executive feel minded to produce appropriate guidance on the concerns discussed 
here – they could be given greater legal force through the MCA. 
By way of contrast, the Court of Protection has been very busy expanding 
guidance around the right to family life – in connection with questions of whether a 
person should live with their family or not, and matters relating to contact with family 
members.  Clearly this is an important area where detailed guidance is desirable.  
However, this does stand in striking contrast with the dearth of case law concerning 
restrictions which do not involve family members.  This may reflect a number of factors.  
One might be the funding priorities of the Legal Services Commission.433  Another, the 
comparatively well established use Article 8 can be put to in relation to family life in 
contrast with somewhat more embryonic rights to development of personality 
(Krajewska, 2011) and freedom from institutionalisation.  However, it may also reflect 
the increased likelihood that public authorities and families will use the court when they 
come into conflict with each other, as opposed to when they come into conflict with 
people with disabilities alone.   
Family carers of people with learning disabilities are not a group who are 
typically regarded as ‗powerful‘ in society.  However, relative to people with learning 
disabilities themselves they are much better equipped to challenge the exercise of 
power by public authorities and providers.  This means that on the one hand, families – 
although they do experience formidable difficulties accessing justice – are still more 
likely to be able to bring a challenge against a public authority than people with 
disabilities would be able to without family support.  On the other hand, knowing this, 
public authorities may be more likely to apply to court themselves where they are in 
conflict with family members.  Furthermore, in many of the cases concerning contact 
public authorities seek to make use of injunctions against family members which are 
                                               
433 
This is touched upon in Chapter 5, and a more detailed summary of the availability of legal 
aid for Court of Protection litigation as of late 2012 is given in Appendix B. 
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only available through the courts.  This means that although the overall numbers of 
people bringing welfare disputes and conflicts to court is low,434 those that are getting 
there are typically disputes between families and professionals.   
Mladenov (2012: 2) and others have observed that groups with greater 
economic, social and cultural power ‗are more likely to influence interpretation [of the 
law], to ―bend‖ it in accordance with their own positions‘.  Consequently the law‘s 
development is skewed towards the interests of those who are better able to access its 
machinery (Brown, W., 2002; Russell, 2002; Rose, 1985).  There may be a strong 
relationship between the access to justice issues outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, and the 
fact contact is a relatively well developed area of MCA case law whilst other areas of 
concern rarely seem to be contested using the Act. 
Disappointingly, this means that at present the MCA cannot be said to 
adequately constrain arbitrary interferences in care settings in order to address the 
problems of institutional domination discussed in Chapter 2.  However the MCA, 
especially in combination with the HRA, has provided a means by which such issues 
might be brought to the attention of the courts and so these issues may be addressed 
in the future.  The MCA is a step on a journey through which the law is becoming better 
acquainted with the issues which have faced a population who have hitherto been 
silent, but it is early days yet. 
  
                                               
434 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 – ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory and research literature has shown that people with learning 
disabilities who live in health and social care institutions are at risk of wide ranging 
interferences with their privacy, choices and freedoms in everyday life.  Republicans 
identify the exercise of arbitrary power with ‗domination‘, and domination by those 
commissioning and providing institutional care is called ‗institutional domination‘ in this 
thesis.  The republican prescription for ameliorating states of domination is to provide 
clear and well known principles defining when interferences are acceptable.  However, 
republicans also maintain that ‗mere normative standards‘ are insufficient to ameliorate 
states of domination – they must be ‗meaningfully backed by some sort of enforcement 
mechanism‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 97).  Republicans often cite appeals to courts and 
tribunals, but standards can also be enforced in other ways (Ferejohn, 2001; Lovett, 
2010a: 100, 107).  Whilst acknowledging that compliance with the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (MCA) may be promoted through a variety of means, not least through ‗legal 
consciousness‘ (Silbey, 2008) and organisational processes, this chapter focuses on 
four key mechanisms of enforcement of the MCA.  These are: 
1. Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs) 
2. The Court of Protection 
3. The Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) 
4. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
One reason for selecting these mechanisms, and not modes of constraint that 
are internal to the individuals and organisations exercising power, is that republicans 
emphasise that ‗effective constraints must be external to the power-wielding persons or 
groups themselves‘ (Lovett, 2010a: 100).  Another reason is that all four are cited in the 
MCA code of practice as means of resolving disagreements and disputes (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: Chapter 15).435 
For republicans, the key questions to ask of these mechanisms are whether 
they are independent, and whether they are effective in reigning in the inappropriate 
exercise of power in accordance with the MCA.  I have already argued in Chapter 4 
that there remain considerable uncertainties regarding how power should be exercised 
                                               
435  
See Chapter 3, section entitled ‗3.3 Mechanisms enforcing the principles of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005‘ for further discussion. 
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under the MCA in relation to the test of mental capacity and various interferences 
associated with institutional domination.  Nevertheless, independent and effective 
mechanisms of enforcement are still of importance as a way of bringing these 
uncertainties to light.  In the words of Fennell (1986: 59), they can ‗open up areas of 
the ...system to scrutiny which might otherwise remain hidden, and they require those 
who operate the system to reflect on and justify what they are doing‘.   
Republican discussion of how such methods of enforcement might work is 
rather scant, and there is a large critical literature – reviewed in Chapter 2 – which 
explores the shortcomings of the ‗turn to law‘ as a means for tackling oppression.  
Particular concern was expressed as to how far oppressed groups are actually able to 
use the law to pursue their own concerns, meaning that those cases which actually 
reach the courts are not representative and thus law is more responsive to the 
concerns of more powerful groups (Brown, 1995; Rose, 1985).  It is suggested that the 
relatively large number of cases concerning conflicts between public authorities and 
family members, in contrast with cases about other aspects of institutional domination, 
is evidence of this occurring in the Court of Protection.  Another area of concern was 
the ‗bureaucratic domination‘ (Brown, 1995: 121, fn 41) that people might experience 
whilst trying to assert their rights using the law. To put this into republican language, 
just because a mechanism of enforcement exists, does not mean people are actually, 
in practice, reliably able to use it to ‗invigilate‘ arbitrary interferences with their interests 
(Pettit, 2008b).   
These criticisms of the ‗turn to law‘ to constrain arbitrary power are 
acknowledged, and as I will show in this chapter they are clearly visible in many modes 
of enforcement of the MCA.  Nevertheless, as Lobel (2006) writes, for as long as law 
exists and exercises social influence it would be unfortunate if reformers turned away 
from legal strategies, or they will simply develop without their input.  Instead, it is 
important to look at the minutiae of those mechanisms which contribute towards the 
very concerns expressed by the critics of the ‗turn to law‘, to see if we can suggest 
improvements or alterations which could reduce its disempowering and dominating 
effects. 
This chapter draws upon a detailed study of the available research and grey 
literature for each of these mechanisms, in addition to relevant doctrinal materials.  
These findings are supplemented by requests made under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (FOIA) and interviews with legal, health and social care practitioners working 
in the field.  Several micro-studies examining particular aspects of enforcement 
mechanisms were also conducted, but are not described in any great detail in the body 
of this thesis.  Details of micro-studies into regulatory and soft-law mechanisms are 
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given in Appendix B, and more detailed statistical and technical information about legal 
activity connected with the MCA is presented in Appendix C. 
5.2 THE EFFICACY OF INDEPENDENT MENTAL CAPACITY 
ADVOCATES IN ENFORCING THE MCA 
5.2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE IMCA SERVICE 
During the later stages of the MCA‘s passage from the Law Commission‘s 
(1995) proposals onto the statute books, civil society groups became increasingly 
concerned that the ‗general defence‘ of s5-6 MCA afforded health and social care 
practitioners considerable scope to make major decisions about medical treatment and 
placement in care services with very few checks and balances.  The Making Decisions 
Alliance (2003: [5d.14]) expressed concern that the Bill did not contain ‗sufficient 
mechanisms to ensure that [its] principles are implemented in practice', observing that:  
...the draft Bill currently lacks any accessible mechanisms by which an 
individual may challenge a formal or informal assessment of capacity 
made about them. Although an individual assessed as lacking capacity 
can make an application to the Court of Protection to challenge any 
declaration made by the Court on the basis of this assessment ...the Bill 
does not explain how Ministers envisage that a person who may have a 
significant mental disorder can be supported to make such an 
application.  
Concern that the ‗general authority‘436 contained insufficient safeguards was shared by 
many respondents to the consultation on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, including 
Mencap, the Alzheimer‘s Society, the Law Society, the British Association of Social 
Workers, People First 437 , the British Psychological Society, the Disability Rights 
Commission, the National Autistic Society, Age Concern and others (Joint Committee 
on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, 2002-3).   
The MDA recommended that the Bill make statutory provision for independent 
advocacy services to help ensure that ‗the needs and rights of the individual remain at 
the forefront of this Bill and that its overarching principles are fulfilled‘ (Making 
Decisions Alliance, 2003: [5b]).  In response, the Mental Capacity Bill laid before 
parliament in 2004 included provision for ‗independent consultees‘ for ‗particularly 
vulnerable people and situations‘ (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2004: R92; 
                                               
436 
This was later renamed the ‗general defence‘ by the government, as it gave ‗rise to concerns 
that the General Authority would allow too much licence to intervene in the lives of people who 
may lack capacity‘ (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2004).  It is unclear how the 
government thought that renaming the provision without changing its core legal structure would 
reduce the scope for intervening in the lives of people who may lack mental capacity. 
437 
A self-advocacy organisation, advocating for people with learning disabilities.   
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Department of Health, 2005c; b; 2006b; e).  These ‗independent consultees‘ eventually 
became Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCA‘s), created by ss35-41 MCA.  
5.2.2 THE IMCA ROLE 
The IMCA role is defined by statute438 and regulations439.  Local authorities are 
charged with ‗making arrangements‘ so that IMCA services are available in their 
area440, using funds allocated from the Department of Health (2006e).  A referral to an 
IMCA must be made where a person is considered to lack mental capacity in relation to 
a particular decision, and the relevant body is satisfied that they have no family or 
friends whom it would be appropriate to consult in determining what would be in their 
best interests, in the following circumstances: 
 Where an NHS body is proposing to provide serious medical treatment for a 
person;441 
 Where an NHS body 442  or local authority 443  is proposing to arrange 
accommodation in a hospital for longer than 28 days or care home for 
longer than 8 weeks; 
 The role was later expanded to allow NHS bodies or local authorities to 
instruct an IMCA if they ‗are satisfied, that it would be of particular benefit to 
P to be so represented‘ for reviews of care plans or in adult protection 
cases.444   
 There are also specific IMCA roles in relation to the DoLS, these are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Once instructed by a decision maker, IMCAs have a variety of tasks directed 
towards ‗how best to represent and support P‘445.  A major part of their role is gathering 
information connected to best interests decisions.446  They must ‗to the extent that it is 
                                               
438 
s35-41 MCA 
439  
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) 
Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1832; The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity 
Advocates) (Expansion of Role) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2883
 
440 
Under s35(1) MCA the ‗appropriate authority‘ is the Secretary of State for Health in England 
and the Welsh National Assembly for Wales.  In England, the Secretary of State for Health has 
issued The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) 
Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1832, which require IMCA appointments to be approved by local 
authorities. 
441 
s37 MCA 
442 
s38 MCA 
443 
s39 MCA 
444  
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (Expansion of 
Role) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2883 
445  
r6 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) 
Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1832 
446
 IMCAs must ‗take all practicable steps to obtain such other information about P, or the act or 
decision that is proposed in relation to P, as the IMCA considers necessary‘ (r6(4)(d) The 
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practicable and appropriate to do so‘, interview ‗P‘, examine records relevant to P447 
and consult with ‗persons engaged in providing care or treatment for P in a professional 
capacity or for remuneration‘ and any ‗other persons who may be in a position to 
comment on P‘s wishes, feelings, beliefs or values‘.    The IMCA must then evaluate all 
this information and ascertain ‗the extent of the support provided to P to enable him to 
participate in making any decision about the matter‘.  IMCAs must also ascertain what 
his ‗wishes and feelings would be likely to be and any beliefs and values that would be 
likely to influence [him] if he had capacity in relation to the proposed act or decision‘, 
what alternative courses of action are available to a person, and for medical treatments 
must ascertain whether a further medical opinion would be likely to benefit the person.  
The IMCA must then prepare a report for the person who instructed him, and include in 
it ‗such submissions as he considers appropriate in relation to P and the act or decision 
which is proposed in relation to him‘.448   
Redley et al (2009: 4) describe the primary responsibility of IMCAs as ‗to ensure 
that the substitute decision-maker gives due regard to the person‘s wishes, beliefs and 
values, including any relevant wishes expressed prior to the decision‘.  When asked 
how the decision process might differ if IMCA's were not present, IMCAs interviewed 
for this research responded that ‗Too many assumptions would be made about people 
because of their condition or age‘, and that there was a danger that the person at the 
centre of the decision might disappear.  They understood their role as being to affirm 
their personhood in what could be a depersonalising process: ‗this is Ruth, this is 
Eleanor‟. 
Many of IMCAs‘ duties to consult, consider and include are also shared by best 
interests decision makers under s4 MCA; part of their role therefore appears to be 
‗outsourcing‘ these relational tasks from decision makers.  In interviews for this 
research, IMCAs noted that decision-makers often did not have enough time to get to 
know a person and consult with people, and increasingly tended to leave it to IMCAs, 
who had built up a reputation of being skilled in this area.  IMCAs interviewed for this 
research also stressed the importance of non-verbal communication in getting to know 
their clients, and their strong links to speech and language therapy services.  Townsley 
and Laing (2011) found that IMCAs often brought additional communication skills to 
decision making processes (see also Lee-Foster, 2010).  They also found that in some 
cases, the support of an IMCA could elevate a person above the threshold of the test of 
                                                                                                                                         
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) Regulations 
2006 SI 2006/1832). 
447 
IMCAs have powers to access P‘s medical, local authority social services and care provider 
records ‗which the person holding the record considers may be relevant to the independent 
mental capacity advocate's investigation‘ under s35(6) MCA. 
448  
r6 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) 
Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1832 
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mental capacity, although their role is not – technically – to enable a person to attain 
capacity. 
Although IMCAs were introduced in response to concerns that there were no 
monitoring arrangements or accessible means of challenging decisions made under 
the MCA (Making Decisions Alliance, 2003), IMCAs are not formally required to monitor 
or challenge mental capacity assessments or best interests decisions.  Their role, as 
defined in the statute and regulations, is primarily to provide information for decision 
makers.  They do have ‗the same rights to challenge the decision as he would have if 
he were a person... engaged in caring for P or interested in his welfare‘,449 but outside 
of the specific context of the DoLS 450  they have no explicit duties to do so.  No 
government guidance is provided to help IMCAs identify when it would be appropriate 
to challenge mental capacity assessments or best interests decisions, either on behalf 
of their client or where they themselves have concerns.  There is, as yet, no case law 
that clarifies this.  This places considerable discretion in the hands of individual IMCAs 
as to how far they challenge departure from the principles of the MCA.  This injects an 
element of arbitrariness into the functioning of the IMCA service as a safeguard in 
itself. 
5.2.3 THE IMCA SERVICE IN PRACTICE 
REFERRALS 
IMCA‘s can only function as a safeguard for decisions where there has been a 
referral.  However, there has been a considerable shortfall between the number of 
IMCA referrals anticipated by the Department of Health and the actual number of 
referrals made.451  Even by the fourth year of the IMCA service, and with the IMCA role 
being significantly expanded452, the total number of IMCA referrals had not reached 
70% of the demand anticipated by the initial impact assessment (Department of Health, 
2006e).  The Department of Health also reported large variations in the number of 
referrals between different geographical areas, which could not be explained by 
population size.  The Department commented that ‗The duty to refer people who are 
eligible to IMCAs is still not understood in all parts of the health and social care sector‘, 
                                               
449  
r7 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (General) 
Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1832 
450 
Section 39D(7)-(9) MCA require IMCAs to assist a detainee or representative they have been 
referred to represent with exercising any ‗relevant rights‘ of appeal or review under the DoLS.  
These provision are discussed in Chapter 6.
 
451
 The Department of Health anticipated that there would be 16,000 decisions requiring an 
IMCA referral in the first year.  Data collected annually by the Department of Health (2008c; 
2009c; 2010d; 2011b) revealed that the number of IMCA referrals in the first year of the service 
reached only 32% of estimated demand.  See Appendix C for a more detailed breakdown of the 
number of IMCA referrals in the first four years of the IMCA service. 
452  
By the deprivation of liberty safeguards (s39 MCA) and The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) (Expansion of Role) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2883.
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and consequently ‗many vulnerable people without family or friends to represent them 
...may not be being referred to an IMCA for support for critical decisions which they 
lack capacity to make themselves‘ (Department of Health, 2011b: 5-6).  The Social 
Care Institute for Excellence (2010: 8) has also expressed concern about the low 
referral rates to IMCAs for care reviews453, and questions whether ‗all possible support 
is being provided to people to participate when care reviews are arranged‘. 
It is unclear exactly why IMCA referral rates are still so low.  As the Department 
of Health suggests, a lack of awareness and understanding of the role may be part of 
the problem.  IMCAs interviewed for this research found that awareness of their role 
varied among decision makers, for example they observed that whilst social workers 
tended to be fairly well aware of the IMCA role, GPs tended not to be.  Low referral 
rates might also relate to attitudes of decision makers towards IMCAs.  Redley et al 
(2009: 10) found a degree of scepticism among medical professionals around the role 
of IMCAs in serious medical treatment decisions, having ‗doubts about the contribution 
that could be made by anyone without medical training‘ and regarding advocacy as 
‗unnecessary, since, as health care practitioners, they themselves already acted in the 
best interests of their patient‘.   IMCAs interviewed for this research also reflected upon 
issues of their status with other professionals, commenting that whilst they were mostly 
seen as helpful they were sometimes seen ‗as an irrelevance and sometimes as a 
nuisance‘.  They expressed frustration at lacking ‗clout‘ as a result of sitting in the third 
sector rather than, for example, being embedded in a hospital.  It seems possible, 
therefore, that even though best interests decision makers are statutorily required to 
make IMCA referrals, scepticism about their role and their ‗outsider‘ status within 
professional and service hierarchies may contribute to low levels of referrals.   
One final – and perhaps obvious – reason for low levels of referrals to IMCA 
services may be that IMCAs are a source of scrutiny and potential challenge for 
decision makers.  It is inherently problematic that referrals for IMCAs must come from 
decision makers themselves if they are to act as a robust safeguard to ensure their 
decisions follow the principles of the MCA.  For those who are aware of their statutory 
duty to refer to an IMCA, there is still considerable scope for flexible judgments as to 
who is ‗befriended‘ or ‗unbefriended‘, and which medical treatments are sufficiently 
‗serious‘, to warrant an IMCA referral.  Meanwhile those who are unaware of their 
statutory duties to instruct IMCAs are also likely to be the decision makers we should 
be most concerned about, being unaware of the requirements of the MCA.  For an 
unbefriended person, the prospects of sanction against decision makers for failure to 
                                               
453  
As per r5 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) 
(Expansion of Role) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2883
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make an IMCA referral is extremely low, 454  and it is difficult to see what realistic 
sources of pressure there are to comply with IMCA referral duties.   
The key problem with the referral mechanism is that those who have the least 
understanding of the MCA, those who are least in tune with its values of including and 
supporting a person to participate in decisions, or those who seek to avoid any external 
scrutiny and possible challenges to their decisions, are among the least likely to make 
an IMCA referral at a time when it might be most beneficial.  And yet, it is difficult to see 
how else the need for a referral for such a decision-specific form of advocacy could be 
flagged up.  This is one argument in favour of provision for longer term support from 
advocates. 
COMPLAINTS 
The Department of Health (2006e: [5.11]) envisaged that ‗IMCAs will use 
existing complaints mechanisms to resolve disputes locally as far as possible when 
these arise about a decision made by an NHS body or local authority, or about the 
process that has been followed in reaching a decision, in relation to a person who lacks 
capacity‘.455  Townsley and Laing (2011: 33) found that IMCAs sometimes ‗queried the 
judgement about the lack of capacity of the client concerned‘ which led to a person‘s 
mental capacity being reassessed.  However, according to data published by the 
Department of Health (2010d; 2011b), only around 0.12-0.14% of IMCA referrals have 
resulted in a formal complaint of some kind, and 0.04-0.07% in an application to the 
Court of Protection.456  During the consultations on the IMCA service, respondents 
‗were clear that a fundamental part of the IMCA role was to be able to challenge the 
original decision that the person lacks capacity‘ (Department of Health, 2005b: [70]), 
yet it appears that in practice this is very rarely happening. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the very low number of reported 
challenges initiated by IMCAs.  The Department of Health (2011b: 28-9) suggested that 
these low figures may simply reflect recording errors, but there have been few signs of 
improvement over the years.  In their research, Townsley and Laing report no evidence 
of IMCAs initiating applications to the Court of Protection.457  Two of the three IMCAs I 
                                               
454 
To the best of my knowledge, the only court case in which a public authority has been 
criticised for failure to refer to an IMCA when they should was London Borough of Hillingdon v 
Neary & Anor, [194], [197]
 
455  
The MCA code of practice guidance on IMCAs also recommends using complaints 
processes (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [10.34]) 
456 
See section ‗C5 Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy Service‘ in Appendix C for a more 
detailed breakdown of complaints instigated by IMCAs, from which these percentages are 
calculated. 
457 
Townsley confirms that ‗there are no examples given by any of the IMCAs involved in the 
research of referring to the Court of Protection‘ in the raw data for the research (personal 
communication, 4 October 2011).  The research surveyed 23 IMCAs, interviewed 9 and covered 
151 cases.  It took place shortly after the DoLS had been introduced.
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interviewed had never initiated an application to the Court of Protection. 458   Data 
supplied by the Court of Protection suggests that IMCAs have initiated applications 
under the DoLS on a very small number of occasions (FOIA #15).459 
IMCAs may also be reluctant to challenge as a result of tensions in 
relationships with decision makers, who are responsible both for instructing them in the 
first place and granting access to much of the information they require to fulfil their role.  
Two of the IMCAs interviewed for this research said they were more likely to be seen 
as an ‗irrelevance‘ or ‗nuisance‘ ‗if we question too hard or uphold the views and 
wishes of the person when these do not accord with the DM‘s preferred course of 
action‘.  They observed that past conflicts could impinge on future working relationships 
which had taken a long time to build up, and so they tried not to go in confrontationally.  
If ‗conflict is on the horizon‘, they would give indications early on if there was the 
potential that they might challenge a decision.  These practices might neutralise some 
potential disputes earlier on, which might offer a partial account of the low number of 
challenges.  However it does also seem possible that concern with maintaining working 
relationships could have a chilling effect on challenging decision makers too assertively 
on behalf of their clients.  Redley et al (2009: 12) also describe the ‗considerable 
tension‘ IMCAs experienced between ‗their responsibility to clients and the need to 
develop and maintain constructive relationships with decision-makers‘.  They 
connected this with reluctance by IMCAs to make formal challenges. 
Another factor discouraging IMCAs from making formal complaints could be a 
lack of time and resources.  ‗Complex‘ IMCA referrals were estimated to require only 
eight hours of their time (Department of Health, 2006e).  IMCAs interviewed for this 
research described operating under considerable time pressure, echoing other 
research findings (Redley, Marcus et al., 2009; Townsley and Laing, 2011). 
Furthermore, if IMCAs apply to the Court of Protection themselves, they will receive no 
specific reimbursement for the costs of applications and legal advice and 
representation.  Although, the resources allocated to local authorities to commission 
IMCA services by the Department of Health (2006e: [5.11]) contained additional funds 
to cover disputes, including ‗where an IMCA takes a case to Court‘, the funding is not 
ring-fenced (Department of Health, 2008d).   
However, the MCA code of practice does not seem to envisage IMCAs applying 
to the Court of Protection in their own right where they have concerns.  It guides IMCAs 
                                               
458 
The third IMCA I interviewed had been involved in Court of Protection litigation in connection 
with a referral under the DoLS.  IMCA‘s duties under the DoLS are different, however, and will 
be discussed in Chapter 5.
 
459 
The role of IMCAs in applying to the Court of Protection under the DoLS is legally distinct 
from their role in non-DoLS cases, and will be discussed in Chapter 5.  The limited data the 
Court of Protection were able to share with me on the identity of applicants for DoLS appeals is 
given in Table 15, Appendix C.
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to approach the OS460 as the ‗first step in making a formal challenge‘ (Lord Chancellor's 
Office, 2007: [10.38]).461  If the OS declines to bring a challenge on a person‘s behalf, 
the code of practice suggests that IMCAs apply to court themselves to be appointed as 
the person‘s litigation friend.  As yet there have been no published judgments where an 
IMCA has acted as a litigation friend in the Court of Protection.462  As a litigation friend 
the legal costs (aside from the initial application free) would be borne by the person 
themselves or any public funding they are eligible for.463  Guidance for IMCA services 
rather unhelpfully suggests that ‗the responsible body [may seek] to recover their costs 
from the IMCA service‘464  (Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2010: 10), without 
highlighting the Court of Protection‘s ‗general rule‘ that a ‗losing‘ party would not be 
awarded costs in personal welfare cases.465   
 
To what extent should we be concerned about the low volume of formal 
complaints and applications to the Court of Protection by IMCAs?  On the one hand 
this may reflect the success of informal dispute resolution processes, an approach 
emphasised by the MCA code of practice (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [10.35]-
[10.36]) and by IMCAs themselves in interviews for this research.  It might also be 
observed that the number of applications to the Court of Protection for health and 
welfare matters is generally low anyway, 466  even in respect of people who are 
‗befriended‘ and do not have an IMCA to support them.  Yet this may simply tell us that 
neither IMCAs nor family and friends are regularly accessing the Court of Protection to 
challenge health and welfare decisions made by professionals.   
                                               
460  
The role of the Official Solicitor as a litigation friend in the Court of Protection will be 
described in more detail below.
 
461 
This advice is also given in early guidance issued by Turning Point (2006). 
462 
In AB v LCC (A Local Authority) [2011] EWHC 3151 (COP), a case connected with the DoLS, 
Mostyn J appointed a paid representative to be a litigation friend, and paid representatives are 
very often provided by IMCA services and may have acted as an IMCA earlier in that case or in 
other cases.  However, strictly speaking a paid representative is not an IMCA and their role is 
distinct.  One critical difference is that IMCAs tend not be funded per referral, whereas paid 
representatives are – consequently any additional costs of acting as a litigation friend might be 
reimbursed to paid representatives but they would be unlikely to be for IMCAs.
 
463 
Public funding for Court of Protection litigation will be touched upon below, and fuller details 
of eligibility for public funding for legal advice and legal representation in the Court of Protection 
is given in Appendix C.
 
464 
Presumably because litigation friends are usually ‗personally liable to the other party to the 
litigation for the costs of unsuccessful proceedings‘, Re E. (Mental Health Patient) [1984] 1 WLR 
320.
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Rule 157 Court of Protection Rules 2007.  The purpose of this ‗general rule‘ is to ensure 
potential applicants are not deterred from bringing important issues to the attention of the court 
for fear of paying the costs of other parties, see G v E & Ors [2010] EWHC 3385 (Fam) [40].  
However, if an IMCA initiated Judicial Review proceedings ordinary rules for costs in civil 
litigation would apply, and so it is possible – as the MCA code of practice notes – that IMCAs 
‗may be liable for the costs of the case going to court‘ if they initiate other types of litigation than 
Court of Protection welfare cases (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [10.39]).
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In 2009 and 2010 the Court of Protection received 1531 and 1283 health and welfare 
applications respectively, but it issued only 182 and 218 orders respectively suggesting that not 
all cases were granted permission (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2010; 2011). 
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The wider question is when do disputes require IMCAs to take ‗formal‘ action, 
including challenges to capacity assessments and best interests decisions, in the Court 
of Protection?  The code describes merely when they may challenge a decision, but 
not when they must (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: 10.32).  One tenuous argument 
might run that IMCAs are ‗hybrid‘ public authorities in the meaning of s6 HRA, and so 
may have positive obligations to challenge decisions where a human rights violation 
might occur otherwise.  Yet this would require much greater legal clarity on whether or 
not IMCAs are public authorities under the HRA, and in precisely which circumstances 
a mental capacity assessment or best interests decision should be challenged.  In 
particular, it would be important to know whether a person who disputes a best 
interests decision that has significant implications for them should always be assisted 
to ‗appeal‘ against it in court.  A related question would be whether responsibility for 
assisting them in doing so falls to the decision maker or the IMCA.  As yet, these 
matters are remarkably unclear in law.   
5.2.4 WHAT KIND OF SAFEGUARD ARE IMCAS? 
ARE IMCAS ADVOCATES? 
Advocacy has been described as ‗fundamental to enabling people with capacity 
difficulties to access to justice‘467.  Given their title it may sound strange to query 
whether IMCAs are advocates, and yet there are some important differences between 
the way the IMCA role is constructed in law and the role of an advocate as traditionally 
conceived.  Action for Advocacy468 (2002; 2007) has produced an advocacy charter 
and code of practice defining key principles of good advocacy.  Several of these 
principles seem, on the face of things, to come into conflict with the way the IMCA role 
is constructed by statute and regulations. 
The Action for Advocacy code of practice states that ‗the wishes and interests 
of the people they advocate for direct advocates‘ work‘.  By contrast, IMCAs are 
obliged to find out about a person‘s wishes and interests and make them known, to 
help people participate in decision making, but nothing in statute or regulations obliges 
IMCAs to be directed by the wishes and interests of the people they ‗represent‘.  In 
particular, a person could not direct their IMCA to challenge a decision that affects 
them.469   IMCAs interviewed for this research did say that they helped people to 
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Oral evidence of Professor Luke Clements to the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental 
Incapacity Bill (2003).
 
468  
A well respected NGO who provide information and guidance for advocacy services in 
England and Wales. 
469 
Except in connection with the deprivation of liberty safeguards; this will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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exercise their rights to challenge. 470   However, given the low volume of formal 
complaints and legal challenges it seems unlikely this is happening consistently across 
the service as a whole.  Given that research shows that mental capacity is most often 
called into question where there is a conflict between what a person wants and 
decision makers‘ views of what is best for them (Emmett et al., 2012; Williams, V. et al., 
2012), we would expect a very high volume of best interests decisions to be formally 
challenged if IMCAs always assisted people in doing so.  Since the volume of 
challenges remains extremely low, we must assume that they are not.   
The advocacy charter states that advocacy schemes should have a policy on 
confidentiality that states that ‗information known about a person using the scheme is 
confidential to the scheme‘ and setting out ‗any circumstances under which 
confidentiality might be breached.‘  Yet a significant part of the IMCA role is collecting 
and sharing that information with decision makers, regardless of whether or not the 
person they are representing wants it to be shared with them.  Nothing prevents an 
IMCA from making known facts that are relevant to a ‗best interests‘ decision which 
might guide decision makers towards outcomes which conflict with a person‘s wishes 
and interests.  In an interview with two IMCAs I asked them what they did in situations 
where they did not regard the preferred option of the person they were representing as 
being in their best interests.  They responded with ambivalence or discomfort at being 
asked this question: 
‗I hate this one.‘ 
‗Our opinions don‘t count.‘ 
They emphasised that their role was not only making sure a person‘s voice gets heard 
and their preferences were recorded – but also to make sure other considerations were 
taken into account by best interests decision makers.  In response to a specific 
question on this point, IMCAs replied that sometimes they would include in their report 
concerns expressed by third parties they had consulted which the person themselves 
did not share.  They emphasised that this was not their opinion, but merely reporting 
evidence that they have gathered.   
The advocacy charter also says that ‗People who use the scheme should have 
a say in the level of involvement and style of advocacy support they want.‘  Yet there is 
no provision in the MCA for people to request or refuse an IMCA, or to reject a 
particular IMCA and request that they be supported by a different person.  The MCA 
itself defines the type of service people will receive from an IMCA, and allows very little 
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Regrettably, however, I did not ask whether they always initiated a formal challenge if a 
person was unhappy with a best interests decision, nor how often this occurred.
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scope for people to ‗have a say in the level of involvement‘ their IMCA has in 
contributing towards a particular decision.   
 
The key distinction between IMCAs and advocates as traditionally conceived is 
that whereas traditional advocates are instructed by their clients, IMCAs are instructed 
by best interests decision makers.  Guidance from the Office of the Public Guardian 
(2007: 7) describe IMCAs as a form of ‗non instructed advocacy‘ to represent a 
person‘s ‗interests‘ when ‗a person is unable to communicate their views‘.471  However, 
as just discussed, IMCAs might represent a person‘s ‗interests‘ even when they are 
able to express a view, and even when a person‘s views come into conflict with what 
others perceive to be in their best interests.   
‗Non-instructed advocacy‘ is a relatively new and sometimes controversial form 
of advocacy.  The term has no formal definition and relatively little has been written 
about it (Henderson, Rick, 2007: 2).  The best known guidance on non-instructed 
advocacy is a document called The Watching Brief by Assist Advocacy (2007), which 
provides guidance for advocates working with people ‗who do not have a system of 
communication that is recognised by the advocate‘.  The guidance sets out values in 
eight domains of life472 and advocates ‗ask questions relevant to those domains‘ for any 
given proposal.  Questions are re-iterated ‗until all parties are satisfied that the 
proposal has been thoroughly tested to identify its effect on the quality [of] life domains 
of the advocacy partner and, where possible, has been modified to ensure that its 
impact is positive‘ (p4).  For those who cannot communicate, the value of independent 
questioning and scrutiny connected with these domains may be tremendous.  It 
certainly seems more desirable than the alternative – that the advocate just walks away 
from the situation because they have no ‗instructions‘, and no independent party is left 
to ask questions relevant to a person‘s rights.   
However, whilst Watching Brief advocacy may be highly appropriate where 
there are communication difficulties, non-instructed advocacy centred around a 
person‘s interests may be more problematic for people who can express a view.  
Although early characterisations of advocacy identify it with promoting a person‘s 
interests (Wolfensberger, 1972), there are acknowledged tensions between ‗best 
interests‘ advocacy and empowerment (Wolfensberger, 1972: 25).  Best interests 
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However, there is no discussion of IMCAs as ‗non-instructed‘ advocates in the consultation 
documents or the explanatory notes on the IMCA role (Department of Health, 2005c; b; 2006b).  
The term cropped up later on in some reports on the IMCA service by the Department of Health 
(2009c). 
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These are: ‗competence‘ (having ‗a level of skill to be able to be as independent as 
possible‘), ‗community presence‘, ‗continuity‘, ‗choice and influence‘, ‗individuality‘, ‗status and 
respect‘, ‗partnership and relationships‘ and ‗well-being‘.  There are some interesting parallels 
between these domains and ‗capabilities‘ identified by Sen, Nussbaum and others (Nussbaum, 
2006; 2009; Sen, 2010).
 
172 
 
advocacy is explicitly eschewed by some advocacy organisations, for example the 
Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance (2008: 5) write that: 
Sometimes people think that advocacy is about working in the best 
interests of an individual. In fact, sometimes the advocate is supporting 
an individual to do something that is not in their own best interests. 
Often professionals make decisions that are in the best interests of an 
individual because they have a legal duty to do so. Advocates do not 
have such a legal duty. An effective advocate needs to challenge, 
question and hold professionals to account when best interests are 
given as a reason for decisions made about their advocacy partner. 
The Scottish Advocacy Alliance do, however, endorse Watching Brief advocacy for 
those who cannot communicate their views.  A recent study on Independent Mental 
Health Advocates (IMHAs) 473  found they felt uncomfortable with non-instructed 
advocacy and ‗―best interest‖ work', describing the central ethos of advocacy as being 
‗not just person-centred but also person-driven‘ (Newbigging et al., 2012: 7, 146).  
There is surprisingly little discussion of this issue in the research and policy literature 
on IMCAs.   
These different approaches to advocacy go right to the heart of two conflicting 
constructions of personal agency that the MCA attempts to straddle.  On the one hand, 
directed-advocacy approaches seek to supplement a person‘s practical abilities to 
enable them to effectively ‗invigilate‘ interferences with their own rights.  However, non-
instructed advocacy approaches are based on the presumption that a person is 
incapable of recognising where their rights have been violated and that a third party is 
better placed to defend them on their behalf.  Republican writings offer no guidance as 
to which approach might be more desirable.   
The requirements of Article 12(4) CRPD, that measures relating to the exercise 
of legal capacity should respect a person‘s ‗rights, wishes and preferences‘, would 
seem to favour a more directed approach to advocacy where a person is able to 
communicate their wishes and preferences.  If IMCAs were tasked with furthering a 
person‘s wishes and preferences, as opposed to their interests, it would be highly likely 
to result in more challenges and more adversarial practices, for the reasons discussed 
above.  It is easy to see how this might lead to a dramatic increase in the volume of 
complaints and litigation around decisions made under the MCA, and may well mean 
that decision makers would be less inclined to make IMCA referrals.  Indeed, the 
possibility of a challenge for any major decision made under the MCA with which the 
person themselves disagrees could pose very significant problems for the smooth 
running of health and social care services.  Yet perhaps we should ask ourselves 
whether the alternative, that major care and treatment decisions that override a 
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The IMCA‘s sister service of statutory advocacy under the MHA.
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person‘s wishes and preferences, can be taken with relative ease and free from any 
likely prospect of challenge is desirable either? 
 
An alternative way of thinking about IMCAs could be as a type of review 
mechanism.  A better comparator than advocates might be Independent Reviewing 
Officers (IROs), appointed to monitor the wellbeing of ‗looked after‘ children in the care 
system. 474   IROs were established because, following several inquiries into child 
protection, ‗It was recognised that these children needed independent safeguarding 
from the occasional acute failings of the care system‘ (Griffith-Jones, 2007).  Where 
IROs have concerns that children‘s human rights have been breached, they have 
powers to refer their case to the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support 
Service (CAFCASS), whose role it is to safeguard and promote the welfare of children 
involved in family court proceedings.   
However, concerns have arisen that IROs are not as ‗truly independent‘ from 
local authorities as had been hoped, and that their role is hampered by their low 
professional status, high workloads and a lack of access to independent legal advice 
(Arnold, 2011; Fortin, 2009; Griffith-Jones, 2007; House of Commons Children, 2009a; 
b).  Like IMCAs, the number of times IROs have used their formal powers to take steps 
to safeguard children has been very low; by 2011 CAFCASS had received only eight 
referrals from IROs475 and ‗no application by Cafcass has been made to the court on 
behalf of a child as a result of a referral to Cafcass by an IRO‘ (Arnold, 2011: 14).  It 
has been questioned whether IROs would ‗readily identify areas of poor practice 
amongst their own colleagues‘ and their reviews have been described as ‗a box-ticking 
exercise‘ (Fortin, 2009: 636-7).  Recently a court found that the Article 6 and 8 rights of 
two boys in care, who had been moved 96 and 77 times before the age of 16, had 
been violated.  The court found that the IRO had failed to identify that their rights had 
been infringed, to take effective action to ensure that the local authority acted upon the 
recommendations from reviews and to refer their circumstances to CAFCASS.476   
The analogy between IMCAs and IROs is imperfect.  Unlike IROs, IMCAs are 
not employed directly by the local authority – although notably IMCAs interviewed for 
this research found that their ‗outsider‘ status was also problematic in performing their 
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s118 Adoption and Children Act 2002, see also Review of Children's Cases 
(Amendment)(England) Regulations 2004. 
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By 2007 it was reported that IROs had not yet made a single referral to CAFCASS (Griffith-
Jones, 2007), there were none in Wales by 2009 (Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales, 
2009).  In response to an FOIA request, CAFCASS confirmed that they received 1 IRO referral 
in 2007, 1 in 2008, 2 in 2009, 3 in 2010 and 1 in 2011 (FOIA #17).
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 A & S (Children) v Lancashire County Council [2012] EWHC 1689 (Fam); see also S (A child 
acting by the Official Solicitor) v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council and the Independent 
Reviewing Officer [2008] EWHC 3283 (Fam); [2009] 1 FLR 1090, as case where the Official 
Solicitor brought judicial review proceedings against the local authority and the IRO for 
inadequacies in the care of a child; the case against the IRO settled.
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role.  IMCAs have substantially less ongoing involvement than IROs.  However, like 
IMCAs, IROs can have very high workloads (Arnold, 2011) and like IROs, the number 
of challenges brought by IMCAs has been worryingly low.  There are many possible 
explanations for why IMCAs and IROs are reluctant to challenge, but one might be the 
expectation that they form their own independent view of a person‘s rights and welfare 
and have sufficient confidence in that view to initiate a challenge.  There is a danger 
that in relying on professional judgment to bring concerns before the courts, ‗those who 
define the goals and outcomes of service provision continue to be professionals‘ and 
not service users (Armstrong, 2002: 340).  By contrast, where advocates understand 
their role as amplifying a person‘s own voice and assisting them to challenge acts that 
they resist, the origin of the challenge is not located within the advocate as such.  
Whereas ‗reviewers‘ must feel confident in the evidence base and their understanding 
of the law to proceed with a challenge, an ‗advocate‘ must merely know that their 
advocacy partner is unhappy with the outcome of a decision and wishes action to be 
taken.  Instructed advocates may therefore find it easier to navigate a lack of 
confidence in their own opinions, and the social dilemmas of challenging decision 
makers, as they exercise less personal judgment in initiating challenges.  It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but it would be interesting to explore empirically whether the 
subjective experiences of advocates and ‗reviewers‘ reflect this hypothesis, and 
whether this impacts upon their readiness to challenge. 
ARE IMCAS INDEPENDENT? 
Republicans emphasise the importance of enforcement mechanisms being 
external to those exercising power.  Although IMCAs belong to legally distinct 
organisations to decision-makers, there are some structural factors that condition their 
independence with respect to decision makers.  I have already touched upon the 
tensions for IMCAs between preserving relationships with decision makers, who are 
responsible for future referrals and are gatekeepers to much information IMCAs need 
to access for their role, and being prepared to challenge their decisions.   
Further concerns arise around commissioning structures.  Local authorities are 
responsible for funding and arranging the very IMCA services that are intended to act 
as an independent check and, sometimes as a brake, on their decision making.  During 
the consultation on the IMCA service, half of respondents felt that funding for the 
service should be held centrally because of ‗conflicts of interest if funding were 
allocated by the LA or PCT to which advocacy organisations were providing a service‘  
(Department of Health, 2005b: 8).  There is a danger that IMCA service providers – 
even if not individual IMCAs – may feel constrained in how far they can hold local 
authorities to account and challenge their decisions if they are dependent upon that 
175 
 
self-same local authority choosing to commission their service again in the future.  Not 
all IMCAs may subjectively experience these tensions, but the very structure of 
commissioning and referral patterns does threaten to compromise the independence of 
the IMCA role.  It is not desirable that the efficacy of IMCAs as a safeguard is so 
closely linked to the esteem they are held in by those whose actions they are supposed 
to be holding in check. 
ARE IMCAS AN EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARD? 
IMCAs were introduced in response to widespread demands for greater 
safeguards on best interests decisions made under the ‗general defence‘, but it is not 
clear that they can satisfy this role.  IMCAs may enhance the quality of decision making 
under the MCA by providing better quality information for decision makers and helping 
– as far as is possible within the resource and other constraints of their role – to include 
a person in the decision making process.  However, research and official data on the 
IMCA service suggests that IMCAs rarely assist people affected by decisions to bring 
challenges against decision makers, or instigate such challenges of their own accord.  
This suggests that IMCAs may be a very weak safeguard against mental capacity 
assessments and best interests decisions that depart from accepted legal standards. 
In a broader sense, even if IMCAs were more effective in challenging poor 
decisions under the MCA, their role is limited to a very small proportion of decisions 
made under the MCA every day.  Their role is short term and decision specific, leaving 
an unbefriended person with few safeguards against other decisions made under the 
‗general defence‘ that did not merit IMCA involvement, and yet which might have 
significant repercussions on their quality of life.  Short term involvement of IMCAs does 
little to ‗empower‘ a person overall as the MCA claims to do, and stands in contrast with 
models of support for people with mental disabilities in other jurisdictions.477   
Furthermore, IMCAs are not instructed where a decision maker regards a 
person as suitably ‗befriended‘ by friends or family.  Yet friends and family are likely to 
have limited knowledge of the MCA, and are poorly placed to identify when decision 
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For example, the Swedish Personal Ombudsman scheme is often favourably cited in the 
literature around Article 12 CRPD (Centre for Disability Law & Policy, 2011; Dhanda, 2006-7; 
Morrissey, 2012).  The Personal Ombudsmen system is similar to personal and peer advocacy, 
and provides people with mental-disabilities with long term support, at a time and place and in a 
manner of their choosing.  For example, an ombudsman might support a person through 
regularly meeting to talk with them, or they might help them advocate to others or negotiate 
complaints and other bureaucratic processes which affect their lives.  Personal ombudsmen use 
a very ‗directed‘ model of advocacy, which is premised upon trust, confidentiality, flexibility and 
a minimum of bureaucracy.  Another interesting contrast with the IMCA approach taken by the 
UK is a bill currently beginning its passage through the National Parliament in India.  Section 9 
Draft Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2012 (India) establishes a ‗duty to provide support 
in exercise of legal capacity‘, which includes a duty upon regional authorities to ‗mobilize the 
community and create social networks  to support persons with disabilities in the exercise of 
their legal capacity.‘
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makers have departed from the requirements of the MCA.  Families are likely to be 
unfamiliar with mechanisms for challenging best interests decisions, and may face 
serious ‗access to justice‘ difficulties – some of which are outlined below.  Disability 
charities have repeatedly raised concerns that family carers of people with learning 
disabilities are not being consulted in accordance with the MCA in healthcare 
decisions, resulting in poor care and treatment decisions and even death (Ambitious 
about Autism et al., 2012; Mencap, 2012; Mencap and Challenging Behaviour 
Foundation, 2012a).   
Neither are family members ‗advocates‘ in the sense of reliably promoting the 
wishes (or even the interests) of people with disabilities themselves.  Research has 
repeatedly found that family carers of people with learning disabilities can be resistant 
to promoting their rights to make choices about their own lives (Bowey, L. and 
McGlaughlin, 2005b; Jingree, Treena and Finlay, 2011; Heyman and Huckle, 1993; 
Heyman, 1995; McGlaughlin and Gorfin, 2004; Walmsley, 1996; Williams, V. and 
Robinson, 2001).  Some researchers have expressed concern that family carers may 
not be able to make ‗impartial‘ decisions about a person‘s right to make an unwise 
decision (Manthorpe et al., 2009: 890).  Others have emphasised that carers have 
‗their own set of entitlements and interests‘ which may come into conflict with people 
with learning disabilities and limit their independence as advocates (Keywood, 2003: 
363).  Empirical research has found that family carers sometimes heavily influenced 
clinicians in best interests decision making and could lead to the person themselves 
being excluded from the process (Redley et al., 2012: 6-7).  Insofar as family carers 
and best interests decision makers are in agreement with professionals about what is 
in a person‘s best interests, a person‘s right to make an unwise decision may be poorly 
protected.  
 
These considerations raise wider questions about when, and how, people who 
are the subject of ‗best interests‘ decisions which they disagree with should be 
supported to challenge them.  This is a rapidly evolving area of law in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), but has yet to make a significant impact on domestic 
litigation.478  All the situations calling for IMCA referrals must, surely engage Article 8.  
It is well established that interferences that engage Article 8 ECHR must be ‗in 
accordance with the law‘, which must in turn be ‗accessible to the person 
concerned‘.479  Furthermore, a growing body of ECtHR case law related to Articles 6 
and 8 has found that a person must be able to challenge a decision that deprives them 
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The domestic authorities will be discussed in connection with applications to the Court of 
Protection, below, and those connected to bringing Article 5 claims, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.
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Herczegfalvy v Austria, [88]; X v Finland, [215].  See also J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1), [11]. 
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of their legal capacity to act in a matter which engages their Convention rights.480  The 
majority of this case law has considered situations where a person‘s access to the law 
is barred by formal ‗deprivation of legal capacity‘ procedures, which is not quite the 
case for decisions made under the MCA.  The obstacles people with learning 
disabilities in England face in challenging such decisions are complex, and are 
discussed in more detail below.   
The ECtHR has taken some tentative steps towards finding that states are 
under some positive obligations to ensure that the law is accessible to people with 
disabilities.  In Stanev v Bulgaria the court held that ‗special procedural safeguards 
may be called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their 
mental illness, are not fully capable of acting for themselves‘.481  The nature of such 
safeguards is not clearly spelled out, although in RP v UK482 the ECtHR held that the 
appointment of a litigation friend will only be compatible with a person‘s Article 6 rights: 
...if the fact of his appointment, the implications of his appointment, the 
existence of a means of challenging his appointment and the procedure 
for exercising it are clearly explained to the protected person in 
language appropriate to his or her level of understanding.483 
One might infer from that that in order for a ‗best interests‘ decision to be compatible 
with a person‘s Convention rights, the existence of a procedure for challenge such 
decisions must be brought to their attention.  A key weakness of the ruling in RP v UK 
is its lack of attentiveness to the further practical assistance a person with learning 
disabilities may need in accessing such procedures in order for their rights to challenge 
decisions to be ‗practical and effective‘ rather than ‗theoretical and illusory‘.484  These 
are issues which the courts have yet to consider, yet they will have important 
implications for the role IMCAs may play in assisting a person to challenge decisions 
which affect them. 
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Shtukaturov v Russia (App no 44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223 [71], [90]; Salontaji-Drobnjak v 
Serbia (App no 36500/05) [2009] ECHR 1526, [144]; X and Y v Croatia, [67]; Stanev v Bulgaria, 
[170] - [177], [241]; D.D. v Lithuania, [118]; X v Finland,  [220]; RP v UK, [72]; Sýkora v The 
Czech Republic (App no 23419/07) [2012] ECHR [102]. 
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[170]; see also Sýkora v The Czech Republic [82]. 
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 (App no 38245/08) [2012] ECHR 1796 
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RP v UK, [72].
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5.3 THE EFFICACY OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION AS A 
SAFEGUARD 
The Court of Protection is the final arbiter of questions of capacity and best 
interests. 485   In contrast with other jurisdictions, 486  there is no dedicated ‗appeal‘ 
mechanism for decisions taken regarding a person‘s mental capacity under the MCA.  
An application to the Court of Protection for a declaration that a person has the mental 
capacity to make a decision487 is the mechanism that most closely approximates an 
appeal against a decision that a person lacks mental capacity.  An application may be 
made by the person themselves, or a third party on their behalf.  Applications to the 
Court of Protection might also be made where disputes arise regarding what course of 
action is in a person‘s best interests.  However, not all welfare related applications are 
prompted by a dispute – they might be made because a person seeks to be appointed 
as a deputy to make decisions on a person‘s behalf488, where there is doubt about the 
appropriate course of action489, or because they are mandated to for a limited number 
of serious medical treatments.490 
Regardless of who applies to court, the entire foundation of the court‘s powers 
to make decisions on behalf of a person by way of an order, or to appoint deputies to 
make decisions on that person‘s behalf, rests on that person lacking mental capacity.491  
All litigation in the Court of Protection, therefore, rests upon the court either being 
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It can also make declarations as to the validity and applicability of advance decisions (ss24-6 
MCA), Lasting Powers of Attorney (ss22-3 MCA) and on matters relating to the deprivation of 
liberty safeguards (s21A MCA) 
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For example in Scotland s16 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 provides that ‗A 
decision taken for the purposes of this Act, other than by the sheriff, as to the incapacity of an 
adult may be appealed by— 
(a) the adult; or  
(b) any person claiming an interest in the adult‘s property, financial affairs or personal 
welfare relating to the purpose for which the decision was taken, to the sheriff or, where 
the decision was taken by the sheriff, to the sheriff principal and thence, with the leave 
of the sheriff principal, to the Court of Session‘.  The Sheriff court is a local court, and a 
Sheriff is roughly analogous to a district judge. 
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Under s15 MCA
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See ss16-20 MCA 
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In London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary & Anor, Jackson J stated ‗Where a dilemma exists, 
the court provides an accessible forum.  Often, parties will have a clear view of what they are 
proposing, but if a party needs more evidence or is uncertain about the best outcome in a 
difficult case, it is no shame to say so.  Proceedings in the Court of Protection need not be 
adversarial.‘ [142] 
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These are listed in the code of practice as: ‗decisions about the proposed withholding or 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) from patients in a permanent vegetative 
state (PVS)‘, ‗cases involving organ or bone marrow donation by a person who lacks capacity to 
consent‘ and ‗cases involving the proposed non-therapeutic sterilisation of a person who lacks 
capacity to consent to this (e.g. for contraceptive purposes)‘ (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: 
[8.18]).  A Court of Protection (2007b) Practice Direction essentially replicates this guidance, but 
adds the withdrawal of ANH from people in a ‗minimally conscious state‘, presumably in 
response to the case W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).  Bartlett (2008: [2.13]) has questioned 
what mechanism the courts could use to enforce this requirement. 
491 
s16(1) MCA 
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satisfied that a person lacks mental capacity in relation to the matter in question, or 
making a declaration that they have the requisite mental capacity to make the decision 
for themselves.  From a republican perspective, constraining the arbitrariness of the 
court‘s decisions regarding a person‘s mental capacity is absolutely fundamental.  A 
republican approach therefore raises a number of questions about the Court of 
Protection as an effective enforcement mechanism for the MCA: 
1. To what extent is the Court of Protection accessible as a means for people 
to challenge the basis for best interests decisions which affect them? 
2. If a person is unable to initiate such litigation, to what extent can they rely 
upon third parties to do so on their behalf? 
3. To what extent are mental capacity assessments subject to effective 
scrutiny by the Court of Protection? 
4. To what extent does the court scrutinise the basis for best interests 
decisions that conflict with a person‘s wishes and preferences, so as to 
minimise the extent of any interferences? 
Answering these questions relies on a careful unpicking of dry, technical and 
often hidden details of the processes behind litigation the Court of Protection.  What 
follows is based on what can be gleaned from the MCA and associated case law, the 
Court of Protection Rules 2007, practice directions, court forms and other grey 
literature.   Many practices are not explicitly laid down in statute, rules, practice 
directions or judicial or statutory guidance, so this was supplemented by interviews with 
the OS, solicitors with experience of Court of Protection litigation and judges.  A 
number of recent ECtHR cases have explored the procedural aspects of deprivation of 
legal capacity proceedings which are, in some respects, analogous to litigation in the 
Court of Protection.  These are considered as they build upon Convention principles 
associated with the ‗rule of law‘, which are closely aligned with republican approaches.  
They are also likely to influence the way that Court of Protection procedures evolve in 
the future.  These issues may appear dry and technical, but they have a profound 
influence on the ways in which the Court of Protection may be used to ‗invigilate‘ 
interferences in the lives of people with mental disabilities, and the way the MCA is 
shaped and interpreted as a whole. 
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5.3.1 KEY DIFFICULTIES IN USING THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
TO ‗INVIGILATE‘ INTERFERENCES PREMISED UPON INCAPACITY 
PRACTICAL OBSTACLES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 
INITIATING PROCEEDINGS 
It is well known that people with mental disabilities experience considerable 
difficulties accessing justice to enforce their legal rights (Bartlett et al., 2007; Cojocariu, 
2011; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009; 2011b; Inclusion Europe, 2007; 
O‘Cinneide, 2009; Ortoleva, 2010-11).  This is one reason why the CPRD contains an 
article dedicated to equal access to justice for people with disabilities (Article 13).  
There are many potential obstacles for people with learning disabilities who live in 
institutions using the court to enforce their rights.  At the most basic level, some people 
with learning disabilities have profound communication impairments which may make it 
difficult to even alert third parties to interferences with their rights.  Disabled people 
often have low levels of awareness of their rights, and are often discouraged from 
making complaints (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009; 2011b).  There is 
evidence that people with mental disabilities are often disbelieved, and can experience 
‗diagnostic overshadowing‘ so that claims that their rights have been infringed are 
regarded as ‗symptoms‘ of their diagnosis (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
2009; Watson, 2002). 
Making complaints or initiating proceedings against those whom people are 
reliant upon for care and support can be particularly problematic.  People may fear 
retribution, or may have few or no other sources of support from people who could 
assist them with the practicalities of challenging their caregivers.  Solicitor and legal 
academic Luke Clements has said that: 
...for every one person with mental capacity difficulties to get to court, 
there are probably 100,000 who have no access because the mere 
concept of stepping into a solicitor's office is intimidating, as it is for all of 
us, and the reality is that people with mental capacity difficulties never 
take the first step. 
Clements argues that advocacy was ‗utterly fundamental‘ in rectifying this difficulty 
(Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, 2003).  However, as noted above, 
IMCAs are only available for a very limited number of decisions and very rarely help 
people make formal complaints or initiate legal proceedings.  Other sources of 
independent advocacy are increasingly drying up due to austerity cuts to local authority 
budgets (Action for Advocacy, 2011).  To make the Court of Protection a plausible 
mechanism for people with learning disabilities to ‗invigilate‘ interferences with their 
rights, considerable efforts would have to be made to promote their awareness of their 
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rights, and provide long term access to independent advocacy to help in asserting 
them. 
Even once a person with learning disabilities has made it as far as contacting a 
solicitor, funding the litigation may pose a problem.  Technical details of eligibility for 
public funding for litigation in the Court of Protection are given in Appendix C, but are 
summarised here.   The content of litigation in the Court of Protection must fall within 
core categories specified by the Legal Services Commission (2011b) 492  (LSC): a 
person's right to life, a person's liberty or physical safety, a person's medical treatment, 
a person's capacity to marry, to enter into a civil partnership or to enter into sexual 
relations, or a person's right to family life.  The LSC comment that ‗Many welfare cases 
concern accommodation issues which will not as such fall within the scope of the 
authorisation‘, but accommodation cases ‗will be within scope where they concern P‘s 
family life‘ (p285).  This suggests that where adults wish to challenge placement 
decisions under the MCA that do not concern family life, they may have difficulties 
securing legal aid.  Proceedings in the Court of Protection are not exempt from the 
‗merits‘ requirements for public funding that they must have good prospects of success 
(Legal Services Commission, 2011a).493  There are also eligibility requirements relating 
to income and capital.  People in receipt of certain ‗passporting‘ benefits would meet 
these criteria.494  However, those who exceed the income or capital thresholds would 
not be eligible, and this is especially problematic where people do not have ‗liquid‘ 
capital assets – for example, they may be home owners but be unwilling or unable to 
sell their home to fund litigation (Official Solicitor, 2011; Pitblado, 2012).495 
The Court of Protection does not keep statistics on the identity of applicants; 
however in an interview for this research the OS stated that in his experience 
applications from ‗P‘496 are rare.  When I put this question to Senior Judge Lush at the 
                                               
492 
And now written into Schedule 1 of Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012. 
493 
A small number of cases are exempt from ‗merits‘ requirements, these include certain types 
of cases relating to family law and mental health. 
494 
Means tested Employment and Support Allowance is one passporting benefit.  1,131,520 
people, or 43.3% of all claimants of Employment and Support Allowance have 'Mental and 
behavioural disorders' recorded as their main condition (McInnes, 2012).  
 
495 
People who lack financial capacity will have especial problems if they have assets which 
exceed the eligibility criteria for public funding, as even if they have financial resources for 
litigation they may not be able to access them without the permission of their deputy or the 
donee of an LPA.  In such cases where those managing their financial assets were unwilling to 
relinquish them for this purpose, they would very likely have to contact the Office of the Public 
Guardian to look into their financial management arrangements, which would be time 
consuming and would be a rather ‗sideways‘ way of approaching the particular matter in 
question.  Those who have assets, lack financial capacity but have no deputy or LPA face 
especial problems funding litigation (Official Solicitor, 2011).
 
496 
‗P‘ is defined in r6 Court of Protection Rules 2007 as ‗any person (other than a protected 
party) who lacks or, so far as consistent with the context, is alleged to lack capacity to make a 
decision or decisions in relation to any matter that is the subject of an application to the court 
and references to a person who lacks capacity are to be construed in accordance with the Act‘. 
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Court of Protection, he confirmed this.  This suggests that although people with mental 
disabilities are legally entitled to use the Court of Protection to challenge allegations of 
incapacity, best interests decisions or other MCA-related matters that affect them, in 
practice they very rarely do.  Access to justice issues may be a key factor in explaining 
this.  Consequently, people with mental disabilities will be heavily reliant on third parties 
initiating litigation to ‗invigilate‘ interferences with their rights which stray from the 
principles of the MCA. 
BRINGING DISPUTES TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION  
Although the courts and MCA code have made clear that a small number of 
medical treatment cases must go to the Court of Protection497, the situation for disputes 
connected with wider welfare matters is far less clear.  The MCA code of practice 
states that ‗cases where there is a doubt or dispute about whether a particular 
treatment will be in a person‘s best interests‘ should be brought to court.  Of disputes 
that do not involve medical treatment it says only that ‗an application to the Court of 
Protection may be necessary for... particularly difficult decisions [or] disagreements that 
cannot be resolved in any other way‘ (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [8.18], [8.3]).  
This guidance gives rise to two questions: 
1. Which parties should be in dispute for the need for formal adjudication to 
arise? 
2. Who is responsible for bringing disputes that require adjudication to court? 
Regarding the first question, I have already touched upon ECtHR case law that 
may mean that people with disabilities should be supported to challenge best interests 
decisions that engage their Article 8 rights if they dispute them. 498   Domestically, 
however, neither guidance nor case law has clearly spelled out that advocates, public 
authorities, providers or others should assist a person who is alleged to lack mental 
capacity to challenge any best interests decisions in court.499   Instead, the case law on 
which cases must go to court has tended to revolve around disputes between families 
and professionals. 
Munby LJ touched upon this important issue in obiter remarks in A Local 
Authority v A (A Child) & Anor.  Having reviewed local authorities‘ powers and duties 
under statute and common law,500 he commented that: 
                                               
497 
See n490 above.
 
498 
See the section entitled ‗Are IMCAs an effective safeguard?‘ 
499 
The situation is slightly different for disputes where Article 5 is engaged, and this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
500  
At [65].  These included local authorities powers and duties to provide care services, 
discussed in Chapter 3, responsibilities for adult protection arising from binding guidance 
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...none of these sources of local authority engagement with someone 
like C confers on the local authority any power to regulate, control, 
compel, restrain, confine or coerce. They are concerned with the 
provision of services and support.501 
Munby LJ then went on to assert that ‗if a local authority seeks to control an 
incapacitated or vulnerable adult it must enlist the assistance of either the Court of 
Protection or the High Court‘502.  If Munby LJ is correct, then there is a point beyond 
which local authorities cannot rely upon ‗necessity‘ or ss5-6 MCA to ‗control, compel, 
restrain, confine or coerce‘.  Yet the point beyond which s5-6 cannot be used is not 
defined by Munby LJ in A Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor, nor in the cases he 
cites in support of his principle 
One might try to understand this by distinguishing ss5-6 MCA, which constitutes 
a defence, from a legal ‗power‘.  Clearly the two are distinct: infancy may be a defence 
to murder, but the state has not granted children under the age of 10 powers to kill.  
Nevertheless, this brings us little closer to understanding the limits of what can lawfully 
be done by relying on ss5-6 MCA.  The government‘s terminological shift from the 
‗general authority‘ to the ‗general defence‘ during the passage of the Bill resulted from 
‗concerns that the General Authority would allow too much licence to intervene in the 
lives of people who may lack capacity‘ and sought to ‗make its proper intention clear‘ 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2004: [5]-[6]).  Yet nowhere in parliamentary 
debates, in the code or in policy guidance are the limits of what interventions are 
permissible under the MCA set out.   
The Law Commission‘s work, which led to the drafting of the MCA, was clearly 
designed to fill the void left by the retraction of the public law powers of guardians (Law 
Commission, 1991; 1995).  Indeed, the MHA code of practice states that ‗one potential 
alternative‘ to relying on public law powers under guardianship ‗will be to rely solely on 
the MCA‘ (Department of Health, 2008a: [26.10], see also [26.11], [26.13]), and 
guardianship – unlike the MCA – does not make provision for consent to treatment.  
Yet if anything this suggests that there was intended to be a broader range of coercive 
acts that can be done to a person under the MCA than under guardianship.  In Re F 
(adult patient) and Munby LJ‘s own ruling in Re S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction: 
Family Life) major decisions regarding where a person should live and restrictions on 
contact with family members were made through best interests declarations by the 
courts.  In neither case was it explicitly stated that it was necessary to apply to court for 
such a declaration in order to invoke the doctrine of necessity for such matters. 
                                                                                                                                         
(Department of Health and Home Office, 2000) and common law duties to investigate 
‗investigate the circumstances of a vulnerable adult whose welfare is seriously threatened by 
the act of another‘ arising from Re Z (Local Authority: Duty).
 
501 
[66] 
502 
[68] 
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Further support for the suggestion that the government did anticipate that 
‗necessity‘ and the MCA could be used to ‗regulate, control, compel, restrain, confine or 
coerce‘ without recourse to the courts comes from its own guidance.  In binding503 
guidance on safeguarding, No Secrets, the Department of Health (2000: [6.21]) stated 
that ‗The vulnerable adult‘s capacity is the key to action since if someone has ‗capacity‘ 
and declines assistance this limits the help that he or she may be given‘.  No Secrets 
makes no reference to ‗enlisting the authority of the court‘504 at any point.  Neither does 
the Department of Health‘s (2003a; 2010c) binding guidance on community care 
assessment and provision of care services specify that an application to the Court of 
Protection is necessary if a person is to be compelled to accept particular care services 
in the face of opposition from themselves or their family. 
Consequently, local authorities may have experienced surprise when, in 
Jackson J‘s ruling in London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary & Anor505 he found that 
Hillingdon Council had acted unlawfully in not bringing the dispute between themselves 
and the Neary family to the Court of Protection.  The basis for this aspect of Jackson 
J‘s ruling was Munby LJ‘s obiter remarks in A Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor: 
The ordinary powers of a local authority are limited to investigating, 
providing support services, and where appropriate referring the matter to 
the court.    If a local authority seeks to regulate, control, compel, 
restrain, confine or coerce it must, except in an emergency, point to 
specific statutory authority for what it is doing or else obtain the 
appropriate sanction of the court: again see Re A and C (above) and the 
authorities referred to therein.506 
Perhaps even more surprisingly, since this was the first time the High Court had 
explicitly issued a judgment based upon this principle, Jackson J found that its origins 
lay in Magna Carta: 
'"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, 
or liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise 
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by 
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."507 
From this, Jackson J held that ‗Significant welfare issues that cannot be resolved by 
discussion should be placed before the Court of Protection, where decisions can be 
taken as a matter of urgency where necessary‘.508 
                                               
503
 Issued under s7 Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 
504 
As per Munby LJ in A Local Authority v A (A child) and C. 
505 
Neary is an important case concerning the deprivation of liberty safeguards which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 
506 
[22]
 
507 
Neary [23], citing Chapter 23 of Magna Carta 1297. 
508 
[33], see also the case of Cardiff Council v Peggy Ross [2011] (COP, 28 October 2011, Case 
No 12063905, Unreported). 
185 
 
Jackson J need not have looked as far back as Magna Carta to find such a 
principle.  A growing body of ECtHR case law has found that in certain circumstances 
Article 8 requires procedural safeguards to ensure that interferences are ‗fair and such 
as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8‘.509  In 
Glass v UK, where medical authorities overrode a mother‘s objections to administering 
morphine to her disabled son, the court found that ‗the decision of the authorities to 
override [her] objection to the proposed treatment in the absence of authorisation by a 
court resulted in a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.‘510  Furthermore, ‗the onus 
was on the Trust to take the initiative and to defuse the situation‘511, and it was not 
sufficient to wait for the mother to apply to court in those circumstances.  Glass 
suggests that in some circumstances, where agreement over a serious treatment 
decision cannot be secured, failure to apply to court by the body proposing the 
measure may result in a breach of Article 8.512   
A key difficulty with applying the ruling in Glass to the Court of Protection is that 
in Glass the mother had clear parental authority over her son as he was a child.  
Relatives of people in the Court of Protection513 have no such parental or other familial 
‗authority‘.  A peculiarity of the ruling in Neary is that the requirement to bring a welfare 
matter to court appears to rest upon a dispute breaking out between professionals and 
a person‘s family, not with the person themselves: 
...it is undoubtedly lawful for actions to be taken by families and local 
authorities, acting together on the basis of a careful assessment of the 
best interests of incapacitated persons.  The vast majority of 
arrangements are made in this way and involve no breach of the rights 
of the persons concerned.514 
This perpetuates a rather unhelpful sense that so long as families and local authorities 
are in agreement about a person‘s mental capacity and best interests, there is no need 
for court adjudication of a person‘s own dispute.  This must, as I have argued earlier, 
be incorrect: a person must have a right to challenge a major interference with their 
                                               
509 
Buckley v The United Kingdom, [76]. 
510 
[83]
 
511 
[79] 
512 
See also Buckley v UK, in which the ECtHR commented that although Article 8 contains no 
explicit procedural requirements, ‗Whenever discretion capable of interfering with the enjoyment 
of a Convention right... is conferred on national authorities‘, the decision making process ‗must 
be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 
8‘ [76].  This does not necessarily require an application to court, but it does require some kind 
of procedural safeguard to be put in place.  In the absence of other possible safeguards under 
the MCA, a court application may be the only available option. 
513 
Except in those rare cases where the Court of Protection is used for people aged between 
16-18. 
514 
[21] 
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Convention rights regardless of whether or not they have family and their family agree 
with it.515 
From a republican perspective, therefore, we can see that there is considerable 
uncertainty over what types of disputes require the adjudication of the Court of 
Protection.  Court of Protection judges have recently ‗discovered‘ that local authorities 
cannot, as previously seemed to be the case, rely upon the MCA or ‗necessity‘ to 
‗regulate, control, compel, restrain, confine or coerce‘ outside of emergencies.  Given 
the importance of being able to ‗invigilate‘ major interferences with their choices and 
freedoms in order to protect against arbitrariness, these tentative steps – however 
questionable their legal foundations – seem desirable.   
Yet there are practical difficulties with the courts attempting to reign in such 
coercive practices through the creation (‗discovery‘) of such principles in the common 
law.  Public authorities and indeed care providers are unlikely to scour all 27,000 words 
of A Local Authority v A (A Child) & Anor for obiter remarks.  They are much more likely 
to be acquainted with guidance such as No Secrets which gives no indication that the 
authority of the Court of Protection is required in the context of disputes.  The principle 
in Neary, being both well publicised and part of the ratio, is likely to be better known, 
but may be more closely associated with cases involving deprivation of liberty.  
Furthermore, as can be seen by the impact assessment predicting that the Court of 
Protection would only hear 200 health and welfare cases each year (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2005: [43]), the court was never set up to adjudicate a high 
volume of these disputes. 
It seems probable that local authorities are not heeding Munby LJ‘s dictum.  In 
2011-12 there were over 23,000 ‗safeguarding‘ allegations involving a person‘s partner 
or a family member (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2012a: Table 
6a).  It seems likely that steps would be taken to protect the best interests of the 
alleged victim in a significant proportion of these cases that would be likely to result in 
disputes between their relatives and professionals.  Yet data from the Court of 
Protection shows that it receives somewhere around 1,000 applications every year for 
welfare issues, the majority of which are refused permission (Judiciary of England and 
Wales, 2010; 2011).516  An analysis of applications for permission to bring welfare 
proceedings showed that the vast majority come from the sons and daughters of P, 
around 14% come from P‘s parents and around 7% are made by a public authority.  
                                               
515 
This would also appear to be supported by the ECtHR‘s recent rulings in Stanev v Bulgaria 
and Kędzior v Poland where the court found that a person had a right to challenge decisions 
about their placement in social care institutions, regardless of the fact their families were either 
apathetic (as in Stanev) or had actively arranged it (as in Kędzior).
 
516 
For a more detailed breakdown of these data, see Table 9, Appendix C.  The majority of 
these are likely to be ‗hybrid‘ applications for welfare and property and affairs deputyships, 
rather than solely relating to welfare issues.
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Applications from the parents of P or public authorities are markedly more likely to be 
granted permission than applications from other people (Series, 2012a).517  Overall, 
however, the number of MCA welfare disputes that result in litigation is remarkably low.  
From a republican perspective this is unfortunate, as it suggests that where a person 
experiences an interference with their choices and freedoms which they, or their family, 
resist, the likelihood that the Court of Protection will ‗invigilate‘ it is low. 
THE ROLE OF LITIGATION FRIENDS IN CONTESTING CAPACITY 
ASSESSMENTS AND BEST INTERESTS DECISIONS 
The instigation of litigation in the Court of Protection is no guarantee that the 
basis for an intervention under the MCA will be thoroughly adversarially tested, even if 
P objects to it.  Once proceedings in the Court of Protection are initiated, the Court of 
Protection Rules 2007 provide that P may be bound as if a party to proceedings without 
actually being joined as a party in his own right.518    If ‗P‘ is joined as a party to 
proceedings he will be represented through a litigation friend in the vast majority of 
cases.  The main function of a litigation friend is to ‗carry on the litigation on behalf of 
the plaintiff and in his best interests‘, and he is ‗responsible to the court for the propriety 
and the progress of the proceedings‘.519  A second rationale for the use of litigation 
friends is that ‗A defendant is entitled to expect that he will not be required to defend 
proceedings brought against him by a person of unsound mind acting without a next 
friend.‘ 520   A litigation friend must be able to conduct proceedings ‗fairly and 
competently‘ and have ‗no interests adverse to those of that person‘. 521   In civil 
proceedings very often a family member will act as litigation friend. However in the 
Court of Protection, where typically there may be disputes about a person‘s best 
interests that involve their family, relatives may not be regarded as sufficiently impartial 
to act as litigation friend.522  In such cases, the OS523 must be appointed as a litigation 
                                               
517 
Charts describing these data are reproduced in Appendix C, see Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 
12 and Figure 13. 
518 
r74 Court of Protection Rules 2007.  According to the consultation on the Rules, this reflected 
earlier practices in the ‗old‘ Court of Protection, which dealt with property and affairs, whereby a 
person was only sometimes joined and represented as a party to proceedings in their own right.  
By contrast, they would always be named as a defendant in the High Court for health and 
welfare proceedings (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006).  Responses to the Rules 
consultation were mixed, with some preferring that a person‘s interests be represented only 
where the court feels it is appropriate; others argued that the person ‗at the heart of the case‘ be 
represented through a litigation friend for all but the most straightforward financial deputyship 
applications (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007: 16-17).  The Rules do not provide 
guidance on when P must be joined as a party, and there is no data to reveal the court‘s current 
practices.
 
519 
Re E (Mental Health Patient)
 
520 
Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889 [65] 
521  
Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 140, see Civil Procedure Rules rule 21.4 for the 
analogous provision in other civil proceedings. 
522 
For example, in the case G v E [2010] EWHC 2512 (COP) the sister of a man who had been 
unlawfully deprived of his liberty applied to replace the Official Solicitor as his litigation friend.  
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friend of last resort.  Consequently, the OS represents ‗P‘ in the vast majority of cases 
in the Court of Protection where P is joined as a party. 
Because litigation friends must conduct proceedings in the ‗best interests‘ of P, 
the possibility arises that they will conduct litigation in a way that conflicts with P‘s 
expressed wishes and preferences.  A litigation friend may decide, for example, not to 
contest a finding that P lacks mental capacity or may advance best interests arguments 
that conflict with what P wants.  Some reported cases give very striking examples of 
this phenomenon.  In Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1) the OS argued that a 
young woman with anorexia lacked the mental capacity to refuse re-feeding treatment, 
that it was in her best interests to be force fed against her will, and that two advance 
decisions she had prepared prohibiting such treatment were invalid.  In this case, as 
barrister Barbara Hewson (2012) remarked, ‗the only people arguing for Ms E to be left 
alone were her parents, who did not have legal representation.‘  However, it should 
also be observed that in some cases the OS does argue that what a person wants is 
also in their best interests.524 In a small number of cases the OS has also argued that a 
person has capacity to make a particular decision – even an unwise decision.525  These 
cases seem, however, to be very rare. 526   And in some cases the wishes and 
preferences of P cannot be discerned at all.527 
This means that in some circumstances, the acts of a litigation friend may 
become a source of ‗interferences‘ with a person‘s choices and freedoms in 
themselves.  This section will present a republican critique of the role of litigation 
friends in the Court of Protection on the following grounds: 
                                                                                                                                         
Baker J found that ‗there is cause to question whether G has the necessary objectivity to act as 
litigation friend on behalf of her brother. It is not uncommon for family members to have strong 
feelings about the misfortunes that befall their relatives. Indeed, it is entirely understandable. 
But there is a danger, in some cases, that such feelings may cloud judgment.‘ [73]
 
523 
The OS is an office holder, presently located within the Ministry of Justice, who has a staff of 
case managers whom he directs which manage cases on his behalf.  The role of the OS is not 
described anywhere in statute, and is poorly documented in textbooks and written materials.  
Information about the role of the OS was gathered in interviews with the OS and solicitors, as 
well as various presentations and reports written by his office (Office of Court Funds Official 
Solicitor and Public Trustee, 2008; 2009; 2010; Office of the Official Solicitor and the Public 
Trustee, 2011; Pitblado, 2012).
 
524 
For example, in LB Haringey v FG & Ors (No.2) [ 2011] EWHC 3933 (COP) the OS argued 
that a young woman should not be made to live with her mother against her wishes, 
notwithstanding that her mother wanted her to.  The court agreed.  In NHS Trust v K & Ors the 
OS argued that a woman should not have a surgery which she refused, but this was less by 
reference to her wishes than by reference to the risks of the surgery itself.  The court disagreed 
and found that surgery was in her best interests.  See also London Borough of Hillingdon v 
Neary & Anor. 
525 
In Local Authority X v MM and KM  the OS argued that a woman had the capacity to consent 
to sex, notwithstanding that she lacked the capacity to consent to contact with her sexual 
partner.  See Chapter 4 for further discussion of this case. 
526 
In interview for this research I asked the OS whether there were examples of where a person 
might have capacity to make a particular decision, but lacks litigation capacity, where the OS 
has supported him to assert his right to make an unwise or eccentric decision.  He replied that 
the situation was ‗technically possible‘ and cited Local Authority X v MM and KM as an example. 
527 
This is especially true of cases about people with disorders of consciousness, e.g. W v M.
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1. The evidence that P lacks mental capacity to make a particular decision 
may be accepted by all parties to the case, and hence will not be fully 
adversarially tested, even if P himself disputes this.  This potentially 
deprives P of his right to appeal against mental capacity assessments which 
he disputes. 
2. Litigation friends make ‗best interests‘ decisions which have significant 
repercussions for how litigation is pursued on behalf of a person, yet there 
are inadequate structural safeguards to ensure that these decisions are not 
arbitrary. 
This critique centres on the role of litigation friends in the Court of Protection, 
and is not intended to be a critique of their role in other kinds of litigation, which raises 
different issues. 528   As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, domination is a structural 
phenomenon, and the critique that follows is not directed towards the current 
incumbent of the role of the OS, whose work I hold in high esteem.529   
EVIDENCE OF INCAPACITY 
The OS confirmed in an interview for this research, and has stated elsewhere 
(Pitblado, 2012), that he bases decisions on whether to bring or continue proceedings 
and what case to advance on the evidence of experts.  This is an entirely 
understandable approach given that the OS and his case workers do not profess any 
kind of personal expertise in the assessment of mental capacity or determining best 
interests, and they have only limited contact with those they represent.530  This means, 
however, that any cases run by litigation friends taking this approach would be unlikely 
to contest in court any expert evidence they receive.  There have been a small number 
of cases where the OS has done so, but this has tended to be due to an expert‘s lack 
of familiarity with the MCA and the Court of Protection rather than because the OS 
                                               
528 
In particular, there is a danger that a person may be awarded significant costs for litigation 
which they lose, or the danger that a person who does not fully understand their claim may 
settle prematurely for an inadequate amount of compensation, see: Dunhill v Burgin [2011] 
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himself has arrived at a different conclusion as to a person‘s mental capacity.531  The 
likelihood of others challenging the evidence that P lacks mental capacity is also slim, 
given that for the most part the conflict will be over which view as to P‘s best interests 
will prevail.   
Lewis (2012a) has critiqued practices in guardianship jurisdictions where 
evidence regarding a person‘s mental capacity is not adversarially tested, and counter-
evidence is not presented.  This also appears to be a danger in the Court of Protection, 
where the evidence of a person‘s mental capacity may not be fully adversarially tested 
if the OS and other parties are in agreement that P lacks mental capacity.  Very often, 
of course, the court will still consider questions of mental capacity where there is an 
important legal question about which test should be used.532  Yet this is not the same 
as the court hearing adversarial arguments and evidence on behalf of a person who 
seeks to assert their mental capacity.  CC v KK is a striking example of a case where a 
judge found that all the expert evidence before the court on incapacity was incorrect, 
and that KK had mental capacity.  There does seem to be a danger that such 
opportunities for a judge to scrutinise and reject expert evidence of incapacity, even all 
the expert evidence, will be lost if the very argument that is put forward by a litigation 
friend is based upon that evidence. 
LITIGATION FRIENDS‘ DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER, AND HOW, P‘S CASE 
SHOULD BE ADVANCED 
The question of what case should be advanced by a litigation friend was 
recently tested in RP v UK.  The case originated in the Family Division of the High 
Court.533  A young woman with learning disabilities alleged that the OS‘s decision to 
concede, on her behalf, proceedings under the Children Act 1989 for the removal of 
her son from her care breached her rights under Articles 6 and 8 ECHR.  In a lengthy 
statement given as an appendix to the Court of Appeal‘s judgment the OS explained 
that: 
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...in the absence of any special features calling for distinctive treatment, 
the correct course for the Official Solicitor to take is to present any 
realistic arguments and relevant evidence that may be available on 
behalf of (i.e. in support of) the parent in relation to the issues before the 
court, whether these are issues of threshold, welfare or consent. The 
criterion should be whether the point is reasonably arguable, not 
whether it is likely to succeed.534 
In interview the OS confirmed that the same approach was taken in Court of Protection 
proceedings.  He confirmed that he and his case workers would not run ‗unarguable‘ 
cases535, including appeals against detention under s21A MCA   When RP took her 
case to Strasbourg, the ECtHR affirmed that ‗it was not only appropriate but also 
necessary‘536 in connection with RP‘s Article 6 right for her interests to be represented 
in the proceedings.  The court then stated ‗it would not have been in R.P.‘s - or in any 
party‘s - best interests for the OS to have delayed proceedings by advancing an 
unarguable case‘ although ‗it was imperative that her views regarding K.P.‘s future be 
made known to the domestic court.‘537 
As the Court of Appeal noted in Buxton v Mills-Owens538, ‗it may be difficult to 
draw the line between an argument which can properly be articulated and put forward 
(but which has little, if any, prospect of success) and an argument which cannot 
properly be articulated and which is believed to be bound to fail.‘539  The difference 
between an argument that cannot be articulated, and an argument where the evidence 
itself is weak or non-existent, may be especially difficult to discern.  Setting aside the 
circumstances in RP, which are proceedings of an entirely different sort from those 
under discussion here, I suggest that it can never be unarguable that a person who is 
able to communicate a wish or preference lacks mental capacity.  Given that there is a 
statutory540 and common law541 presumption of mental capacity which must be rebutted 
by those arguing that a person lacks mental capacity, surely it is always arguable that a 
person has capacity until those claiming incapacity have demonstrated otherwise to the 
court?542  For tactical reasons it might sometimes be more effective to challenge an 
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prove they were no longer detainable; the Court of Appeal found that this was incompatible with 
their rights under Article 5 ECHR in R (H) v MHRT North and East London Region [2001] EWCA 
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interference by arguing that it is in a person‘s best interests to make a decision which 
accords with their wishes and preferences.  In such cases, again, it is hard to see how 
it would be unarguable to give effect to their wishes and preferences, since they are a 
key consideration under s4 MCA, and are likely to be the least restrictive alternative in 
accordance with s1(6) MCA.  The Law Society (2011) advises solicitors representing 
clients appealing against detention under the MHA as follows: 
You can, and must, refuse to advance an argument which is not 
'properly arguable', despite instructions to do so, consistent with the duty 
in the Solicitors' Code 2007 543 , para 11.01(3): see Buxton v Mills-
Owens... However a submission may be 'properly arguable' even if it 
has few, if any, prospects of success... It will depend upon the context 
and your judgment. Given the 'least restrictive alternative' principle in s 
1(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 it would be in a rare case that to 
seek a client's discharge in accordance with his or her express wishes 
would not be 'properly arguable', although it will be a matter for your 
judgment in each case. 
Similar considerations for arguability, I suggest, would apply in the Court of Protection. 
 
The role of litigation friends in the Court of Protection poses something of a 
conundrum.  On the one hand the ECtHR has affirmed in several cases concerning 
deprivation of legal capacity that Article 6 secures a ‗right to a court‘ to ‗anyone who 
considers on arguable grounds that an interference with the exercise of his  (civil)  
rights  is  unlawful  and  complains  that  he  has  not  had  the  possibility  of submitting 
that claim to a tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 6‘.544   In Stanev the ECtHR 
held that ‗the right to ask a court to review a declaration of incapacity is one of the most 
important rights for the person concerned‘ as it would impact upon his other 
Convention rights.545  On the other hand, in RP v UK, the ECtHR has committed itself 
to the view that Article 6 requires that a person‘s interests – as opposed to what they 
want – must be represented in court.  The difficulty lies in what happens to a person‘s 
right to have their arguable case heard before a court where a litigation friend does not 
regard it as being in their best interests for the case to proceed, or where the litigation 
friend does not seek a court review of a finding that they lack mental capacity. 
It seems as if one way in which litigation friends may circumvent this dilemma is 
by conflating what they regard as in their client‘s best interests with what is ‗properly 
arguable‘.  Yet, as discussed above, there must be circumstances in which the case 
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which appears to a litigation friend to be in a person‘s best interests conflicts with their 
‗properly arguable‘ claim that they have the mental capacity to make a different 
decision.  But litigation friends cannot simultaneously advance both cases on their 
behalf; the case of Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1) is an example of one 
such case.   
A related difficulty is the ECtHR‘s assertion that: 
Remedies  the  use  of  which  depends  on  the  discretionary  powers  
of  public officials  and  which  are,  as  a  consequence,  not  directly  
accessible  to  the  applicant cannot be considered as effective 
remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention546   
It is difficult to reconcile the ECtHR‘s decision in RP v UK to the reality that litigation 
friends – including the OS – exercise considerable discretion over a person‘s access to 
an effective remedy to challenge best interests decisions. 
SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA 
There are several possible solutions to both the republican and the Article 6 
dilemma, yet few are entirely satisfactory.  The first is that adopted by the ECtHR itself 
in RP v UK, to suggest that people are safeguarded against arbitrary decisions by 
litigation friends through the existence of a mechanism to challenge their 
appointment.547  Another approach, also endorsed by the ECtHR in RP v UK,548 is to 
require litigation friends to always present a person‘s own views to the court, even if 
they are not arguing for them.  A third approach would be to enable a person 
themselves to put their case directly to the court, even if their litigation friend advanced 
a different case.  A fourth approach – the most radical but, I suggest, the most 
compatible with both the commitments of Article 6 and republican concerns  – would be 
for litigation friends in the Court of Protection to advance the strongest possible case 
they can put together for what a person actually wants. 
The ECtHR held that: 
...in  order  to  safeguard R.P.‘s rights  under Article  6  §  1  of  the  
Convention,  it  was  imperative  that  a  means  existed whereby  it  was  
possible  for  her  to  challenge the  Official  Solicitor‘s appointment or 
the continuing need for his services.549   
The court found that RP could have used the OS‘s complaints procedure or applied to 
court herself for such a purpose, yet these suggestions are neither especially 
independent nor especially accessible when one examines them closely. 
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An application to the court to terminate the appointment of a litigation friend 
would require considerable knowledge of court processes and procedures and 
assistance navigating them.550  It seems unlikely in the extreme that an ordinary litigant 
would possess the requisite knowledge and abilities to do so without the assistance of 
legal advisors, let alone a person with borderline mental capacity to conduct litigation.   
It should be recalled that RP herself was only able to do so with the dubious ‗help‘ of an 
MP; assistance which resulted in an extraordinary and notorious exchange between 
the MP and the presiding judge which deflected attention from the important Article 6 
issues at stake and did little to advance RP‘s case.551  In order to be able to make use 
of this right to challenge the appointment of a litigation friend, a person must have 
access to the appropriate help they will need to do so – otherwise they will be driven to 
seek assistance from questionable sources.  Yet people who have been found to lack 
the mental capacity to litigate will experience difficulties obtaining such help, as a 
solicitor who takes instruction from them may be negligent552 or in breach of their 
professional code (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2011: 18).  I asked two of the 
solicitors interviewed for this research what they would do if a client whom they were 
representing, who had a litigation friend, asserted that they had the capacity to litigate.  
They confirmed that they would not take instruction from this client to make an 
application to the Court of Protection to consider their litigation capacity, but would refer 
this matter to the OS. 
Even if a person were able to locate a solicitor who felt able to take their 
instructions, they would require payment, as might any experts they instructed for the 
requisite evidence on their mental capacity.  Yet there are no obvious sources of public 
funding for contesting the appointment of litigation friends.  Furthermore, a person who 
is said to lack financial capacity might not have access to their own personal financial 
resources for such a purpose. 
Where the OS becomes aware that a client of his is asserting that he has 
capacity to litigate, he confirmed in interview that the case manager would have to 
make a decision about whether or not to apply to court for the matter to be determined 
by a judge.  This, he said, would depend upon how credible the person‘s claim was.  
Where a client made such a claim via the OS‘s complaints mechanism, presumably the 
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case managers would have to make a similar decision.  Without wishing to cast doubt 
in any way on the integrity, experience and care which the OS and his case manager 
bring to such decisions, this arrangement does seem – as the EHRC put it in their 
submissions in RP v UK – ‗institutionally unsatisfactory‘.553  This procedure would not 
satisfy the republican requirement that checks against arbitrary decisions be external to 
the decision maker – nor the analogous maxim of natural justice that nemo iudex in 
causa sua554.   
The second safeguard endorsed in RP v UK was for a litigation friend to 
represent a person‘s own views in court without actually endorsing or arguing for them.  
Yet this hardly seems likely to produce a fair and thorough adversarial testing of the 
basis for any interferences that P resists.  Solicitors and barristers (I am sure they 
would agree) serve an important purpose in presenting to the court the best possible 
argument for their client‘s case.  They have a knowledge of law which is not usually 
matched by their clients, and they are aware of what evidence and reasoning may 
persuade a judge.  If advocates and counsel merely relayed to the court what their 
client had told them, there would be little point in their existence.  In CC v KK, for 
example, KK‘s counsel argued forcefully and persuasively that KK had capacity and 
that experts had erred on the basis of a very sophisticated understanding of what a 
good mental capacity assessment should look like.  It is extremely unlikely that such a 
case would be put by counsel who are also arguing, on the basis of that self-same 
evidence, that a person lacks mental capacity. 
The third possibility was that a person could be enabled to participate directly in 
proceedings themselves in order to ensure their views are made known to the court, 
and/or to persuade the court of their mental capacity.  This could occur either by a 
person attending court in person, or perhaps also via a visit to that person by the 
presiding judge.   Court rules provide that the court may ‗hear P on the question of 
whether or not an order should be made‘555, but do not require it to.  A court may also 
exclude a person from proceedings which they are the subject of,556  but there is little 
guidance specifying when this is permissible and when a person must be enabled to 
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participate.  In LB Hammersmith and Fulham v MW 557  HH Judge Horrowitz QC 
acceded to the request of the OS and the local authority that MW should not be 
permitted to attend court on the basis that ‗it would be pressure to him and not 
conducive to the maintenance of his good mental health‘.558  Disappointingly, HH Judge 
Horrowitz QC gave no discussion of the Article 6 issues raised by this decision and 
there was, therefore, no discussion of whether the decision to prevent MW from 
attending a case that was about him was necessary and proportionate.  Nor did the 
judge report making any efforts to meet with MW in person outside of proceedings.  
A small number of judgments do describe P attending proceedings,559 others 
describe judges making efforts to meet with P560, including in one case where P was in 
a minimally conscious state.561  In Re J562 HH Judge Marshall QC found a visit to Mrs J 
‗extremely illuminating, as many pieces of the jigsaw then fell into place.‘563  In CC v KK 
Baker J described it as ‗unusual‘ although not ‗unique‘ for the subject of proceedings in 
the Court of Protection to give oral evidence, 564  yet CC v KK is testament to the 
transformative effect their participation can have.  Participation in proceedings does, 
however, need to be approached with some care.  Even amongst those who wish to 
participate may experience stress and anxiety at the prospect565 and there have been 
cases where participation has not been managed well, such that P has had distressing 
experiences in the courtroom.566  Creative thinking around special measures to assist 
with participation, and judicial sensitivity, will be paramount. 
Recent ECtHR cases may mean that Court of Protection judges must make 
greater efforts to ensure they meet the people whose lives their judgments concern.  In 
Shtukaturov v Russia the court held that Mr Shtukaturov‘s participation in proceedings 
concerning his legal capacity was ‗necessary  not  only  to enable him to present his 
own case, but also to allow the judge to form his personal opinion about the applicant‘s 
mental capacity‘.567  Consequently, in circumstances where ‗he had been a relatively 
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autonomous person‘, ‗it was indispensable for the judge to have at least a brief visual 
contact with the applicant, and preferably to question him‘.568  The ECtHR held that for 
a judge to decide the case on the basis of documentary evidence, without seeing or 
hearing the person, was unreasonable and in violation of Article 6.569  In X and Y v 
Croatia the ECtHR held that ‗judges adopting decisions with serious consequences for 
a person‘s private life, such as those entailed by divesting someone of legal capacity, 
should in principle also have personal contact with those persons.‘570  The court also 
emphasised that: 
...at  the  end  of  the  day,  it  is  the  judge  and  not  a  physician, albeit  
a  psychiatrist,  who  is  to  assess  all  relevant  facts  concerning  the  
person  in question  and  his  or  her  personal  circumstances.  It  is  the  
function  of  the  judge conducting  the  proceedings  to  decide  whether  
such  an  extreme  measure  is necessary  or  whether  a  less  stringent  
measure  might  suffice.  When such an important interest for an 
individual‘s private life is at stake a judge has to balance carefully all 
relevant factors in order to assess the proportionality of the measure to 
be taken.  The necessary procedural safeguards require that any risk of 
arbitrariness in that respect is reduced to a minimum.‘571 
These cases suggest that Articles 6 and 8 ECHR place the judges of the Court 
of Protection under an active duty to meet with P and come to their own conclusions 
regarding his capacity and the proportionality of any measures proposed in connection 
with him.  There are differences between deprivation of legal capacity procedures, 
which these ECtHR cases concerned, and the kinds of financial and welfare decisions 
made in the Court of Protection.  However, it is undeniable that even the most routine 
application for financial deputyship will have ‗serious consequences for a person‘s 
private life‘ and hence may carry a requirement for personal contact. 
Before we get too carried away believing that judicial contact with ‗P‘ can 
resolve all our difficulties we should recall that even if a judge does meet with P, this 
does not place P on an equal footing in putting his case and asserting his mental 
capacity with other litigants.  As observed earlier, much of the reason KK was found to 
have mental capacity was surely due to the skilful arguments put by her legal 
representatives.  If a litigation friend is instructing a person‘s representatives to argue 
that they lack mental capacity, or for something which is contrary to their interests, who 
will work to present their oral evidence in the best possible light for minimising 
interferences with their personal preferences? 
This concern would be addressed by the fourth proposal, that the role of a 
litigation friend should itself be transformed in the context of Court of Protection 
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litigation572 from one who represents P‘s interests, to one who puts to the court the 
strongest possible case that P has mental capacity, or - in the alternative – that what P 
wants is in his best interests.573  This may seem rather radical to some, but in contrast 
with some interpretations of the requirements of Article 12 CRPD it appears rather 
conservative and would not go as far as many would like.   
This approach would be likely to mean that litigation friends are required to 
argue cases which they feel are weak, or for outcomes which they regard as 
detrimental to P‘s best interests.   Furthermore, this proposal would result in a greater 
volume of litigation in the Court of Protection if litigation friends were required to pursue 
cases which challenge best interests decisions on P‘s behalf that would currently be 
regarded as futile or not in P‘s best interests.  However, this approach would ensure 
that the case for any interference under the MCA which P resisted would be thoroughly 
adversarially tested.  It would mean any evidence that a person lacked mental capacity 
would always be contested before the court, even if there were no expert evidence to 
the contrary.  Similarly, arguments that it was not in P‘s best interests to give effect to 
his wishes and preferences would be fully adversarially tested.  
This approach would accord with the view that it is for the court, not litigation 
friends, to decide whether or not to accept expert evidence as to a person‘s mental 
capacity and best interests.  It would also seem to accord with supported decision 
making approaches influenced by Article 12(4), which calls for ‗measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity‘ to ‗respect the rights, will and preferences of the person‘.  My 
proposal would not accord with approaches that suggest that a person‘s will and 
preferences should always be determinative,574 because it would be open to the court 
to make an order which conflicts with them.  However, this would guarantee the best 
possible resistance to this possibility under the MCA.   
It might reasonably be asked what danger lies in litigation friends instructing 
solicitors in this fashion.  Welfare litigation would not arise unless some party were 
advancing a case based on P‘s alleged mental incapacity and best interests.  The 
Court of Protection must have regard to the overriding objective of ‗ensuring that P‘s 
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interests and position are properly considered‘.575  If there were residual concerns that 
a person‘s interests were not adequately represented by those parties, it would be 
open to the court to instruct the OS as an ‗advocate to the court‘.  This practice was 
common in cases heard under the declaratory jurisdiction where a person asserted that 
they had capacity and was not represented via a litigation friend.576 
CHALLENGES FOR REFORM OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
In this chapter I have argued that people must be supported to challenge best 
interests decisions which engage their Article 8 rights if they disagree with them.  I 
have argued that they should be entitled not only to participate in proceedings so far as 
they are willing to do so, but also to be supported by a litigation friend who represents 
their subjective interests – not their interests as construed by experts or others.  I 
suggest that this is the only way in which we can rest assured that the basis for 
interventions premised upon a person‘s alleged mental incapacity are thoroughly 
adversarially tested, and hence best safeguarded against arbitrariness. 
Suggestions of this nature would be likely to meet with considerable resistance 
from those familiar with the Court of Protection, in particular on the basis that they are 
impracticable.  I fully acknowledge that the Court of Protection as it is currently 
composed would struggle to accommodate these proposals.  The court is overworked 
as it is, and almost certainly could not cope with the increased volume of litigation this 
would entail.  Participation is problematic when judges sit in regional courts which may 
present significant access problems for people with disabilities. 577   Currently the 
majority of cases, especially those concerning financial deputyship and other such 
matters, are heard ‗on the papers‘, and so opportunities for P to participate in person 
would not exist.  Legal advice and representation for P would need to obtain funding 
from some source.  Currently financial cases are not eligible for legal aid, and so P‘s 
own resources could be depleted by litigation friends running ‗futile‘ arguments.  
Welfare cases are more likely to obtain public funding, but in many cases arguments 
which advance P‘s subjective interests would not meet the LSC‘s ‗merits test‘.  None of 
these obstacles are, I suggest, insurmountable a priori.  However they would, I 
acknowledge, require radical and costly reforms to be overcome. 
These are serious concerns.  They suggest that the court as currently 
composed will struggle to accommodate the requirements of the ECHR that judges 
make efforts to meet P in cases which have serious consequences for their personal 
lives.  The more radical suggestion that P be supported to challenge any best interests 
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Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 3(3)(b)
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E.g. Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).
 
577 
In contrast, for example, with mental health tribunals which occur in the hospital where a 
person is detained. 
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decisions he disagrees with is even more challenging.  This suggests that there is a 
fundamental tension between P‘s theoretical right to challenge interferences under the 
MCA, and the practical demands of ensuring that P is enabled to do so as fully as 
possible.  Currently the status quo seems to be maintained through the fiction that 
wherever P wishes to challenge a major interference with his rights, he is able to do so.  
Ex hypothesi, evidence to the contrary would be unlikely to come before the courts.  
Unlike those subject to formal deprivation of legal capacity procedures in other 
jurisdictions, those who are alleged to lack capacity under the MCA are not subject to 
any formal bar to using the courts.  Yet their rights to challenge decisions made under 
the MCA may still be ‗theoretical and illusory‘ for the most part due to an accumulation 
of practical and procedural hurdles.  The remote possibility of litigation acts as a safety 
valve for the most persistent to assert their rights, protecting the state from confronting 
the reality that the vast majority never could. 
If the UK is to take steps in the direction of ensuring that people‘s rights to 
challenge decisions made under the MCA are ‗practical and effective‘, they may well 
have to revisit the Law Commission‘s (1995: [10.3]-[10.8]) decision to prioritise the 
status of a court over the accessibility of a tribunal.  Tribunals are by no means 
uncritically vaunted as the best way to guarantee fairness or positive experiences of 
tribunal users (see, e.g., the following writings on mental health tribunals: Bartlett and 
Sandland, 2007; Care Quality Commission and Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
Council, 2011; Horne, 2011; Machin and Richardson, 2000; Mental Health Act 
Commission, 2005; Munro, 2008; Perkins, 2003; Richardson and Machin, 2000; 1999).  
However they do overcome several of the concerns about the Court of Protection 
rehearsed here.  It might be questioned whether or not tribunal hearings could 
accommodate Court of Protection welfare cases, which Munby LJ describes as having 
‗all the complexity of a heavy child care case but, in addition, the extra complexity of 
disputes about capacity and, sometimes, also about deprivation of liberty‘ (The Right 
Honourable Lord Justice (Sir James) Munby, 2011: 34).  Yet there are those who 
suggest that they could (Jones, R., 2012; Mental Health Lawyers Association, 2011), 
and it light of these concerns this is surely an avenue worth pursuing through further 
research and investigation. 
5.4 THE EFFICACY OF COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS AS A 
SAFEGUARD 
The MCA code of practice suggests the use of complaints mechanisms to 
challenge decisions made under the MCA (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007).578  Local 
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See paragraphs [5.68], [10.15], [10.34], [10.37], [14.37], [15.12], [15.14]-[15.21], [15.23]-
[15.32] 
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authority social services, NHS bodies579 and care providers580  are obliged to have 
complaints procedures in place.  Complaints to NHS bodies and local authority social 
services must be made by the victim of the act or omission, or a person entitled to 
complain as a representative on their behalf.581  Where complaints involve more than 
one authority they have a duty to co-operate together to coordinate investigation of the 
complaint. 582   The complaint must be resolved speedily and efficiently, within a 
maximum of six months.583  If a complainant is dissatisfied by the response to their 
complaint then they can take the complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman 
(LGO) – for complaints about local authority social services and social care providers584 
- or the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) if it is about a health 
service. 
5.4.1 THE ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN 
Ombudsmen can investigate complaints into ‗maladministration‘, which is a 
somewhat vague concept and subtly different to ‗unlawful‘.  The LGO (2008) describes 
the following as examples of maladministration which it could investigate: 
 delay 
 incorrect action or failure to take any action 
 failure to follow procedures or the law 
 failure to provide information 
 inadequate record-keeping 
 failure to investigate 
 failure to reply 
                                               
579 
Through regulations issued by the secretary of state for health under The Health and Social 
Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.  The relevant regulations are The Local 
Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009 
SI 2009/309 and The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints 
(England) (Amendment) Regulations 2009 SI 2009/1768
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By r19 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 
2010/781 
581 
Representatives may complain on behalf of a person where the person themselves has died, 
is a child, has appointed the representative to act for them, or the person is unable to make the 
complaint themselves because of a physical disability or because they lack capacity in the 
meaning of the MCA. Rule 5 The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service 
Complaints (England) Regulations 2009 SI 2009/309. 
582 
r9 The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) 
Regulations 2009 SI 2009/309 
583 
r14 The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) 
Regulations 2009 SI 2009/309 
584 
Historically the CSCI used to investigate complaints made against care providers, but ceased 
to do so in 2008.  This was not the result of any legal change, but apparently resulted from the 
CSCI ‗realising‘ it had no statutory powers to investigate complaints FOIA.  The LGO was 
unable to investigate complaints into private care providers where the care had not been 
arranged by the local authority; however, s35 Health Act 2009 gave the LGO powers to 
investigate complaints in those settings as well.
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 misleading or inaccurate statements 
 inadequate liaison 
 inadequate consultation 
 broken promises 
Ombudsmen investigate and report on complaints 585  and can make 
recommendations, including recommendations to compensate complainants.586  The 
findings and recommendations of ombudsmen are not legally binding, although if a 
local authority chooses not to adopt the LGO‘s recommendations they must publish a 
statement to that effect in a local newspaper.587  Former ombudsman Ann Abraham 
(2012: 93) has described the role of ombudsmen in today‘s administrative justice 
landscape as a ‗muddle‘, one of a ‗miscellany of institutions – alongside the quite 
separate but frequently overlapping regulators, auditors and inspectorates, not to 
mention the Equality and Human Rights Commission‘.  Nevertheless, as a free and 
independent source of scrutiny into the actions of local authorities and care providers, 
LGOs occupy a potentially very important role in effective enforcement of legal 
principles.  It is important to note from the outset, however, that ombudsmen do not 
have many of the powers which make the Court of Protection such a potent safeguard 
– to require the production of reports as evidence, to make declarations as to a 
person‘s mental capacity and orders regarding their best interests.  They might, 
however, recommend that an authority or provider revisit any defective assessment or 
decision making processes with regard to the principles of the MCA. 
5.4.2 PROBLEMS WITH LOCAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 
Detailed consideration of internal complaints procedures for local authorities 
and care providers is not within the scope of this thesis, although research on social 
work complaints procedures in Scotland identified several practical barriers.  Like 
litigation, complaints procedures are inherently self-starting, meaning people with 
learning disabilities will either need to be able to make a complaint themselves or a 
representative must make one on their behalf.  Gulland (2007: 252-7) found that people 
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Ombudsmen can also initiate thematic investigations of its own accord in areas where it has 
particular concerns, it is – according to Abraham, a former Ombudsman – ‗a system of justice 
that is about more than the individual antagonism of the adversarial litigation process: it is a 
system that is inquisitorial and reflexive, public and rights-based, as much about constitutional 
entitlement as consumer satisfaction‘.  This is, Abraham notes, ‗especially salient when 
considering the situation of some of the most socially disadvantaged, including those who are 
detained in prison, psychiatric institutions and care homes and so are among the least likely to 
have the opportunity to alert the Ombudsman to their concerns‘ (Abraham, 2012: 95-6). 
586 
For the LGO see Local Government Act 1974 and for the PSHO see the Health Service 
Commissioners Act 1993, as amended by the Health Service Commissioners (Amendment) Act 
1996.
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s31(2D)-(2H) Local Government Act 1974 
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were less likely to complain when they were ‗physically or emotionally drained‘.  Some 
potential complainants were put off by a perceived necessity to put the complaint in 
writing – particularly where they had concerns about their spelling or had visual 
impairments.  A person who had difficulty making a phone call without assistance was 
entirely reliant on professionals to help him to complain as he had no friends or family 
to support him.  An advocate raised concerns that people in hospitals or residential 
care settings might have difficulty getting access to the telephone.  Gulland concluded 
that ‗one obvious answer to this problem is advocacy‘, but noted that advocacy 
services were ‗thin on the ground‘, and that many of the same practical obstacles 
pertained to contacting advocacy services in the first place.   
A government consultation found that NHS and social care complaints 
procedures were ‗too prescriptive and inflexible, not meeting the needs of the person 
making the complaint‘; too ‗fragmented‘ and lacked ‗the proper emphasis on resolving 
problems locally, quickly and effectively‘ (Department of Health, 2008e: 5).  Clements 
and Thompson (2011: [26.11]) observe that ‗it remains to be seen‘ whether reforms 
resulting from this consultation will improve matters.  Mandelstam (2009a: [4.5]) 
highlights that law courts have pointed out that complaints procedures are unsuitable 
for resolving matters of law, and comments that the LGO has ‗repeatedly found that 
complaints procedures are in practice too often ineffective and long-winded‘.  From a 
republican perspective, internal complaints mechanisms do not satisfy the requirement 
of enforcement from an external and independent body (Lovett, 2010a; Pettit, 1997b).  
Consequently, the role of Ombudsmen is essential in providing a form of external 
adjudication. 
4.4.3 THE ACCESSIBILITY OF OMBUDSMEN COMPLAINTS 
PROCEDURES 
Despite their limited powers and the concerns discussed above, there are 
aspects of Ombudsmen complaints procedures which could make them a fairly 
attractive remedy for people with learning disabilities.  Unlike litigation, a person does 
not have to make a complaint through a third party if they are deemed to lack mental 
capacity, and so the subject matter of the complaint can be defined by them not others.  
Complaining to ombudsmen does not necessarily require a person to procure expert 
legal advice to help them navigate the system.  The LGO website states that they have 
arrangements to help people make a complaint if they have difficulty using the service, 
and give as examples providing materials in Braille, Easy Read guidance or as a voice 
recording.588  The Easy Read guidance states ‗It is best if you call us on the phone and 
tell us about your complaint. We can take down the details over the phone so you do 
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<http://www.lgo.org.uk/making-a-complaint/> [accessed 04 September 2012] 
204 
 
not have to write it down' (Local Government ombudsman, 2010: 7).  This method may 
not be accessible to all complainants,589 however it is significantly more accessible than 
attempting to navigate complex Court of Protection application procedures. 
Despite the relative accessibility of Ombudsmen, they appear to receive 
relatively few complaints about adult social care services.  For example, Figure 1 
shows data obtained under the FOIA from CQC and the LGO which suggests that the 
volume of complaints against care homes declined steeply when LGO assumed 
responsibility for this role from the CSCI590 (FOIA #10; #11):   
Figure 1 Volume of complaints about care providers received by the CSCI and LGO
591
 
 
 
Because the volume of complaints to the CSCI was initially so high, it must be 
assumed that the decline in the number of complaints is in some way specific to its 
transfer to the LGO – rather than difficulties initiating complaints in general.   One 
reason may be that not all potential complainants are aware of the Ombudsman‘s role.  
In email correspondence592 LGO officials confirmed that government restrictions had 
severely limited their ability to publicise their new role.  It is disappointing that more 
people have not been able to make use of ombudsmen complaints procedures, given 
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Including those with learning disabilities which impair communication; they might require 
special assistance to make a complaint. 
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See n584, above 
591  
Only partial data is available for 2011-12; it is correct up to February 2012. 
Data may be incomplete, as not all complaints about adult care services were ‗assigned‘.  See 
Table 8, Appendix B, for a more detailed breakdown of the LGO data. 
592 
Dated 9 February 2012 (FOIA #10)
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
2001/12
*
CSCI LGO
Series1 18433 21301 14531 13907 6998 0 1 128 191
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
205 
 
they offer a potentially much more accessible route to independent investigation and 
arbitration of some issues connected with the MCA than the courts. 
4.4.4 OMBUDSMEN AND THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 
Although departure from the procedures required by the MCA is likely to result 
in maladministration, Ombudsmen have no obvious source of authority to revisit an 
assessment of mental capacity, nor do they have powers to make declarations 
regarding a person‘s best interests.  This is a significant limitation on the extent to 
which they can adjudicate disputes around mental capacity and best interests, or 
operate as a ‗review‘ for decisions made under the Act.  Nevertheless, they can draw 
attention to the Act‘s principles where appropriate. 
To understand the way in which Ombudsmen work with the MCA, I undertook a 
review of all published LGO investigations which referenced the MCA.  All those which 
I could locate are summarised in Study B5, Appendix B.  The LGO also kindly 
disclosed to me three investigation reports which were related to the DoLS, and gave 
permission for them to be published in this thesis.593 
Scrutiny of these investigations reveals that the MCA intersects in numerous 
ways with the LGO‘s work, not all directly related to the concerns under discussion 
here.594  Very often the ombudsmen have been critical of lapses in assessment and 
consultation duties related to the MCA.  The LGO found maladministration where a 
person with dementia was moved between care services without a capacity 
assessment and without following the best interests consultation requirements.  
According to the LGO, this denied ‗the family the opportunity to make best interest 
representations on her behalf at the earliest opportunity and overlooked considering 
whether advocates should have been involved‘.595  Maladministration was also found 
where a mental capacity assessment was not conducted in a timely fashion where a 
care home had prevented a woman from visiting her mother.  As a consequence of the 
delay, by the time the daughter visited her mother, she was no longer able to recognise 
her.596  Interestingly, the LGO made no reference of the need to bring disputes of this 
nature before the Court of Protection.  Maladministration was found where a council 
failed to review and record why a man ‗was being effectively detained in unsuitable, 
locked accommodation‘ and failed to locate suitable permanent accommodation (Local 
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See Study B7, Appendix B 
594 
For example, the LGO has considered a person‘s mental capacity to understand the terms of 
a grant from the LGO, and the mental capacity of people who are the subject of bankruptcy 
proceedings initiated by a council or whose neighbours have made complaints about their 
behaviour.  See Study B7, Appendix B, for summaries of these cases. 
595 
Bristol City Council 2011 (09/005/944) 
596 
Leeds City Council 2011 (10/012/561) 
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Government Ombudsman and Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2011: 
[103]).  
Like the authors of Serious Case Reviews (SCRs), discussed in Chapter 4, the 
ombudsmen have also criticised care providers and authorities for exhibiting excessive 
deference to a person‘s wishes and preferences without considering whether they 
might lack mental capacity.  The LGO and the PSHO were critical of a community 
mental health team and local authority for assuming that a man ‗had at all times the 
capacity to make decisions in relation to his day-to-day life‘, without his mental capacity 
being formally ‗tested‘.  They were critical of ‗a culture which emphasised the 
individual‘s right to live in the way they chose‘, and a failure to pursue concerns about 
his wellbeing through the framework of the MCA or use of guardianship (Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman and Local Government Association, 2011).  Council 
care workers have been criticised for not intervening to prevent a woman with dementia 
from overheating and dehydrating in hot weather through over-exercise, and not 
opening windows, because ‗they had to take into account Mrs Nash‘s wishes.‘  The 
LGO found maladministration because ‗while it was clearly known to the Council that 
Mrs Nash lacked capacity always to take decisions in her best interests, the Council did 
not communicate this to the care workers who would deliver her care.‘597   
These cases suggest that the ombudsmen are able to look into concerns where 
there are complex hierarchies of responsibility and control between providers and 
authorities.  This is a clear strength of passing the responsibility for investigating 
complaints from the regulator – who can only consider the role of providers – to the 
ombudsman.  The ombudsmen appear capable of highlighting deficiencies in the 
processes connected with the MCA.  This is of clear importance where providers and 
authorities have not even complied with the MCA‘s requirements for assessment and 
consultation, nor recorded the results of these appropriately.  However, as suggested 
at the outset there is little evidence that they would be able to review the content of a 
mental capacity assessment or the outcome of a best interests decision where it has 
taken place.  This limits the extent to which a person who is alleged to lack mental 
capacity could use the Ombudsmen complaints procedures to challenge interferences 
where the MCA‘s procedures have been followed, but where they dispute its 
substantive interpretation. 
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Worcestershire County Council 2011 (09/013/172) 
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5.5 THE EFFICACY OF REGULATION OF CARE SERVICES AS A 
SAFEGUARD 
Complaints mechanisms and litigation, as Munro (2012: 911-2)  writes,  ‗rely 
heavily on dedicated and hard-working complainants willing to sacrifice considerable 
resources to the cause of seeing their rights protected‘ where ‗These resources are 
especially scarce for people with mental disabilities‘.  This is supported by the evidence 
presented here which suggests that people with mental disabilities experience 
considerable difficulties accessing the Court of Protection and complaints procedures.  
Regulation may provide an important safeguard where opportunities for pursuing 
individual complaints are limited.   
In the context of institutional care, Munro suggests that regulatory inspection is 
‗the most effective mechanism available for raising standards and ensuring that the 
worst practices are outlawed are domestic and supranational inspection regimes‘ 
(p904-5).  The view that regulation is a more effective way to safeguard the rights of 
care institution residents than litigation appears to be broadly shared.  For example, 
regulation by the CSCI was one reason given by Lord Scott in YL v Birmingham City 
Council for care home residents not needing the direct protection of s6 HRA.  In a 
recent study of lawyers‘ interpretations of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ Cairns et al (2011b: 
235) reported that some lawyers believe that: 
An alternative approach to widespread use of DoLS might involve better 
inspection and regulatory regimes for all non-objecting incapacitated 
individuals in hospital and care homes aimed at ensuring good care 
really is provided. The DoLS could be more narrowly targeted ―towards 
the real ills‖. 
Without wishing to suggest that regulation is unimportant, or that it offers no protection, 
I believe there are dangers in overstating what can be achieved via regulatory 
approaches.  They are certainly no substitute for ensuring there are accessible 
procedures whereby an individual – or others on their behalf – can challenge decisions 
made by a care provider under the MCA or which otherwise affect their human rights.  
This section will explore some of the strengths of regulatory protection, but cautions 
that they are not a panacea for the issues of concern here. 
5.5.1 GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) was created by the Health and Social 
Care Act 2008 and amalgamated many staff and functions from three predecessor 
bodies: the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI), the Healthcare Commission 
(HCC) and the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC).  Like the CSCI and HCC, the 
CQC is responsible for registering and inspecting health and social care providers, but 
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it also retains the monitoring and visiting functions of the MHAC in respect of patients 
detained under the MHA598.  As a regulator, CQC enforces ‗essential standards‘ for 
compliance laid down in regulations599 (Care Quality Commission, 2010a; c).  A main 
statutory objective of the CQC is ‗the improvement of health and social care 
services‘.600  The CQC must have regard to the views of the public about services, the 
experiences of people who use services and their families and friends, the ‗need to 
protect and promote the rights of people who use health and social care services‘ and 
in particular ‗the rights of children, of persons detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983, of persons who are deprived of their liberty in accordance with the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005... and of other vulnerable adults‘.601 
The first years of the CQC has been rocky for regulator, providers and service 
users alike.  The CQC‘s budget represented a 32% reduction of the combined budget 
of its predecessors, and the overall regulatory and visitation workforce was reduced by 
28% (Care Quality Commission, 2010b: 17).602  The CQC took the decision to re-
register all health and social care services, which had a significant impact on their 
ability to inspect against compliance standards (Controller and Auditor General, 2011; 
Department of Health, 2012c).  The CQC‘s approach to regulation in the UK has been 
heavily influenced by the ‗Hampton Principles‘, which sought to reduce the 
‗administrative burden‘ of regulatory inspections by reducing inspections where risks 
were low, increasing them where risks were high, and applying tougher and more 
consistent penalties where necessary (Hampton, 2005).  Consequently, the CQC 
adopted a ‗risk based‘ approach to regulation which had been trialled in different ways 
by its predecessors in the HCC and the CSCI.   
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s52 Health and Social Care Act 2008.    The CQC is now part of the National Preventive 
Mechanism for monitoring the conditions of detainees in accordance with OPCAT (United 
Nations, 2006b).
 
599 
The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 2010/781 
600 
s3(2) Health and Social Care Act 2008.  There seems to have been some confusion about 
the CQC‘s improvement role for its previous Chief Executive Cynthia Bower, who said that the 
CQC could not be ‗an improvement agency and a control agency‘ and had to settle for ‗policing 
the bottom line‘ (Calkin, 2012).  It is unclear how Bower thought this approach was compatible 
with the CQC‘s statutory objectives, and the new CEO David Behan said that CQC had been 
‗chased off the territory of improvement‘ and indicated that it would be at the heart of CQC‘s 
renewed strategy and mission statement (Samuel, 2012a). 
601 
s4(1) Health and Social Care Act 2008
 
602 See Figure 7, 
 
Figure 8 and 
 
Figure 9, in Appendix B, for graphs showing the year on year reduction in expenditure on 
regulation and inspection of health and social care services.
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The CQC‘s approach to regulation has been subject to sustained criticism on a 
variety of fronts, many expressed in the context of the CQC‘s failure to respond to 
whistleblower allegations at Winterbourne View hospital (Flynn, 2012; House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2011b; a; Mencap and Challenging Behaviour 
Foundation, 2012a; Rosebush, 2011).  The regulatory approach was also scrutinised 
by a public inquiry into serious neglect and poor standards at the Mid Staffordshire 
Hospital (Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012).603  Although 
not all these criticisms can be considered in detail here, many of them impact upon 
how effectively CQC can enforce the provisions of the MCA in adult social care 
services and protect related rights. 
 
As the CQC itself notes in its Guidance for Providers on the MCA, it ‗has no 
direct powers to enforce the MCA‘ (Care Quality Commission, 2011h: [6]) 604 .   
However, CQC suggest that the following ‗essential standards‘ are relevant to 
enforcing the  MCA: 
 Outcome 1: Respecting and involving people who use services605 
 Outcome 2: Consent to care and treatment606  
 Outcome 4: Care and welfare of people who use services607 
 Outcome 14: Supporting workers608 
The CQC has – with the input of the EHRC – read human rights values into the 
‗essential standards‘ (Care Quality Commission and Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2011b; a; c).  As noted in Chapter 3, their interpretation of key rights such 
as Article 8 is in many ways more expansive than the approach taken by the courts. 
However, no matter how aspirational its values or effective its methodology, the 
CQC is constrained by its remit as to the matters it can investigate.  It is a regulator of 
providers, not commissioners of care,609 and so is by and large unable to tackle issues 
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Please note that at the time of writing the Chair of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry, Robert Francis QC, had yet to publish his report.  However, evidence of 
witnesses, and submissions of counsel to the Inquiry, can be found on the website: 
http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/ [accessed 19 January 2013] 
604  
The MCA code of practice was published before the CQC was established.  It still 
recommends people go to the CSCI if they wish to complain about care providers (Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 2007: [14.20]). 
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r17 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 
2010/781 
606  
r19 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 
2010/781
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r9 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 2010/781
 
608  
r23 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 
2010/781
 
609  
The CQC, and its predecessor the CSCI, did used to assess the performance of local 
authority adult social care services, however the Minister for Social Care took the decision to 
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that relate to a person‘s trajectory into – or out of – a particular service.  This is a 
serious shortcoming in situations where a person may be unhappily or inappropriately 
placed in a service – a key concern considered in Chapters 2 and 4 – which gives rise 
to issues which may be challenging for a service to manage.  A good example of this is 
the situation which arose in C v A Local Authority610, where the school simply could not 
accommodate C‘s need to be naked and sole-resident accommodation had to be 
sought instead.  CQC could not regulate out of area placements, nor situations where a 
provider was inadequately resourced by commissioners to meet all of a person‘s 
eligible needs and address any human rights issues which arose as a result of the 
placement or restrictions.611  Matters which raise questions of whether or not a service 
is appropriately commissioned are unlikely to be tackled through regulatory approaches 
which focus on that which remains within the control of providers. 
5.5.2 DETECTION OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY 
STANDARDS 
Self-evidently, in order for CQC to act upon non-compliance with regulatory 
standards, it must first become aware of it.  CQC relies upon four main sources of 
information in order to monitor a provider‘s compliance: information provided to the 
CQC by the service provider; information gathered by CQC inspectors on site visits; 
information volunteered to the CQC by ‗whistleblowers‘ and others; and statistical 
information collated from other data sources and compiled to create Quality and Risk 
Profiles (QRPs)612.  Each of those methodologies has been subject to criticism on the 
basis they could fail to detect poor care standards and abuse and neglect of service 
users, especially in connection with the social care sector. 
5.5.2.1 SELF-ASSESSMENT 
CQC‘s Provider Compliance Assessment tool is a ‗self-assessment tool for 
[providers] to monitor [their] compliance with the essential standards of quality and 
safety‘ (Care Quality Commission, 2010g: 4).  Providers are encouraged to use the tool 
‗on a regular basis to self-assess if you wish‘, but if CQC is conducting a planned 
review of compliance or responding to concerns ‗Where we have gaps in the 
                                                                                                                                         
strip them of this role in 2010, calling it ‗unnecessary bureaucracy‘ (Dunning, 2010).  The Local 
Government Association (2012) set up a program entitled ‗Towards Excellence in Adult Social 
Care‘, said to consist of ‗regional work; robust performance data; self-evaluation; and peer 
support and challenge‘, to replace the performance assessments.  At the time of writing, their 
precise methodology and role appears to be in development still. 
610 
This case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
611  
For example, provision to assist a person to visit family or access community based 
activities.  Or unusual circumstances such as arose in Local Authority X v MM and KM, where a 
local authority had to put in place arrangements to facilitate a person‘s sexual relationship. 
612  
CQC has produced guidance on the statistical methodology, sources of data and 
development behind QRP‘s (Care Quality Commission, 2011j; 2012e; 2011c). 
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information we hold about a regulated activity at specific locations, we may ask you  to 
send us parts of the PCA‘ (p4, 5).  According to an internal document sent by CQC 
middle managers to its Chief Executive, the quality of information supplied by self-
assessment is often poor (Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 
2012: [35]).  Prior to its amalgamation into the CQC, the MHAC expressed concern that 
their experience showed ‗considerable and dangerous gaps between self-assessment 
and reality‘ (Mental Health Act Commission, 2008b: 18).  The EHRC (2011a), the 
Public Accounts Committee (2012), the House of Commons Health Select Committee 
(2011a), several witnesses to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry (2012), the charities Age Concern (2009), Counsel and Care (2010) and the 
Relatives and Residents Association (House of Commons Health Committee, 2011a) 
have all expressed concern that self-assessment may not detect failings within a 
service and hear the concerns of service users.   
The reasons for this are self-evident.  Care providers who do not fully 
understand what regulatory compliance looks like, will not detect failings through self-
assessment.  Providers who are motivated to conceal breaches of regulatory standards 
from CQC, will not report them through self-assessment.  A CQC inspector interviewed 
for this research observed that good services, who are more aware of their 
shortcomings and honest enough to raise them, will be penalised by self-assessment 
approaches in contrast with those who are unaware of difficulties or conceal them.  
Consequently, self-assessment is unlikely to identify providers who do not understand 
the provisions of the MCA, or who are not upfront about departures from good practice.  
This is a good example of why the externality of enforcement mechanisms is a 
fundamental principle for securing republican liberty (Lovett, 2010a: 100; Pettit, 1997b: 
155).  It should, therefore, be a matter of concern that ‗regulation of health and adult 
social care is falling increasingly on the providers of these services‘ (Controller and 
Auditor General, 2011: 11). 
RISK RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
At a recent CQC event on restrictive practices in care settings the 
Chief Inspector of Prisons, Nick Hardwick (2012) noted four key reasons why closed 
institutions ‗go wrong‘ in his experience: 
1. The power imbalance between detainee and custodian; 
2. The disparity in credibility between custodian and detainees, who are 
usually drawn from stigmatised social groups, means their reports of what 
has happened to them are often not believed; 
3. In closed institutions, outsiders cannot see what is going wrong; 
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4. Those working within closed institutions become habituated to its practices 
and customs, and they come to be seen as ‗normal‘; the ‗vision of staff is 
also restricted by the walls‘. 
Hardwick emphasised that inspectors play a key role in casting a less habituated set of 
eyes over a service and its practices, confirming the credibility of reports of detainees, 
and rectifying wrongs that have arisen as a result of power imbalances.  Hardwick 
described a key function of prison inspection as giving governors information on the 
discrepancies between the ‗virtual prison the governor thinks he is running‘ and what 
they have seen on the ground.  For the purposes of preventing ill treatment, the 
importance of such independent monitoring of places of detention, defined as places 
which a person is not free to leave, is a central insight of the UN Optional Protocol on 
the Convention Against Torture (‗OPCAT‘, United Nations, 2006b).  
Despite these, perhaps obvious, advantages of independent inspection of care 
services, over the last decade regulatory inspection came to be seen as a ‗burden‘ for 
providers of services which should be eased (Hampton, 2005).   A reduction in social 
care inspection under the Coalition government has achieved a high profile in the 
national media (Hari, 2011; Hill, 2010; O'Murchu, 2011; Pitt, 2011a), but this trend can 
be traced much further back in both health and social care.  Following a government 
consultation (Department of Health, 2006a), a requirement to visit registered care 
services twice annually613 was replaced by new regulations614 which reduced inspection 
frequencies to once every three years.   The results were striking: 
  
                                               
613  
r6 The Commission for Social Care Inspection (Fees and Frequency of Inspections) 
Regulations 2004 SSI 2004/662
 
614  
The Commission for Social Care Inspection (Fees and Frequency of Inspections) 
Regulations 2007 SSI 2007/556 
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Figure 2 Residential care services registered and inspected each year (NCSC, CSCI and 
CQC), 2003-2012 
 
 
Figure 3 Domiciliary care services registered and inspected by NCSC, CSCI and CQC, 
2003-2012 
 
 
The Health and Social Care Act 2008 established no minimum inspection frequency for 
care services, and some care services – including supported living services – are not 
subject to regulatory inspections on site at all.615   
                                               
615  
This is because supported living services are technically domiciliary care services in a 
person‘s own home.  CQC has no rights of access to a private home, and so it regards itself as 
unable to visit service users there.  To the best of my knowledge, CQC has never tried a ‗by 
invitation‘ approach to supported living and domiciliary care services.  Failure to inspect 
supported living services where people are not free to leave may be a violation of the OPCAT.  
The Department of Health and Ministry of Justice have been aware of this potential violation 
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In order to ‗target‘ inspection resources CQC and its predecessor inspectorates 
used a ‗risk based‘ approach to regulation.  The CSCI and the HCC used different 
models.  The CSCI‘s approach to risk targeting was based on a methodology of rating 
services (‗poor‘, ‗adequate‘, ‗good‘ or ‗excellent‘) and visiting poorer services more 
frequently, however this rating system was discontinued by the CQC (2010d).  Instead 
CQC has looked to adopt an approach modelled on the HCC‘s statistical modelling of 
risk, by developing ‗Quality and Risk Profiles‘ (QRPs) for each service.  A key difficulty 
for adult social care has been the absence of good quality data to construct such 
indicators (Controller and Auditor General, 2011: 11).616  Furthermore, a ‗statistical‘ 
approach will only incorporate data on what can be measured statistically, and may 
miss important qualitative indicators of non-compliance with regulatory standards.  
Powerful examples of this come from the failures of QRPs in Winterbourne View 
hospital (FOIA #5) and Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012) to detect any elevated risks in those 
services.  Meanwhile families of patients in those services had serious concerns about 
the care of their relatives (Flynn, 2010: 18-9). 
This is not to suggest that QRPs are entirely useless.  Studies of the HCCs 
statistical indicators show that inspections of the 10% ‗highest risk‘ services were twice 
as likely to find non-compliance with standards than a randomly selected sample of 
10% (Bardsley et al., 2009; Spiegelhalter et al., 2012).  However, some elementary 
maths reveals that if only 10% of high risk services, and 10% of services selected at 
random, are subject to a compliance inspections, over 70% of non-compliant service 
would remain undetected. 617  Consequently, under this ‗targeted‘ approach to 
inspection, the majority of non-compliant services would remain registered and publicly 
declared compliant.  The advocates of QRPs do not discuss this, but as numerate 
researchers and regulatory experts they must be aware of this fact. 
 
The reality of a shift towards ‗targeted‘ use of inspection resources in social 
care was a dramatic decline in the use of inspection at all between the years 2007-11.  
                                                                                                                                         
since before the formation of CQC (Mental Health Act Commission, 2008b: [3.33]), but has yet 
to take any action on this issue. 
616  
The size of social care services, in contrast with larger health services, may also be 
problematic as variations in statistics such as mortality rates will be far less robust indicators of 
risk (or the absence of risk) in a service with ten users than in a hospital with hundreds of 
thousands of patients.  
 
617 
Bardsley reported that 26% of the 10% ‗most risky‘ hospitals were non-compliant, whereas 
only 13% of those randomly selected were.  With a total of 567 hospitals overall, it can be 
calculated that the inspections detected approximately 22 non-compliant hospitals; however, 
13% of the uninspected hospitals were also be non-compliant based on the rate from the 
random sample.  This means that of an estimated total of 81 non-compliant hospitals, only 22 
(27%) were actually detected through inspection – the rest would have been registered as 
compliant, as self-declared by providers. 
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During 2010-11, the proportion of services reviewed618 by CQC reached rock-bottom; 
fewer than 7% of all services for people with learning disabilities were inspected that 
year (FOIA #8).619  During that year CQC came in for sustained criticism for its inaction 
over whistleblower allegations at Winterbourne View (Flynn, 2012), its methodology 
and executive were heavily criticised by witnesses at the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2011a; b; c; d; e; f; 2012).  The National Audit Office 
(Controller and Auditor General, 2011), the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee (Public Accounts Committee, 2012), the House of Commons Health 
Committee (2011b; a) and the Department of Health (2012c) all heavily criticised CQC 
for a range of failings, including the failure to prioritise inspection over the bureaucratic 
and administrative task of re-registering providers.   
In response to concerns about falling inspection frequencies, the CQC‘s former 
chief executive, Cynthia Bower, promised ‗to put our boots on the ground,‘ and doubt 
inspection frequencies (Samuel, 2011a) and asked the government for more money 
(Pitt, 2011b).  The government awarded CQC one-third less than it asked for,620 and 
although CQC managed to increase the volume of inspections to 62% of all services 
during 2011-12 (FOIA #9) its new chief executive David Behan has warned that annual 
inspections of all services are not sustainable (Calkin, 2012).  Instead, CQC is 
exploring a ‗differentiated approach‘ with some services being inspected more 
frequently (Care Quality Commission, 2012c; Samuel, 2012a).  Figures within CQC 
now appear to recognise ‗institutional‘ services for people with learning disabilities are 
‗inherently risky‘ (Samuel, 2011a), however it is unclear whether they also include 
community based services in this category, and institutional services for other groups 
with mental disabilities.  At present, the future of inspection of adult learning disability 
services looks uncertain. 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Where a service is non-compliant but has not volunteered to CQC information 
which might reveal this, it is possible that ‗whistleblowers‘ – either staff members, 
service users, or relatives or professionals visiting a service – might alert the CQC to 
difficulties.  Senior CQC figures have indicated that they regard whistleblowers as an 
important source of information about compliance which they can rely upon where self-
assessment falls short (Brindle, 2011; Care Quality Commission, 2011a; Hill, 2010).  In 
response to criticisms of CQC‘s failure to formulate a whistleblower policy (Mid-
                                               
618 
Not all reviews would necessarily entail an inspection, although CQC affirm that the majority 
of them would.
 
619 
In 2010-11 CQC reviewed 18% of nursing homes, 10% of residential care homes, 5% of 
domiciliary care agencies and 14% of independent healthcare and NHS services (FOIA #8).
   
620 
CQC had asked for £15m (Pitt, 2011b), but the Department of Health awarded it £10m 
(Samuel, 2011b).
 
216 
 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012: [147]-[148]), and to act upon 
the concerns of whistleblowers in relation to Winterbourne View hospital (Flynn, 2012), 
a whistleblower helpline for NHS staff was extended to adult social care (Department of 
Health, 2011c).   
Whilst clearly the concerns of whistleblowers are a valuable source of 
information and should be acted upon, over-reliance on whistleblowers to prompt 
action and make good a shortfall in inspection activity is problematic.  Very often 
failings occur because staff themselves are unaware of care standards.  Furthermore, 
as a highly vulnerable workforce, health and social care staff may – with good reason – 
fear retribution and difficulty securing future employment if they make their concerns 
known to employers (Public Concern at Work, 2008; 2011).621  Not all service users will 
have regular contact with family or friends, a situation which is made worse by regular 
placement of adults with learning disabilities far from their home areas (Mencap and 
Challenging Behaviour Foundation, 2012a; Whelton, 2009).  Family and friends may 
not reliably recognise poor care standards, or see what goes on behind the scenes in a 
care service.  Many of the ‗low level‘ interferences with the autonomy and wellbeing of 
adults with learning disabilities, for example excessively restrictive rules and regimes, 
may not be considered of sufficient severity for ‗whistleblowing‘ to the regulator.  
Furthermore, there may be cultural expectations among staff and even among other 
visitors to services that adults with learning disabilities should be subject to rules for the 
benefit of their health or morals.  By contrast a regulatory inspector, as somebody who 
should be familiar with policy and standards in the field, should recognise that 
unjustified restrictions are – in theory at least – unacceptable in the modern social care 
landscape. 
5.5.3 QUALITY OF JUDGMENTS BY CQC INSPECTORS AROUND 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT  
On the basis of evidence gathered through feedback from providers, 
whistleblowers and inspection, CQC inspectors must make judgments as to whether or 
not a service is compliant with regulatory standards.  These judgments are dependent 
both on CQC compliance inspectors‘ knowledge of the service, and their own personal 
skills and expertise in relation to the sector.  Unfortunately, the CQC restructured its 
‗field force‘ (compliance inspection workforce) so that compliance inspectors no longer 
specialised in inspecting a particular type of service, but inspected all types of services 
registered with CQC.  Rather than specialists in particular fields of health or social care, 
                                               
621 
Based on my own experience of whistleblowing in social care services, a key area of concern 
for agency workers would be the loss of any particular placements they raised concerns about 
with their agency.  People whose employment itself is threatened may be concerned that they 
would not secure the requisite references for future employment.
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CQC inspectors were to be ‗professional regulators‘ (Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012: [35]).622  In an interview for this research, a CQC 
inspector with a background in social care described being required to inspect dental 
practices, GP‘s surgeries, ambulances and commented that it could be embarrassing 
to go out and judge the compliance of services that are very specialist.  They stated ‗at 
the moment I feel I do not have the skills to do this‘, echoing the concerns of 
whistleblowers among CQC‘s own staff about the training and expertise of inspectors 
at the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry (Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 
2011c).   
Because the practical application of the MCA and human rights standards can 
be closely interlocked with understanding the specialist needs of people with disabilities 
and best practice in the field, expecting a generalist regulatory workforce to identify 
human rights violations and breaches of the MCA seems flawed.  Again, the case of C 
v A Local Authority is a good example of where human rights concerns arose, but 
identifying them as such and making recommendations for changes would have 
required considerable knowledge of best practice for supporting C‘s particular needs.  
CQC do have specialist expert inspectors, but according to a recent report by the 
House of Commons Health Committee (2012: [44]) they have not been used in 87% of 
inspections since the resource became available.   
Even with specialist expertise, assessing compliance with the details of MCA 
procedures – ensuring a person has been supported to make a decision for themselves 
as far as possible, ensuring their family have been consulted for best interests 
decisions – seems likely to require time commitments for individual service users which 
regulatory inspectors are unlikely to have.  Although it is not stated anywhere in the 
CQC‘s guidance, it seems extremely unlikely – and perhaps inappropriate – that a 
CQC inspector would themselves undertake to assess a person‘s mental capacity or 
come to a view on their best interests.  CQC‘s (2011h) own guidance on how it will 
monitor the MCA suggests it will look at records of capacity assessments and best 
interests decisions, and will ask staff about their knowledge of the MCA and 
implementation of its requirements.  Clearly compliance with the MCA‘s procedures 
and good record keeping are important, but there is little sense that the CQC provides 
any substantive scrutiny of its implementation.  This is not intended as a criticism of the 
CQC, rather to acknowledge the limits of regulatory approaches to enforcement of the 
Act. 
                                               
622  
A recent job advertisement for a CQC compliance inspector reflects this shift, requiring 
experience of ‗using analytical information‘, ‗In-depth knowledge of enforcement processes‘, ‗In-
depth knowledge of Regulations‘ under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 and a ‗professional 
demeanour‘ rather than experience of health and social care itself.  (Job description for a 
‗Compliance Inspector‘ taken from an advertisement on NHS Jobs (<www.jobs.nhs.uk>) with a 
closing date of 6 March 2012) 
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A small study of CQC inspection reports for residential care services for people 
with learning disabilities in Cornwall was conducted to examine how CQC inspectors 
make reference to issues connected with the MCA.  This study is reported in greater 
detail as Study B2, Appendix B.  The study showed that CQC inspectors did make 
reference to the MCA and various associated concepts, but no topics were routinely 
covered in reports.  Reports contained very few criticisms of practices relating to 
capacity or consent, and where they did criticisms tended to relate to recording 
practices rather than the substance of a mental capacity assessment or best interests 
decision.  In two reports inspectors appeared to be under the mistaken impression that 
where a service user could not offer consent it should be sought from their relative or 
advocate.  Several reports referenced recording practices around restrictions on liberty, 
but only one questioned the appropriateness of such restrictions.  
The DoLS were also most likely to be mentioned in the context of staff training, 
with only three reports describing whether DoLS authorisation had been, or should 
have been, sought.  Human rights were mentioned in only a handful of reports, and 
where praise or criticism was offered there was little substantive detail of which rights 
were being breached or upheld.  Compliance inspectors preferred to couch their 
judgments using less explicitly legal terms like ‗person-centred‘ or ‗dignity‘.  The EHRC 
(2011a: 87) has argued that CQC should ‗use explicit human rights language‘ to 
emphasise that ‗human rights are enforceable under the HRA rather than being merely 
aspirational‘.  There was, however, evidence that compliance inspectors were 
interested in ‗low level‘ issues such as the quality of a person‘s surroundings, their diet, 
their everyday activities and institutional regimes. 
WHOSE VOICE GETS HEARD? 
Because the MCA and many human rights values are fundamentally oriented 
towards a person‘s will and preferences, actually talking to service users is vital for 
understanding whether they are being applied appropriately.  For example, whether or 
not a person is objecting to living in a service may be vital to understanding whether or 
not they are deprived of their liberty.623  Blanket rules imposed by staff might only be 
identified by talking to care service users.  Hidden abuses would be unlikely to be 
detected by chatting to staff and residents in public areas.  This is no doubt why the 
MHAC regarded visiting and meeting with patients in private as ‗the most effective 
safeguard‘ (Mental Health Act Commission, 2009b: [1.3]).  The MHAC visitation role 
also checks whether service users are appraised of ways to take steps to protect their 
                                               
623 
However, see discussion of uncertainties regarding the meaning of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ in 
the context of social care in Chapter 6. 
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rights themselves, for example through appealing against detention and accessing 
statutory advocacy services.  Consequently, the MHAC methodology is a good 
example of how visitation can be help to strengthen other safeguards. 
CQC has a statutory obligation to publish a statement on how it will involve 
service users, including ensuring ‗that proper regard is had to the views expressed by 
service users and carers‘ and making arrangements for its functions to be ‗exercised 
by, or with the assistance of, service users and carers‘.624  The current statement 
describes a range of strategies, including consulting with service users, involving 
stakeholder panels, and using ‗experts by experience‘625 (Care Quality Commission, 
2009b).  However, speaking with service users in private is not a required part of the 
ordinary compliance inspection methodology and is not discussed in the current 
statement on user involvement.626   
Asking the right questions is also important.  In the post-Winterbourne View 
national inspection program, CQC visited a care home operated by the same provider, 
Castlebeck.  In March 2011 they had reported ‗The service is trying to be person 
centred‘, that documentation showed the service promoted ‗the independence of the 
person in their daily lives‘ and concluded ‗the home have a really clear idea of the right 
sort of care and support to give to the residents‘ (Care Quality Commission, 2011l).  
However, an inspection only a few months later heard evidence from residents 
themselves that the home operated a highly institutional regime, requiring residents to 
get up, eat, wash, tidy their rooms at particular times, and using punishments and 
incentives such as banning community access and rationing treats and cigarettes 
(Care Quality Commission, 2011k).  A services‘ idea of itself as ‗person-centred‘ can 
only be properly tested by examining the experiences of the people it serves, 
regardless of how ‗person centred‘ the paperwork appears to be. 
CQC include a section on ‗what people say about this service‘ in each of their 
reports.  However, a small audit of CQC reports of compliant and non-compliant 
residential care services for adults with learning disabilities suggested that quite often 
inspectors did not speak to users of those services.627  Several inspectors attributed 
this to the ‗disability‘ of service users, without comment on whether their own 
                                               
624 
s5 Health and Social Care Act 2008 
625 
Experts by experience are people who are, or have been, users of services themselves, or 
are carers of others who are.  They accompany CQC compliance inspectors during visits to 
services.  They contributed towards the large inspection program for services for adults with 
learning disabilities conducted by CQC in the wake of Winterbourne View (Care Quality 
Commission, 2011b; 2012b).  However, there were no signs of use of experts by experience in 
any of the inspection reports audited for this research (see Studies B2 and B3 in Appendix B).  
In 2011/12, 506 site visits included experts by experience (Care Quality Commission, 2012a: 
24); this amounts to 3% of all site visits by CQC to nursing homes, residential care, domiciliary 
care and acute services in 2011-12 (see FOI #7). 
626 
A new statement of service user involvement is currently being prepared by CQC, however.
 
627 
See Study B4, Appendix B
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knowledge and experience of alternative communication methods may have 
contributed to their inability to consult with them.  In some cases, inspectors sought out 
the views of relatives or advocates instead, but it was unclear how they had been 
selected for consultation, and whether they had been chosen by the service itself.  In 
several reports, inspectors merely left the section on ‗what people say about this 
service‘ blank without further comment as to why service users had not been 
consulted.   
Given the weight that is accorded to the voice of the service management and 
staff through self-assessment and through guiding inspectors during site visits, it is 
troubling that seeking out the voice of service users might not be regarded as an 
absolute priority of inspectors.  This is vital information if compliance inspections are to 
identify violations of people‘s rights in care services and address matters of concern to 
service users themselves.  If CQC is unable to draw from the voices of service users in 
their reports, they risk becoming little more than brochures for the ‗virtual service‘ the 
providers would like to think they are operating. 
5.5.4 ENFORCEMENT 
In contrast with its predecessors the HCC and CSCI, the CQC has stronger 
powers of enforcement for compliance.  However, examination of data provided under 
the FOIA by CQC reveals that it uses them only rarely.  Between April 2010 – February 
2012 CQC issued 518 warning notices, cancelled the registration of 15 providers, 
imposed conditions of registration of 18 and made one prosecution for regulatory 
offences (FOIA #9). 628   This might be interpreted as indicative of high levels of 
compliance in the services it regulates, but this seems unlikely when one considers that 
its recent audit of learning disabilities services found that only 22% of services were 
compliant with both Outcome 2 (Consent to care and treatment) and Outcome 4 (Care 
and welfare of people who use services).  Instead it seems likely that CQC adopts a 
fairly high threshold for formal enforcement action on the basis that services will take 
action to improve once non-compliance has been brought to their attention. 
In contrast with its predecessor commissions, CQC‘s approach to enforcement 
was, as its first chair Baroness Young put it, to ‗talk softly and carry a big stick‘ (Carvel, 
2008).  This signified a change of language used in reports, toning down ‗inflammatory‘ 
or ‗emotive‘ language and using the ‗factual‘ language of compliance with standards.  
The reason given for this was the risk that a 'publicly damning report' could damage the 
ability of provider to improve if nobody would apply for a job with it (Mid-Staffordshire 
                                               
628  
On 8 August 2012 CQC had 26,379 registered ‗locations‘ that were nursing homes, 
residential homes, domiciliary care agencies or acute services (FOIA #7).  See Study 4, 
Appendix B for a more detailed breakdown of the data.
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NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012: [34]).  In evidence to the Mid Staffordshire 
Public Inquiry, several CQC whistleblowers argued that the ‗tough‘ language of its 
predecessors played a very important role in promoting compliance (Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2012).  Mencap and the Challenging Behaviour 
Foundation (2012a: 12) have argued that whilst CQC‘s inspections may be more 
rigorous than predecessors, they are: 
...not helped by the bland words used in its reports, such as ‗non-
compliance‘ and ‗failing to meet essential standards‘, which betray the 
seriousness of what this could mean. Hidden behind these words are 
stories of abuse, neglect and appalling care – of loved family members 
whose lives have been irrevocably damaged.  
From a practical perspective, whether or not language is ‗tough‘ or 
‗inflammatory‘, it must be sufficiently detailed that providers and users of services can 
understand what a finding of non-compliance means and looks like, in order to be 
aware of what standards are expected.  In their new approach, CQC‘s descriptions of 
what a non-compliant service looks like are markedly less detailed.  For example, their 
post-Winterbourne audit of learning disabilities services used mainly statistical 
descriptions of regulatory compliance yet contained little of the qualitative detail of the 
predecessor reports for A Life Like No Other (Care Quality Commission, 2012b; 
Healthcare Commission, 2007b).  More recently CQC has commissioned a piece of 
research looking in more detail at the most recent reports on learning disabilities 
services, and they have found many of the same restrictive practices and concerns 
about restraint as those earlier studies (Care Quality Commission, 2012f).629  Although 
it might be noted that finding the same problems all over again is hardly indicative that 
the previous regulators‘ descriptive, and perhaps sometimes inflammatory, approach 
failed to address the problem, it does at least help bring the problem itself into view.   
5.5.5 IS THE CQC AN EFFECTIVE ENFORCER OF THE MENTAL 
CAPACITY ACT? 
The CQC undoubtedly plays a potentially very important role in enforcing the 
MCA.  Of the four mechanisms for enforcement reviewed in this chapter, it is the only 
one that is not wholly dependent upon either the person who is alleged to lack mental 
capacity, a decision maker or a concerned third party involved in their care initiating 
action.  Of the four mechanisms reviewed in this chapter, it is the only one which has 
displayed a serious interest in tackling the ‗low level‘ yet serious interferences adults 
with learning disabilities experience in care institutions in their everyday lives.  
                                               
629 
This research is due to be published alongside recommendations for improvement in 2013.
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Furthermore, it is the most transparent of all the above discussed mechanisms,630 and 
is very effective at publicising its concerns – including its concerns about restrictive 
practices in care settings.  It can potentially play a very important role in highlighting 
violations of the MCA in individual cases, and areas of broader public concern. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that regulation cannot address all the issues 
connected with institutional domination, nor enforce all the elements of the MCA.  In 
practice, CQC has an increasingly limited presence ‗on the ground‘ in care services as 
a result of the dramatic decline in inspection levels over the last decade.  The decision 
to develop a generic, and not specialised, compliance inspection workforce, means that 
insofar as the MCA requires specialist communication skills, knowledge of best practice 
or detailed knowledge of the Act itself, CQC‘s ability to enforce the Act will be limited.   
Yet even if these obstacles were overcome, there are limits to what issues and 
concerns inspectors can detect and respond to in the course of a day‘s visit.  Whereas 
IMCAs and courts tend to be concerned with how a person ends up in a place or 
having a particular treatment, CQC is less able to detect and respond to matters which 
straddle the responsibilities of providers and commissioners of services.  Its strength 
lies in its attention to detail in everyday life, to identifying - for example - that service 
users are required by providers to ask before making a cup of tea, or to get up earlier 
than they would like to.  These are, as has been repeatedly stressed throughout this 
thesis, important issues which have a significant impact upon people‘s wellbeing and 
personal development.  Nevertheless, they are not the whole story, and very often they 
will interlock with assessment and commissioning decisions which typically lie outside 
CQC‘s remit. 
5.6 DISCUSSION: ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS FOR THE 
MENTAL CAPACITY ACT  
The foregoing discussion describes a patchwork of potential mechanisms of 
enforcement for the MCA, each with particular ‗trigger‘ mechanisms, methods of inquiry 
and enforcement, and each tending to attend to different types of issues.  It might be 
thought that with such a range of alternatives for enforcement, adults with learning 
disabilities are well protected against arbitrary departures from the requirements of the 
MCA.  Yet each mechanism had significant shortcomings for this purpose when one 
                                               
630 
Almost all of CQC‘s reports are available online, as are minutes of its board meetings and a 
wealth of other information about how it functions.  I have also found it to be by far and away the 
most ‗transparent‘ organisation I have requested information on using the FOIA.  By contrast, 
only a small proportion of Court of Protection judgments and LGO reports are ever published, 
there is limited available information about their internal policies and practices and limited 
statistical data giving an overview of their work.  Similarly, there is only limited information in the 
public domain about the work of IMCAs, and we know very little indeed about outcomes from 
their work.
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delves into their practical application and design.  In essence, the mechanisms for 
guarding against arbitrary interferences can themselves be highly arbitrary in their 
application.  An arbitrary enforcement mechanism cannot be a good remedy for states 
of domination.  There are too many ways in which its application can be avoided by the 
ignorant or unscrupulous, and people who are subject to dominating power relations 
will not experience the security of knowing they are effectively protected against 
arbitrary interferences by third parties. 
A central difficulty with relying upon complaints procedures and the Court of 
Protection is their reliance upon the person whose rights have been interfered with 
being able to identify this, and take the appropriate action.  A variety of reasons for 
believing adults with learning disabilities in institutional care will struggle to do so have 
been reviewed here.  Advocacy could overcome many of these difficulties, but the form 
of advocacy provided for by the MCA itself suffers from a number of serious 
deficiencies.  In particular, it is only available for a small subset of decisions made 
under the MCA, the duties of advocates to assist people in challenging decisions made 
under the MCA are not clearly defined, and all the evidences suggests that advocates 
very rarely do so.   
Even if a person is able to initiate a challenge via a complaints mechanism or in 
the Court of Protection, there are difficulties with using either channel as a means to 
‗appeal‘ against interferences founded on a person‘s incapacity.  There is no evidence 
to suggest that the LGO would independently assess the mental capacity of a 
complainant, and they would have no powers to issue a declaration of a person‘s 
mental capacity or best interests.  The Court of Protection has the requisite powers, but 
the number of cases reaching the court is extremely low, suggesting it is not an 
accessible mechanism for the vast majority of MCA related disputes.  Furthermore, if a 
person is represented through a litigation friend, evidence of mental incapacity may not 
be fully adversarially tested in court, meaning that the courts are excessively reliant 
upon professional judgment.  By court and LGO alike, expert opinion on mental 
incapacity may generally be accepted uncritically, and so these mechanisms are poorly 
placed to constrain any arbitrariness which creeps into mental capacity assessments. 
The CQC overcomes the difficulties of access to justice, but their presence is 
increasingly thin on the ground and it is questionable whether their inspectors have the 
requisite time or expertise to pick up on complex problems with implementing the MCA.  
Furthermore, the CQC cannot address issues which are related to the decisions of 
commissioners.  The CQC do not offer any kind of a review of an assessment of 
incapacity or best interests decisions; like the LGO, they are only equipped to pick up 
on defects in procedure and recording for decisions relating to the MCA. 
 
224 
 
Contrasting the content of the Act with the means of enforcing it reveals its 
paradoxical stance towards disability and the rule of law. On the one hand, the MCA 
recognises (perhaps perpetuates) the depleted autonomy of people with mental 
disabilities.  On the other hand, the processes and procedures of the court are oriented 
towards the ‗ontologically autonomous, self-sufficient, unencumbered subject‘ (Brown, 
W., 2002: 431; Scott, 1996) of liberal mythology.    It is a central principle of 
republicanism and the rule of law that law must be accessible to those affected by it.  
Yet the MCA has done little to help people with mental disabilities to access justice in 
order to fend of arbitrary interferences with their rights.  IMCAs and litigation friends 
play an ambivalent role in this process.  On the one hand they potentially assist a 
person to participate in decisions and legal challenges which affect them.  On the other 
hand, they serve to filter out the irrational, unpredictable and slow from professional 
decisions and courtrooms, to optimise the efficiency and propriety with which their 
affairs can be despatched.  In so doing, central ideas of justice and the rule of law – of 
transparency, equality of arms, of adversarial testing of disputes – become distorted. 
Given the serious difficulties people with mental disabilities will experience in 
using the Court of Protection to ‗appeal‘ against interferences with their choices and 
freedoms, it is small wonder these issues make very few appearances in the case law 
reviewed in Chapter 3.  The claims of Rose (1985) and Brown (2002), that differential 
access to justice can skew legal systems towards the interests of the powerful, and 
entrench unequal power relations seem well founded here.  In effect, the primary use 
made of the Court of Protection appears to be to mediating conflicts between two 
possible groups of substituted decision makers: professionals (mainly health and social 
care), and family and social networks.  If people with mental disabilities dispute a 
decision made under the MCA that affects them, they are likely to be unsuccessful in 
resisting it unless somewhere in one of those groups is a person who seeks the same 
outcome as them, and is willing and able to fight for it. 
These difficulties with the enforcement of the MCA in institutional settings 
suggest that the degree to which the MCA may provide a ‗promising lever‘ (Care 
Quality Commission, 2012f: 12) for tackling the arbitrary restrictions connected with 
institutional care will be limited.  No other independent mechanism than the court has 
the power to prevent admission or help a person leave a service where they are 
unhappy, make a declaration that a person has mental capacity, nor make 
personalised but enforceable recommendations for the lifting of restrictions.  Yet the 
court, for most, will be beyond reach.  One last mechanism of enforcement which will 
be considered in this thesis is potentially able to unpick the relationship between these 
kinds of day to day restrictions with larger questions of how a person ended up subject 
to them in the first place.  It may overcome many of the difficulties people with learning 
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disabilities face in asserting their rights through legal channels.  That mechanism is the 
DoLS, and it is to this widely derided yet also perhaps promising framework that I now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER 6 – THE DEPRIVATION OF 
LIBERTY SAFEGUARDS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
By the time the MCA was passed by parliament, it was known that it would need 
to be amended to take into account the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in HL v. United Kingdom631 (Department of Health, 2005a; Joint Committee on 
Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, 2002-3: [223]-[225]).  The case concerned the ‗informal‘ 
hospital admission of HL, a man with autism who lived in the community with his carers, 
Mr and Mrs E.  HL had displayed agitated behaviour at his day centre and, unable to 
cope, the day centre called his GP and a social worker who decided to take him to 
Bournewood Hospital.  HL had in fact previously lived in Bournewood Hospital for 31 
years before moving in with Mr and Mrs E under an ‗adult placement‘ scheme632 (Health 
Service Ombudsman, 2001; Robbins, 2008).   
At Bournewood Hospital, HL was reported not to resist or ‗object‘ to his 
admission, nor to try to escape.633  However, HL was heavily sedated at the time he was 
admitted634 and he had impairments which limited his ability to communication.635  The 
hospital refused to let Mr and Mrs E visit HL for the first four months of his detention in 
case he tried to leave with them,636 and refused requests to discharge him into their 
care.637  Because HL was not detained under the MHA, he and his family could not use 
the mechanisms therein to seek his discharge.638  HL‘s cousin, acting as his litigation 
friend, applied to the court for judicial review of the decision to admit HL to hospital, 
sought a writ of habeas corpus and damages for false imprisonment and assault 
connected with the admission.639  The Court of Appeal found that HL had been falsely 
imprisoned, and that the hospital should have used the MHA to admit him formally.640 
The Court of Appeal‘s decision caused consternation amongst health authorities 
and care providers.  The Secretary of State for Health, the Mental Health Act 
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These are now called ‗Shared Lives‘ schemes, and involve a person moving in with paid carers 
in their own home, either on temporary or long-term basis.  
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Commission (MHAC) and the Registered Nursing Homes Association all intervened in R 
v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust Ex p. L641 in the House of Lords 
and relayed the considerable resource implications of the Court of Appeal‘s ruling.  It 
was estimated that it might mean an additional 22,000 formally detained residents on 
any given day, whereas the current figure was said to be between 11-13,000.  The 
MHAC raised further concerns that some patients might be detained in nursing homes, 
which were not registered for detention under the MHA.  Professional bodies and 
charitable organisations were reported to be concerned about the impact on patients and 
their carers of being detained under the MHA.  In the context of this groundswell of 
opposition to bringing compliant but incapacitated patients within the scope of the MHA, 
a majority in the House of Lords found that HL had not, in fact, been ‗falsely imprisoned‘, 
and that in the event that he had been this would have been justified under the common 
law doctrine of necessity.  Lord Goff distinguished between ‗restraint upon the plaintiff's 
liberty which is conditional upon his seeking to exercise his freedom (which would not 
amount to false imprisonment), and an actual restraint upon his liberty‘.  
Lord Steyn issued a powerful dissent to the majority finding that HL was not 
detained, commenting ‗The suggestion that "L" was free to go is a fairy tale.‘  He noted 
that the ‗unfortunate effect‘ of the judgment was ‗to leave compliant incapacitated 
patients without the safeguards enshrined in the [MHA 1983]‘.  In the meantime, HL 
himself had been detained under the MHA following the Court of Appeal‘s ruling, and 
had been discharged after an independent expert found that he did not meet the criteria 
for detention under the Act.642 
Following his ordeal, HL‘s case that he had been unlawfully detained was 
pursued to the ECtHR.  The Strasbourg court rejected the House of Lords‘ distinction 
between ‗actual restraint‘ and ‗restraint which was conditional upon his seeking to 
leave‘643 and found that HL had been deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 
5 ECHR.  The ECtHR found that the common law doctrine of necessity did not satisfy the 
‗aim of avoiding arbitrariness‘. 644   The ECtHR was struck by ‗the lack of any fixed 
procedural rules by which the admission and detention of compliant incapacitated 
persons is conducted‘, and contrasted ‗this dearth of regulation‘ with ‗the extensive 
network of safeguards applicable to psychiatric committals covered by the [MHA 
1983]‘.645  The Strasbourg Court‘s complaint was, in spirit, a republican one: that the 
common law failed to supply clear principles for the detention of incapacitated but 
                                               
641 
[1998] UKHL 24.  No paragraph numbers are available for this judgment. 
642 
HL v UK, [17]-[22] 
643 
HL v UK, [90] 
644 
HL v UK, [119] 
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compliant adults, and the mechanisms available to a person to ‗invigilate‘ any such 
interferences were inadequate.  Like republicans, the court was not concerned with 
whether or not the interference was well intentioned in the particular case: 
While the Court does not question the good faith of those professionals or 
that they acted in what they considered to be the applicant‘s best 
interests, the very purpose of procedural safeguards is to protect 
individuals against any ―misjudgments and professional lapses‖.646 
The lack of procedural safeguards for the deprivation of liberty of incapacitated 
adults became known as the ‗Bournewood gap‘, and the deprivation of liberty safeguards 
(DoLS) were developed to attempt to plug it. 
6.1.1 THE BOURNEWOOD CONSULTATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY SAFEGUARDS 
Following the ruling in HL v UK, the Department of Health (2005a; 2006d) 
consulted on the introduction of legal safeguards to bring England and Wales into 
compliance with Article 5.  The Bournewood Consultation proposed ‗a new system to 
govern admission/detention procedures, reviews of detention and appeals‘ entitled 
‗Protective Care‘ (Department of Health, 2005a: [5.2]).  In November 2006 the 
government introduced a draft Mental Health Bill, which contained the amendments to 
the MCA that were to become the deprivation of liberty safeguards.647   Hargreaves 
(2009: 118) records that ‗At the time of the first stakeholder consultation meeting in 
September 2006 the scheme appeared to be still in a very raw and unsatisfactory state, 
with much unnecessary complexity‘, but the Schedules had already been ‗signed off‘ and 
could be amended only in detail.  According to Hargreaves, efforts to ‗compensate for 
the deficiencies in the Schedules‘ resulted in inconsistencies between the Schedules and 
the code of practice, meanwhile parliament and civil society groups were preoccupied by 
other matters connected with the Mental Health Bill (p118).648  Jones, R., (2012: v) writes 
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Hl v UK, [121].  The ECtHR endorsed Lord Steyn‘s comments that the decision in Bournewood 
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November 2012] 
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Hargeaves cites debates around Community Treatment Orders and the ‗appropriate treatment‘ 
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that ‗It is surely scandalous that the [schedules] ...did not give rise to one word of debate 
during the Bill's passage through both Houses of Parliament.‘649   
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (2006-07: [1.26]-[1.29]; 2007b: [89]-[90]) 
raised concerns about the complexity of the scheme and endorsed JUSTICE‘s650 call for 
a statutory definition that would clearly define who needed safeguards, instead of relying 
on the courts to define ‗deprivation of liberty‘.  A large number of responses to the 
Bournewood Consultation (FOIA #21; Department of Health, 2005a; 2006d), the 
consultations on the DoLS code of practice (FOIA #22, #25; Ministry of Justice and 
Department of Health, 2007a; b; c), and the consultations on monitoring and reporting on 
the DoLS (FOIA #23; Department of Health, 2008b; 2009a), expressed similar concerns 
and raised other serious problems. 651   However, the schedules ‗passed into law 
unscrutinised and unamended' despite these widely voiced concerns (Hargreaves, 2009: 
119). 
During the consultations (Ministry of Justice, 2008; Ministry of Justice and 
Department of Health, 2007a; b; c; 2008a), it was never quite clear what problem the 
DoLS were attempting to fix, beyond insulating the UK from further litigation like HL v 
UK.  Estimates of the number of people who might need safeguards diverged widely, 
suggesting differing conceptions of what ‗deprivation of liberty‘ might mean.  The 
Bournewood Consultation put the figure at 98,000 (Department of Health, 2005a: [3.1]-
[3.6]), meanwhile the impact assessment put the figure at 21,000 (Ministry of Justice and 
Department of Health, 2008a).652  Most respondents to the consultation felt the impact 
assessment underestimated the number of people affected (Ministry of Justice and 
Department of Health, 2008b: 15), but the government (Ministry of Justice and 
Department of Health, 2008a: [16]) did not accept: 
...the view expressed by some respondents to the consultation that every 
person who lacks capacity to consent to the arrangements made for their 
care or treatment, and who is in a care home from which they are not 
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In fact, there are records of debates in the House of Lords about DoLS.  Particular concern 
was expressed around the lack of certainty of the number of people who would need the 
safeguards and the likelihood that, in light of JE v DE & Ors [2006] EWHC 3459 (Fam), the 
government had underestimated this number.  See: Hansard HL vol 455 col 98 (29 January 
2007); Hansard HL vol 455 col 727 (17 January 2007); Hansard HL vol 457 col 1485 (27 February 
2007); Hansard HC Vol 525 Col 140WH (17 March 2011); Hansard HL vol 460 col 392-6 (15 May 
2007) and Hansard HL vol 460 col 390 (16 May 2007). 
650
 JUSTICE are an NGO who ‗promote access to justice, human rights and the rule of law – 
through research, education, lobbying and interventions in the courts.‘ The briefing by JUSTICE 
can be found here: 
<http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/153/Mental_Health_Act_HL2ndreading_JUSTICE_
briefing_nov06.pdf> [accessed 14 November 2012] 
651 
See also Robinson (2007) for similar criticisms.
 
652 
It was even suggested in Parliament that it might be as many as 400,000 Hansard HL vol 455 
col 98 (29 January 2007).
 
231 
 
allowed complete freedom of egress, are inevitably deprived of their 
liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the ECHR. 
The impact assessment suggested that Bournewood was an ‗extreme‘ 
circumstance. 653   Guidance from the early draft DoLS code of practice advised 
commissioners and care providers that they could avoid deprivation of liberty by 
maximising people‘s day to day choices and apply the principles of person-centred 
planning (Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2007c: [2.12]-[2.25]).  However 
this guidance, which seemed to identify deprivation of liberty with a loss of freedom 
within an institution, was excised from the final DoLS code of practice (Ministry of 
Justice, 2008). 
 
Hitching safeguards to a definition of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ to be supplied by the 
courts has proven to be one of the most fundamental and enduring problems with the 
DoLS, although it was a difficulty widely foreseen during the consultations (Department 
of Health, 2005a; 2006d; Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2007a; b).654  The 
definition(s) supplied by the courts proved to be complex, controversial and sometimes 
contradictory, and will be discussed in more detail below.  Two of the most recent and 
defining rulings from the Court of Appeal on the meaning of deprivation of liberty, P & Q 
v Surrey County Council and Cheshire West and Chester Council v P, have generated 
considerable debate, and have been granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court 
in October 2013.    Meanwhile in 2012 the ECtHR issued a trinity of rulings which found, 
for the first time, that a person could be deprived of their liberty in a social care facility.  
The rulings in Stanev v Bulgaria, D.D. v Lithuania and Kędzior v Poland applied criteria 
which differed significantly from the approach taken by the domestic courts, and it has 
been suggested that they may mean that the domestic authorities will need to be 
reconsidered (Ruck Keene et al., 2012e: 23-4; Lord Justice Munby, 2012c). 
The complexity of the Schedules themselves has given considerable cause for 
concern.  Barrister Paul Bowen QC, who represented HL in Bournewood, has 
commented that the provisions are ‗so labyrinthine and bureaucratic that those 
responsible for administering them are likely to take every opportunity to avoid using 
them‘ (Bowen, 2007: ix).655  Professor Richard Jones (2010: v) has described the DoLS 
as ‗complex, voluminous, overly bureaucratic and difficult to understand‘ whilst providing 
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‗mentally incapacitated people with minimum safeguards‘.  The Mental Health Alliance 
has written several critical reports about the DoLS and recently described them as ‗not fit 
for purpose‘ (Hargreaves, 2010; 2011; Mental Health Alliance, 2012).  Several authors 
have raised concerns about conflicts of interest in the operation of the safeguards 
(Bowen, 2007; Scott-Moncrieff, 2007).  Richard Jones (2007; 2010; 2012) and the 
Mental Health Lawyers Association (2011) have continued to argue that a simpler and 
cheaper alternative to DoLS would be to replace it with an amended form of 
guardianship under the MHA.656   
The scheme even appears unpopular amongst the judiciary.  Lady Hale echoed 
Paul Bowen‘s description of the DoLS as ‗decidedly inelegant‘ (Hale, 2009b: 114), 
Munby LJ has called them ‗labyrinthine‘ (Lord Justice Munby, 2012a: 33) and Jackson J 
recently issued the following cri de coeur in C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough 
Council657: 
It is a truly unhappy state of affairs that the law governing the fundamental 
rights and welfare of incapacitated people should be so complex. As this 
case shows, its intricacies challenge the understanding of professionals 
working in the field and are completely inaccessible to those for whose 
benefit the legislation has been devised, including those with a relatively 
high level of understanding, such as Mr C.658 
As the JCHR (2007b: [90]) noted, the DoLS scheme may so complex that it does not 
satisfy the basic requirement of the rule of law, that it is ‗adequately accessible: the 
citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the 
legal rules applicable to a given case.‘659 
This complexity does not merely mean that those using the scheme must work 
harder to understand it.  As Bowen notes, it increases the likelihood that those who are 
supposed to apply the safeguards will avoid using them where possible.  The complexity 
and indeterminacy of the schedules and regulations increase the number of conflicts that 
arise, some of which require extraordinarily complex and lengthy judicial interpretations.  
It also increases the likelihood of mistakes being made by those applying the schedules, 
and in many cases it is genuinely difficult to determine the correct course of action from 
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the schedules and the case law.660  As Jackson J noted, the rights of those who are 
detained, and those supporting them, can be extremely difficult to discern.   
Small wonder, then, that in two notorious cases which occurred after the DoLS 
scheme came into force it took Mr E in G v E & Ors and Steven Neary in London 
Borough of Hillingdon v Neary & Anor longer than HL to successfully challenge their 
unlawful detentions.661  The problems with the DoLS scheme are too numerous, and too 
complex, to cover comprehensively in this chapter.  However, the key defining difficulty 
which prevents the scheme fulfilling its purpose can be simply put: at every point in the 
scheme, for every safeguard, those responsible for the confinement and control of 
disabled adults have too much unconstrained discretion to avoid applying the safeguards 
in a fashion which would act as a brake against their power.  Nevertheless, even amidst 
such complexity and such potential for arbitrariness there are signs that for the dogged 
and persistent amongst detainees, their supporters and professionals, the framework 
can yield positive results.  Whilst the scheme is in no sense adequate to the task of 
reducing the arbitrariness of interferences in the lives of adults with mental disabilities in 
institutional care services, it offers several tantalising pointers towards measures which 
potentially could be. 
6.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE DOLS 
It is not possible in one chapter to go into detail about the operation of all aspects 
the Schedules, although excellent introductions are given by Bartlett (2008), Bowen 
(2007), Hale (2011) and, of course, Jones, R., (2010; 2012).  In particular, I have not 
discussed in any great detail the interaction between the MHA and the DoLS.  This is 
because adults with learning disabilities predominantly live in residential care and 
supported living services (Mencap, 2011), and make up fewer than 1% of the population 
detained under the civil provisions of the MHA (NHS Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care, 2012e). 662   The intersection between the MHA and the MCA/DoLS is 
extremely complex and worthy of a chapter in its own right (Allen, 2010; Bartlett and 
McHale, 2003; Cairns et al., 2010; Jones, R., 2007; Morris, F., 2012; Rapaport et al., 
2009; Richardson, 2010).  To help the reader navigate the various elements of the 
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safeguards, this overview is supported by a schematic diagram in Figure 4, which 
depicts the various decisions, actions and outcomes in the DoLS scheme.   
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Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the deprivation of liberty safeguards
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MA applies to SB for authorisation of a 
deprivation of liberty which may be 
occurring now or in the future (s24, s25-6, 
s30). 
P or a third party request that MA apply to 
SB for authorisation of a deprivation of 
liberty which may be occurring (s68)
If MA do not comply with 
request, request SB 
consider whether there 
is an unauthorised DoL, 
(s68)
Subject to s69, SB must carry out the 
six assessments (s33-48) unless 
equivalent assessments have already 
been carried out and SB is satisfied 
that it remains accurate (s49)
If all qualifying 
requirements are met, SB 
must grant authorisation 
(s50).
If all qualifying 
requirements but ‘best 
interests’ are met, SB may 
grant authorisation with 
conditions which the MA 
must comply with(s53, 
see also s43)
If BIA finds deprivation of 
liberty is occurring, yet 
qualifying requirements 
are not met, authorisation 
cannot be granted under 
Sch A1.
If BIA find no deprivation 
of liberty is occurring, 
authorisation cannot be 
granted. P gets no 
safeguards.
Unauthorised 
deprivation of liberty, yet 
P has no safeguards. If in 
hospital, P might be 
eligible for MHA. 
If P or third party still 
believe there is a 
deprivation of liberty, 
they may continue to 
request authorisation or 
bring action without the 
safeguards
Or...
SB must appoint P’s representative, R (s139), and give 
information about the authorisation to P and R (s57-8)
If P has nobody appropriate to 
consult during assessments, 
then SB must appoint an IMCA 
(s39A MCA).  If authorisation is 
granted and there is no 
appropriate representative, an 
IMCA may act as his 
representative (s39C MCA, 
s159).  A paid representative 
might be used instead.
If P or R request an advocate, 
or it appears to SB that P or R 
need support of advocate to 
exercise relevant rights, then 
SB must instruct an IMCA to 
support P and/or R.  IMCA 
must help them understand 
authorisation, and must help 
them exercise relevant rights 
(S39D MCA).
P or R may request a review, and 
MA must request a review (s102-3), 
if a person no longer qualifies for 
DoLS (s105), if there is a change of 
reason for qualifying (s106) or it 
would be appropriate to vary the 
conditions of authorisation (s107). 
Subject to s110 SB must conduct 
review.
P or R may apply to the Court of Protection 
under s21A MCA without permission (The Court 
of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2009), with 
non means-tested legal aid (Community Legal 
Service (Financial) (Amendment) Regulations 
2009).  Application from P subject to litigation 
friend. Third parties, including IMCAs, require 
the court’s permission and may not be entitled 
to legal aid.
MA may grant itself 
urgent authorisation 
pending standard 
authorisation (s74).
SB may apply to the Court of 
Protection under s15/16 
MCA. It must if there is a 
significant dispute over 
welfare (Neary).  If 
application is made under 
s15/s16 P and other third 
parties will be subject to 
means testing for legal aid.
If there is an ongoing dispute over 
P’s detention...
Court of Protection may determine any 
question about whether qualifying 
requirements are met for DoLS, its purpose, 
duration and conditions. May terminate or 
vary authorisation or direct SB to do same 
(s21A MCA). Might also consider s16 matters.
Court of Protection may make 
declarations regarding P’s 
capacity to consent to 
placement, the lawfulness of any 
acts done to P (s15 MCA), and 
may make an order in connection 
with P’s best interests (s16 MCA). 
Court may authorise deprivation 
of liberty itself if DoLS qualifying 
requirements met (s16A).
Court of Protection 
may direct that P is 
discharged from 
detention
Key:
MA = managing authority
MCA = Mental Capacity Act 2005
MHA = Mental Health Act 1983
SB = supervisory body
R = Relevant person’s representative
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The entry point into the safeguards is for the managing authority of the hospital or 
care home where ‗P‘ lives to apply to the ‗supervisory body‘ for authorisation for the 
possible deprivation of liberty of P.664  For care homes the supervisory body is the local 
authority,665 and for hospitals it is currently the Primary Care Trust (PCT).666  P or a third 
party may request the supervisory body to decide whether or not there is an 
unauthorised deprivation of liberty, provided they have already requested that the 
managing authority make an application and they have not done so within a reasonable 
period of time.667  If the possible deprivation of liberty is already occurring, or will occur 
imminently, the managing authority can grant itself an ‗urgent authorisation‘ for seven 
days, pending the supervisory body‘s consideration of its application for a ‗standard 
authorisation‘.668  The supervisory body must conduct six assessments by a minimum of 
two assessors – including a ‗best interests assessor‘ (BIA) and a mental health assessor 
– to see if six qualifying requirements are met.669  The six qualifying requirements are: 
 
1. The age requirement: P must have reached the age of 18.670 
2. The mental health requirement: P must be suffering from a mental disorder 
within the meaning of the MHA, but disregarding any exclusion of persons 
with learning disabilities.671 
3. The mental capacity requirement: P must lack the mental capacity to decide 
whether or not he should be accommodated in the relevant hospital or care 
home for the purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment.672 
4. The best interests requirement: 
a. P must be, or be going to be, a detained resident; 
b. It must be in the best interests of P for him to be a detained resident; 
c. It must be necessary, in order to prevent harm to P, for him to be a 
detained resident; 
                                               
664
 s24 Sch A1
 
665 
s182 Sch A1
 
666 
s181 Sch A1.  Although, as of April 2013 local authorities will be supervisory bodies for both 
hospitals and care homes (Department of Health, 2012a).  This is because PCTs are to be 
abolished and replaced by ‗Clinical Commissioning Groups‘ operated by general practitioners, 
under the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
 
667 
s68 Sch A1
 
668 
s74 Sch A1
 
669 
s33-48 Sch A1, although the supervisory body is exempt from this requirement if equivalent 
assessments have already been carried out within the previous 12 months and the supervisory 
body is satisfied that they remain accurate (s49).
 
670 
s13 Sch A1; s34 Sch A1
 
671 
s14 Sch A1
 
672 
s15 Sch A1
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d. It must be a proportionate response to the likelihood of P suffering 
harm and the seriousness of that harm for him to be a detained 
resident.673 
5. The eligibility requirement: P must be eligible to be deprived of his liberty by 
the MCA, which is to be determined by reference to Schedule 1A.  Schedule 
1A specifies which individuals are ineligible to be deprived of their liberty by 
the MCA because of its relationship with the MHA.674 
6. The no refusals requirement: P cannot be deprived of his liberty under the 
DoLS for the purpose of administering treatment which conflicts with a valid 
advance decision he has made, or where the authorised detention would 
conflict with the valid decision of a donee of an LPA or a deputy that he 
should not given a particular treatment or accommodated in the care home or 
hospital specified in the authorisation.675 
 
If the assessors find that each of the six qualifying requirements are met, the 
supervisory body must grant a standard authorisation for the detention;676 if any of the 
qualifying requirements are not met then the supervisory body may not grant any such 
authorisation.677  BIA‘s may recommend that particular conditions be attached to the 
authorisation678 and the supervisory body must have regard to these recommendations 
when deciding what conditions to impose on managing authorities.679  The supervisory 
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s16 Sch A1
 
674 
Eligibility is such a complex area in its own right, I have not devoted significant attention to it 
here.  In GJ v The Foundation Trust & Anor [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam), Charles J held that if the 
MHA could be used to detain a person, then it should be used in preference to the DoLS.  In 
essence, clinicians had no discretion to pick and choose between the MHA and the DoLS in the 
context of detention for the purpose of medical treatment.  Where either detention framework 
might apply, eligibility for the DoLS is determined first by reference to the ‗status test‘ and the 
‗objections test‘.  The status test states that if, ‗but for‘ their physical treatment needs, the person 
would not be detained, then they are eligible for the DoLS.  But a person might still be eligible for 
DoLS even if they are being detained for the purpose of treatment for mental disorder if their 
behaviour indicates that they are not objecting.  Neil Allen (2010) observes that the broadened 
definition of ‗objections‘ would have encompassed HL in the Bournewood case, who was detained 
for treatment of a mental (not physical) disorder.  Consequently, ironically, HL himself would not 
have been eligible for the DoLS.  The eligibility requirement can also potentially bring the DoLS 
into conflict with decisions made under MHA regimes (e.g. guardianship, s17 leave etc), where 
those decisions would result in a deprivation of liberty which can only be authorised under the 
MCA, but where the DoLS requirements are not met.  In such cases, it is unclear how to proceed 
– nothing under the MHA can authorise that detention, but no decision of the Court of Protection 
can ‗trump‘ the MHA regime.  See: C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council.  
675
 s18 Sch A1 
676 
s50 Sch A1
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 s22 Sch A1 
678 
s43 Sch A1 
679 
s53 Sch A1 
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body may grant a standard authorisation for a period of time which does not exceed the 
duration recommended by the BIA680 or one year, whichever is the shorter.681   
Once a standard authorisation has been granted, the supervisory body must 
appoint someone to act as P‘s representative (R).682  Regulations specify that R must be 
chosen by P if the BIA assesses him as having the mental capacity to do so, otherwise R 
must be chosen by any donee of an LPA or deputy if it is within the scope of their 
authority.  In the alternative, R must be selected by the BIA herself.683  If the BIA feels 
there is no suitable person to act as P‘s representative, they may either pay a person to 
act as R (a ‗paid representative‘)684 or instruct an IMCA under s39C MCA.  A paid 
representative or a s39C IMCA generally has the same rights under the schedules as 
any other R.  Rs have various rights for their views to be considered by BIAs conducting 
assessments685 and to be kept informed regarding any assessments or reviews.686  R‘s 
have rights to request Part 8 reviews of standard authorisations687 and special rights 
connected with ‗appeals‘ against the detention under s21A MCA, discussed below.  The 
managing authority is responsible for monitoring R and reporting to the supervisory body 
on the extent to which he maintains contact with P.688 
Once a standard authorisation is granted the supervisory body may conduct a 
review at any time to ensure the qualifying requirements are still met, and it must do so if 
such a request is made by P, P‘s representative689 or the managing authority of the 
hospital or care home.690   The grounds for a review are that P does not meet the 
qualifying requirements691the reason why the person meets any of those requirements 
has changed, 692  or that a person‘s situation has changed and hence it might be 
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s42 Sch A1 
681 
s51 Sch A1 
682 
s139 Sch A1 
683  
The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Appointment of Relevant Person‘s 
Representative) Regulations 2008 
684  
NB: these would be subject to various ‗conflict of interest‘ rules in the Mental Capacity 
(Deprivation of Liberty: Appointment of Relevant Person‘s Representative) Regulations 2008
 
685 
s49 and s132 Sch A1
 
686  
Informed: To receive a copy of the authorisation: s57 Sch A1; To receive copies of any written 
information given to P by the managing authority to explain the standard authorisation to them: 
s59 Sch A1; To be informed if a standard authorisation has ceased to be in force: s65 Sch A1, or 
has been suspended: s93 Sch A1, or ceased to be suspended: s95 Sch A1; To be notified of any 
pending Part 8 Review: s108 Sch A1, and the outcome of any such reviews: s120 Sch A1, and to 
be given written records relating to any requests for reviews and their outcomes: s121 Sch A1; To 
receive written records of any assessments conducted for the DoLS: s135 Sch A1. 
687 
s102 Sch A1 
688 
s147 Sch A1 
689 
The role of P‘s representative will be discussed shortly.  
690 
s101 Sch A1 
691 
s105 Sch A1 
692 
s106 Sch A1 
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appropriate to vary the conditions the authorisation is subject to.693  A review may not be 
carried out on any other grounds,694 and the supervisory body is not required to take any 
action if no qualifying requirements ‗appear to be reviewable‘.695  If it appears to the 
managing authority that one or more of these grounds for review are met, then they must 
request a review.696  The supervisory body must conduct assessments for the purpose of 
reviewing the relevant aspects of the authorisation,697 and if one or more of these review 
assessments comes to a negative conclusion the supervisory body must terminate the 
standard authorisation with immediate effect.698  This procedure is sometimes known as 
a ‗Part 8 Review‘ as it is described in Part 8 of Schedule A1. 
Once an urgent or standard authorisation has been granted, any person – 
including P, P‘s representative or any other concerned third parties – may apply to the 
Court of Protection under s21A MCA to ask the court to determine any of the following 
matters: 
 whether the relevant person meets one or more of the qualifying 
requirements; 
 the period during which the authorisation is to be in force; 
 the purpose for which the authorisation is given; 
 the conditions subject to which the authorisation is given. 
Having determined any of these matters, the court may make an order varying or 
terminating the authorisation, or directing the supervisory body to do so.  Consequently, 
s21A MCA is sometimes referred to as the ‗appeal‘ mechanism under the DoLS, 
although it is nowhere referred to as such in the statute or its schedules.  Section 21A 
MCA represents the means by which P is ‗entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered 
if the detention is not lawful‘, in accordance with Article 5(4).  Unlike appeals against 
detention under the MHA,699 however, there is no automatic periodic review of detention 
under the DoLS by a court.  Although any person may apply to the Court of Protection 
under s21A MCA, the usual requirement that the court‘s permission to initiate 
proceedings is sought first applies for any claimant other than P, P‘s representative700 or 
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s107 Sch A1 
694 
s104 Sch A1 
695 
s110 Sch A1 
696 
s103(2) Sch A1 
697 
ss112-116 Sch A1 
698 
s117 Sch A1 
699 
Under s68 MHA hospital managers have a duty to refer a patient‘s case to a tribunal if they 
have been subject to Part 2 or Part 4A MHA (other than guardianship) for a period of six months 
without having exercised that appeal right. 
700 
Under The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2009 SI 2009/582, rule 6 (definitions) of the 
Court of Protection Rules was amended so that ‗P‘ included the ‗relevant person‘ in Schedule A1, 
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any other parties generally exempt from seeking permission. 701   Both P and P‘s 
representative are entitled to non means-tested legal aid,702 although public funding is 
still subject to a ‗merits‘ test.703  Consequently, for P and R at least, being subject to a 
DoLS authorisation removes two significant access to justice hurdles in seeking a review 
by the Court of Protection: permission to bring proceedings, and funding for litigation. 
Where P has an unpaid representative, he and R have a right to support from an 
IMCA under s39D MCA.  Under s39D the IMCA must take such steps as are practicable 
to help P and R understand the effect, purpose and duration of the authorisation, any 
conditions of authorisation, and why assessors decided that P met the qualifying 
requirements for the authorisation. S39D IMCAs must also help P and R understand 
their rights and how to exercise them, and they must ‗take such steps as are practicable‘ 
to help P or R exercise their right to apply to court or their right of review ‗if it appears to 
the advocate that P or R wishes to exercise that right‘.  P and R‘s have rights to support 
from a s39D IMCA upon request.  However, if the supervisory body have reason to 
believe that ‗without the help of an advocate, P and R would be unable to exercise one 
or both of the relevant rights‘, that ‗P and R have each failed to exercise a relevant right 
when it would have been reasonable to exercise it‘ or that ‗P and R are each unlikely to 
exercise a relevant right when it would be reasonable to exercise it‘, then the supervisory 
body must instruct an IMCA under s39D MCA.   
Nothing in the statute or the schedules explicitly requires a supervisory body to 
apply to the Court of Protection where a standard authorisation is in place and where 
they are in dispute with either P, R or any other third party over the detention.  However, 
in Neary Jackson J held that ‗there is an obligation on the State to ensure that a person 
deprived of liberty is not only entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his detention 
reviewed speedily by a court.‘704  The specific nature of this obligation is somewhat 
unclear.  It might be satisfied by referring a person to an IMCA under s39D for support 
but, in some circumstances, it might also require a supervisory body to issue 
                                                                                                                                            
and Rule 51 (exemptions from seeking permission) exempted the relevant person‘s 
representative from seeking permission for an application under s21A MCA. 
701 
See s50 MCA and Part 8 Court of Protection Rules 2007.   
702  
The Community Legal Service (Financial) (Amendment) Regulations 2009 regulation 5 
amended The Community Legal Service (Financial) Regulations 2000 regulation 39(ea) to 
exempt P and R from the financial eligibility test for public funding to bring a claim under s21A 
MCA. 
703 
There are no reported decisions where a person has been refused legal aid  for a s21A MCA 
appeal, although it has been suggested that this can be a problem  (Ruck Keene and Butler-Cole, 
2011).  It is also reported that there have been some technical problems obtaining public funding 
for s21A MCA claims where authorisations have expired and been renewed.  The technicalities of 
legal aid for the DoLS are outlined in more detail in Appendix C.
 
704 
Neary, [202]
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proceedings themselves.  This ‗final safeguard‘, added in by the common-law patching 
up the shortcomings in the schedules, will be discussed in more detail below. 
Finally, before passing on to scrutinise the safeguards in more detail it is worth 
observing that the schedules did not provide any safeguards for P in circumstances 
where a BIA found that he was deprived of his liberty but one or more of the qualifying 
requirements were not met. 705  The DoLS code simply states that ‗the managing 
authority, in conjunction with the commissioner of the care, will need to consider how the 
care plan could be changed to avoid deprivation of liberty‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2008: 
[5.22]), yet it is unclear how this provision is to be enforced.  If the BIA decides that P is 
not deprived of his liberty, but P or another third party do not agree, then P does not 
have access to safeguards such as advocacy and non-means tested legal aid to 
challenge the arrangements.  In some circumstances P might be deprived of his liberty 
but not eligible for the DoLS because he is eligible for the MHA; in such circumstances 
nothing in the MCA or the MHA mandates health authorities to detain him under the 
MHA, although failure to do so may not be compatible with the HRA and Article 5 ECHR.  
There are thus a variety of possible scenarios where P may fall into a problematic 
hinterland where he is de facto detained, yet the practical means by which he could bring 
his situation to the attention of the court lies out of reach.   
6.3 THE SAFEGUARDS 
Having outlined the way the schedule works as a whole, I now turn to examine 
how effectively various aspects of the safeguards function in practice.  In this section I 
draw upon doctrinal materials, a review of the available research and grey literature, 
interviews with DoLS team staff, IMCAs, and legal practitioners, and information 
obtained under the FOIA.  More fine grained statistical data obtained under the FOIA or 
drawn from published official data are presented in Appendix C. 
                                               
705 
This point was made by Mencap in their response to the consultation on the code of practice: 
‗In the flowchart on page 33, the red box containing the words "Request for authorisation 
declined" leads nowhere else.  In some circumstances... this could be a very serious situation - for 
example, the person is being deprived of the liberty but it is not in their best interests‘.  The Mental 
Health Lawyers Association Observed ‗There is a lacuna in the position of an un befriended 
person who is assessed and where the best interests assessor concludes that not in their best 
interests criterion is not met [sic], but that deprivation of liberty is already occurring (paragraph 
3.96).  It would surely be helpful for the IMCA to remain involved whilst the steps anticipated in 
this paragraph are taken‘.   The Royal College of Psychiatrists noted that there was no duty upon 
the supervisory body to resolve such situations (FOIA #22).  In response to the Bournewood 
Consultation Age Concern noted ‗It appears that only those who are under Protective Care will 
have the safeguards of an appeals system. This still leaves those who are not placed in 
Protective Care in - but where questions are being raised as to whether they should be - in an 
anomalous position‘ (FOIA #21).
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6.3.1 SEEKING AUTHORISATION 
A person‘s access to the safeguards depends upon either the managing authority 
or some third party triggering an application for authorisation to the supervisory body.  As 
Figure 5 shows, annual data collected by the Department of Health shows that the 
overall number of DoLS applications has been far lower than initial predictions 
(Department of Health, 2005a; Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2008b; 
NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2010; 2011; 2012): 
Figure 5 Number of DoLS applications per year - predicted and actual data (England) 
 
This suggests that even if the courts endorsed the ‗extreme circumstances‘ 
definition of deprivation of liberty which was used in the impact assessment, large 
numbers of people may still be de facto detained.  The government also predicted that 
the number of applications and authorisations would decline year on year as providers 
and commissioners learned how to avoid deprivation of liberty (Department of Health, 
2007: [85]).706  The number of DoLS applications in fact continued to rise until the first 
quarter of 2012 – coincidentally, this was the first quarter after the publication of the 
Court of Appeal‘s decision in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P. 
In addition to the low volume of applications, there is considerable variation in the 
number of applications received by each supervisory body.  The troubling regional 
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An alternative hypothesis, Lady Hale (2009: 114) observes ‗is that they will become skilled at 
avoiding using these procedures, just as most people managed to avoid troubling the Court of 
Protection even though they should have done.‘
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variations recognised by the Department of Health (NHS Information Centre for Health 
and Social Care, 2010a; 2011d; 2012f) in fact mask the true scale of variation in the 
number of applications received by supervisory bodies by collapsing their data together.  
Figure 6, below, plots the number of applications received by each local authority (NHS 
Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2012g) against the size of that local 
authority‘s population (Office for National Statistics, 2009):  
Figure 6 DoLS application rates by local authority, 2011-12 (England) 
 
To put into context the scale of the variation shown in Figure 6, if the per-capita 
application rate for Leicestershire707 were scaled up to reflect the whole of England, there 
would be over 37,000 applications per year.  If the same were done for Reading708, there 
would be only 341.  These discrepancies cannot be explained by population size. 
One likely explanation is that that managing authorities within different 
supervisory body areas are operating with very different interpretations of what 
‗deprivation of liberty‘ means.  Another possibility is that some managing authorities 
avoid complying with their duties to seek authorisation under the DoLS, or are 
discouraged from doing so by supervisory bodies themselves.  There are various 
reasons why managing authorities and supervisory bodies might seek to avoid DoLS 
applications.  The Mental Health Alliance writes that ‗The term ‗deprivation of liberty‘ 
gives a negative impression which is creating resistance on the part of service providers‘, 
and have argued that the original title of ‗Protective Care‘ had much more positive 
connotations (Hargreaves, 2010: 3; Mental Health Alliance, 2012: 12).  As one DoLS 
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Leicestershire had the highest per-capita application rate for the whole of England in 2011-12.
 
708 
Reading had one of the lowest per-capita application rates in England, 2011-12.
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team manager interviewed for this research put it, ‗depriving people of their liberty isn‘t 
exactly what managing authorities want to put in their brochure‘.  Troke (2012: 62, 58) 
has suggested that judgments like Cheshire and C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough 
Council, discussed below, may compound this problem by undoing the ‗massive effort‘ 
spent educating providers and commissioners that deprivation of liberty is ‗not 
necessarily a bad thing‘.  Other factors which may discourage applications from 
managing authorities include ‗a reluctance of care homes in particular to invite external 
scrutiny‘, and ‗the length and complexity of the application forms and subsequent 
paperwork‘ (Hargreaves, 2010: 6).   
The supervisory body will also have a heavy administrative burden wherever it 
receives an application.  Shah et al (2011) estimated that the average cost of a DoLS 
assessment was £1277, whereas the impact assessment allocated only £600 per 
assessment (Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2008a).  The Department of 
Health (2012a) now allocates £1200 per application for all the attendant costs of a DoLS 
authorisation, but this does not take into account the potential costs of litigation, and the 
funds are not ring-fenced.  This heavy resource burden may lead to supervisory bodies 
discouraging managing authorities from making applications when they should do.  The 
Mental Health Alliance (2012: 10) comments: 
There is evidence that the differences in application rates are driven 
mainly by the different policies of the supervisory bodies, who have been 
largely responsible for the training and guidance given to staff of 
managing authorities in their areas. The statistics show that where a high 
proportion of applications is turned down, the application rate 
subsequently falls off. 
In many cases the care will have been commissioned by the self-same local authority or 
supervisory body whom the managing authority must seek authorisation from.  In those 
circumstances, both commissioner and provider may be motivated to avoid assessments 
which could result in conditions being placed on the care, or a finding that an 
unauthorisable deprivation of liberty is occurring.  Furthermore, if there is an active 
dispute with P or R, granting an urgent or standard authorisation entitles them to many 
tools which could support them in bringing litigation against them both.  As with referrals 
to IMCAs, discussed in Chapter 5, it is problematic that the engagement of the 
safeguards hinges upon actions by those whose power it is meant to hold in check.  
Where managing authorities and supervisory bodies are ignorant of their obligations 
under the DoLS, or strive to avoid fulfilling these obligations wherever possible, the DoLS 
will provide weak protection for detainees. 
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Where managing authorities have failed to apply to the supervisory body for 
authorisation, in theory the ‗third party request mechanism‘ means that P or another 
concerned third party can request the supervisory body look into a possible deprivation 
of liberty.  Upon receipt of a third party referral the supervisory body must assess 
whether or not P is deprived of his liberty unless ‗it appears to the supervisory body that 
the request by the eligible person is frivolous or vexatious‘709 or the question of whether 
P is deprived of his liberty has already been decided and ‗there has been no change of 
circumstances which would merit the question being decided again‘710.  No official data is 
collected on the use of the third party request mechanism, however in a FOIA request 
sent to all local authorities in England I found that it had only been used 165 times in the 
first fourteen months of operation of the DoLS (FOIA #29).  Furthermore, there were 
significant variations in levels of its use between local authorities; one had received 25 
third party requests whereas 67 of the 120 local authorities responding to the 
questionnaire stated that had not received any third party requests.711  
Against these disincentives to apply the safeguards, there are few realistic 
sources of pressure to comply with them.  Although de facto detention would implicate 
providers and commissioners in a human rights violation, without authorisation and its 
attendant safeguards the prospects of P or his family bringing this to the attention of the 
courts is much reduced.  Against the possible vast scale of unauthorised deprivation of 
liberty, reports of compensation for unlawful detention awarded by the Court of 
Protection are rare.712  Where the qualifying requirements are met but the DoLS have not 
been engaged, the courts may be reluctant to award damages following the ruling in 
Lumba (WL) v Secretary of State for the Home Department713 .  In Lumba, a case 
concerning the unlawful detention of an immigrant, a majority in the Supreme Court held 
that only nominal damages should be awarded where a person was unlawfully detained 
but where the detention would have been lawful had the appropriate procedures been 
followed.  Furthermore, the Court of Protection‘s ‗general rule‘ against awarding costs in 
welfare cases may mean that any potential damages payments could be offset by the 
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 s69(4) Sch A1 
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More detailed data on the use of the third party request mechanism is given in Table 14, 
Appendix C.
 
712 
The ruling in YA(F) v A Local Authority [2010] EWHC 2770 (COP) found that the Court of 
Protection has equivalent powers as the High Court to award damages in connection with 
breaches of the HRA.  However, only two published cases report compensation being awarded 
for unauthorised detention.  In LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary (2012) MHLO 71 (COP) the Court of 
Protection approved a consent order for Hillingdon to pay Steven Neary £35,000 in damages for 
unlawful detention.  In G v E & Ors [2010] EWHC 3385 (Fam) [5] Baker J stated he would be 
hearing a damages claim in connection with E‘s unlawful detention later that year, but the 
outcome of this does not seem to be published anywhere. 
713 
[2011] UKHRR 437, [2012] AC 245, [2011] UKSC 12
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high costs of DoLS litigation unless – as the court does in some exceptional cases – it 
departs from the ‗general rule‘ and awards costs to the other parties.  This is likely to be 
especially problematic for claimants who are publicly funded, where any potential 
damages claims are unlikely to satisfy the merits test because any damages awarded 
would usually be recouped by the Legal Services Commission.  One way to circumvent 
these problems might be to bring ‗procedural‘ failings to the attention of the Local 
Government Ombudsman as maladministration, who can then make recommendations 
for compensation.714 
A related question, which has not been examined in any published judgment to 
date, is what offence a care provider who is not a public authority in the meaning of s6 
HRA715 is committing if they deprive somebody of their liberty without authorisation.  
Following the House of Lords‘ ruling in Bournewood – which has not been reversed for 
the tort of false imprisonment – it is not obvious that they would commit any common law 
offence either.716  In response to a question on this topic from myself to the Department 
of Health, an official suggested that it would be a breach of statutory duty for a private 
care provider to fail to seek authorisation where they should.717  However, nothing in the 
schedules establishes a private right of action for breach of statutory duty if a managing 
authority fails to seek authorisation where they should; the schedules, like the MCA as a 
whole, appear to provide protection from liability for those applying them correctly718 
                                               
714 
The LGO confirmed that they had heard a small number of such cases, and shared three 
reports on DoLS which are reproduced in Appendix B.  These reports demonstrate that the LGO 
is attentive to procedural failings in connection with DoLS (FOIA #19).
 
715 
See discussion of the ruling in YL v Birmingham City Council in Chapter 2.  The amendment in 
s145 Health and Social Care Act 2008 specified that where care was arranged under the National 
Assistance Act 1948 the provider was a public authority in the meaning of s6 HRA.  However, this 
amendment would not cover the situation of privately commissioned care, or care arranged under 
other statutes such as s117 Mental Health Act 1983, or – for users of supported living services – 
care arranged under the Chronically Sick and Disabled Person‘s Act 1970.  R (A) v Partnerships 
In Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin) held that private sector healthcare providers are public 
authorities in the meaning of s6 HRA for patients detained under the MHA, but the situation of 
those who are de facto detained or detained under the DoLS is unclear. 
716  
Horsey and Rackley (2009: 396) have commented that the House of Lords‘s decision in 
Bournewood may be incompatible with Meering v Graham-White Aviation [1920] 122 LT 24 (CA).  
In Meering the House of Lords found that a man was falsely imprisoned when two security guards 
were stationed outside his employers office, which he was brought to in connection with an 
alleged theft, although he did not know that they were there and would have prevented him 
leaving.  Lord Atkins said (p. 53): ‗It appears to me that a person could be imprisoned without his 
knowing it. I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of 
drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while he is a lunatic...It is quite unnecessary to go on 
to show that in fact the man knew that he was imprisoned.‘ 
717 
Email, 12 August 2010: ‗managing authorities must act under this legislation so the action 
against 
them is against that failure irrespective of the separate issue re care homes and the Human 
Rights Act isn't it.‘ 
718 
s3 Sch A1 states:  
‗3(1)This paragraph applies to any act which a person (―D‖) does for the purpose of 
detaining P as mentioned in paragraph 1(2).  
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without establishing any specifically actionable offence.  Consequently, litigation for 
unlawful detention does not look like a realistic source of pressure to comply with the 
DoLS. 
As the regulator of care services, CQC might identify possible unlawful 
deprivation of liberty when they are inspecting care homes and hospitals and make an 
appropriate referral or take enforcement action if necessary.  CQC is responsible for 
monitoring the DoLS, 719  and in their first two reports they commented that their 
inspectors encountered situations where a person may have been deprived of their 
liberty but no application had been made (Care Quality Commission, 2011i; 2012d).  
Data collected from local authorities suggested that the CQC had only used the third 
party request mechanism 24 times by December 2010 (FOIA #29),720 and so certainly at 
that stage CQC did not appear to be functioning as a reliable fallback mechanism for 
detecting unauthorised deprivation of liberty.  It is possible that the situation has 
improved, however in their most recent report CQC noted that there was a need for 
greater awareness and understanding of the DoLS even amongst their own staff.  CQC‘s 
ability to enforce compliance with the DoLS will be significantly hampered by uncertainty 
over what ‗deprivation of liberty‘ actually means.  The comments in their most recent 
report suggests that they are working from a definition of deprivation of liberty which has 
not taken into account the rulings in P & Q and Cheshire (Care Quality Commission, 
2012d: 5, 18-20).  Nevertheless, they may represent the most promising source of 
pressure for managing authorities to comply with the obligation to seek authorisation for 
a detention which may be occurring. 
6.3.2 THE MENTAL HEALTH AND CAPACITY ASSESSMENTS 
The mental health assessor must confirm that P has a qualifying mental disorder.  
Regulations specify that mental health assessors must either be approved doctors by 
s12 MHA or be ‗a registered medical practitioner who the supervisory body is satisfied 
                                                                                                                                            
(2) D does not incur any liability in relation to the act that he would not have incurred if 
P—  
(a) had had capacity to consent in relation to D's doing the act, and  
(b)had consented to D's doing the act.‘ 
719  
Under The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Monitoring and Reporting; and 
Assessments -Amendment) Regulations 2009 the CQC ‗must monitor the operation of Schedule 
A1 in relation to England‘ (regulation 2) and ‗must report to the Secretary of State on the 
operation of Schedule A1 in relation to England as the Secretary of State may from time to time 
request‘ (regulation 3).  In connection with monitoring Schedule A1, the CQC has powers to visit 
and interview persons accommodated in care homes and hospitals, and ‗require the production 
of, and inspect, records relating to the care or treatment of persons‘ who are, or whom the CQC 
believes should be, subject to an authorisation under Schedule A1 (regulation 4). 
720 
More detailed data on the use of the third party request mechanism by CQC is given in Table 
14 Appendix C.
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has at least three years post registration experience in the diagnosis or treatment of 
mental disorder‘.  They must also have completed the DoLS Mental Health Assessors 
training programme by the Royal College of Psychiatrists.721  In practice, mental health 
assessors will often conduct the mental capacity assessment as well as the mental 
health assessment, although this can also be done by anybody who is eligible to act as a 
best interests assessor. 722   Whilst the MCA code of practice states ‗More complex 
decisions are likely to need more formal assessments‘, neither admission to hospital nor 
placement in residential care services are listed among those situations where ‗it may be 
a legal requirement, or good professional Practice, to undertake a formal assessment of 
capacity‘ (Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [4.42], [4.54]).    Considering findings that 
sometimes capacity assessments for major ‗best interests‘ decisions like a move into 
residential care do not take place (Emmett et al., 2012; Williams, V. et al., 2012),723 the 
DoLS mental capacity assessment may be the first time that a person‘s mental capacity 
to decide ‗whether or not he should be accommodated in the relevant hospital or care 
home for the purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment‘724 has been formally 
assessed by an experienced professional.   
The mental health assessor must also consider how P‘s ‗mental health is likely to 
be affected by his being a detained resident‘ 725  and inform the BIA of that finding.  
Robinson (2007: 32) points out that the substantive aspects of the mental capacity 
assessment under the DoLS are much more specifically defined than under the main 
provisions of the MCA, and import a stricter diagnostic threshold.726  Between 5-7% of all 
DoLS applications result in a finding that P has mental capacity727, and so in this small 
minority of cases the DoLS do appear to be functioning as a safeguard against 
inappropriately imposed best interests decisions. 
 
Presumably the mental health assessment is intended to satisfy the requirement 
established in Winterwerp v the Netherlands for ‗objective medical expertise‘ 728  to 
confirm that a person has a mental disorder ‗of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
                                               
721 
r4 The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Standard Authorisations, Assessments and 
Ordinary Residence) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1858  
722 
r6 The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Standard Authorisations, Assessments and 
Ordinary Residence) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1858  
723  
Emmett called for stronger legal safeguards to ensure greater scrutiny of capacity 
assessments for decisions around changes of residence (p8). 
724 
s15 Sch A1  
725 
s36 Sch A1 
726 
Although, Shah and Heginbotham (2010) express concern that this may exclude people with 
neurological disorders such as strokes.   
727 
This figure was derived from the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care (2010b; 
2011e; 2012g) data presented in Figure 16 and Figure 19 in Appendix C.
 
728 
Winterwerp v The Netherlands, [39]
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confinement‘729.  However, there are some difficulties with this.  In a Court of Appeal 
hearing of the long running case G v E & Ors730 it was argued on behalf of E that Baker J 
had erred in authorising a detention under s16 MCA without independent psychiatric 
evidence to satisfy the Winterwerp criteria.  In that case, there was evidence from a 
psychologist but it was argued that as a psychologist she ‗lacked the ...competencies‘ of 
a psychiatrist‘. 731  The OS argued that whilst the diagnosis of ‗unsoundess of mind‘ 
required medical evidence, the justification for detention was not a medical decision 
requiring evidence from a medical professional;732 the Court of Appeal preferred the OS‘s 
argument.733  In addition to holding that ‗objective medical evidence‘ was only required 
for a diagnosis, the Court of Appeal also found that requiring psychiatric evidence of 
incapacity, as opposed to other expert evidence, ‗would, in our judgment, make MCA 
2005 unworkable‘. 734   This author, at least, sees no reason why the evidence of 
psychiatrists should be preferred over that of psychologists, and is cautious about 
excessive deference to professional hierarchies and disciplinary expertise. 
The independence of mental capacity assessments is, however, a paramount 
concern from a republican perspective.  In G v E counsel for E raised concerns that the 
psychologist whose evidence the court had relied upon was also ‗intimately tied up in the 
decision-making that violated Articles 5 and 8‘. 735   Whilst the Court of Appeal paid 
considerable attention to the professional status of expert assessors, the Lords of Appeal 
did not turn their attention to the question of their impartiality.  Whereas regulations 
require that the BIA is not involved in P‘s care, or making decisions about P‘s care,736 no 
such provisions apply for the mental health assessor.  Consequently they might – as P‘s 
GP or another treating professional – have referred P for the treatment for which the 
DoLS are proposed or treatments which are otherwise implicated in the care plan.737  
Where P resists such care or treatment, it will be essential that doctors who have 
endorsed that treatment are able to separate out ‗incapacity‘ from unwise decisions; 
something expert capacity assessors found challenging in CC v KK.738 
                                               
729 
Winterwerp v The Netherlands, [39] 
730 
[2010] EWCA Civ 822 
731 
[40] 
732 
[46] 
733 
[56].  It has been suggested that the ruling in Stanev v Bulgaria affirmed that the Winterwerp 
criteria apply even for people detained on the basis that they lack capacity for reasons other than 
psychiatric treatment, and thus may conflict with this ruling in G v E (Ruck Keene et al., 2012a: 
11). 
734
 [61] 
735 
[40] 
736  
The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Standard Authorisations, Assessments and 
Ordinary Residence) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1858 regulation 12 
737 
For example, where P is sedated by means of medications prescribed by his GP. 
738 
Likewise in CYC v PC and NC, Hedley J complained that expert evidence came close to 
saying that PC lacked capacity because she made an unwise decision. 
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Although the MCA (but not the DoLS) code of practice does recommend 
obtaining ‗a second opinion from an independent professional‘ where there are disputes 
(Lord Chancellor's Office, 2007: [4.65]), the DoLS provided no mechanism for requiring a 
supervisory body to provide an independent second opinion on a person‘s mental 
capacity.  In R (PD) v West Midlands and North West Mental Health Review Tribunal739 
the High Court considered the independence of the medical member of a mental health 
tribunal who worked for the defendant trust.  They found that his professional obligation 
to act in the interests of P, the wider safeguards in the system and the fact the member 
had not actually worked in the hospital P was detained in were sufficient to satisfy the 
common law test of bias and the requirements of Article 6.  The mental health assessor 
satisfies the professional obligations aspect of this reasoning, and the courts might well 
regard it as relevant that a person could appeal to the court under s21A MCA as a 
safeguard.  However, unlike the medical member of the tribunal in R (PD) the mental 
health assessor may work for the managing authority, or be otherwise involved in P‘s 
care and treatment.  Subsequent to the decision in R (PD) the ECtHR found in X v 
Finland that the possibility ‗to benefit from a second, independent psychiatric opinion‘ 
was ‗an important safeguard against possible arbitrariness in the decision-making when 
the continuation of confinement to involuntary care is concerned‘.740  Failure to provide 
an independent second opinion contributed towards a violation of Article 5.741  Although a 
person could potentially obtain a second opinion through applying to the Court of 
Protection under s21A MCA, this seems to be a very cumbersome, costly and uncertain 
route to bring the safeguards into compliance with Article 5. 
6.3.3 THE BEST INTERESTS ASSESSMENT 
The best interests assessment is a critical safeguard in the DoLS process.  BIAs 
must hold specified professional qualifications with at least two years post-qualifying 
experience, and have attended approved BIA training. 742   The DoLS code also 
recommends that supervisory bodies consider whether assessors have ‗experience of 
working with the service user group from which the person being assessed comes‘, 
                                               
739 
[2003] EWHC 2469 (Admin)
 
740 
[169] 
741 
[171] 
742 
They must be one of the following: an approved mental health professional;  a social worker 
registered with the General Social Care Council; a first level nurse, registered in Sub-Part 1 of  
the Nurses‘ Part of the Register maintained under article 5 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 
2001(b ); an occupational therapist registered in Part  6 of the register maintained under article 5 
of the Health Professions Order 2001(c); or a chartered psychologist who is listed in the British 
Psychological Society‘s Register of Chartered Psychologists and w ho holds a relevant practising  
certificate issued by that Society. r5 The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Standard 
Authorisations, Assessments and Ordinary Residence) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1858.
 
251 
 
people from their cultural background or with their communication needs (Ministry of 
Justice, 2008: [4.14]).  In conducting their assessment BIAs must have regard to P‘s care 
plan and any relevant needs assessments743  and, as noted above, must determine 
whether or not: 
 P is, or will be, deprived of his liberty; 
 It is in P‘s best interests to be deprived of liberty 
 It is necessary for P to be deprived of liberty in order to prevent harm to 
himself, and deprivation of liberty is a proportionate response to the likelihood 
of P suffering harm and the seriousness of that harm. 
 
In determining whether or not detention is in P‘s best interests, the BIA must consult with 
those individuals specified in s4(7) MCA (Ministry of Justice, 2008: [4.65]), and they must 
state the name and address of every interested person whom they have consulted in 
their assessment.744  It is worth observing that these requirements place the details of 
P‘s care and treatment under much closer scrutiny than the requirements for detention or 
entry into guardianship under the MHA. The list of consultees is potentially broader, but 
less specific, than for Approved Mental Health Professionals (AMHPs) 745  making 
applications under the MHA.746 
One important contrast between the criteria for detention under the DoLS and 
MHA detention and guardianship regimes is the focus on the quality and suitability of the 
placement itself.  Under the MHA the grounds for detention are located primarily in the 
need for the individual to be detained in the interests of his or others‘ health and safety, 
and there being appropriate medical treatment available for him.747   The criteria for 
reception into guardianship are that ‗it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the 
patient or for the protection of other persons that the patient should be so received‘.748  
These criteria direct assessors‘ scrutiny towards individuals, not placements, and 
consequently seem more attuned to individualised and medicalised models of disability, 
without necessarily taking into account how a particular placement interacts with a 
person‘s impairment or general wellbeing.  Unlike BIA‘s, AMHPs are not required to 
                                               
743 
s39 Sch A1 
744 
s40 Sch A1 
745  
AMHPs are responsible for contributing towards assessments for detention or entry into 
guardianship under the MHA 1983, as amended.  This role was previously known as the 
‗approved social worker‘.  In only a few cases is it possible for a person to become subject to a 
MHA regime without an AMHP‘s approval. 
746
 AMHPs only have a statutory obligation to consult the Nearest Relative (see s26 MHA), but the 
MHA code suggests that consulting with others can also be valuable (Ministry of Justice, 2008: 
[4.66]-[4.70]). 
747 
s2 and s3 MHA 1983 
748 
s7(2)(b) MHA 
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investigate the quality or conditions of the place where a person would be detained to 
under the MHA.749  It is interesting to consider what a BIA might have made, for example, 
of the conditions that patients at Winterbourne View were detained in, and whether those 
could be said to be in their best interests.750 
Because BIAs must scrutinise care plans, needs assessments and consult with a 
range of people, they are potentially very well placed to examine the ‗micro-detail‘ of the 
restrictions a person is living under in an institution, as well as the decision to place them 
in that institution.  However, what, precisely, a BIA must be assessing under the DoLS is 
somewhat unclear as the nature of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ itself is so poorly defined.  
Insofar as an accumulation of restrictions that a person must live under amounts to 
detention, BIA‘s must consider whether or not those restrictions are in that person‘s best 
interests.  On that view of deprivation of liberty, the BIA‘s role appears to be to examine 
the conditions within the institution itself – an area the courts have generally been 
reluctant to consider from a best interest perspective.  However, if deprivation of liberty is 
a property of the decision to place a person in an institution rather than some other 
place, then the best interests decision would rest upon a comparison between those two 
places.  In Neary the BIA was criticised for focussing on the restrictions that Steven 
Neary was subject to whilst ignoring the ‗elephant in the room‘ of whether he should be 
in a care home or at home with his father.751  However, if BIAs focus entirely on contrasts 
with available alternatives, the restrictions a person is subject to might fall to be 
scrutinised only insofar as other settings offer fewer restrictions.  If there are no obvious 
alternatives for a person‘s care, it would be unfortunate if a BIA were unable to address 
the question of whether or not the particular restrictions a person was subject to 
complied with s6 MCA and respected a person‘s other rights.   
If a BIA were concerned about the nature of restrictions a person was subject to 
they could, in theory, recommend that they be lifted or otherwise adjusted as a condition 
of the authorisation.  DoLS team members interviewed for this research spoke 
enthusiastically about the transformative potential that conditions could have on the 
quality of a person‘s care.  For example, one anecdote recounted by a BIA described a 
young woman placed several hundred miles from her family, and who was subject to 
very significant restrictions in her care – including being required to wear a harness held 
by care staff much of the day and only leaving the care home infrequently.  The young 
                                               
749 
DD v Durham County Council [2012] EWHC 1053 (QB) 
750 
The SCR reported that no patients at Winterbourne View were subject to DoLS, although 
several patients were likely to be de facto detained and some of those who were supposed to be 
detained under the MHA 1983 were missing second opinions from medical assessors or any kind 
of assessment by an AMHP (Flynn, 2012). 
751 
[74] 
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woman was unable to communicate verbally, but would point to a picture of her family 
every day and her challenging behaviours suggested she was distressed in her 
placement.  Her family had tremendous difficulty visiting her as they worked full time and 
the distance was so great.  The BIA recommended as a condition of the authorisation 
that she be given trips outside the care home on a daily basis, and that visits to her 
family home were facilitated on a regular basis.  The BIA described having to visit the 
home frequently to check that the managing authority was complying with the conditions, 
and found that initially the home disregarded them.  With regular visits from the BIA and 
persistent nagging the conditions were implemented.   As the young woman‘s quality of 
care was transformed, so was her challenging behaviour, and eventually she was 
subject to so few restrictions in her care it was felt that she was no longer deprived of his 
liberty. 
Other BIAs from other local authorities contacted for this research told similar 
tales of using conditions to transform a restrictive or inappropriate care plan into one 
where a person was able to flourish, or was at least less miserable.  One, for example, 
described an agitated older man who had taken to dismantling the fittings of the care 
home in what appeared to be an attempt to escape from it.  Through consulting with his 
family the BIA identified that he had a lifelong passion for DIY and was very likely to be 
bored by life in the care home, which did not stimulate him.  The BIA recommended as a 
condition of the authorisation that facilities be provided for the man to tinker with and 
dismantle objects using DIY tools.  The man enjoyed this opportunity, stopped trying to 
dismantle the care home‘s doors, and after a few months appeared sufficiently happy 
and content so that it was felt the DoLS authorisation was no longer needed.  The BIA 
emphasised that the problem was not that the care home was ‗bad‘, simply that it did not 
– until this intervention – attend to his particular needs and interests. 
These anecdotes suggest that DoLS, and in particular BIAs, may have 
tremendous potential to tackle the kinds of micro-restrictions that can accumulate in 
institutional care.  However, these ‗good news‘ stories should be approached with some 
caution, and further research is needed to see how widespread practices like this are.752  
The BIAs interviewed for this research were self-selecting, as were their examples, and 
their enthusiasm and passion for what can be achieved under the DoLS may not be 
universally shared.  Furthermore, the level of ‗nagging‘ by BIAs required to ensure 
adherence to conditions seemed to be significant, and yet nothing in the schedules 
requires a BIA to visit frequently to ensure they are complied with.  Oddly, this task 
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Such research may be forthcoming from a research project at Bristol University: ‗Liberty, 
equality, capacity: The impact of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards on human rights and social 
care practice.‘ http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sps/research/projects/current/rk7148/
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appears to fall to the person‘s representative, who may well be less confident and less 
well placed to ascertain whether or not they are being complied with.   
Furthermore, conditions can only be set on the managing authority, not those 
commissioning the care, nor the supervisory body.  This is problematic where 
compliance with conditions would require expenditure by commissioners.  In the example 
of the man who liked DIY, the care home was operated by the local authority; this meant 
that conditions could be placed directly on the commissioner because they were also the 
managing authority.  In the example of the young woman hundreds of miles from home, 
facilitating home visits – and even visits to the community – required considerable 
additional funding.  In those circumstances the BIA had alerted the commissioning body 
to a possible breach of her human rights and they provided additional funding to facilitate 
her recommendations.  However, it is uncertain that a commissioner would always 
respond in this way to such concerns, especially if they were a private individual such as 
a deputy.   
Situations where a BIA is asked to assess a possible detention which she feels 
may violate a person‘s Convention rights pose a dilemma.  Similar issues arise, although 
they may not always engage the Convention, if she feels that the care proposed for the 
person is poorly planned.  On the one hand, it seems natural to suppose that detention 
which involves a human rights violation or poor care planning should not be authorised.  
On the other hand, if she does not authorise the detention the person will not benefit 
from any of the safeguards which they could use to challenge the placement and the BIA 
herself has no powers to do so on their behalf.  Counter-intuitively, the legally correct 
and practical response may be to authorise it in such circumstances. 
Strictly speaking, best interests decisions can only be made from the options that 
actually exist; neither the MCA nor the DoLS can make new options available. 753  
Logically, of the options available, one must be ‗best‘.  But it is also logically possible that 
this ‗best‘ option potentially violates a person‘s Convention rights, where none of the 
available options would be Convention compliant.754  The BIA is not explicitly required to 
consider the Convention compliance of a placement for her assessment.  Guidance from 
the Department of Health (2010a: [18]) explicitly cautions BIA‘s against setting 
‗conditions that otherwise could have been achieved by effective care plans‘.  The 
difficulty is that this guidance offers BIA‘s no levers where they feel a care plan is 
inadequate.  In such circumstances, BIA‘s could feasibly authorise the detention but 
explicitly record for the benefit of commissioners, managing authorities and supervisory 
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For exceptions to this, see section entitled ‗4.5.2 Best interests and resources‘ in Chapter  4.
 
754 
For example, a person might be so unsafe in their own home as to potentially breach Articles 2 
and 3, yet the care home placement may be so restrictive, so far from family or offer such 
undignified care as to violate Article 8. 
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body alike that they regard the care plan as inadequate755 and/or that a person‘s human 
rights are being violated by it.  Some DoLS team members interviewed for this research 
commented that they had been advised against finding that a person was detained and it 
was not in their best interests, as this could leave a person being deprived of their liberty 
without any safeguards.  They indicated that this guidance had been issued informally 
from officials at the Department of Health.756  Official data on DoLS suggests that BIAs 
may be following this guidance; only a tiny fraction of assessments find that a person is 
deprived of their liberty where the qualifying requirements for detention are not met.757 
Where BIA‘s have authorised detention in circumstances where they have 
concerns, the ruling in Neary suggests that an application by the supervisory body to the 
Court of Protection will be necessary.  In Neary Jackson J criticised the BIA for not 
recommending a court application as a condition.758 However – unusually – in Neary the 
managing authority was the local authority, who was also the commissioner and the 
supervisory body.  Consequently the BIA could, in theory, have been able to require the 
local authority as a managing authority to apply to the Court of Protection.  But in most 
situations the managing authority will not be the supervisory body and so whilst the BIA 
could informally recommend that such an application be made, it could not be a condition 
of authorisation.  Where there are public law issues around care planning or resources, 
an application to the Court of Protection would not be the appropriate route for a 
challenge.759  Nevertheless, few public authority commissioners would wish to defend a 
care plan which was defective under public law or raised serious human rights concerns 
as being in a person‘s best interests. 
 
During the DoLS consultations it was noted that supervisory bodies would often 
have a conflict of interest when authorising deprivation of liberty (FOIA #22; Scott-
Moncrieff, 2007).  Bowen (2007: [12.13]) comments: 
                                               
755 
For providers, this would breach of regulatory standards (r9 The Health and Social Care Act 
2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 SI 2010/781), for commissioners this would be a 
breach of binding guidance on care planning (Department of Health, 2010c).
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Correspondence between myself and officials at the Department suggests that what may have 
been meant is that unless there are real and existing alternatives for a person to be discharged to, 
it is in their best interests to remain where they are as opposed to being discharged with nowhere 
to go.  This correspondence was with a member of the now-disbanded deprivation of liberty 
safeguards team, dated November 2011. 
757 
See Figure 19 Appendix C.
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[74] 
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In A Local Authority v PB [2011] EWHC 502 (COP) Charles J stated: ‗These jurisdictional 
points will clearly arise in respect of a number of cases in the Court of Protection, in others they 
will not exist and in some their existence may be open to argument.  However, it seems to me 
that, in most cases in the Court of Protection (I hesitate to say all), that the public authorities 
involved, in which I include the relevant local and health authority, the Official Solicitor and the 
court, need to be alert to and address these jurisdictional points at an early stage.‘ [28] 
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...conflicts of interest are bound to arise where the supervisory body is 
also responsible for providing P with a package of care ...The hospital or 
care home then seek the supervisory body's authorization for P's 
detention.  The supervisory body then has a conflict: it has already 
decided that P should be cared for (and therefore detained) in the hospital 
or care home, so how can it then decide whether that detention is 
authorized under Sch A1?  A fair-minded and impartial observer may well 
conclude that there was a real possibility the supervisory body would be 
biased in favour of detention, rendering the decision unlawful. 
The supervisory body as an organisation has very little discretion over whether or not to 
authorise the detention – if all the qualifying requirements are met it must, if any are not 
met, it cannot.760  The independence of BIAs is therefore especially important.  There are 
various means by which BIAs could potentially dampen threats of challenge to a 
supervisory body/commissioner about a placement.  By finding that P is not deprived of 
his liberty, he would be entitled to no safeguards, including advocacy and non-means 
tested legal aid.  BIA‘s may select a person‘s representative, and although the 
Department of Health (2010a: [11]-[12]) has warned against it, there is concern that they 
may overlook relatives who oppose the detention (Hargreaves, 2010; Mental Health 
Alliance, 2012).  BIA‘s are the most likely conduit by which a supervisory body would be 
alerted to the need to make a s39D IMCA referral.   
From a republican perspective, it is vital that such an important safeguard is 
independent and free of any conflict of interest.  However there are reasons to believe 
that structurally the BIA is not as independent as might be desired.  The schedules 
require that BIAs, unlike mental health assessors, must not be involved in P‘s care, or in 
making decisions about P‘s care, and the code of practice states that ‗a potential best 
interests assessor should not be used if they are in a line management relationship with 
the professional proposing the deprivation of liberty or the mental health assessor‘ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2008: [4.13]).761 Despite these provisions, the reality is that many 
BIAs will work alongside those responsible for making decisions about P‘s care – either 
those planning P‘s care or making ‗safeguarding‘ decisions762 to place P in a care home 
or admit him to hospital.  In such circumstances a BIA may come under considerable 
social pressure to find that a care plan arranged by their colleagues is compatible with 
the MCA and the person‘s human rights.  One BIA interviewed for this research 
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However, the supervisory body as an organisation does have discretion in decisions about 
referrals to s39D IMCAs, reviews and applications to the Court of Protection.  If the supervisory 
body were concerned about the quality of a particular assessment, they could undertake a review 
with a fresh assessor. 
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I have been unable to find the equivalent provision for this in the schedules or the regulations.  
It is possible I have overlooked something, but this might be an example of a discrepancy 
between the schedules and the code warned of by Hargreaves. 
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The CQC (2011i: 8) found that it was common for supervisory bodies for DoLS teams teams to 
be based in a safeguarding team. 
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described themselves as ‗the dog that‘s allowed to bite the master‘, but not all assessors 
may feel secure enough in their role and confident in their independent judgment to ‗bite‘ 
their colleagues and employers.  It may be difficult to establish a ‗Chinese Wall‘ within an 
organisation to protect BIAs and other DoLS assessors from these pressures. 
Many BIAs the author has encountered give one cause to believe there are 
excellent, knowledgeable and independent-minded assessors working with DoLS, who 
approach complex care planning and human rights issues creatively and constructively.  
However, the centrality of their role in the safeguards means that the DoLS offer 
inadequate protection where a BIA‘s skills, knowledge or independence are 
compromised.  In Neary, for example, Jackson J found all the BIAs‘ assessments to be 
inadequate, yet it took nearly a year for the case to reach court.  The problem is that 
whilst a great deal of good can be done by BIAs, much of this is contingent upon their 
good judgment and good faith.  From a republican perspective this is unsatisfactory – 
domination results from structures which do not offer protection against the caprices and 
whims of individuals.  In the words of the ECtHR in HL v UK: 
...the very purpose of procedural safeguards is to protect individuals 
against any ‗misjudgments and professional lapses‘.763 
6.3.4 THE RELEVANT PERSON‘S REPRESENTATIVE 
The DoLS code of practice describes P‘s representative as ‗a crucial role in the 
deprivation of liberty process, providing the relevant person with representation and 
support that is independent of the commissioners and providers of the services they are 
receiving.‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2008: [7.2]).  Under the DoLS, P‘s representative has 
certain formal duties specified by the regulations:764 
 To maintain contact with the relevant person,  
 To represent the relevant person in matters  relating to, or connected with, the 
deprivation of liberty, and  
 To support the relevant person in matters relating to, or connected with, the 
deprivation of liberty. 
Representatives have rights to be kept informed of given records of assessments and 
other developments connected with P‘s detention under the DoLS.   They also have 
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HL v UK, [121].  The ECtHR endorsed Lord Steyn‘s comments that the decision in 
Bournewood ‗...places effective and unqualified control in the hands of the hospital psychiatrist 
and other health care professionals. It is, of course, true that such professionals owe a duty of 
care to patients and that they will almost invariably act in what they consider to be the best 
interests of the patient. But neither habeas corpus nor judicial review are sufficient safeguards 
against misjudgments and professional lapses in the case of compliant incapacitated patients.‘ 
764  
r12The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Appointment of Relevant Person‘s 
Representative) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1315 
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powers to request reviews of P‘s detention, to apply to the Court of Protection under 
s21A MCA without permission, and ‗gold plated‘ entitlements to legal aid for that 
purpose. 
Because P is likely to face many practical obstacles initiating a formal challenge 
to his detention under the DoLS, he will be very reliant on the representative to trigger a 
review or litigation on his behalf.  Difficulties may therefore arise where a representative 
is unwilling or unable to initiate a challenge on behalf of P.  In some circumstances 
representatives may support the detention, even where P is objecting to it; it is quite 
possible that a representative may have helped to choose the care which constitutes a 
detention themselves.  In A v A Local Authority & Ors765 Mr A‘s son, S, was appointed as 
his representative, but S ‗did not support A in exercising his right to challenge the 
authorisation‘766  and felt ‗he would dislike wherever he was.‘ 767   As a result of S‘s 
unwillingness to support Mr A in challenging his detention, the supervisory body 
appointed a different representative who did support him to.  Whilst it is laudable that the 
supervisory body took action to support Mr A‘s right to challenge an authorisation they 
themselves had issued, it is not obvious that they were obliged to.  The regulations 
stipulate that the appointment of a representative should be terminated where the 
supervisory body is satisfied that the representative is ‗not maintaining sufficient contact‘ 
with P, or ‗is not acting in the best interests of‘ P768, but it is not explicitly stated that 
representatives must help P to challenge decisions which both the representative and 
the supervisory body regard as being in P‘s best interests.  There is certainly an 
argument that it is always in a person‘s best interests to be supported and enable to 
exercise their rights of appeal under Article 5(4).  However, this has never been made 
explicit in case law and – as will shortly be discussed in connection with litigation friends 
– there are reasons to believe that not everybody would agree with this statement. 
Since it can never be assumed that simply because a representative is in 
agreement with professionals the detention must be justified, 769  the representative 
cannot be regarded as failsafe safeguard against arbitrary detention, or a guarantee that 
P is able to exercise his Article 5(4) rights of appeal should he want to.  Furthermore, 
representatives may not find it easy to initiate a challenge under s21A MCA even if they 
themselves oppose the detention.  It is difficult to think of a representative more 
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The Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Appointment of Relevant Person‘s 
Representative) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1315  
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In the trinity of ECtHR cases on deprivation of liberty – Stanev, DD and Kędzior – the person‘s 
guardian was in agreement with other professionals that a person should be placed in the 
institution against their objections.   
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dedicated to securing the release of a detainee than Mark Neary, the father of Steven 
Neary.  He spent almost a year campaigning online and in the media to ‗Get Steven 
Home‘,770 yet legal action was not initiated until his son had been detained for nearly a 
year.  In part the court found this was due to the Council‘s failure to ensure he obtained 
the support of a s39D IMCA, and in part this was because the Council had misled him 
into believing that Steven would soon be discharged back into his care when in fact they 
were secretly planning to send him to a hospital many hundreds of miles away.  Another 
reason, not discussed in the judgment, is the considerable difficulty Mark Neary had in 
finding a solicitor – having contacted over fifty law firms before finding one who was 
prepared to take on his case,771 and having previously been ill-advised by a major law 
firm that he was not entitled to legal aid to take the case to court (Kenber, 2011b).   
In addition to these practical and tactical problems, representatives may also 
have good reason for being cautious about ‗rocking the boat‘ with those whom they rely 
upon to commission or provide care for their loved ones.  If Steven was ever to return 
home, Mark Neary would be reliant upon the self-same local authority he was expected 
to challenge using the DoLS to put in place a care plan to support him as a carer and 
Steven himself.  In Neary Jackson J recorded:  
Speaking of his relations with the social worker, [Mark Neary] said that he 
found them quite awkward ever since the meeting in January where the 
idea of reviewing the support package was brought up. He said that this 
fear remained "tattooed on my brain" and from that point on he was 
worried about the consequences of rocking the boat. Indeed, when he 
finally put his foot down on 9 July, and directly asked for Steven's return, 
Hillingdon's immediate response was that the necessary support package 
would not be made available. Mr Neary became understandably 
emotional when describing how powerless he had felt.‘772 
This passage is testament to the subjective experience of being dominated by an 
organisation upon whom one depends, who is capable of taking decisions which may 
have very significant consequences for one‘s life, where one is not secure in the 
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Mr Neary set up a Facebook group called ‗Get Steven Home‘ which attracted thousands of 
members and growing media attention.  He started a petition to secure the release of his son, and 
worked hard to co-operate with Hillingdon Council to arrange for him to be released back into his 
care.  Some of his travails are described in the judgment in Neary but they are also described by 
Mark Neary himself in his book (Neary, 2011). 
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Declaration of interest: I was a member of Mark Neary‘s Facebook group and saw that he had 
posted that he needed to apply to the Court of Protection urgently to prevent Steven being moved 
to a hospital in Wales the following week, but was unable to find a solicitor.  I contacted him and 
offered to help him ringing round law firms on the Mental Health Lawyers Association list.  I myself 
contacted tens of firms, and encountered a small number who offered to take the case to ‗judicial 
review‘ in the administrative court or to a tribunal, suggesting they lacked the expertise to act in a 
DoLS case.  By coincidence, a solicitor from Exeter of my acquaintance was in London that day 
and was able to visit Mark Neary and lodge an urgent application to the Court of Protection. 
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knowledge that one can effectively challenge them.  It is now two years on from the 
ruling in Neary and the family are reported to be facing losing their home due to a 
decision by Hillingdon Borough Council to withdraw housing benefit despite there being 
no change in their financial status (Kenber, 2012).  It is important to bear in mind that 
both P and R are likely to have an ongoing relationship of dependency upon the local 
authority, and the fear of retributive withdrawal of forms of support they rely upon may 
have a bearing on their willingness to exercise their rights of appeal. 
One further weakness in the role of representative lies in the selection process.  
As noted, where a BIA is satisfied that P lacks the mental capacity to choose his own 
representative, and there is no deputy or LPA with the requisite authority to select one,773 
the BIA will select the representative herself.  The Mental Health Alliance has found 
evidence that: 
...in some cases close relatives who opposed the authorisation were 
being passed over in favour of paid representatives, or other relatives who 
supported the action. Where this is done, it effectively allows DoLS to be 
used   to override an objection by the closest relative to a hospital or care 
home placement without going to court as would previously have been 
necessary, and to deny them access to the information they would need 
in order to mount a legal challenge. If this is happening to any significant 
extent it would be ironic, as the whole scheme came about as a result of a 
successful challenge by carers who had been deliberately excluded.774 
The Department of Health (2010a: [11]) has cautioned supervisory bodies against 
avoiding challenges by appointing only representatives who support the detention.  The 
Mental Health Alliance (2012: 12) recently called for clarification in the DoLS code of 
practice that possible representatives ‗should not be regarded as acting contrary to the 
detained person‘s best interests solely because they object to the authorisation or are 
likely to challenge it‘.  However, merely issuing guidance does not do much to guard 
against potentially arbitrary decisions in the appointment of representatives.   
One possibility might be to adopt a ‗statutory list‘ which offers supervisory bodies 
very little discretion in who they appoint as representative – such an approach is taken 
for the appointment of the Nearest Relative who occupies a similar role under the 
MHA.775  In recognition of the fact that not everybody may want the first person on this 
statutory list to be their Nearest Relative776 a person may apply to the county court for 
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For reasons discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, this is especially likely to be the case for people 
with learning disabilities who tend not to have made LPAs and where welfare deputyships are so 
rarely awarded.
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 Hargreaves (2010: 10) 
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s26 MHA 1983 
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Or as solicitor David Hewitt (2008) puts it, ‗when your nearest isn‘t your dearest‘. 
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their displacement.777  If there are concerns about the Nearest Relative the AMHP or any 
other relative of the detained patient or person with whom they reside might also apply 
for them to be displaced.  Arguably an application to court asks a lot of a person who is 
undergoing detention on the basis of mental disorder, and so it might be more desirable 
if detainees could exercise a veto778 on the appointment of a particular representative.   
Meanwhile, a requirement that supervisory bodies must apply to court to displace 
representatives who might challenge their decisions could guard against this particular 
potential subversion of the safeguards. 
 
By way of comparison, the powers of representatives under the DoLS are 
substantially weaker than those of the comparable role of Nearest Relative under the 
MHA 1983.  Nearest Relatives can object to a person‘s detention under s2 or s3 MHA, 
reception into guardianship or discharge them from those regimes.  If the detention or 
guardianship is to go ahead, or discharge to be prevented, the Nearest Relative must be 
formally displaced from their role by a court.  If, as Richard Jones argues should have 
been the case, an amendment to guardianship under the MHA had been introduced 
instead of the DoLS, relatives opposing a detention would have substantially greater 
powers to prevent it or bring it to an end.  If the detaining and guardianship authorities 
were committed to that course of action, it would be incumbent upon them – not the 
detainee or the relative – to apply to court.  This represents one of the most significant 
differences between the MHA and the DoLS in the balance of power between detaining 
authorities and detainees and their families.  It is worth reflecting that if Steven Neary 
had been subject to guardianship, his father could have discharged him simply by writing 
a letter to the local authority,779 and either Hillingdon would have had to comply with that 
request or defend their decision in court many months sooner than they did under the 
DoLS. 
6.3.5 THE PART 8 REVIEW 
The Bournewood Consultation initially proposed that the procedure which 
became the Part 8 Review could operate as a ‗first tier‘ review process, to alleviate 
pressure on the courts (Department of Health, 2005a: [5.14]-[5.16]).  This suggestion 
was robustly rejected by consultees, and the government concluded that ‗it might be 
seen as interfering with the right, under Article 5(4), of appeal to a court and delay the 
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speedy decision by such a court on the lawfulness of instances of deprivation of liberty‘ 
(Department of Health, 2006d: [41]).  Consequently, Part 8 Reviews are better 
understood as a mechanism that allows a supervisory body to adapt to changes in 
circumstances, or any internal concerns they may have about the quality of assessments 
or compliance with conditions, rather than a quasi-appeal mechanism for detainees and 
representatives.   
The Part 8 Review procedure as it stands would not be a robust safeguard 
against misjudgments or poor assessments by a supervisory body where they did not 
entertain such concerns.  Although both P and R can request a Part 8 Review, the 
supervisory body is not obliged to carry out a review ‗if no qualifying requirements 
appear to be reviewable‘.780  There is no guarantee that the assessments undertaken for 
the purposes of a review would not replicate the defects of the very assessments which 
P or R seek to challenge; this was a problem in Neary with the BIA‘s assessments and 
reviews.  There is no right to a fresh assessor or an independent second opinion.  The 
review process might be used by supervisory bodies to get a second opinion on an 
assessment which they or P or R have concerns about, but nothing compels them to.   
Like other aspects of the safeguards which depend upon discretionary decision 
making, the use of the Part 8 Review mechanism appears to be highly variable.  No 
official statistics are collected on the use of Part 8 reviews, but data collected by BBC 
journalist Matthew Hill found that of 103 local authorities surveyed using the FOIA only 
226 Part 8 Reviews had been requested by P or R in 2010-11 and 58 (56%) of 
supervisory bodies had received no such requests (FOIA #30).  The Mental Health 
Alliance (2012: 11) comment that the review process ‗is still little used by detained 
persons or their representatives‘.  They also recommend that supervisory bodies should 
be required by statute to give written reasons where they decline to undertake a Part 8 
Review requested by a representative (p12).  Supervisory bodies who are open and 
responsive to challenges may exercise good judgment to use the review process to 
guard against arbitrariness in their initial decisions.  However, Part 8 offers little 
protection against those supervisory bodies who both make poor initial decisions and 
poor subsequent decisions in the conduct of reviews. 
6.3.6 SECTION 39D IMCAS 
In situations where P and/or R might struggle to understand and exercise their 
rights under the DoLS, support from a s39D IMCA will be vital.  Given the complexity of 
the DoLS, this seems likely in the majority of cases.  The role of a ‗s39D IMCA‘ is 
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therefore distinct in several important respects from that of IMCAs under the main 
provisions of the MCA.  Unlike the IMCAs discussed in Chapter 4, s39D IMCAs are 
available upon request to support P, and to support P‘s family if they are acting as his 
representative.  Furthermore, the role of the IMCA is not primarily to gather information 
for decision makers, but to help P and R to understand and exercise their rights.  The 
drafting of s39D leaves s39D IMCAs with little discretion in whether or not to help P or R 
apply to court; if P or R wishes to exercise that right, then the IMCA must assist them in 
doing so.  This is a much stronger and clearer right to support in challenging a decision 
made under the DoLS than a person has under the main IMCA provisions discussed in 
Chapter 5.   
Supervisory bodies have a proactive duty to make referrals for an IMCA to 
support P or R where it seems to them that without that support P and R would struggle 
to exercise their rights of appeal and review.  On paper, therefore, it looks as if we have 
a safeguard which should guarantee that if P struggles to exercise his right of appeal, 
and R is unable or unwilling to help him, the s39D IMCA should step into the breach to 
support and enable him to exercise his Article 5(4) rights.  In Neary Hillingdon‘s failure to 
appoint a s39D IMCA in a timely fashion contributed towards Jackson J finding that 
Steven Neary‘s Article 5(4) rights had been breached.781  Neary is testament to the 
transformative input an IMCA can make.  According to Jackson J ‗The first best interests 
assessment that deserves the name‘ was the report of the IMCA782, ‗For the first time, 
professional support was given to Mr Neary's arguments‘783 and ‗This report pointed the 
way towards a different outcome for Steven‘784.  In the absence of a mechanism which 
would refer P‘s case to court automatically, the s39D IMCA is likely to offer the strongest 
means by which the obstacles to a court review in P‘s path could be circumvented.   
 
In practice, however, s39D MCA does not appear to be functioning in the way it 
was intended.  This much is obvious from the tiny trickle of DoLS appeals which have 
actually reached the court, discussed in more detail below.  The s39D mechanism 
appears to be breaking down both at the point of referral, and at the point where s39D 
IMCAs themselves should be helping P to transmute any objections into an appeal. 
Analysis of official data on the number of s39D IMCA referrals for each local 
authority in 2010-11 (Department of Health, 2011b) revealed that 51 of 145 local 
authorities had not made a single referral under s39D; 26 of those local authorities had 
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granted over 10 authorisations and one had granted as many as 132.785  The Mental 
Health Alliance has also found evidence of underuse of s39D IMCAs, and comments 
that: 
...the implication is that the requirements  of Section 39D are generally 
being disregarded and that the vast majority of family representatives are 
receiving no support in grappling with an opaque and impenetrable 
system.786  
Even where an IMCA has been appointed, the evidence suggests they are very 
rarely supporting P to appeal against his detention.  Data from the Court of Protection 
suggests that 2 out of 30 s21A MCA applications between April 2009 and January 2011 
were made by IMCAs, with three more being made under s15 MCA (FOIA #15).787  
However, it is more likely that IMCAs would help P to initiate litigation in his own name 
than make an application themselves.  Yet, the recorded data suggests that IMCAs are 
involved only rarely in even assisting P to appeal.  As noted in Chapter 5, the 
Department of Health (2010d; 2011b) reports that there were a total of ten cases 
between 2009-11 where an IMCA referral led to an application to the Court of Protection 
– inclusive of both DoLS and litigation connected with other decisions under the MCA.  
These data, in combination with the data on the overall low volume of s21A applications 
discussed below, suggests that there may be widespread failure on the part of s39D 
IMCAs to support and enable P to exercise his Article 5(4) rights in accordance with their 
statutory duty. 
It is unclear why this is the case.  The problems of resources, independence and 
preserving future relationships with decision makers outlined in Chapter 5 may form a 
partial answer.  It is possible that IMCAs themselves do not understand that s39D 
imposes a much stronger duty upon them to help P to apply to court than in their role 
elsewhere under the MCA.  It may be that IMCAs are interpreting their role to support P 
in exercising his rights of appeal as only being engaged where they regard an appeal as 
being in P‘s best interests.  From the perspective of Article 5(4) which appears to bestow 
an absolute right of appeal against detention, not one which is conditional upon a person 
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This data breakdown for 2009-10 was not published, and I encountered considerable 
difficulties obtaining it under the FOIA (FOIA #27).  When, after a year, the Department of Health 
agreed to share the information with me they issued the following warning: ‗The data by category 
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clarity in the first year of the DoLS over the role of s39D IMCAs. 
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having capacity or it being in their best interests, this would seem to be a highly dubious 
interpretation.  In Stanev, DD and Kędzior, their mental capacity and their best interests 
did not enter the ECtHR‘s discussion of their right to seek a court review of their 
detention.  In Neary, Jackson J stated  ‗there is an obligation on the State to ensure that 
a person deprived of liberty is not only entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his 
detention reviewed speedily by a court‘788, and made no mention of Steven Neary‘s 
mental capacity.   
In the context of detention under s2 MHA, the House of Lords held in MH v 
Secretary of State for the Department of Health & Ors789 that although an automatic 
referral to the tribunal is not necessary for a person who lacks mental capacity, every 
‗sensible effort should be made to enable the patient to exercise that right if there is 
reason to think that she would wish to do so‘.790  The question of whether Article 5(4) is 
qualified with reference to incapacity will be discussed below, but it certainly seems far 
from conclusively the case in light of the ruling in the ruling in MH.  Further research is 
needed to understand why IMCAs appear to be failing to live up to their role, and such 
research is of urgent importance given their centrality to ensuring the DoLS offer 
adequate protection against arbitrary detention. 
6.3.7 ACCESS TO THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
I argued in Chapter 5 that the Court of Protection is one of the most important 
safeguards against arbitrary mental capacity assessments and best interests decisions; 
in the context of DoLS it also represents the most important safeguard against arbitrary 
detention under Article 5(4).  Yet there are reasons to be concerned that whilst access to 
the court may be improved under the DoLS, many of the procedural difficulties discussed 
in Chapter 4 remain an area of concern for appeals made under s21A MCA.  
Nevertheless, the DoLS do seem to provide a framework which facilitates more legal 
challenges by P himself, even if they do not facilitate many.  When asked how often P 
was the applicant to the Court of Protection, judges and the OS had responded that it 
was quite rare, but the OS added this qualification: ‗except in section 21A applications.‘   
There are several reasons why the DoLS may offer an enhanced route to court 
over the ordinary s15/s16 MCA procedure.   One problem discussed in Chapter 4 was 
that P might not understand his rights of challenge, yet the DoLS requires the managing 
authority and any s39D IMCA to explain the authorisation to P and his rights of appeal.  
Thus DoLS potentially circumvent the rights-awareness issues which prevented people 
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from using the Court of Protection to challenge best interests decisions.  Another 
obstacle facing both P and P‘s family was difficulties securing funding for litigation – yet 
the DoLS offers ‗gold plated‘ legal aid for an application to court.  P‘s representative does 
not have to secure the permission of the Court of Protection to initiate proceedings, 
whereas ordinarily friends and family would have to and often do not obtain it (Judiciary 
of England and Wales, 2010; 2011; Series, 12a).   Where P is unable to secure the 
support of R or other third parties to appeal, the supervisory body is statutorily obliged to 
refer him to a s39D IMCA, who in turn is statutorily obliged to assist him.  If all else fails, 
Jackson J held in Neary that supervisory bodies themselves should refer an ongoing 
dispute to court in order to enable a person to exercise their Article 5(4) rights of 
appeal.791 
Yet despite the substantial improvements made by the DoLS on rights of appeal 
elsewhere under the MCA, the number of appeals under s21A MCA has been extremely 
low.  The impact assessment, for reasons which are entirely unclear, predicted that only 
2.5% of all authorisations would result in an application to the Court of Protection 
(Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2008a). 792   However the number of 
reported appeals in the first year of the DoLS fell far below even this conservative 
estimate.  Drawing from data supplied to me by the Court of Protection (FOIA #16)793 
and comparing them against official statistics on DoLS authorisations, it appears that 
there were 19 s21A MCA applications in 2009-10 for 3297 DoLS authorisations (0.6%), 
and 40 in 2010-11 for 4951 DoLS authorisations (0.8%).  It is true that the duration of 
DoLS authorisations has typically been lower than anticipated by the impact assessment, 
and it is likely that some of these authorisations may relate to multiple authorisations for 
the same individual.794  A roughly equivalent number of court hearings appear to have 
come about through the supervisory body themselves applying to the Court of Protection 
in connection with a deprivation of liberty under the MCA – although many of these will 
be cases which cannot be authorised under Schedule A1 (discussed below).  
 This seems an astonishingly low number of appeals for a mechanism whose 
primary function is to ensure people are able to exercise their Article 5(4) right to a court 
review of their detention.  It compares very poorly, for example, with the rate of appeals 
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Significant welfare issues that cannot be resolved by discussion should be placed before the 
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Neary v Hillingdon Borough Council, [33]
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This figure seems especially extraordinary when one considers the reason the government 
gave for projecting only 21,000 people might need safeguards was that Bournewood represented 
an ‗extreme‘ set of circumstances.  Yet if these circumstances are so ‗extreme‘, surely more than 
2.5% of detainees and their families would object to them? 
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under s2 MHA which must be initiated by detainees, and even that is considered to be 
concerning low (Bartlett and Sandland, 2007: 376).795  This low volume of applications 
is likely to be linked to the defects in the safeguards discussed above – BIAs selecting 
representatives who are less likely to challenge the detention; representatives who are 
unwilling, unable or too cowed by the supervisory body to trigger the appeal mechanism; 
low rates of referral to s39D IMCAs, and s39D IMCAs‘ failures to understand and comply 
with their statutory duty to support appeals.  It is also reported that there can sometimes 
be difficulties convincing the Legal Services Commission that ‗best interests‘ matters 
considered by the Court of Protection in connection with an application under s21A MCA 
are not s15/s16 MCA matters which do not entitle a person to non-means tested legal 
aid (Ruck Keene et al., 2012d).796  The clear exhortation to bring disputes to court in 
Neary appears to have resulted in a marked increase in the number of s21A MCA 
appeals and DoLS cases before the Court of Protection.  Unfortunately, more recent 
data on the number of appeals since Neary was not available from the Court of 
Protection at the time of writing.797 
Further evidence that the volume of DoLS challenges is closely linked to a 
supervisory body‘s willingness to support a person in the exercise of their Article 5(4) 
rights is provided from a finding that s21A MCA challenges appear to cluster around 
certain supervisory bodies.  In a survey of local authorities in England (FOIA #29) I 
asked how many DoLS related court cases each local authority had been involved in.  By 
November 2011 they reported having been involved in 33 s21A MCA cases.798  One 
hundred and one local authorities had not been involved in any DoLS-related litigation at 
all, twelve local authorities had been involved in one s21A MCA challenge, seven had 
been involved in two s21A MCA challenges and one local authority had been involved in 
seven s21A MCA challenges.  That particular local authority also had a noticeably high 
volume of third party requests for Part 8 Reviews (FOIA #30), a medium volume of 
applications received and granted under the DoLS compared with other local authorities, 
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268 
 
and had made an above average number of referrals to s39D IMCAs.  Whilst at face 
value a higher rate of challenge might be regarded as indicative of poor decision making, 
I would contend that it is more likely to represent a local authority who is more committed 
than most to upholding P‘s Article 5(4) right to challenge their decisions.  Another 
relevant factor may be the development of specialist legal expertise in DoLS in that 
region, and strengthening connections between IMCAs and solicitors who are capable of 
taking on DoLS-related work. 
 
A further obstacle to P exercising his Article 5(4) rights of appeal is securing a 
litigation friend who is willing to pursue it.  As for cases in the Court of Protection heard 
under s15/s16 MCA, the litigation friend for s21A MCA appeals will often be the OS, 
although there has been one reported case of a paid representative acting as a litigation 
friend in a s21A MCA challenge.799  I tried to obtain information under the FOIA and by 
asking my local MP to table a written question in parliament as to whether the OS ever 
discontinues appeals under s21A MCA brought by P (FOIA #32; #33).  Unfortunately, the 
OS is not bound by the FOIA800 and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State for the 
Ministry of Justice was unable to answer this question.801  However, in an interview for 
this research I was able to ask the OS himself whether he operated a policy of always, 
automatically, challenging a deprivation of liberty authorisation if P was objecting.  He 
responded ‗I would apply the best interests test and if it was unarguable than I wouldn‘t 
run it‘, and emphasised that his role was different from that of a mental health solicitor.   
This raises the question of what case a litigation friend should pursue on behalf of 
P, and what constitutes an ‗arguable‘ case, rehearsed in Chapter 4.802  In essence, 
litigation friends will sometimes face an uncomfortable choice between assisting a 
person in bringing their arguable claim before a court, although they do not believe either 
the litigation or their preferred outcome to be in their best interests, or else withdrawing 
the claim without the court determining the lawfulness of the detention.  If anything the 
arguments in favour of litigation friends pursuing appeals, no matter how futile they 
appear to be, are stronger in the context of Article 5(4) than elsewhere.  The approach of 
litigation friends under the DoLS contrasts starkly with appeals against detention under 
the MHA.  The right to bring an unarguable appeal against detention under the MHA 
seems well established; approaching 90% of appeals to tribunals under the MHA fail 
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AB v LCC (A Local Authority) 
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The Office of the Official Solicitor does not appear upon the list of bodies bound by the FOIA 
given in Schedule 1 FOIA.   
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Hansard HC vol 527 col 954W (9 May 2011) 
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See section in Chapter 5 entitled ‗Litigation friends‘ decisions about whether, and how, P‘s 
case should be advanced‘. 
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(Care Quality Commission, 2011f).  The Law Society‘s (2011) guidance to solicitors 
representing clients in mental health tribunals emphasises that the threshold for capacity 
to litigate is very low, and states that ‗it would be in a rare case that to seek a client's 
discharge in accordance with his or her express wishes would not be 'properly arguable'.  
In Waite v The United Kingdom803 the ECtHR found that ‗an applicant is not required, as 
a precondition to enjoying [the protection of Article 5(4)], to show that on the facts of his 
case he stands any particular chance of success in obtaining his release‘.  It is very 
difficult to reconcile this ruling to the practice of discontinuing a s21A MCA appeal on the 
grounds that it might be futile. 
It is possible that the OS cannot withdraw appeals initiated under s21A MCA 
without the consent of the court itself, although this is somewhat unclear at face value.  
Under Civil Procedure Rule 21.10 no settlement, compromise or payment in proceedings 
can be reached without the consent of the court, but there is no obvious parallel rule in 
the Court of Protection Rules 2007.  Nevertheless, a litigation friend can only be 
appointed for P by the court, and so proceedings must always be initiated before a 
litigation friend could seek to withdraw them.  Presuming the Court of Protection 
observes the convention under CPR 21.10,804 the court itself would have to agree to the 
OS withdrawing any appeals which he regarded as ‗unarguable‘.  It is disturbing in itself 
that there is so little information in the public domain about the procedure that litigation 
friends and the Court must follow if proceedings are withdrawn on behalf of P. 
It is difficult to reconcile the practice of withdrawing P‘s appeal against his 
detention before the court has reviewed its lawfulness, to his rights under Article 5(4).805  
No ECtHR case has ever suggested that a person‘s Article 5(4) rights hinge on their 
capacity and best interests, and there are sound reasons for believing they should not.  
As discussed in Chapter 5 the OS bases his case on expert evidence, but expert 
evidence can be wrong – as CC v KK so strikingly showed.  The court is better place to 
consider all the amassed evidence, and it is increasingly clear that judges may be 
obliged to meet appellants in person where their mental capacity is in dispute, and 
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(App no 53236/99) (2003) 36 EHRR 54, [2002] ECHR 804 
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Under s1 Civil Procedure Act 1997 the Civil Procedure Rules bind the civil division of the Court 
of Appeal, the High Court, and county courts.  However, although sometimes High Court judges 
from the Family Division sit in the Court of Protection it is not a division of the High Court in its 
own right.  Under s47(1) MCA it ‗has in connection with its jurisdiction the same powers, rights, 
privileges and authority as the High Court.‘  It is not clear that this means it is a High Court for the 
purposes of the Civil Procedure Act.  However, it could be argued that the requirement for a 
litigation friend to seek the court‘s consent under s21.10 is a power or source of authority for the 
court, and hence that is imported into the Court of Protection by s47(1) MCA. 
805 
In interview I asked the OS whether it might not be the case that P has an unqualified and 
absolute right to be enabled to appeal against his detention under Article 5(4).  The OS 
responded that this was an arguable point which at some stage the court will almost certainly 
have to determine in light of the ECtHR authorities.   
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perhaps also for decisions about detention.806  Failing to consider and determine an 
appeal against detention would also appear to conflict with the Court of Protection‘s own 
case law in A Local Authority v A, where it held that: 
...the [MCA] has laid down stringent conditions for the deprivation of 
liberty, and that the court cannot simply act as a rubber stamp, however 
beneficial the arrangements may appear to be for the individual 
concerned. In the instant case, A wishes to challenge the authorisation, 
which deprives him of his liberty. Parliament has decreed that he should 
be entitled to do so, and has created safeguards to protect those deprived 
of their liberty against arbitrary action.807 
Whether the OS and the Court of Protection are entitled to allow P‘s appeal to be 
withdrawn without the court determining it will surely, eventually, fall to be decided by a 
court.   
 
As for supporting P‘s rights to challenge ‗best interests‘ decisions, the logical 
consequence of patching up the safeguards to strengthen P‘s right for his detention to be 
reviewed by a court, is that there will be more litigation in the Court of Protection.  There 
are reasons for believing this would have significant repercussions for the resources of 
the court, the OS and public authorities alike.  The system of welfare hearings in the 
Court of Protection is already under considerable strain.  The OS has repeatedly warned 
about the growing number of Court of Protection welfare cases he is taking on (Office of 
the Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee, 2012: [4.2]).808  The OS recently wrote to the 
President of the Court of Protection stating that he had reached the limit of his resources 
with regard to Court of Protection welfare cases,809 and he would only be able to accept 
invitations to act in serious medical treatment cases and s21A appeals which were not 
brought by the person‘s representative.810  Even s21A appeal might be subject to a delay 
in acceptance by the OS until a case manager became available (Official Solicitor, 
2012).  The number of applications for welfare hearings in the Court of Protection dwarfs 
the couple of hundred predicted by the impact assessment, although only a small 
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See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of this.  Shtukaturov v Russia, [72]-[73]; X and Y v 
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See Figure 14 in Appendix C for a chart detailing the growing workload of the OS. 
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The OS later clarified that ‗he did not mean by this that he had run out of money, but rather that 
his available staff, (after movement of staff to this area of work and recruitment to the full extent 
which was possible), to manage this class of case were unable to take on any more of these 
cases‘ (Official Solicitor, 2012). 
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It is unclear what happens in those cases where a claim is brought under s21A MCA by P‘s 
representative if the OS does not act for P.  It is possible that the court might substitute P as the 
claimant, and appoint R to be his litigation friend.  Or, it is possible that the proceedings continue 
with P bound as if a party but not joined as a party.  Whilst, in substance, this might not give rise 
to any material differences in the way the proceedings were conducted, it does seem peculiar that 
P‘s appeal should be considered in a case in which he is not represented in his own right. 
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proportion of these are granted permission (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2005; 
Judiciary of England and Wales, 2010; 2011).  Even so, the number of health and 
welfare matters the court decides has increased each year.811  Senior judges have made 
comments to the effect that the DoLS and the MCA are having a significant impact on 
the resource of the Family Division,812 particularly welfare cases (The Right Honourable 
Lord Justice (Sir James) Munby, 2011: 34).   
The impact on public authorities of an increasing amount of Court of Protection 
litigation could also be very significant.  I conducted a small study, published elsewhere 
(Series, 2012b), of the costs of DoLS court cases and found that the costs to a local 
authority alone could range between £4,700 - £58,600, and were typically in the region of 
£20,000.  The average value of a legal aid certificate (for either P or R) was £10,993, 
and there could potentially be two in a single case.  Some cases include health 
authorities and managing authorities in addition to local authorities, where 
commissioning arrangements were more complex.  If as many people were able to 
appeal under the DoLS as are currently able to under the MHA, the costs could be 
astronomical. 
In short, the system for hearing welfare disputes in the Court of Protection, which 
was only ever set up to hear a couple of hundred cases per year, has begun to creak 
under the strain of even this pitiful trickle of DoLS appeals.  It is clear to everyone close 
to the system that this is not sustainable.  In the foreword to the latest edition of his 
widely read and well respected Mental Capacity Act Manual Richard Jones (2012) 
bemoans judges who have not heeded Hedley J‘s exhortation that: 
...it is absolutely essential that the [court] establishes a practice that... 
interim cases [concerning the appropriate placement of P] must be dealt 
with quickly, and, having regard to the demands on the system generally, 
proportionately, that is to say almost certainly without detailed oral 
evidence.813 
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resources of the Family Division to deal with these difficult and urgent cases‘ [4].  This concern 
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Jones cites DJ Eldergill‘s approach in A Local Authority v JH814, a judgment which this 
author at least considered as an excellent example of a careful and considerate 
approach, as an example of judicial failure to ‗focus their attention on the essential 
issues that arise in applications; the temptation to convert legal proceedings into a Rolls 
Royce case conference service for the very few should be resisted.‘  This criticism of the 
Court of Protection as a ‗Rolls Royce case conference service for the few‘ resonates with 
much chatter in legal circles.  However there is undoubtedly a difficult balance to be 
struck between the accessibility and efficiency of the court, and its ability to deliver a 
careful review of complex questions of capacity and best interests, not to mention the 
manifold technical questions arising out of the Schedules and the meaning of deprivation 
of liberty.  These issues would certainly be exacerbated if there was a greater emphasis 
on P participating in the process himself, as I have argued in Chapter 5 should be the 
case.  Although it is desirable that the court hears more cases, the danger of hearing 
more cases in a system not equipped to deal with it is either extensive delays in 
obtaining justice, or a court which becomes a rubber stamp.  It is easy to suggest this in 
a doctoral thesis, much harder to implement in reality, but it is clear that the problem is 
that the system itself needs revisiting in its entirety.   
There may be many cases where a BIA and others are able to resolve disputes 
and problems with a detention without resort to a court.  However, for the safeguards to 
function effectively it is imperative that there is a credible threat of litigation should 
assessors‘ judgments err, or conditions not be complied with.  The court is the keystone 
which gives the other safeguards their strength and structure.  One troubling 
consequence of this increasing volume of welfare litigation is the temptation for those 
working within this struggling system to address the problem by limiting the scope of the 
DoLS themselves, and of detainees‘ rights of appeal.  It is hard to avoid the suspicion 
that the domestic courts have sought to close down the volume of DoLS-related litigation 
by significantly narrowing the definition of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ which engages the 
safeguard.  Yet by circumscribing the scope of the DoLS, of court reviews under the 
DoLS, and the likelihood of compensation for unlawful detention, the court system risks - 
perhaps unwittingly – significantly diminishing the power of the other safeguards 
contained within the schedules. 
6.4 THE MEANING OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY  
A shortcoming of the DoLS, which is becoming increasingly apparent, is that 
Schedule A1 does not apply to all people who might be deprived of their liberty on the 
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basis that they lack mental capacity, and does not apply in all the settings where they 
might be detained to.  Whereas the MCA applies to anybody over the age of 16, 
Schedule A1 applies only to over 18‘s.  Schedule A1 applies only in hospitals and care 
homes, not to other kinds of formal care service.815  A large number of people with 
developmental disabilities live in supported living services to which the Schedule does 
not apply as they are not registered care homes.  As described in Chapters 2 and 3, 
some supported living services may display highly ‗institutional‘ practices, and exercise 
very high levels of surveillance and control over residents.  
Almost a year before Schedule A1 came into force, Munby LJ held in Salford City 
Council v GJ & Ors 816  that a man – BJ – was deprived of his liberty in his 
accommodation in a supported living service.  Finding that the deprivation of liberty could 
not be authorised under Schedule A1, Munby LJ authorised the detention under the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court and set out a requirement for (at least) annual court 
reviews in order to comply with Article 5(4).817   Laudable though it was to use the 
common law to provide safeguards for those whom the DoLS did not protect, this 
decision has presented serious practical problems for the Court of Protection and the 
Family Division.  If large numbers of minors or people accommodated in supported living 
are, indeed, deprived of their liberty, the courts may very swiftly become swamped by a 
high volume of authorisations and reviews.   
Whilst, of course, it would be illegitimate for the court to allow this to influence 
their interpretation of the scope of Article 5, it is hard to escape the impression that this 
has been in the minds of judges in critical cases which have shaped the meaning of 
‗deprivation of liberty‘ as it applies in social care settings.  There have been three key 
Court of Appeal rulings on the meaning of deprivation of liberty in the context of 
incapacity: P & Q, Re RK, and Cheshire West and Chester Council v P.  Each of these 
three cases fell outside the scope of Schedule A1, and – as will be discussed shortly – 
each of them significantly narrowed the definition of ‗deprivation of liberty‘ as it applies in 
social care.  In each case the High Court or the Court of Appeal appear to have heard 
pleas from local authorities that if such situations did amount to deprivation of liberty, 
they – and the courts - would quickly find themselves swamped with the need for court 
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The definition of a ‗care home‘ used in Schedule A1 was supplied by the Care Standard Act 
2000, which has now been repealed.  The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Consequential 
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applications.  Their pleas evoke those of the interveners in the House of Lords in 
Bournewood: 
If the Official Solicitor and the Applicant are right, suggest BCC, the 
implications will be formidable as a large number of cases will require 
applications to the Court of Protection by local authorities and further 
regular consideration in time consuming reviews by both local authorities 
and the Court of Protection... [T]he Official Solicitor may consider claiming 
damages on behalf of children who have wrongly been deprived of their 
liberty. There are therefore out there numerous potential damages claims 
against a large number of local authorities... BCC therefore argue that this 
case has considerable implications for local authorities and may have a 
direct impact on the use of their limited resources available for meeting 
their responsibilities in respect of vulnerable children. 
Mostyn J, in Re RK818 
I entirely ignore the fact that, were this appeal to be allowed, the vast, if 
unquantifiable, number of necessary reviews of such a character would 
surely be beyond the present capacity of the Official Solicitor‘s 
department and in particular of the Court of Protection. To have an eye to 
that factor would be to raise to it the wrong end of the telescope. The 
importance of the right to liberty is paramount (McKay v. UK (2006) 44 
EHRR 827, at [30]) and the state‘s positive obligation to provide the 
facilities necessary for its effective exercise is absolute. 
Wilson LJ, in P & Q819 
...the importance of the appeal was not really at all about how P will be 
dealt with. The point of major importance for the local authority, and 
indeed local authorities generally, was how often they have to come back 
to court in this and other like cases. 
Munby LJ, in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P820 
These passages suggest that, despite resource implications being an ‗irrelevant‘ factor in 
the analysis of deprivation of liberty, counsel and courts have devoted considerable 
energies to reflecting upon them. 
 
Before proceeding to examine the myriad ways in which the courts have 
attempted to draw a line between those situations which constitute a deprivation of 
liberty and those which do not, it is worth pausing to reflect on why the DoLS contain 
these lacunae in respect of supported living.  Guardianship, by way of contrast, applies 
to any setting where a guardian decides a person should live.  Twice during the DoLS 
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consultations, the CSCI ‗made the point ...that deprivation of liberty can occur in social 
care settings other than care homes, yet people subject to this in other settings would 
not benefit from the safeguards‘ (FOIA #22).  The British Psychological Society raised 
similar concerns that community care had expanded beyond care homes in recent 
decades, and people in other settings should also have access to safeguards (FOIA 
#21).  Age Concern questioned why the safeguards would not apply in Extra Care 
Housing for older adults (FOIA #21; #22).  Despite these loudly, and repeatedly, voiced 
concerns, uncovered through requests made under the FOIA, they are not mentioned 
once in the government‘s consultation response documents (Department of Health, 
2006d; Ministry of Justice and Department of Health, 2008b). 
To find out why supported living was not covered by the Schedules, I requested 
from the Department of Health: any research they had relied upon or commissioned 
when deciding not to extend the DoLS framework to supported living; copies of any 
documents setting out their reasoning that deprivation of liberty was unlikely to occur in 
supported living settings and any estimates of the number of people who might be 
deprived of their liberty in supported living which they obtained or commissioned.  The 
Department initially responded simply that 'The Government did not include supported 
living because it considered it less likely that severe restrictions would be placed on 
people in supported living arrangements, who would tend to lead more independent 
lives'.  When pressed to confirm whether such research, documents or statistics were 
held, the Department of Health responded it neither held, nor knew of, any research on 
this question, it held no documents which recorded their reasoning that deprivation of 
liberty was unlikely to occur in supported living and it held no statistical estimates of the 
number of people who might be deprived of their liberty in supported living.  Neither, by 
2011, was the Department of Health keeping track of the number of cases of deprivation 
of liberty in supported living being authorised by the Court of Protection, nor had it 
considered a revision of the safeguards to extend them to those settings (FOIA #24).   
It is extraordinary that the Department of Health and the Ministry of Justice could 
have failed to even investigate the warnings of such authoritative bodies as the CSCI, 
the British Psychological Society and Age Concern.  This cannot even be pinned to the 
hurried drafting of the schedules, as these concerns were raised before June 2005821 
and the Bill was not introduced into Parliament until November 2006.  The belief that 
deprivation of liberty simply did not occur in such settings was contradicted by the 
discovery of the inspectorates that very summer of the abuse of over a hundred adults in 
supported living services in Cornwall – residents whom the MHAC (2008b: [3.33]) 
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described as de facto detained.  The Department of Health‘s belief that all people in 
supported living services ‗would tend to lead more independent lives', and so not require 
the benefit of statutory Article 5 safeguards, has had disastrous consequences for the 
DoLS. 
6.4.1 KEY ELEMENTS OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY  
In Storck v Germany 822  the ECtHR distinguished three key elements that 
engaged Article 5:  
1. The objective element of confinement in a restricted space for a non-
negligible period of time;  
2. The subjective element of the absence of valid (encompassing capable) 
consent to that confinement; and  
3. Imputability to the state whether by way of its active involvement in the 
detention, or through breach of its positive obligations to provide safeguards 
for detainees.   
In all the cases under discussion here it is common ground that capable consent is 
absent, and that the state‘s responsibilities are engaged: thus the debate centres on the 
interpretation of the objective element of Article 5.  In Engel v The Netherlands823 the 
court said ‗the starting point must be his concrete situation [and]… account should be 
taken of a whole range of factors such as the nature, duration, effects and manner of 
execution of the penalty or measure in question.‘824  In Guzzardi v Italy825 the ECtHR 
noted that the Convention distinguished between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 
and mere restrictions on liberty under Article 2 of Protocol No.826  It then added: 
The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is 
nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or 
substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of 
these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some 
borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion827 
The Guzzardi formulation presents little difficulty for ‗paradigm‘ cases which have 
long been accepted to represent detention, such as the situation of a prisoner. 828  
However, for reasons worthy of an entire discourse analysis in its own right, the status of 
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those confined to particular social care institutions has remained in the category of 
‗borderline‘ cases, matters of ‗pure opinion‘.  Guzzardi‟s emphasis on the concrete 
situation too easily leads, as Munby LJ put it in Cheshire ‗to the worrying and ultimately 
stultifying conclusion that the decision in every case can safely be arrived at only after a 
minute examination of all the facts in enormous detail.‘829  Meanwhile the necessity of 
drawing line across the gradations between restrictions of liberty and deprivation of 
liberty calls to mind the Sorites paradox, 830  well known to philosophers.  Doctrinal 
lawyers, as Clements (2011: 682) has noted, ‗crave the ―discrete incident‖‘, and so it is 
that Munby LJ and others have sought to identify that elusive element ‗which enables us 
to pursue a more focussed and less time-consuming enquiry‘ and evade the Sorites 
paradox.831  Unhappily, each judge appears to have happened upon a unique element of 
their own, which often appear to contradict the ratio of other cases or be difficult to apply 
in cases with different facts.  In what follows I review the trajectory of some such 
elements from Bournewood through the domestic case law, and consider how the recent 
trinity of ECtHR rulings on deprivation of liberty in social care might impinge upon 
domestic interpretations. 
CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION AND CONTROL AND FREEDOM TO LEAVE 
The ratio for the ECtHR finding that HL was deprived of his liberty in Bournewood 
Hospital was initially understood by many to be that ‗the concrete situation was that the 
applicant was under continuous supervision and control and was not free to leave.‘832  
However, even at the time HL‘s own legal team noted that ‗The paradox is that if this is 
what the ECtHR meant by deprivation of liberty then, because of the nature of his 
condition, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which HL is free‘ (Robinson and 
Scott-Moncrieff, 2005: 22).  A similar point was made by Jackson J in Neary, 
commenting that Steven Neary ‗is to some degree or other necessarily subject‘ to 
deprivation of liberty ‗wherever he lives‘.833  A construction of deprivation of liberty as not 
being free to leave a place because one is subject to the control of others could 
potentially apply to very large numbers of people indeed who are said to lack the mental 
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capacity to decide where they live.  Freedom of egress for such people would, in most 
cases, be subject to the permission of some substitute decision maker.  For those who 
would seek to limit the scope of the DoLS, this is a very unattractive outcome indeed, 
especially since - as Robinson and Scott-Moncrieff noted – a strict reading of it could 
potentially even include people being cared for by their family. 
In the early case of JE v DE & Ors Munby J himself seemed to take such an 
expansive reading of ‗freedom to leave‘ when he found that Mr DE was deprived of his 
liberty by not being permitted to leave the care home where he was accommodated to 
return home to live with his wife.  The local authority protested that Mr DE was not 
subject to the same level of controls as Mr HL, that he enjoyed considerable freedoms 
within the care home and was given support to go on visits to other place.  However, 
Munby LJ retorted that for the purposes of Article 5 freedom to leave did not mean ‗for 
the purpose of some trip or outing approved by [the Council] or by those managing the 
institution; I mean leaving in the sense of removing himself permanently in order to live 
where and with whom he chooses.‘834  Robinson (2007) noted that Munby J‘s definition 
in JE v DE would encompass far greater numbers of people than those anticipated by 
the DoLS impact assessment, and other eminent lawyers lamented that it seemed to go 
beyond Strasbourg‘s ruling in HL v UK (Morris, F., and Ruck Keene, 2007).835 
This expansive reading of deprivation of liberty did not withstand the test of time.  
In the first instance hearing of P & Q, a case then known as Surrey County Council v 
MEG & MIG v Anor, it was suggested by the OS that two young women with learning 
disabilities aged 17 and 18 might be deprived of their liberty by placements in a foster 
care home (for MIG, or P) and a small group home (for MEG, or Q).  Parker J noted that 
‗If either wished to leave in the immediate sense each would be restrained or brought 
back for their safety‘836 yet found that neither were deprived of their liberty.  Equating 
deprivation of liberty with lacking the freedom to leave the place where one is living, in 
Parker J‘s view, ‗casts the net too wide‘.837  Freedom to leave had to be assessed 
against the background that neither wanted to leave, nor was there any alternative 
home.838  By the time MIG and MEG arrived in the Court of Appeal as P & Q other issues 
more closely connected with purpose, normality and objections were the focus of the 
appellate courts‘ attentions and ‗freedom to leave‘ was not even discussed as a relevant 
factor.  A recent High Court ruling gave a striking example of the burial of ‗freedom to 
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leave‘ for Article 5 purposes.  In C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council Jackson J 
found that a man who was subject to 1:1 supervision within and outside his care home, 
who lived there on the basis of a decision of his guardian, who objected strongly to living 
there and had kicked down a door trying to escape it, was not deprived of his liberty 
because he had nowhere else to go. 
The second element of the ratio in HL v UK – being subject to ‗continuous 
supervision and control‘ – was also dismissed by Parker J in MIG & MEG, saying that: 
Each lacks freedom and autonomy dictated by their own disability, rather 
than because it is imposed on them by their carers. Each is under the 
continuous supervision and control of her carers ...so as to meet her care 
needs rather than to restrain her in any way.839 
This contained the seed of two related tactics to mitigate what would otherwise be a 
deprivation of liberty: reliance on the purpose of restrictions and locating the loss of 
liberty in the individual‘s impairment, rather than a social response to it.  Although, in 
general, being subject to continuous supervision and control no longer equates to being 
deprived of one's liberty in the domestic case law, this element of control seems to have 
continued to be influential in cases concerning the prevention of sex.  In D Borough 
Council v AB and A Local Authority v H both AB and H were said to be deprived of their 
liberty because they were subject to restrictive care regimes for the purpose of 
preventing them from having sex.  Neither judgment considers why these regimes 
constituted deprivation of liberty as this was not a contested point, so it is uncertain how 
exactly they fit into the Article 5 landscape after P & Q. 
Parker J‘s decision in MIG & MEG appeared to be the last sighting of ‗freedom to 
leave‘ for domestic purposes; it very rarely appeared in the published cases which 
followed.840  Meanwhile, the three recent rulings on deprivation of liberty in care facilities 
from Strasbourg all appear to have applied criteria remarkably similar to the early 
supposed ratio in HL v UK.  In Stanev, DD and Kędzior the ratio for finding the claimants 
were deprived of their liberty was almost identical to that given in HL v UK – that they 
were under continuous supervision and control, and were not free to leave.841  In each 
case the defendant governments argued that the claimants were free to leave the 
institutions to make visits or trips, but the ECtHR emphasised that this was always 
subject to the permission of management. 842   The ratio in these ECtHR authorities 
                                               
839 
[233] 
840 
C v A Local Authority, where C was not only confined to the school but also – frequently – to a 
seclusion room, is a rare example of a lack of ‗freedom to leave‘ contributing towards a finding of 
deprivation of liberty [48].
 
841 
Stanev [128]; DD [146]; Kędzior [57] 
842 
Stanev [124], [128]; DD [146]; Kędzior [57] 
280 
 
echoes a definition of deprivation of liberty found in the UN Optional Protocol on the 
Convention against Torture (‗OPCAT‘, United Nations, 2006b), which defines deprivation 
of liberty as ‗the placement of a person in a public or private custodial setting which that 
person is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial, administrative or other 
authority.'843  The Human Rights Implementation Centre (HRIC, 2011) has commented 
that in some states there have been disagreements as to whether care homes could fall 
under the umbrella of OPCAT.844  However, the HRIC observes that Article 4 ‗covers 
both ‗traditional places of detention‘ such as prisons and police cells as well as less 
traditional ones such as, but not limited to, social care homes, psychiatric hospitals and 
centres for children‘ (HRIC, 2011: 3).  Although domestic case law resists that 
identification, internationally there appears to be growing recognition that social care 
homes may be places of detention where a person‘s egress is subject to the control of 
the authorities. 
OBJECTIONS, ESCAPE ATTEMPTS AND HAVING SOMEWHERE ELSE TO GO. 
In Storck the ECtHR distinguished between the ‗objective‘ and ‗subjective‘ 
elements of deprivation of liberty, with objections and the absence of capable consent 
falling into the latter category.  In HL v UK, HL was found to be deprived of his liberty 
despite not resisting or objecting to his admission to hospital, and not attempting to 
escape.  Nevertheless, in domestic case law the ‗subjective‘ element has increasingly 
bled into the ‗objective‘ element and increasing weight has been placed on a person‘s 
objections to their confinement. 
In MIG & MEG, Parker J stated that ‗Notwithstanding that MIG and MEG cannot 
consent to their placements, the fact of happiness in their respective environments, each 
regarding the place where they live as home, and their wish to stay there, must be 
relevant to the question of both the objective and the subjective element.‘845  In the Court 
of Appeal, Wilson LJ rejected Parker J‘s analysis that happiness was relevant to the 
‗objective element‘ of deprivation of liberty,846 but found that the ‗overlapping feature‘ of 
whether or not a person objects to the confinement which is imposed on her ‗is relevant 
to the enquiry.‘847  However, objections per se do not appear to be the defining feature of 
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Wilson LJ‘s analysis, rather objections are relevant because overruled objections 
inherently give rise to a ‗level of conflict‘.  Meanwhile, according to Wilson LJ, ‗the 
absence of objections generates an absence of conflict and thus a peaceful life, which 
seems to me to be capable of substantial relevance in the opposite direction.‘848  Wilson 
LJ also held that ‗in that objections may be highly relevant, medication which has the 
effect of suppressing them may be relevant to an equally high degree. But again, 
conversely, the absence of medication is a pointer in the other direction.‘849  Curiously, 
Wilson LJ did not discuss whether Q‘s (MEG) being administered the potent and 
sedating anti-psychotic risperidone might be suppressing any potential objections of 
hers. 
Objections were not specifically discussed by Munby LJ in Cheshire, although he 
did indicate that ‗where a person has somewhere else to go and wants to live there but is 
prevented from doing so by a coercive exercise of public authority‘ he is more likely to be 
deprived of his liberty.850  It must be that wanting to live elsewhere is a key factor, as in 
several other cases where people have had somewhere else to go but expressed no 
desire to live there they have not been found to be deprived of their liberty. 851  
Conversely, wishing to be ‗elsewhere‘ but having nowhere else to go seems not to 
amount to a deprivation of liberty in the domestic cases.  In C v Blackburn and Darwen 
Borough Council, C‘s clear objections and physical escape attempts were not taken to 
be indicators that he was deprived of his liberty because ‗He would like to be able  to  
live  an  unconfined  life  in  the  community,  but  this  is  not realistically possible due to 
the extent of his difficulties‘.852  Jackson J distinguished C‘s ‗situation from those where a 
person has been removed from a home that is still realistically available.‘853  Oddly, 
Jackson J never discussed the significance given to objections and conflict by Wilson LJ 
in P & Q, but instead relied entirely upon Munby LJ‘s emphasis in Cheshire of those 
cases where a person not only wants to go and live elsewhere but has somewhere else 
to go. 
Two other cases appeared to go even further than C v Blackburn and Darwen 
and are difficult to reconcile to either Cheshire or P & Q.  In the background to the case 
Re RK was a dispute between RK‘s parents and the local authority ‗as to whether it 
should fund care package that the parents believe is necessary in order to bring RK 
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home‘.854  RK herself was said to be ‗very upset in her current placement and is not 
eating‘. 855   One might have thought this satisfied both the objections element of 
deprivation of liberty, and the existence of an alternative placement, yet the court did not 
discuss either element of this analysis of deprivation of liberty.  It might be argued that 
the existence of an alternative home was not ‗realistically available‘ because of the 
refusal of the local authority to provide an adequate package of care. Yet this places a 
remarkable amount of power in the hands of public authorities to determine the scope of 
Article 5 through the application of their public law discretionary powers.   
In CC v KK, KK expressed ‗a strong wish to return home‘856, had brought a s21A 
MCA appeal on that basis, and had an alternative home – a bungalow – to go to.  This 
would appear to be precisely the circumstances Munby LJ in Cheshire considered would 
still amount to a deprivation of liberty, where ‗a person has been removed from a home 
that is still realistically available.‘ 857   Nevertheless, Baker J found that KK was not 
deprived of her liberty because ‗there is now little evidence that her overruled objections 
lead to a significant degree of conflict‘858, ‗the arrangements for her care could not, in my 
view, be described as one of "continuous control"‘859, and because ‗Considerable time 
and effort is devoted to enabling KK to experience a greater degree of freedom‘ through 
visits to her home.860  There is very little consistency of approach in these cases as to 
which elements should be determinative and in what combinations and permutations.  
In the three most recent Strasbourg cases of Stanev, DD and Kędzior, the 
claimants were all clearly objecting to their confinement in social care facilities.  There 
are no indications from the judgments that this gave rise to a more significant degree of 
conflict than that described in CC v KK.  In the cases of Stanev and DD there was no 
suggestion that either claimant had somewhere else which they could go to if they left 
the facility.  In Stanev and Kędzior the absence of alternatives to confinement in social 
care institutions was a specific matter of concern raised by the interveners (Cojocariu 
and Duffy, 2010; Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2009).  In HL v UK, of course, HL 
himself was not objecting – and there is no obvious reason why the absence of 
objections should carry any less weight in a care facility than a hospital.   
These ECtHR cases suggest that the domestic courts have taken a wrong turn in 
trying to interpret deprivation of liberty.  It is very difficult to see how a person in HL‘s 
situation, had he not had carers demanding his release, would have brought his 
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predicament to the attention of anybody in authority.  Neither do cases like C v A Local 
Authority, where very serious shortcoming in the care of a young man with autism were 
exposed in connection with deprivation of liberty proceedings in the Court of Protection, 
fit easily into the schema adopted by the domestic courts.  C‘s family were not offering 
him an alternative placement, and distressed though he was he was not said to be 
‗objecting‘ to his placement any more than HL was.  The consequences of excluding 
situations where a person has nowhere else to go, or is not vociferously objecting, are 
likely to be serious for a population who are often reliant upon the state to provide 
alternative placements, who may have significant communication impairments, be 
heavily institutionalised or merely be cowed by those in authority.   
RESTRICTIONS AND PURPOSE 
In Guzzzardi the court held that ‗The difference between deprivation of and 
restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of 
nature or substance.‘861  Nevertheless, the domestic courts have attempted to distinguish 
deprivation of liberty from mere restrictions on liberty on substantive grounds connected 
with the purpose of those restrictions.    Although there have been some cases where 
people who are subject to high levels of restrictions on their liberty have been found to 
be deprived of their liberty,862 the general direction of travel in domestic case law has 
been to divorce the concept of ‗detention‘ from even very intensive restrictions. 
In MIG & MEG both MIG and MEG were subject to continuous supervision and 
control and MEG (Q) in particular was subject to physical restraint and the administration 
of medications to control her mood.  Parker J‘s analysis of the relevance of these 
restrictions to the question of whether or not MIG or MEG were deprived of their liberty 
owed a great deal to the House of Lords‘ ruling in Austin & Anor v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis.863  In Austin the Lords found that protesters who were ‗kettled‘ 
by a police cordon during protests were not deprived of their liberty.  Lord Hope held that 
‗there is room, even in the case of fundamental rights as to whose application no 
restriction or limitation is permitted by the Convention, for a pragmatic approach to be 
taken which takes full account of all the circumstances‘ including the purpose of such 
restrictions. 864   Parker J claimed to ‗treat with extreme caution the suggestion that 
purpose is relevant‘ to whether or not a person is objectively deprived of their liberty, and 
she agreed that it was ‗impermissible‘ to consider whether confinement ‗is with good or 
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benign intentions or in their best interests‘.865 However, she did find that it is relevant to 
‗consider the reasons why they are under continuous supervision and control.‘866  In this 
case, control was exercised over the two girls ‗so as to meet her care needs rather than 
to restrain her in any way‘.867  The purpose of restraint was for ‗ensuring safety‘ and for 
MEG ‗for her immediate protection and that of others when she has an outburst‘.868  
MEG‘s tranquilising medication was ‗not administered to MEG so as to restrain her from 
leaving or to restrain her activities generally‘869 but ‗for the purpose of controlling her 
anxiety‘.870  Consequently, she held, the restrictions they were subject to did not amount 
to deprivation of liberty.  It is difficult to understand quite how Parker J‘s reasoning that 
these restrictions did not amount to a deprivation of liberty did not turn on the prohibited 
basis of their good or benign purpose.   
The appellate courts have taken a rather ambiguous approach to Parker J‘s use 
of purpose as derived from Austin.  In P & Q Wilson LJ said ‗To the extent that... the 
judge was there attaching significance to the fact that the purpose of the arrangements 
for the girls was to further their best interests, I believe that she was wrong to do so‘871 
and went on to set out an alternate principle of normality, discussed below.  Earlier 
rulings by Munby LJ also appeared to strongly reject this approach, saying in JE v DE: 
The argument, if taken to its logical conclusion, would seem to lead to the 
absurd conclusion that a lunatic locked up indefinitely for his own good is 
not being deprived of his liberty. And if beneficent purpose cannot deprive 
what is manifestly a deprivation of liberty of its character as such, why 
should a beneficent purpose be of assistance in determining whether 
some more marginal state of affairs does or does not amount to a 
deprivation of liberty?872 
However, Munby LJ appeared to resurrect this use of purpose in Cheshire873 where he 
stated: 
...it is legitimate, in my judgment, in determining whether or not there is a 
deprivation of liberty, to have regard both to the objective ‗reason why 
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someone is placed and treated as they are and also to the objective 
‗purpose‘ (or ‗aim‘) of the placement.874 
An improper motive or intention, he said, ‗may have the effect that what would otherwise 
not be is in fact, and for that very reason, a deprivation of liberty‘, however a good 
intention or motive ‗cannot render innocuous what would otherwise be a deprivation of 
liberty‘.875 
The reasoning in Austin, and its corollaries in MIG & MEG and Cheshire, has 
been subject to extensive criticism by legal scholars and practitioners.  Feldman (2009: 
244) agrees that a custodian‘s intentions might mean that a situation becomes a 
deprivation of liberty, where his intention is to prevent a person from leaving,876 but 
argues that his purpose ‗is relevant only to whether a deprivation of liberty can be 
justified‘ not whether it is occurring at all.  There is no dispute, in these cases, that the 
custodians intend to prevent their charges from leaving.  Mead (2009: 392) cautioned 
that Austin would make Article 5 ‗increasingly redundant‘ for the purpose of requiring 
states to justify detention, by ‗defining out‘ arrests and detentions by reference to states 
of mind.  Mead is also highly critical of the idea that detention is not a deprivation of 
liberty if its purpose is to benefit the detainee, saying this ‗smacks of benevolent 
authoritarianism which most would consider to be inimical to a system of human rights 
premised on individuality, on autonomy and on dignity‘ (p390).   
On Munby LJ‘s use of Austin in Cheshire, Hewitt (2012) complains that the ‗idea 
surely takes us back once again ...to the days before the Bournewood case‘ and that the 
‗possibility that good intentions will prevent there being deprivation of liberty flatly 
contradicts the decision in that case.‘  Given that deprivation of liberty can only be 
authorised under the MCA if it is necessary and in a person‘s best interests, it is difficult 
to reconcile the ruling in Cheshire to the very purpose of the safeguards.  Hewitt 
comments that ‗the DoLS are relevant where an incapable person is deprived of liberty in 
his own best interests; yet, if strict observation of best interests will prevent there being 
deprivation of liberty, there will be no patient to whom the DoLS apply.‘  Troke (2012: 59) 
makes the point that it becomes: 
...difficult to imagine a situation that would be a deprivation that could still 
be lawful (whether by DOLS authorisation or by Court of Protection order) 
as being in P‘s best interests, necessary and proportionate, and the least 
restrictive option. It would seem that Cheshire suggests all the conditions 
that are required to make any deprivation lawful will, in effect, mean in 
most cases that there is no deprivation at all. 
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Since the rulings in MIG & MEG and Cheshire, Austin has been heard by the ECtHR.877  
The Strasbourg court resoundingly rejected the analysis of the House of Lords, stating 
that ‗...the purpose behind the measure in question is not mentioned in the above 
judgments as a factor to be taken into account when deciding whether there has been a 
deprivation of liberty.‘ 878   However the court did find that Article 5(4) should be 
‗interpreted in a manner which takes into account the specific context in which the 
techniques are deployed‘. 879  It agreed that in a context where ‗the police had no 
alternative but to impose an absolute cordon if they were to avert a real risk of serious 
injury or damage‘880 that it did not constitute a deprivation of liberty.    
On the face of things, the ECtHR appears to have employed the same sleight of 
hand as the domestic courts, on the one hand denying that the purpose of restrictions is 
relevant to whether or not a deprivation of liberty has occurred, and then appearing to 
bring purpose back in through a broadly synonymous concept.  However, the authors of 
the 39 Essex St Court of Protection Newsletter argue that the reasoning in Austin v UK 
can be distinguished from the use of purpose in Cheshire and elsewhere because: 
There is no concern that by finding that P was deprived of his liberty in the 
Cheshire case, it would be impracticable for local authorities to fulfil their 
duties in providing community care, because, unlike in Austin, where the 
acts of the police did not fall within one of the exhaustive categories in 
Article 5 and therefore could not be justified if Article 5 was engaged, the 
deprivation of P‘s liberty could be warranted as being proportionate and in 
P‘s best interests.881 
Speaking extra-curially, Munby LJ has suggested that following the ECtHR‘s ruling in 
Austin v UK, the ‗questions of reason, purpose, aim, motive and intention are wholly 
irrelevant to the question of whether there is a deprivation of liberty‘ and that Cheshire 
may need to be reconsidered in light of this (Lord Justice Munby, 2012a: 35).  However, 
an even more recent ECtHR ruling in Munjaz v United Kingdom882 found that secluding a 
detained mental health patient did not constitute any additional deprivation of his residual 
liberty by reference to the make reference to the aims of the seclusion, and the fact that 
it was not imposed as a punishment.883 
Consequently, the relevance of the purpose, aims, motive or reasons for 
restrictions on liberty to the question of whether or not a person is deprived of their 
liberty, and hence eligible for safeguards, is highly uncertain.  The difficulty with tying the 
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definition of deprivation of liberty to the justification for restrictions is that it seems to 
short-circuit the use of deprivation of liberty safeguards to ensure that restrictions are, 
indeed, so justified.  As Troke and Hewitt observe, for so long as beneficent purpose 
means that restrictions on liberty do not qualify for safeguards under the DoLS, it is 
extremely difficult to see how a person‘s care could both constitute a deprivation of 
liberty and be lawful under the MCA and the DoLS.  It should be recalled that the facts of 
Stanev, DD and Kędzior are much closer to the facts of deprivation of liberty in social 
care settings than Munjaz and noted that they make little or no884  reference to the 
purpose of restrictions in finding deprivation of liberty to be occurring.   
NORMALITY AND COMPARATORS 
The ‗normality‘ of a person‘s living arrangements has also been used by the 
courts to distinguish circumstances which amount to a deprivation of liberty from those 
which do not.  Normality made an early appearance in LLBC v TG, where living in ‗an 
ordinary care home where only ordinary restrictions of liberty applied‘ carried weight for 
MacFarlane J in finding that TG was not deprived of his liberty.885  Subsequently, the 
‗normality‘ of a person‘s living arrangements was adopted by the Court of Appeal in P & 
Q as one of two key considerations (the other being objections) in determining whether 
or not a person was deprived of their liberty.  Wilson LJ stated: 
If the person is living with her parents or other members of his natural 
family in their home, she is living – in that respect – the most normal life 
possible. Typically – but sadly not always – there will be no deprivation of 
liberty in such circumstances:... Not much less normal for this purpose is 
the life of a child in the home of foster parents or of an adult... But, even 
when the person lives in an institution rather than in a family home, there 
is a wide spectrum between the small children's home or nursing home, 
on the one hand, and a hospital designed for compulsory detentions like 
Bournewood; and it is in my view necessary to place each case along 
it.886 
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Wilson LJ went on to say that the ‗enquiry into normality transcends an enquiry into the 
residential arrangements‘ and should also have regard to whether or not a person 
attends school, college a day centre or other occupation.887  This reasoning appeared to 
influence Baker J in finding that KK was not deprived of her liberty in CC v KK, as she 
was able to make regular visits home and the care home was ‗an ordinary care home 
where only ordinary restrictions of liberty apply‘.888 
It might be countered that for the man on the Clapham Omnibus, living under the 
restrictions that MIG and MEG, KK and others were subject to in their care homes would 
not be altogether ‗normal‘.  However, in Cheshire Munby LJ further refined the normality 
principle by introducing the concept of ‗relative normality‘ and the ‗comparator approach‘.  
In the first instance hearing of Cheshire889, Baker J had found that P was deprived of his 
liberty even thought the local authority had taken great care to ensure P‘s life was as 
normal as possible.  He did not live in accommodation designed for compulsory 
detention,890 he had regular contact with his family, attended a day centre five days a 
week and had a good social life with staff and other residents.891  However, for Baker J 
this did not mitigate the fact that ‗his life is completely under the control of members of 
staff at Z House‘, and a range of measures including physical restraint had to be adopted 
by staff to stop him from attempting to ingest his soiled incontinence pads, which 
presented a serious risk of choking.892  According to Munby LJ in the Court of Appeal, 
Baker J had erred in his analysis because he had not compared ‗P's situation in the Z 
House with the kind of life P would have been leading as someone with his disabilities 
and difficulties in what for such a person would be a normal family setting‘.893  He had 
not, according to Munby LJ, ‗grappled with the question whether the limitations and 
restrictions on P's life at Z House are anything more than the inevitable corollary of his 
various disabilities.‘894   
Relying on a manoeuvre used by the ECtHR in Engel v The Netherlands, Munby 
LJ argued that the analysis of whether or not a person was deprived of their liberty 
depended upon the life they would have been living otherwise.895  In order to assess 
‗relative normality‘ of restrictions, it was necessary to find the appropriate ‗comparator‘: 
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...when evaluating and assessing the 'relative normality' (or otherwise) of 
X's concrete situation in a case such as this, the contrast is not with the 
previous life led by X (nor with some future life that X might lead), nor with 
the life of the able-bodied man or woman on the Clapham omnibus, but 
with the kind of lives that people like X would normally expect to lead. The 
comparator, in other words, is an adult of similar age with the same 
capabilities as X, affected by the same condition or suffering the same 
inherent mental and physical disabilities and limitations (call them what 
you will) as X.  Likewise, in the case of a child the comparator is a child of 
the same age and development as X.896 
The ‗comparator‘ approach embodied by Cheshire has been subject to a range of 
criticisms, and will eventually fall to be considered by the Supreme Court. 
In Hewitt‘s (2012) critique of Cheshire and P & Q he cites a passage from the 
autobiography of Jaycee Dugard, describing watching fireworks on the roof of a barn 
with a man who is, it transpires, her kidnapper.897  Hewitt states that normality is a 
‗decidedly dubious notion‘ and cautions that ‗life can look very different from the outside.‘  
It should hardly need saying that approaches to the care of people with disabilities can 
appear ‗normal‘ in a given place and time, yet appear abhorrent with hindsight.898  In a 
national conference the OS, Alastair Pitblado, was reported to say that ‗people in care 
homes, if they are nice care homes and there are red roses around the front door and 
not many residents or rooms‘ had very limited protection as they were no longer 
considered to be deprived of their liberty (Samuel, 2012b).   
This use of ‗normality‘, particularly as it appears in P & Q, seems to rest upon a 
judicial fantasy of institutional care services being, in the main, delightful places to live 
where residents need only minimal protection to ensure their rights are protected.  It is 
extremely difficult to reconcile this fantasy with the reality repeatedly uncovered by 
national audits of care services which found them to be places prone to excessive and 
inappropriate restrictive care, where there was reason to believe that people‘s rights 
were routinely being violated (Banerjee, 2009; Care Quality Commission, 2009a; 2012b; 
f; g; Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2007; Healthcare Commission, 2007b; 
Royal College of Physicians and British Society of Gastroenterology, 2010). 
The comparator approach also seems to be discriminatory in a number of 
respects.  Baker J comments that a difficulty with Cheshire may be that ‗it may permit 
                                               
896 
Cheshire, [97] 
897 
Jaycee Dugard was abducted at the age of 11 in the US state of California, and was not found 
for eighteen years.  Although Dugard was initially kept in close captivity by her kidnapper, Phillip 
Garrido, eventually he allowed her and the daughters she bore him to come into contact with 
members of the public, but she never told them she had been abducted nor attempted to leave.  
Only after Garrido confessed to abducting Dugard to police did she reveal her true identity to 
them. 
898 
For example, some states still routinely use caged beds for children with disabilities ('Filming 
reveals Czech children still caged', 2008) 
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some people to be denied a declaration of deprivation of liberty in circumstances where 
others would be entitled to such a declaration‘.899  By finding that restrictions which are 
‗necessary‘ because of a person‘s disability do not amount to a deprivation of liberty, the 
ruling seems to mean that the more restrictions a person is taken to need because of 
their disability, the greater the interferences they may be subject to before the law offers 
them an accessible means to challenge those restrictions.  Ironically, this means that 
those with the most significant (perceived) difficulties in making decisions around risk 
and protecting themselves may benefit the least from the safeguards (Series, 2011b).  
Mind (2012) has expressed concern that the ruling in Cheshire will make it harder for 
‗vulnerable people‘ to challenge and request regular reviews of significant restrictions on 
their liberty, in contrast with those detained under the MHA.  Troke (2012: 59) highlights 
that those ‗who do not have family offering alternative proposals‘, and so are not 
considered deprived of their liberty by way of having an alternative residence, will be left 
especially vulnerable by the ruling in Cheshire as there will be little ongoing scrutiny of 
their care.  In an awful irony, the comparator approach means that the unbefriended will 
be the least entitled to this extra source of scrutiny of their care. 
It would seem from Munby LJ‘s comments in Cheshire and elsewhere (Lord 
Justice Munby, 2012a: 34) that he hoped this ‗comparator‘ approach had clarified the 
meaning of deprivation of liberty, and would give rise to a more ‗a more focussed and 
less time-consuming enquiry‘ than a ‗minute‘ examination of the restrictions a person 
was subject to.900  There are reasons to doubt that Cheshire can live up to this hope.  As 
solicitor John O‘Donnell (2012) puts it, ‗It  would  lead  to  a  case  by  case examination  
as  to  whether  or  not  particular  disabilities  were  sufficiently  similar  to  establish the 
comparison‘.  O‘Donnell anticipates considerable evidential issues and scope for legal 
argument arising on this point.  The comparator approach rests on two connected 
assumptions: that it is straightforward to identify a person ‗with the same capabilities as 
X, affected by the same condition or suffering the same inherent mental and physical 
disabilities and limitations ...as X‘, and that it is a straightforward matter to describe what 
restrictions they should be subject to.   
From the outset, reflection on the social model of disability should caution us that 
it is never easy to divorce a person‘s ‗disabilities‘ from their context, as the comparator 
approach would seem to have us do.  For example, a person might be subject to high 
levels of restrictions in a setting which they are unhappy in and trying to escape from, 
whilst they need not be if they were in a setting where they are happy and content.  A 
person who is frequently restrained to protect themselves or others from harm may 
                                               
899 
CC v KK, [92] 
900 
[38]-[40] 
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manifest this ‗behaviour that challenges‘ because they are unhappy, because they have 
unmet care needs or for other context-specific reasons.  This medicalisation and 
individualisation of restrictions averts our attention from the fact that restrictions on liberty 
are perpetrated by staff, who exercise considerable discretion and power in this respect.  
Without the DoLS, there are few mechanisms to call those exercising this control to 
account for it.  The rulings in P & Q and Cheshire perpetuate the notion that people with 
disabilities are inherently and intrinsically ‗other‘ than the man on the Clapham Omnibus.  
As Hewitt (2012) puts it, ‗it seems to abandon the idea that there are common standards 
– common liberties, we might say, or common protections – that are available to 
everyone; and it implies that the mentally ill or the mentally incapable are entitled to 
fewer protections, to lower-grade liberty.' 
The comparator approach also seems suffer from the same deficiency as the 
‗purpose‘ of restrictions.  In order for restrictions to satisfy s6 MCA, they must be 
‗necessary‘, and that necessity must arise in connection with a person‘s lack of mental 
capacity to make decisions about a particular risk. Yet the comparator holds that if 
restrictions are necessary because of a person‘s disability, which they must be if they are 
justified under the MCA, then they are unlikely to contribute towards a deprivation of 
liberty.  It is very difficult to see how a person could both be said to be deprived of their 
liberty and the restrictions be compatible with the MCA and the DoLS (Hewitt, 2012; 
O'Brien, 2012; Series, 2011b; Troke, 2012).   
Nothing resembling the comparator approach has been invoked by the ECtHR in 
Stanev, DD or Kędzior (Lord Justice Munby, 2012c; Ruck Keene, 2012), and the 
Supreme Court will no doubt be asked to address these matters when it rules on 
Cheshire and P & Q in 2013.  In the meantime, Cheshire is widely taken to be the 
leading authority on the meaning of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of DoLS and 
the MCA, and the comparator approach is still being applied by the High Court.901 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
The difficulties caused by these complex and contradictory court rulings on the 
meaning of deprivation of liberty cannot be overstated.  Research conducted soon after 
the DoLS came into force902 found total agreement in judgments regarding deprivation of 
liberty between panels of professionals who worked with the DoLS was ‗slight‘ (Cairns et 
                                               
901 
CC v KK 
902 
The authors report that the research on lawyers was conducted in October 2009 (Cairns et al., 
2011b), they do not give a data for research involving psychiatrists, best interests assessors and 
IMCAs, although the case studies the research was based on were compiled during the summer 
of 2009.  
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al., 2011a; 2011b).903  In response to Cheshire, best interests assessor Sue O‘Neal 
complained: 
I  am  no  longer confident  that  I  know  how  to  do  my  job...  As a 
trainer of acute hospital staff, I feel that I no longer  know  how  to  explain  
how  they  are  to identify cases that may amount to deprivation of liberty,  
when  it  goes  without  saying... that  the  objective ‗purpose‘ of medical 
and nursing interventions is always, one would hope, to save life and 
limb.904 
In the first quarter following the ruling in Cheshire the official statistics on DoLS 
applications showed a decline for the first time (NHS Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care, 2012g).  However, whilst the ruling has dismayed many,905 there are those 
who regard it as offering clarity and a ‗common sense‘ approach to the scope of the 
DoLS (Curry, 2012; King's Chambers, 2011; Henderson, 2011; Spain, 2011).  Despite 
the claims of some to have found a clear and easy to apply the ratio in Cheshire and P & 
Q, later cases such as C v Blackburn and Darwen and CC v KK have continue to offer 
interpretations or extensions of the decisions which have taken the ruling much further, 
with sometimes surprising results. 
The inconsistency between domestic and ECtHR case law raises the question of 
whether those detained under Strasbourg‘s approach, but not under the domestic 
courts‘, should be entitled to safeguards, or alternatively to compensation for unlawful 
detention under Article 5(5).  It is usually assumed under the HRA that where domestic 
and Strasbourg authorities conflict, that domestic authorities must prevail until an 
appellate court can overturn the problematic domestic authority.906  However, it has been 
suggested that it is possible that as s64(5) MCA states ‗references to deprivation of a 
person's liberty have the same meaning as in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights 
Convention‘, for the purposes of the MCA (but not the HRA) the meaning of Article 5 
should be supplied by Strasbourg directly (Ruck Keene et al., 2012f: 7).   
Whatever the technicalities of stare decisis for the DoLS, the result of complex 
and contradictory domestic rulings, aggravated by their divergence from Strasbourg, is 
considerable uncertainty over when the safeguards should be applied.  From a practical 
perspective this is clearly problematic and unsettling for all concerned.  From a 
                                               
903 
The panels comprised ‗six eminent barristers and solicitors with expertise in mental health law‘, 
six consultant psychiatrists, six IMCAs and five BIAs.  Out of twelve vignettes based on clinical 
case studies, the professionals were unanimous in only one case that a person was deprived of 
their liberty, and agreement levels were lowest amongst the ‗eminent‘ lawyers themselves.   
904 
Ruck Keene et al  (2011: 10).
 
905  
The ruling has met with particular dismayed responses from social care practitioners 
('Ermintrude', 2011; Norman, 2011; Samuel, 2011c). 
906 
Kay & Anor v. London Borough of Lambeth & Ors [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465; 
R (RJM) v SSWP [2008] UKHL 63; [2009] 2 All ER 556  
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republican perspective it means that the very mechanism which is supposed to 
safeguard against arbitrary detention is itself subject to highly arbitrary application.  The 
rulings offer up such a diverse menu of rationales for finding that a person is not 
deprived of their liberty, that those who seek to avoid applying the safeguards can 
happily take a ‗pick and mix‘ approach and claim Article 5 is not engaged in almost any 
circumstance.  In this uncertain and unpredictable landscape Charles J has advised that 
public authorities should authorise ‗borderline cases‘ in order to provide legal protection 
to provider, commissioner and ‗P‘ alike.907  Yet, sadly, the courts in CC v KK and C v 
Blackburn with Darwen did not appear to take this approach, and are likely to encourage 
others to apply a very high threshold to the engagement of the safeguards, even in the 
light of the divergent Strasbourg authorities. 
There are undoubtedly BIAs and DoLS teams out there who use these judgments 
in the most expansive way possible to maximise the protection offered by the DoLS.  No 
doubt these authorities and practitioners will be frustrated by the limitations imposed on 
their work by Cheshire and P & Q.  Once again, however, we see that the application 
and operation of the safeguards is to a very significant degree determined by the good 
faith and attitude of those applying them.  This means that the DoLS may offer many 
fantastic opportunities for those working within the system for better protections, and to 
challenge restrictions.  But it also means that people with disabilities are subject to the 
whims and caprices of those with authority over them.  It matters not, from a republican 
perspective, that some of those in positions of authority act as benevolently as they can; 
from a republican perspective what matters is the shortfall in protection if they do not. 
One solution to this uncertainty over the scope of the DoLS would be to draft a 
statutory definition which sets out in clear and unambiguous terms when the safeguards 
should be engaged.  This approach was called for by many respondents to the DoLS 
consultation and by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007b: [89]).  This is also an 
approach which the Scottish Law Commission (2012) recently endorsed, in a 
consultation on introducing deprivation of liberty safeguards for Scotland, after a wry 
discussion of the tortuous English and Welsh case law.  A statutory definition, if well 
drafted, could provide greater legal certainty and foreseeability for all – including care 
providers and supervisory bodies who face a theoretical risk of litigation for unlawful 
deprivation of liberty if they fail to apply the safeguards where they should have.  
However, any attempt to formulate such a definition would be likely to give rise to 
significant heated debates amongst disabled people‘s organisations, public authorities, 
care providers and the government. 
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A Local Authority v PB & Anor [2011] EWHC 2675 (CoP) [64]
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The debates over the appropriate scope of Article 5 must be better understood as 
a proxy struggle for the scope of protective safeguards for involuntary placement and 
restrictive care.  This legalist approach has met with resistance, as it has always done, 
by those who would prefer that those caring for adults with mental disabilities are 
afforded more discretion and carry less heavy ‗bureaucratic‘ burdens to account for, and 
face challenges to, the exercise of that discretion.  The polarised positions in this debate 
were in evidence at a recent seminar on deprivation of liberty (One Crown Office Row, 
2012).  Eminent panellists including Professor A C Grayling and Philip Havers QC 
commented that situations like Cheshire were not what the Convention drafters really 
had in mind908, and to call these a ‗deprivation of liberty‘ would lead to an excessive 
administrative burden.  Professor Grayling and other panellists drew comparisons with 
the restrictions imposed upon children to emphasise that paternalism was clearly justified 
in such circumstances, and there were no obvious human rights violations occurring.  
From the audience, the OS909 asked ‗how disabled does a person have to be before they 
cease to have human rights, or an Article 5 right?‘, before adding ‗one can be flippant 
about little children if one wants, but these aren‘t children, they‘re adults.‘  The OS‘s 
argument for expanding the scope of the DoLS, no matter how ‗troublesome‘ in 
bureaucratic terms, was an argument for republican liberty in a nutshell: ‗Quite often 
people need protection, but not with the state assuming control without any regulation of 
that control.‘    Or as barrister Joe O‘Brien (2012) asked rhetorically at a recent 
conference on the MCA, ‗without the DoLS, how else is an incapable adult supposed to 
protect themselves? 
 
                                               
908
 A similar point is made by Mostyn J in (High Court), and Munby LJ in Cheshire. 
909 
Who has argued in Re RK, P & Q and Cheshire that the claimants were deprived of their 
liberty, and who took the decision to appeal P & Q and Cheshire in the Supreme Court.  In the 
seminar, he indicated he would be prepared to pursue this case in Strasbourg. 
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CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION 
When people with learning disabilities are ‗placed‘ in institutional care services, 
they are exposed to a range of interferences with their choices and freedoms.  These 
interferences include the imposition of rules and regimes by institutional authorities, 
surveillance, a loss of private space and encroachments upon bodily integrity, being 
subjected to restraint, seclusion and sedating medications, and restrictions may be 
imposed over their dealings with others outside of the institution.  Such interferences 
have been found across the entire spectrum of care services, even in those which were 
initially designed to replicate the choices and freedoms of living in one‘s own home.   
As Goffman and others have argued, their cumulative and pervasive effects can 
be monumentally detrimental to self and wellbeing.  Yet few in the policy and regulatory 
literature have argued that it is never appropriate to restrict a person‘s choices and 
freedoms in care services.  Rather, the literature highlights a range of situations where 
such restrictions occur but are unjustified according to particular normative criteria.  The 
essence of such concerns is that restrictions are being imposed on an unprincipled and 
arbitrary basis.  This I call the problem of ‗institutional domination‘, whereby institutional 
authorities, including those commissioning such care, exercise de facto powers to 
impose a range of arbitrary interferences on people with learning disabilities, with little 
likelihood that those affected will challenge them. 
7.1 THE LOSS OF FAITH IN LEGALISM 
The republican solution to the problem of domination is to ensure that there are 
clear and well known principles which spell out which interferences are permissible, and 
in what circumstances.  There must, furthermore, be effective methods of enforcing 
those principles.  Although republicans do not believe that law is the only means by 
which this can be achieved, they regard the rule of law as fundamental to constraining 
the arbitrary exercise of power by state and non-state actors alike.  Since the 18th 
century, we have turned to law to try to constrain the acts of institutional authorities 
responsible for the care and control of people with mental disabilities.  Yet during the 
20th century there was a shift away from legalism, prompted by a belief that community 
based care services – rather than legal controls – would be best placed to ensure good 
and humane care.  Although ‗legalism‘ was in part restored in psychiatric care, this has 
not been the case for most of the community based settings where the majority of people 
with learning disabilities live.  Kathleen Jones (1980: 14) expresses this loss of faith in 
legalism most forcefully: 
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There are limits to what the law can do, and the present need is not for 
more law, but for an ‗open-textured‘ law backed by good policy. The 
mental health services have been allowed to drift while reformers 
concentrated on minor issues... The need is not for increased legal 
formalism, but for human compassion and professional skill. 
Jones‘ rejection of legal formalism was based on a belief that the problem was not one of 
constraining professional discretion, but ‗because deteriorating  morale  and  conditions 
of  work, have  facilitated  the  development  of  a vicious  subculture,  and  the  Law 
could  not  contain  or negate  it‘ (p14). 
Others, who are less likely to share Jones‘ view that we should leave disciplinary 
professionals alone to get on with what they do best, have also rebuked the ‗turn to law‘ 
to address the oppression of excluded social groups.  The law, it is argued, does not 
hold disciplinary power in check, but constitutes its authority; law does not oppose 
disciplinary power but is colonised by it.  Furthermore, law is a resource which is tapped 
by the powerful – barring a few token cases – and so it is the powerful who shape its 
development, thus re-inscribing in law the very inequalities it was meant to address.  At 
base, the reason for this is that law is built upon a liberal myth of a particular kind of legal 
subject: one who is rational, unencumbered and self-sufficient.  Those who do not 
conform to these expectations find themselves written out of law‘s empire; unable to 
access it, subjected to a range of filters and barriers to ensure their deviant subjectivity 
does not snarl up law‘s elegance, efficiency and self-referential logics.   
In recent times, legal efforts to further disability rights have been connected with 
exposing this ‗myth of the masterless man‘ (Lewis, 2011; Quinn, 2011b), with thinking 
new forms of law based upon a more inclusive subjectivity.  Yet even these scholars and 
campaigners have turned away from ‗legalism‘ and the use of procedural safeguards 
(Gooding, 2012: 9-10; Quinn, 2011b: 62), calling for legal efforts to focus on supporting 
the exercise of legal capacity rather restraining disciplinary power, as if these were 
binary alternatives. 
7.2 LEGALISM RECOVERED? 
This thesis, I suggest, provides several reasons for believing we should approach 
these calls to turn away from legalism and procedural safeguards with some caution.  In 
response to Jones , it is certainly the case that a relentless focus on ‗civil and political‘ 
rights, without regard to economic and social rights , will be doomed to failure .  As 
Arnardóttir and Quinn (2009: xviii) write, in the context of disability – and no doubt in 
many other contexts – civil and political rights are interconnected with and dependent 
upon social and economic rights.  This thesis is littered with examples of this: a person‘s 
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‗right to liberty‘ is so often dependent on the availability of support to obviate the basis for 
detention; a person‘s ability to assert their rights through law is so often dependent upon 
practical and legal assistance to do so; a person‘s ability to meet the functional criteria 
for mental capacity will be dependent on support and opportunities to learn to make good 
decisions. 
Yet one can agree that ‗rights‘ to liberty, to legal capacity, are dependent upon 
support, without agreeing that formal procedural safeguards are unimportant or inevitably 
ineffective.  It is true that the legal formalism of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries has not 
prevented an array of horrifying abuses of power in institutional care.  Yet it is surely not 
correct to argue that because these legal efforts failed, the law should simply turn away 
from these problems?  That those who are detained should have no legal avenue to 
challenge their detention; that those whose ‗support‘ has become malignant and 
domineering should have no legal recourse? 
The experiences of the MCA and the DoLS offer a number of important 
reminders.  In the first place, that inscribing fine sounding, but ultimately abstract, 
principles into a statute is no guarantee that those principles will be interpreted in ways 
which satisfy the hopes of reformers.  Like a Rorschach test, admirers of the MCA can 
project onto it their own personal values – be they of a libertarian or paternalistic bent, as 
the MCA accommodates both – whilst ‗wrong‘ outcomes can be attributed to a ‗wrong‘ 
interpretation in a particular case.  No doubt the sheer vacuity of the MCA‘s principles 
helps to explain its enduring popularity.  The Act flatters caregivers and disciplinary 
professionals that they are appropriately placed to judge whether a person really 
understands and appreciates a particular decision, and what course of action would 
really be in their best interests.  The Act imposes few constraints upon those judgments. 
As Quinn (2009: 217) has written of the CPRD, ‗the text alone does not 
guarantee that its values will be transposed into the worldview of policy and law-makers‘: 
there will always be ‗textual toeholds‘ which can temporise profound reforms.  Yet if 
reformers really do want profound reform of the normative principles which inform the 
acts of professionals, carers, supporters and courts, they will need to offer better 
answers than they have yet done to the practical and ethical difficulties of interpreting 
their worldview in real life.  Almost all the literature associated with Article 12 CRPD 
suggests that it is unacceptable to ever override a person‘s wishes and preferences, 
where they can be discerned, on disability related grounds (e.g. Centre for Disability Law 
& Policy, 2011; Dhanda, 2006-7; Minkowitz, 2006-7).  Yet does this really mean they 
would have support workers allow P to ingest and choke on his soiled incontinence 
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pads?1  That they would leave Mrs EH, without sufficient clothing in cold weather and at 
risk of hypothermia, scrambling down the embankment of a busy main road?2  Is this the 
‗dignity of risk‘, the opportunity to learn from one‘s mistakes, that they are vaunting?  I, 
for one, doubt that it is.  Yet unless reformers supply clear criteria to help us distinguish 
between an intervention to stop P choking or Mrs EH wandering in front of traffic from 
those interventions which are unacceptable, they leave open the door to unconstrained 
authoritarian power.  Reformers need to spell out much more clearly what risks the ‗new 
paradigm‘ would be prepared to tolerate, and it must confront those which it would not. 
Reformers should take note of what happened in England and Wales when 
guardianship was all but abolished: the courts made far reaching use of the doctrine of 
necessity, including uses such as non-consensual sterilisation which most disability 
rights campaigners would find abhorrent,3 because the law contained no principles to 
prevent it.  There is a need, as Quinn (2010: 17) himself has said, ‗to identify toeholds on 
the slippery slope that will forestall the possibility that the exception (making ‗decisions 
for‘) becoming the norm.‘  Analysis of MCA case law suggests there are other places 
where such ‗toeholds‘ will be needed.  Of particular significance for the CRPD are those 
areas where the distinction between support and coercion are unclear:  from the 
influence of overbearing family members on decision making, to the (compulsory) 
insertion of people with learning disabilities into ‗independent living‘ services to enhance 
their decision making capabilities.  The task of constraining discretionary power within 
acceptable limits is Sisyphean.  We will never reach a point when the meanings of words 
are certain, where new dilemmas and uncertainties do not emerge, because meanings 
can always be contested and can never be fixed (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Wittgenstein, 
2001).  But neither should we forget the power of words to guide and constrain, to 
encourage and deter.  These are transient and contingent powers, no doubt, but this 
should not lead us to apathy but, as Foucault (1994a: 256) puts it, ‗to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism.‘ 
The lesson of the DoLS is that if legalism has failed to prevent abuses of power, it 
is very often for remediable defects.  I suggest that we can draw from the critical analysis 
of the DoLS in this thesis several important indicators of what a better form of legalism 
would entail: 
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Dorset County Council v EH [2009] EWHC 784 (Fam) 
3 
Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)
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1. Where a person is subject to an interference with their rights, they must be 
supported to understand it as such, and to understand the means by which 
they can contest it. 
2. Support to bring such a challenge must be readily accessible. 
3. Support should be made available on the basis that if a person needed to 
bring a challenge, they would need support; not that others agree that a 
challenge should be brought.  People should not have to ‗coat-tail‘ on the 
back of disputes between other figures in their lives for their concerns to be 
heard by a court. 
4. It is imperative that people are fully supported to adversarially contest all the 
evidence and arguments which form the basis for an interference with their 
rights.  This inevitably means, contra RP v UK, that their subjective interests 
must be represented in the legal process, even if they require special 
assistance to do so. 
5. In order to forestall the tendency for disciplinary and familial discourses and 
‗expertise‘ to drown out the voices of peoples with mental disabilities, they 
must be supported and enabled to participate in proceedings which are about 
them as far as possible. 
The potential strengths of the DoLS do not arise because of a person‘s detained status, 
whatever that even means, they arise because Article 5 safeguards are fundamentally 
oriented towards constrain arbitrariness, where mechanisms like the MCA are not.  
Whereas the ‗informalism‘ of the MCA is entirely founded upon the belief that caregivers 
and disciplinary professionals usually make good decisions, in the words of the ECtHR 
and Lord Steyn in Bournewood, ‗the very purpose of procedural safeguards is to protect 
individuals against any ―misjudgments and professional lapses‖‘. 4   In republican 
language, the MCA simply hopes that you have a good ‗master‘; the DoLS try to make 
him less of one. 
One difficulty with legalism as traditionally conceived is that it has – since the 
18th century – treated institutional admission as a separable issue from the institutional 
conditions.  As argued throughout this thesis, the conditions within a setting are 
intimately linked to the extent to which it is suitable for the individuals within.  Where a 
particular ‗placement‘ is manifestly unsuited to a person – where they are unhappy, 
where their needs for support cannot be met, where they are isolated and excluded from 
family and community – the problem is not necessarily either the setting or the person, 
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HL v UK, [121].
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but that this person should not be in that setting.5  Traditional legalism has tried to tackle 
these issues separately.  Detention safeguards like the MHA have asked whether a 
particular individual should be confined to an institution (any institution).  Meanwhile, 
regulation has asked whether a service is ‗good‘, without being able to address the more 
nuanced question of whether it is good for some but not for others.   
Neither detention safeguards nor regulation are well suited towards examining 
the fit between individual and environment; yet the social model of disability tells us this 
is precisely what we should be doing if we are serious about supporting people 
appropriately.  The much-maligned DoLS, meanwhile, do offer better prospects than 
existing frameworks such as detention and guardianship under the MHA for examining 
this relationship.  Unlike the criteria for detention or reception into guardianship, the best 
interests qualifying requirement forces assessors to ask whether the particular 
placement is really the best available option for that person, and whether particular 
restrictions a person is subject to therein are really necessary and proportionate.  
Regrettably I have only been able to offer a few examples in this thesis of the 
transformative potential of DoLS best interests assessments and the use of conditions to 
lever improvements in care planning and delivery.  Much more research would be 
needed to generalise from this that DoLS do achieve such remarkable results; but this 
research suggests that they certainly can do.  And, moreover, they may be able to do 
this without resort to a court at all. 
The danger that law becomes ‗colonised‘ by disciplinary power is all too much in 
evidence in the MCA and its case law, but as Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009) write, this 
colonisation is contingent and not an inevitable feature of law.  We must exploit ‗this 
receptivity of the law, this ever-opening by which the law disrupts its determinate self and 
by which it is incipiently attuned to 'the outside into which it is always receding‘ (Golder 
and Fitzpatrick, 2009: 79).  Re-colonising the law with the voices of disabled people will 
take radical reforms, no doubt, but our imaginations must be directed towards these.  
The voices of disciplinary professionals are inserted into law not merely as parties to 
cases, but also as ‗experts‘; is it really beyond the realms of possibility that people with 
disabilities could themselves be a source of expertise which the law could draw from?  
Why do disabled people‘s organisations intervene so rarely in cases related to the MCA; 
do they really have nothing to say about the acceptable boundaries of interventions 
under the MCA, about the state of the DoLS?  Is Freyenhagen and O‘Shea‘s (2013: 29) 
suggestion that ‗those who have experienced life with these conditions might have to be 
                                               
5 
The case C v A Local Authority is an excellent example of this. 
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included as lay members onto case review panels – just as already mental health 
tribunals often include lay members‘ really so improbable? 
7.3 LEGALISM FOR THE FUTURE 
Legalism has been tried and has failed.  But form is everything, and we have yet 
to see a legalism that takes a form that fully recognises the subjectivity of people with 
mental disabilities - the kinds of oppression they face, and the kinds of support they will 
need to hold authority to account.  Many questions remain about the form the legalism of 
the future can, and should, take.  For the most part in this thesis I have focussed on the 
formal and procedural questions of arbitrariness in discretionary decision making and the 
efficacy of mechanisms of enforcement, rather than looking at the substantive principles 
of the MCA themselves.  I now offer some tentative remarks about substance.   
Given the literature on the kinds of interferences people with learning disabilities 
– and other disabilities – experience in institutional care, it is tempting to conclude that it 
would be better to abolish altogether any laws which could permit acts which modulate a 
person‘s ordinary legal rights to self determination on disability related grounds.  Indeed, 
this appears to be what some interpretations of the CRPD call for.  I agree that 
‗incapacity‘ is insidious, that the MCA appears to have legitimated a vast range of 
interferences which have massive, and often detrimental, repercussions for people with 
disabilities.  I understand the temptation to conclude that legal devices which label some 
individuals, or some decisions, as suitable to be overridden are so dangerous they 
should be abolished altogether.   
However, as I observed earlier, there are – I believe – a narrow range of 
situations where it is extremely difficult to see how to proceed if one respects absolutely 
a person‘s ordinary legal rights to liberty and privacy.  Earlier I suggested that the 
tendency of P in Cheshire to eat, and choke on, his incontinence pads was one such 
example, the case of Mrs EH another.  I have encountered many such situations – as a 
care worker, and in my personal life.  Such situations included a care worker having to 
force her way into the home of a woman who appeared to be having a stroke, and 
physically restraining her to prevent her from setting her home on fire or wandering 
naked into the road whilst waiting for an ambulance.  In hospitals, patients which acute 
infections refuse antibiotic treatments which could save their lives, on the basis of terrors 
and delusions arising from the infection itself.6  As I wrote in the first chapter, I have 
worked with a man who would try to ingest anything, hurtle towards dangers he did not 
                                               
6 
It is important to recall that ‗incapacity‘ is also applied to people with illnesses which would not 
constitute disabilities, and even to people in toxic states, highly emotional states and a wide range 
of other conditions. 
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understand.7  In such circumstances, it is very difficult indeed to see how to do without a 
device which even if it does not call itself ‗incapacity‘ and does not explicitly incorporate a 
diagnostic threshold serves a similar purpose and can be put to similar ends.  The 
requirements of the MCA that the ‗least restrictive option‘ should be considered, that any 
interferences should be for the benefit of the person themselves and not others, are not 
objectionable - but they are insufficient.  Yet once we have agreed that in some, limited, 
circumstances interventions which are – undeniably – related to disability or illness are 
permissible, a number of problems present themselves. 
As Dhanda (2006-7: 445) asks, ‗by what procedure will this small percentage of 
persons be identified?‘  One of the difficulties with ‗decision specific‘ capacity, as I 
argued in Chapter 4, is that it potentially renders all the decisions and acts of people with 
disabilities open to question.  So constraining the point at which such questions can be 
posed is critical.  Under the MCA there is no such threshold; one possible approach 
would be to try to formulate one, although it is very difficult to envisage one which would 
be attractive across the broad range of situations which the MCA applies to.  One 
strategy might be to require that there must be evidence of real and immediate danger 
before it is permissible to resort to strategies which involve impinging upon a person‘s 
rights to self-determination.   
This would constrain the extent to which the MCA could be used to stage major 
non-consensual interventions in cases like K v LBX, where there is no major risk but the 
outcome is thought merely to be ‗better‘, or somehow preferable in light of certain policy 
objectives.  Arguably, the low threshold established in K v LBX opens the way to using 
the MCA for tinkering, and by lowering thresholds for intervention may reduce the 
pressure to find collaborative strategies.  I suggest that this option requires further 
attention, but that this should take place in a democratic arena where a broader range of 
perspectives can be consulted.  I suggest that we also need to be cautious about 
progression towards holding caregivers responsible for all the harm that befalls those 
whom are later labelled, with alarming ease, as ‗lacking capacity‘.  Again, it would be 
preferable to canvass a broader range of perspectives, not least those of disabled 
people themselves, before the law proceeds further in this direction. 
A second issue is the little-addressed question of ‗who decides?‘  The ordinary 
practice of using clinicians to assess capacity, and of disciplinary professionals making 
major ‗best interests‘ decisions on behalf of people, is virtually unquestioned in 
commentaries on the MCA.  Yet why should these groups be afforded these roles? – this 
                                               
7 
Although I would not, for one moment, condone the ‗solution‘ that service arrived at; the service 
itself was not equipped to cater to his need for secure, but open, spaces to run around in, and 
provide tactile and olfactory stimulation. 
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is not the case in all other jurisdictions.  In British Columbia in Canada, for example, 
substituted decisions for people who ‗lack capacity‘ around medical treatment and 
placement in care facilities are not taken by professionals except in emergencies.  
Decisions are either taken by guardians, by a person‘s nominated representative, or 
through a relative selected from a statutory list (Gordon, 2012).  One of the major 
substantive critiques I would levy at the MCA is that it empowers almost anybody who 
proposes some act of care or treatment, and is in a position to provide it, to decide 
whether or not that person has the capacity to consent to it and whether they should 
deliver it anyway in that person‘s best interests.   
This is quite extraordinary when one stops to think about it.  Imagine if 
hairdressers routinely stopped people in the street, decided that they lacked the capacity 
to make decisions about their hairstyle and imposed haircuts on them in their best 
interests, just because they could cut hair.  We have become so accustomed to 
disciplinary authority over the lives of people with disabilities, we barely stop to notice it.  
The emphasis on relationships and relational autonomy in the literature associated with 
the CRPD is not without its shortcomings, but it does at least force us to ask – who 
would we want to make decisions on our behalf, if we were unable to express a view or 
in those rare circumstances when our will should be overridden?  Few, I suggest, would 
say ‗anybody who works in care services‘.   
A third question is what criteria should be used for coercive interventions or 
interventions which conflict with a person‘s will and preferences where these occur.  The 
MCA‘s best interests standard has been described as ‗the weakest standard for 
respecting previous self-determined choice‘ (Samanta, 2010: 384).  This is thought to 
increase the risk that the values of decision makers will inform best interests decisions, 
and some suggest that the old ‗substituted judgement‘ standard would be less 
paternalistic (Boyle, 2011: Samanta, 2010).  Whilst acknowledging that substituted 
judgement might be more attractive in principle, the Law Commission (1995: [4.22]-
[4.23]) expressed concern about situations where a person‘s views were not known, 
where they had never had capacity, or they had always been a poor decision maker.  
However, these need not be binary alternatives – the approach taken under the 
Representation Agreement Act 1996 (British Columbia), for example, starts with an 
outcome approach – is the person‘s choice ‗reasonable‘? – before switching to 
substituted judgement, and it is only if a person‘s past or present values and beliefs are 
not known that decision makers may resort to ‗best interests‘.  Bach and Kerzner (2010) 
suggest a post-structuralist inspired ‗narrative approach‘.  Smull and Parsley (2003) 
recommend a duty to promote self-determination.  Whatever approach is taken, 
however, one cannot escape the reality that substituted decision makers will still exercise 
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considerable scope for interpreting whether a person‘s currently expressed preference is 
part of their overall ‗narrative‘ or ‗values‘.  As Schmitt (1922: 1) would put it, ‗'Sovereign is 
he who decides on the exception'. 
 
An important avenue for future research will be to look at the relational elements 
of supporting capacity and making substituted decisions, at mechanisms like the British 
Columbian representation agreements.8  Such research will need to be more attentive 
than the disability rights literature has hitherto been of questions of power, and how one 
guards against support which becomes malignant or domineering.  Safeguards to 
address such situations must be available and accessible. 
This leads me, last of all, to efforts towards deinstitutionalisation.  For people with 
learning disabilities, no program of reform could be more important than lessening the 
hold of institutions over their lives.  The horrors of long-stay hospitals like Ely, Budock 
and their 21st century privatised progeny in Winterbourne View loom large on the 
horizon.  Yet, as I argued in Chapter 2, we should remain vigilant, knowing that 
‗institutionalisation‘ is linked to a set of practices perpetrated by a body of caregivers and 
‗support staff‘: institutions can be found in any kind of service, can be found in people‘s 
own homes.  The reason for this, I suggested in Chapter 2, is that the institution has 
followed the ‗tutelary relationship‘ which people with learning disabilities are so often 
subject to, out from the hospitals and into the community.  It has even followed them into 
their own homes.  And this tutelary relationship is, as Unsworth (1991: 254-5)9 observes, 
intimately linked to practices associated with incapacity: 
...the liberal-contractual society emergent in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, faced, in the mentally disordered, with subjects who 
could  neither participate in rational exchange nor be held responsible for 
their  actions, relegated them to a special subordinate legal status.  
Rather than being constituted as active subjects vested with rights over 
which they could exercise autonomous control and exclusive dominion, 
they were placed under a relation de tutelle, or relationship of tutelage or 
guardianship, within which they were legally guaranteed to be subject to a 
regime of (principally medical) paternalism. 
We should be cautious of believing that the ‗new paradigm‘ abolishes this tutelary 
relationship; it seems more likely to be a transformation, albeit an important one.  Few 
                                               
8 
Representation Agreement Act (British Columbia) 1996.  One could also, I believe, make a 
republican argument for shifting the balance of power away from professionals towards ‗informal‘ 
and familial sources of support.  Inevitably, when care and welfare decisions are being made, 
supporters would come into contact with professionals commissioning or providing care and 
treatment.  If those professionals have concerns about ‗informal‘ supporters and substituted 
decision makers they are much better placed to use the law to challenge their authority than 
informal decision makers are to challenge professionals.   
9 
Unsworth cites Castel (1988) as the source of this thesis. 
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today would hold that plenary guardianship was an acceptable measure, yet it does have 
in common with support paradigms agreement that decision-making deficits exist.  Quinn 
(2011a: 40) describes the ‗support paradigm‘ as shifting the response to these deficits, 
not denying their existence.  Yet the modes of support necessary for ‗assistive thinking‘ 
or supported decision making are not, contra Francis and Silvers (2010), comparable to 
a prosthetic limb or a golf buggy.  They involve human agency; in particular they involve 
agents who have skills, abilities and resources which those with ‗decision making 
deficits‘ do not.  Of particular note are their enhanced discursive powers, which have 
been found time and again in studies using Conversation Analysis to place ‗supporters‘ 
in positions of power, however benevolent their intentions (Antaki et al., 2009; Finlay et 
al., 2008a; Finlay et al., 2008b; Jingree et al., 2006; Jingree, Treena and Finlay, 2008).  
The support paradigm will still entail people with mental disabilities being exposed to the 
risk of domination; it cannot not, because wherever there is a power imbalance and 
dependency, the conditions for domination to take root are present (Lovett, 2010a).  The 
key is constraining that power. 
 
People will be at risk of institutionalisation in any setting for as long as they exist 
in some kind of tutelary relationship – whether it is formalised as guardianship, takes an 
informal form such as the MCA or is transformed by the support paradigm.  This is 
because their acts will always be subject to some level of surveillance to look out for 
‗decision making deficits‘ or risky actions and take action accordingly.  Even if we 
embrace a greater tolerance for risk, there will be some risks, I believe, that we will not 
tolerate.  There will be some people, like P in Cheshire, whose lives will always be 
subject to interferences of some kind or another – but that does not mean we should rest 
from finding ways to minimise these, to support his flourishing as best we can.  I have 
argued here that the bar for such interventions must be raised, that their legitimate scope 
must be nailed down with much more detailed guidance than open-ended aims to pursue 
a person‘s ‗best interests‘ or even to ‗support capacity‘.  Those exercising powers to 
influence and intervene should be called upon to justify it, should face scrutiny, and 
should regard the person whom they exercise it over as a realistic source of a challenge 
to their authority should they overstep the mark.   
I suggest that to enable this, the following steps must be taken: 
1. There is a need, as Mostyn J expressed in J Council v GU & Ors (Rev 1), for 
much clearer guidance over which interferences are, and are not, permissible 
in care settings.  This guidance should be produced with input from disability 
rights reformers, who should be able to provide advice on the kinds of 
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interferences which are, and are not, acceptable and which risks will, and will 
not, be tolerated. 
2. People who use care services who exist, or are at risk of existing, within a 
tutelary relationship, should be given access to long-term, independent 
advocacy, where those advocates are required to support them in holding 
authority to account. 
3. Relationships of support for decision making, which are not malignant or 
domineering, should be recognised as such, rather than dependence being 
identified as evidence of a person‘s incapacity.  The state and care services 
should be under a duty to actively foster supportive relationships and 
environments which are conducive to decision making. 10   It is doubtful, 
however, that providers and commissioners of care are suitably placed to 
take on such a role themselves, given the potential for conflicts of interest. 
Even these reforms will not, however, be sufficient to ensure people with learning 
disabilities are as free as possible from institutionalisation, social exclusion and other 
forms of oppression.  The roots of these evils run deep in our society, and can be traced 
through their exclusion from democratic and political mechanisms, through welfare 
reforms which exacerbate dependency and prioritise the efficiencies of ‗batch living‘ 
(Goffman, 1961) over personal flourishing.  It can be traced through the lack of credibility 
they encounter in their daily interactions, through failure to recognise that people with 
learning disabilities have the same capabilities and needs as anybody else if they are 
given the means to enjoy them.  Incapacity, undeniably, plays a role in these processes.  
In legal terms it creates a mechanism whereby the understandable objections and 
outrage people experience at their subjection, confinement and institutionalisation can be 
overridden and contained.  It confirms, in law, that their views are less credible, that they 
are fundamentally ‗other‘.  Yet it is essential that the law is able to respond, in some way, 
to disability and difference – be it through MCA, the DoLS, or the CRPD.  And all the 
solutions advanced so far have only paradoxes to offer. 
  
                                               
10 
See s9 The Draft Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2012 (India) for an interesting example 
of such an active duty, which is far less situation-specific and qualified than the duties to support 
decision making under the MCA.
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‗My point is not that 
everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which 
is not the same as bad.  If 
everything is dangerous, then 
we always have something to 
do.  So my position leads not to 
apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism.‘ 
 
Foucault (1994a: 256) 
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APPENDIX A – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT 2000 REQUESTS 
Table 2 Table of Freedom of Information Act 2000 Requests 
# Body 
informati
on 
requested 
from 
Nature of information requested Date 
reque
sted 
Date 
recei
ved 
URL to 
documents 
1 Office of 
the Public 
Guardian 
Demographic data on people with deputies or 
active LPAs; Number of complaints by P about 
his LPA and deputy, number of investigations 
proceeding from those complaints. 
06-
Jun-
12 
20-
Jun-
12 
by email 
2 Devon 
and 
Cornwall 
Constabul
ary 
Report of police investigation into the abuse 
of adults with learning disabilities in services 
operated by Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust, 
dated 2009 and entitled 'Operation Apple'.  
The report was redacted to protect identities. 
01-
Jun-
10 
22-
Jun-
10 
http://ww
w.devon-
cornwall.p
olice.uk/Yo
urRightInfo
rmation/Fr
eedomInfo
rmation/Pa
ges/Disclos
ureLogs.as
px 
3 Crown 
Prosecuti
on Service 
Data on the number of prosecutions initiated 
by the CPS under s44 MCA and s127 MHA 
(2007-9) 
27-
Oct-
09 
12-
Nov-
09 
http://ww
w.cps.gov.
uk/publicat
ions/docs/f
oi_disclosu
res/2009/d
isclosure-
63.pdf 
4 Crown 
Prosecuti
on Service 
Data on the number of prosecutions initiated 
by the CPS under s44 MCA and s127 MHA.= 
(2009-12) 
23-
Jul-12 
07-
Aug-
12 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/prosecuti
ons_under
_s44_ment
al_ca 
5 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Data on the development of the Quality and 
Risk Profile methodology, and the risk profile 
of Winterbourne View hospital. 
08-
Jun-
11 
05-
Jul-
11 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/quality_a
nd_risk_pr
ofiles 
6 Care Data on expenditure and the number of care 03- 01- http://ww
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Quality 
Commissi
on 
homes and domiciliary care services registered 
with NCSC, CSCI and CQC and the number of 
inspections annually, 2003-2011 
May-
11 
Jun-
11 
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/data_on_
inspections
_of_care_h
ome 
7 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Data on the number of care homes, 
domiciliary care services and hospitals 
registered with CQC and the number of 
inspections in 2011-12, broken down by type 
of service user. 
13-
Aug-
12 
05-
Sep-
12 
by email 
8 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Data on inspection of registered services in 
2010-11 broken down by type of service user 
10-
Jul-12 
10-
Aug-
12 
by email 
9 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Data on enforcement action taken by CQC 
between April 2010 and February 2012 
12-
Jan-12 
09-
Feb-
12 
by email 
10 Local 
Governm
ent 
Ombudsm
an 
Data on the number of complaints made 
concerning adult social care providers, 
including private providers.  Qualitative 
information in response to questions about 
the LGO's relationship with CQC and its use of 
the MCA and HRA. 
12-
Jan-12 
09-
Feb-
12 
by email 
11 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Information on the number of complaints 
received by the CSCI against care homes and 
domiciliary care providers. 
12-
Jan-12 
25-
Jan-
12 
by email 
12 Care 
Quality 
Commissi
on 
Information on the number of services 
registered and inspected 2003-2010 
03-
May-
11 
31-
May-
11 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/data_on_
inspections
_of_care_h
ome 
13 Departme
nt of 
Health  
Information on the number of paid 
representatives and s39D IMCA referrals per 
local authority, in the first year.  The request 
was initially refused on the basis that it would 
be published in the future, but it was not.  It 
was then refused by the DH on the grounds 
that the NHS Information Centre held the 
data.  They refused disclosure.  A referral to 
the Information Commissioner's Office was 
unsuccessful as it transpired the Department 
of Health held the data.  Eventually, the DH 
disclosed the data. 
03-
Mar-
11 
31-
Jan-
12 
by email 
14 Departme The basis for the Department of Health's 03- 21- by email 
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nt of 
Health  
decision not to include supported living within 
the scope of DoLS; whether the Department of 
Health commissioned any research to 
estimate the number of people who might be 
deprived of their liberty in supported living; 
whether the DH was keeping records of the 
number of people deprived of their liberty in 
supported living by order of the Court of 
Protection; Whether the DH planned to review 
the scope of the safeguards to cover 
supported living.  The final response came 
after several requests for clarification and 
review.  The DH responded 'The Government 
did not include supported living because it 
considered it less likely that severe restrictions 
would be placed on people in supported living 
arrangements, who would tend to lead more 
independent lives' and 'As far as the 
department is aware, there is no estimate of 
the numbers of people who might be deprived 
of their liberty beyond care homes  
and hospitals.' 
Mar-
11 
Jun-
11 
15 Court of 
Protection  
Number of appeals against deprivation of 
liberty under s16 and s21A MCA. Delay due to 
my request for more detailed breakdown of 
data. 
14-
Jan-11 
01-
Apr-
11 
by email 
16 Court of 
Protection  
Number of appeals against deprivation of 
liberty under s21A MCA and s16 MCA, 
updated. 
16-
Jul-11 
22-
Nov-
11 
by email 
17 CAFCASS A request sent by A. Watson via a third party 
website sought information from CAFCASS 
about the number of IRO referrals they had 
received.  
24-
Nov-
11 
26-
Jan-
12 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/informati
on_about_i
ro_referral
s 
18 Office of 
the Public 
Guardian 
A request sent by Mr Winston Lyon via a third 
party website sought information from the 
OPG about the number of Court of Protection 
visitors employed in England, by region, and 
details of the recruitment process for Court of 
Protection visitors, by region.  The OPG 
responded to his request for information in 
full. 
07-
Oct-
12 
29-
Oct-
12 
by email 
19 Local 
Governm
ent 
Ombudsm
an 
A request to the LGO for information on 
whether the LGO had received and 
investigated any complaints relating to the 
deprivation of liberty safeguards.  The LGO 
confirmed that they had, and by way of 
example shared three unpublished 
21-
Jun-
12 
22-
Jun-
12 
by email 
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investigations into issues concerning the DoLS.  
These are reproduced with kind permission of 
the LGO in Appendix 2. 
20 Ofsted Request for data on the number of a) 
children's social care services, and b) 
residential special schools, registered with 
Ofsted for each financial year; The number of 
inspections of a) children's social care services, 
and b) residential special schools, for each 
financial year; Ofsted's overall expenditure on 
regulation of a) children's social care services, 
and b) residential special schools, for each 
financial year; and  Ofsted's expenditure on 
inspection only (separated from other 
regulatory costs) for a) children's social care 
services and b) residential special schools, for 
each financial year. 
27-
Jul-11 
23-
Aug-
11 
by email 
21 Departme
nt of 
Health  
Responses to 'DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
(2005) “Bournewood” Consultation: The 
approach to be taken in response to the 
judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Bournewood” case (Gateway Ref 
267902, London)' from specified organisations 
requested from the Department of Health.  
These were returned by email, and have been 
placed in a zipped folder at the listed URL. 
12-
Oct-
10 
05-
Nov-
10 
https://dl.d
ropbox.co
m/u/43970
81/Thesis/
FOIA%20da
ta/Respons
es%20to%2
0the%20Bo
urnewood
%20Consul
tation.zip 
22 Office of 
the Public 
Guardian 
Responses to 'MINISTRY OF JUSTICE & 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (2007) 'Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards: Consultation Paper CP23/07 '' 
from specified organisations requested from 
OPG.  OPG sent paper photocopies by post; 
these have been scanned in and placed in a 
zipped folder at the listed URL. 
24-
Jun-
10 
22-
Jul-
10 
https://dl.d
ropbox.co
m/u/43970
81/Thesis/
FOIA%20da
ta/DOLS%2
0consultati
on%20fro
m%20LS.zi
p 
23 Departme
nt of 
Health  
Responses to 'DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
(2008) Consultation on the mental capacity 
(deprivation of liberty: monitoring and 
reporting) and (deprivation of liberty: 
standard authorisations, assessments and 
ordinary residence) (amendment) regulations 
2009 (Gateway Ref 11057, Department of 
Health, London)' requested from Department 
of Health.  These were supplied by email, and 
have been placed in zipped folder at the listed 
URL. 
14-
Oct-
10 
05-
Nov-
10 
https://dl.d
ropbox.co
m/u/43970
81/Thesis/
FOIA%20da
ta/Respons
es%20to%2
0the%20D
OLS%20mo
nitoring%2
0consultati
on.zip 
24 Departme I contacted the DH to ask: 1) Whether the 03- 21- email 
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nt of 
Health  
Department of Health based its original 
decision not to extend the DoLS framework to 
‘supported living’ or ‘extra care’ services on 
any research, and for copies/citations for that 
research; 2) Copies of any documents setting 
out the DH's reasoning that deprivation of 
liberty was likely to occur in supported living 
settings; 3) Whether the Dh based its decision 
not to extend the DOLS to supported living on 
any estimates of the numbers of people who 
might be deprived of their liberty in those 
settings and a copy of those figures; 4) 
Whether the DH kept a count of the number 
of people deprived of their liberty in 
supported living services by an order of the 
Court of Protection; 5) Whether the DH 
planned to review the scope of the safeguards 
to extend beyond care homes and hospitals?.  
The DH initially responded simply that 'The 
Government did not include supported living 
because it considered it less likely that severe 
restrictions would be placed on people in 
supported living arrangements, who would 
tend to lead more independent lives', but gave 
no detail as the basis for this belief.  A follow 
up request for a review confirmed that 'the 
Department does not hold any research and is 
also unaware whether or not any such 
research exists' for the basis for this belief.  It 
held no documents which could testify to the 
DH's reasoning that deprivation of liberty was 
unlikely to occur in supported living.  It held no 
statistical estimates or information on the 
number of people who might be deprived of 
their liberty in supported living.  They also 
stated 'whilst our previous response 
confirmed that the Department had no plans 
to review the scope of the safeguards, I can 
also  confirm that extending the safeguards 
beyond care homes and hospitals was not 
considered by the Department so there are no 
documents or meeting minutes to this effect.' 
Mar-
10 
Jun-
11 
25 Departme
nt of 
Health  
Responses of CSCI, HCC and MHAC to 
'MINISTRY OF JUSTICE & DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH (2007) 'Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards: 
Consultation Paper CP23/07 '' requested. 
Supplied by email and placed in zipped folder 
and the listed URL. 
03-
Aug 
09-
Aug 
https://dl.d
ropbox.co
m/u/43970
81/Thesis/
FOIA%20da
ta/Respons
es%20of%2
0CSCI%20H
C%20and%
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20MHAC%
20to%20D
OLS%20con
sultation.zi
p 
26 Departme
nt of 
Health  
I asked the DH whether 'any further 
correspondence taken place between the 
Department of Health and the Care Quality 
Commission on the subject of compliance of 
the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards with 
OPCAT, following the receipt of the document 
'Joint CSCI, Healthcare Commission, MHAC 
response to chapter 8 of the Deprivation of 
Liberty safeguards draft addendum to the 
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice'?' and 
requested copies of that correspondence.  The 
DH replied 'Having searched our records, there 
has been no correspondence between the 
Department and the Care Quality Commission 
on the subject of compliance of the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards with OPCAT 
since your last request dated September 3rd.'  
A request for clarification as to whether there 
had been any correspondence (including prior 
to September 3rd) on this resulted in 
confirmation that 'I can confirm that in both 
cases DH has not corresponded with Ministry 
of Justice or CQC on this matter'. 
09-
Sep-
10 
29-
Sep-
10 
email 
27 Departme
nt of 
Health 
and NHS 
Informati
on Centre 
I contacted the DH asking for, amongst other 
things, 'the number of: section 39C IMCAs, 
section 39D IMCAs, unpaid representatives 
and paid representatives for each local 
authority up until 1st November 2010'.  The 
DH confirmed they do not collect data on 
paid/unpaid representatives.  I was offered 
collapsed data on s39C/D IMCAs.  The data 
was then withheld under s22 FOIA on grounds 
it was for future publication, but it was never 
published.  I was then passed to the NHS IC, 
who were said to hold the data.  The NHS IC 
refused on the basis that it might be possible 
to identify individuals from the LA level 
breakdown.  I complained about the decision 
to the Information Commissioner's Office 
(ICO), the ICO found that in fact the DH - not 
the NHS IC - held the data. I then applied again 
to the DH for the data.  On 31 January 2012 
the DH supplied the data with the following 
comment 'The data by category for 2009/10 
were not published due to feedback from 
advocates, care homes and local authorities, 
28-
Feb-
11 
31-
Jan-
12 
email 
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which showed that there was considerable 
confusion over the understanding and 
recording of the different categories of DoLS in 
the first year. The decision was made at the 
time that the numbers inputted under the 
three categories were unreliable and 
unusable. However, this review has 
highlighted that, despite its erroneous nature, 
there are no legal grounds for withholding the 
information.' 
28 Law 
Commissi
on 
I asked the Law commission to provide copies 
of responses to  'LAW COMMISSION (2010) 
Adult Social Care: A Consultation Paper (Law 
Com No 192, London)' which 'were of the view 
that the Law Commission should have 
included proposals on complaints and 
redress.'  The Law Commission were able to 
identify and supply those responses.  They 
have been placed in a zipped folder at the 
URL. 
18-
Jul-12 
18-
Jul-
12 
https://dl.d
ropbox.co
m/u/43970
81/Thesis/
FOIA%20da
ta/Respons
es%20to%2
0Law%20C
om%20ASC
%20consult
ation.zip 
29 Local 
authoritie
s in 
England 
I sent out a 'round robin' request to all local 
authorities in England asking them a series of 
questions about their DoLS activity up to 1 
November 2010.  Questions included the 
number of court cases concerning the DoLS 
each LA had been involved in, the number of 
third party requests to consider whether an 
unauthorised deprivation of liberty was 
occurring received by each local authority and 
the number of times the CQC had brought a 
possible unauthorised deprivation of liberty to 
the attention of the local authority.  Results 
for this FOIA request are given in Appendix 3. 
01-
Dec-
10 
07 
Feb 
2011 
All 
requests 
were 
initiated 
via the 
website 
'www.what
dotheykno
w.com', 
however 
some 
responses 
were 
received 
via email.  
All 
requests by 
the author 
can be 
located 
from: 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/user/lu
cy_series 
30 Local 
authoritie
s in 
England 
Matthew Hill, a journalist working for BBC 
Radio 4's The Report conducted a series of 
FOIA requests of local authorities asking them 
about the use of Part 8 Reviews and 
Jun-
11 
Sep-
11 
email 
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challenges to DoLS authorisations in the Court 
of Protection.  He asked for my assistance in 
analysing the data, and kindly permitted me to 
share his findings in this thesis. 
31 Departme
nt of 
Health  
A request for the DH to provide the responses 
to DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (2005) 
Consultation on the 
Independent Mental Capacity 
Advocate Service (Department of Health, 
Gateway Ref 5090, London).  The DH supplied 
the following responses: Action for Advocacy, 
the Alzheimer's Society, the English 
Community Care Association, the Law Society, 
Mencap, the Mental Health Foundation and 
the Foundation for People with Learning 
Disabilities, the Official Solicitor, the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists and the Royal College 
of General Practitioners. 
25-
Oct-
12 
23-
Nov-
12 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/response
s_to_imca_
consultatio
n 
32 Office of 
the 
Official 
Solicitor 
and Public 
Trustee 
A request for the Official Solicitor (OS) to 
provide data on the number of times he had 
acted as a litigation friend in appeals against 
detention brought under s21A MCA, the 
number of times he had withdrawn such an 
appeal on the basis it had low prospects of 
success, the supervisory bodies whom he had 
challenged in his capacity as litigation friend in 
a s21A MCA appeal and the outcomes of such 
cases.  The OS declined to supply this data on 
the basis that he was not a public authority 
who was bound to disclose information under 
the FOIA. 
29-
Mar-
11 
12-
Apr-
11 
http://ww
w.whatdot
heyknow.c
om/reques
t/appeals_
under_s21
a_mental_
capaci 
33 The 
Attorney 
General 
Strictly speaking, this was not a request under 
the FOIA.  I asked my local MP, Mr Stephen 
Williams, to table a written question in 
parliament to ask the Ministry of Justice for 
the information described in request #32.  Mr 
Williams tabled the question, but Mr Djanogly 
declined to provide the information on the 
basis that 'The information requested is not 
held by the Ministry of Justice and is not 
readily available. The cost of collating it would 
be disproportionate, as such an exercise 
would require the Official Solicitor to recover 
from secure storage all files relating to 
applications to the Court of Protection (other 
than those relating solely to Property and 
Affairs) and to then trawl through them for 
the relevant information to be obtained.' 
09-
May-
11 
09-
May-
11 
http://ww
w.publicati
ons.parlia
ment.uk/p
a/cm20101
1/cmhansr
d/cm11050
9/text/110
509w0001.
htm 
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APPENDIX B – SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIALS ON REGULATION AND 
OMBUDSMEN 
This appendix supplements discussions of regulatory approaches to the 
enforcement of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and the deprivation of liberty 
safeguards (DoLS) in the body of this thesis.  It contains details of data gathered under 
the FOIA, or combined in new ways from other sources.  It includes several small studies 
which sampled CQC‘s regulatory reports, and summaries of reports by Ombudsmen 
discussed in this thesis. 
STUDY B1: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF CQC AND 
PREDECESSOR BODIES, 2005-2011 
Data source: Data supplied by CQC under the FOIA (FOIA #6).  Annual reports 
of the predecessor commissions (Mental Health Act Commission, 2007; 2008a; 2009a; 
Healthcare Commission, 2007a; 2008). 
Figure 7 Total combined expenditure on regulation of health and social care, and Mental 
Health Act visitation (£000) 
 
  
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
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Figure 8 Annual expenditure of CQC and its three predecessor commissions (£000), 2005-
2011 
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Figure 9 Expenditure on regulation and inspection for adult social care, 2005-2011 
 
STUDY B2: CSCI AND CQC INSPECTION REPORTS 
As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, it is expected that health and social care 
regulators will contribute towards the protection of legal rights of social care service 
users through enforcement of the principles of the HRA, the MCA and other legislation.  
Inspection reports for Cornish residential care services for people with learning 
disabilities were examined for mentions of key terms linked to the MCA and the HRA. 
SAMPLE 
30 inspection reports were downloaded from the CQC‘s website in July 2012.  
These reports were identified by using the CQC‘s search engine920 and selecting the 
first 30 services that came up for a search of care homes for ‗Cornwall‘ with the ‗learning 
disability‘ option selected for which there was a report.  A sample of 30 was chosen as it 
was felt that it would be sufficient to demonstrate whether or not inspectors in that area 
were routinely making reference to matters connected with the MCA and various key 
connected issues.  The sample was not intended to exhaustively cover all the sub-
categories of issues connected with the MCA, and so data saturation techniques were 
not employed (Guest et al., 2006). 
Finding 30 reports required a search of 36 services, as 6 did not have inspection 
reports available online at all.  For eight of the services there was no inspection report by 
                                               
920 
www.cqc.org.uk
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the CQC, so a CSCI report was used.  The table below shows the properties of the 
reports in terms of compliance, and the period since the inspection the most recent 
report for that service is based upon. 
Table 3 Properties of CQC and CSCI inspection report sample 
 
Number   % 
Number recorded non-compliant 
3 8% 
Number of services with no inspection reports online 
8 22% 
Average (mean) number of months since last 
inspection 
28  
Average (median) number of months since last 
inspection 
32  
Longest period (months) since last inspection 
39  
Shortest period (months) since last inspection 
1  
Number of services inspected in last 12 months 
5 14% 
Number of services inspected in last 24 months 
7 19% 
Number of services inspected in last 36 months 
22 61% 
Number of services inspected 3 years or longer ago 
10 28% 
 
CODING 
The inspection reports were uploaded to qualitative research software package 
NVivo.  The following terms were chosen as a priori themes for coding the reports: 
advocacy; capacity; choice; consent; deprivation of liberty; dignity; person-centred; 
privacy; restrictions; restraint; rights; rules and regimes.  These terms were selected as 
they reflect key issues relating to the MCA and associated areas of human rights. Each 
report was then hand coded against each theme.  The key terms were ‗tree nodes‘, with 
various emergent sub-themes for the ways in which these concepts appeared in the 
inspection reports.  The number of sources (i.e. individual inspection reports) each node 
appeared in, and the overall number of references for each node, is given in Table 4, 
below.  Sometimes a particular term came up in almost all reports because it was part of 
CQC‘s standard rubric;921 uses of a term which were not deliberately included by an 
inspector are excluded.  For each category of code, the ‗node‘ with the most references 
is given in bold: 
                                               
921 
For example, ‗rights‘ and ‗choice‘ come up as part of the CQC‘s rubric explaining what the 
essential standards are.
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Table 4 Frequency of codes arising in CQC reports for residential care services for people 
with learning disabilities in Cornwall, by source and reference 
Code category Node 
Sourc
es 
Re
fs 
Advocacy 
*Concerns about lack of access to advocacy 0 0 
 
Service praised for involvement or encouragement of 
advocate 
6 11 
 
Service providers as advocates 1 1 
Capacity 
Best interests decisions appropriately recorded 1 1 
 
Capacity assessment needed 1 1 
 
Capacity Ax seen in care plan 2 2 
  
Lack of involvement in decision making of people who 
lack capacity 
2 2 
 
MCA training 8 14 
 
People assessed by service as having the capacity to 
consent to use of lap straps 
1 1 
 
Provider has participated in multidisciplinary best interests 
meeting 
1 1 
 
Restriction of a person with diminished ―cognitive 
capacity‖ observed 
1 1 
 
Staff demonstrated 'awareness' of MCA 2 2 
 
No recording of best interests decisions in lieu of consent 2 5 
Choice 
Care plan includes restrictions on choice and freedoms 2 2 
 
Choice given as reason for not changing smelly 
furnishings 
1 1 
 
Choice in furnishings 3 3 
 
Choice of activity 7 9 
 
Choice of food 7 10 
 
Choice of format of care plan 1 2 
 
Choices around admission 3 6 
 
Evidence of support to make decisions 1 3 
 
Good choice practice 3 3 
 
Poor choice practice observed 2 5 
 
Potential restriction the result of choice 1 1 
Consent 
*Concerns about consent and medication 0 0 
 
Concerns about consent and support 2 3 
 
Consent to care recorded in care plan 2 4 
 
Consent to involvement of family or advocate 1 1 
 
Good consent practice 1 2 
 
Misunderstanding of consent 1 2 
 
Provider has policies on consent 1 1 
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Deprivation of 
liberty 
DOLS referral made 1 1 
 
DOLS referral not made but should have been 1 1 
 
DoLS training 5 7 
 
Nobody currently subject to DOLS 1 1 
 
Requirement made about restrictions on liberty 1 1 
 
Staff show awareness of DOLS 1 1 
Dignity 
Care plan covers dignity 1 1 
 
Concerns about dignity 2 4 
 
Dignity included in statement of purpose or service policy 2 3 
  
Dignity is respected in service 2 2 
  
Environment needs improvement to promote dignity 2 5 
  
Staff observed treating residents with dignity 6 7 
 
Staff say they provide care with dignity 1 1 
 
Storage of personal information must not compromise 
dignity 
2 6 
Person-
centred 
Evidence of non-person centred care 1 2 
  
Participation in service delivery 1 1 
  
PCP training 1 1 
  
Personalised room 5 6 
  
Person-centred or individualised plans viewed by 
inspector 
7 11 
  
Service says it uses person-centred approaches 2 3 
  
Treated as an individual 1 1 
Privacy 
Concerns about privacy 1 1 
 
Evidence of privacy being respected observed by 
inspector 
3 3 
Restrictions 
Child gate used 1 1 
  
Concerns about restrictions 2 4 
 
Requirement made concerning restriction on liberty 1 1 
 
Restraint 3 3 
 
Restrictions appear appropriate 1 1 
 
Restrictions are recorded 4 4 
  
Restrictions not agreed in care plan 1 1 
  
Restrictions on consumption of food or drink 2 4 
  
Restrictions on visitors 1 1 
  
*Seclusion 0 0 
  
Some restrictions on access to hazardous areas 1 1 
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Staff show awareness of restrictions linked to DOLS 1 1 
  
Window not fitted with restrictors 1 1 
  
Windows fitted with restrictors 1 1 
Rights 
Rights mentioned in care plan 1 1 
  
Rights  mentioned in statement of purpose or policy 
documents 
1 1 
  
Inspector expresses concerns about rights of residents 2 8 
 
Service users informed of 'rights and responsibilities' 3 3 
 
Service users' rights are respected 2 2 
 
Staff have been on human rights training 1 1 
 
Staff promote service users' rights and choices 1 1 
  
Staff say they promote people's rights 2 2 
  
Voting rights 2 3 
Rules and 
regimes 
The service operates a 'no alcohol' policy 1 1 
  
Service users report not having to ask permission to make 
a cup of tea 
2 2 
  
Service users report being allowed to manage their own 
money 
1 1 
 
DISCUSSION 
The sample was adequate to show that whilst CQC inspectors do make frequent 
reference to the MCA and related concepts.  Most references are related to recorded 
information, especially information connected with training and care plans, but some 
inspectors also sometimes record their own observations and interactions with service 
users.  Such observations occurred less frequently, however, than references to 
recorded information. 
These data suggest that MCA inspectors do monitor the MCA and related issues 
on a fairly frequent basis, but not routinely for all services.  There was a greater tendency 
to report that an inspector had seen a capacity assessment or evidence of training on the 
MCA or the DoLS, than to raise concerns about the absence of an assessment or 
training, etc.  The absence of routine mention of capacity assessments, bests interests 
decisions, DoLS referrals, and training on these schemas may mean that that CQC 
inspectors  are not routinely be considering these issues.  There is a danger that 
inspectors simply report what they are shown and told, rather than routinely probing for 
evidence in each area. 
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STUDY B3: THE VOICE OF SERVICE USERS  
CQC reports on adult social care services contain a section entitled ‗What people 
say about this service‘.  This small study examined how reliably these sections are 
completed by inspectors visiting learning disabilities residential care services, and offer a 
sample of the kinds of things they reported.  The study examined reports from two areas, 
and included compliant and non-compliant services. 
SAMPLE 
Within the time constraints of this doctoral research it was not practical to conduct 
a large survey of CQC inspection reports.  To pick up on possible differences between 
inspectors from different regions, I chose two separate postcodes – one being rural, and 
one being urban.  Using the CQC‘s search engine, I searched for learning disabilities 
residential care services in those areas, and picked the first ten compliant and the first 
ten non-compliant services for each.  Searches were conducted in November 2011.   
RESULTS 
Table 5 shows, for each area and for compliant and non-compliant services, 
whether or not a report was available on the website; whether or not the report recorded 
that inspectors spoke to residents; whether CQC inspectors spoke with relatives or 
advocates of residents; and whether or not CQC inspectors observed interactions 
between residents and staff. 
Table 5 Methods used by CQC inspectors to examine the experiences of care home 
residents 
Area 1 (Rural) 2 (Urban) 
 
Compliant Compliant 
Non-
compliant Compliant 
Non-
compliant 
Totals 
Reports available (of a 
possible 10) 
2/10 8/10 2/10 9/10 21/40 
Inspector spoke with service 
users (of number of reports) 
1/2 8/8 0/2 4/9 13/21 
Inspector observed 
interactions between staff 
and service users 
1/2 3/8 1/2 1/9 6/21 
Inspector spoke with 
relatives or advocates of 
service users 
0/2 1/8 2/2 3/9 6/21 
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Inspector did not speak with 
residents, their relatives or 
their advocates 
1/2 1/8 0/2 4/9 6/21 
 
DISCUSSION 
Online inspection reports were unavailable for almost half of services when this 
study was conducted; reports were more likely to be available for services which were 
non-compliant with CQC‘s regulatory standards.  For those services for which reports 
were available, inspectors spoke to service users in 61% of services, they spoke with 
relatives or advocates of service users in 29%, observed interactions between staff and 
service users in 29% and did not speak with residents, their relatives or their advocates 
in a residual 29% of services. 
For most of the reports where inspectors did not speak with service users, the 
reason for not speaking with them is not recorded.  One report states that the ‗the level 
of their learning disability‘ was a reason for not talking to service users, but states that 
inspectors contacted a relative to seek their views instead.  Other reports stated: 
‗People living in [the service] have a learning and physical disability and 
use non verbal communication to communicate their needs. This made it 
difficult to fully gain the views of the people who use the service.‘ 
‗The individuals living at [the service] have a learning disability and 
complex needs which meant that it was difficult to seek their views as 
many of the individuals used non verbal communication. However, those 
that could let us know told us they were happy living in the home.‘ 
‗During our visit to [the service] we were able to talk with one person who 
lives there.  The other people were not able to communicate extensively, 
but we were able to get some useful information and views from another 
person.  We also talked to the relative of one person who lived at [the 
service] by telephone.‘ 
‗We spoke with 4 people who use the service and they told us that they 
were happy living [there] and said that they were treated well.  We were 
unable to speak with other people due to the nature of their learning 
disability.  We did speak to family members and they told us that their 
relatives are supported by the staff to receive the care they need.‘ 
‗We were unable to talk to people about the outcomes we assessed and 
obtain a detailed view about what it is like living at [the service] due to the 
level of their learning disability‘ 
In that last service, inspectors relied upon observations of how staff and residents 
interacted in lieu of talking to residents.   
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In almost all reports residents were reported as being complementary about the 
service, however a few were not: 
‗We spoke to three people living in the home but we received few 
comments about their lives at the home. Some of the comments we 
received were positive and others were not and we have raised these with 
the local safeguarding team...  Since our site visit the provider has agreed 
to suspend all admissions to the home for the time being.‘ 
‗We were only able to speak to 2 people during the visit and received 
limited information from them. We also spoke to social services who have 
recently investigated an allegation that a staff member shouted at 
someone living at the home. This allegation could not be substantiated 
and social services told us that the service is meeting people's needs. 
People told us that they are happy living at the service and that the staff 
treat them well.‘ 
COMMENT 
This study suggests that in November 2011 no online reports of inspections were 
available for a large proportion of learning disability services in these areas.  This may 
relate to problems with the CQC‘s website, and not the existence of such reports.  Of 
those reports that were available, it appears that inspectors are not always able to seek 
the views of service users.  In some cases this is described as being because of the 
level of the service users‘ disability.  A lack of specialist knowledge of their 
communication method on the part of the inspector might contribute towards this inability 
to communicate, but this is not discussed in the reports.  In some cases, inspectors 
compensated for an inability to communicate with residents by seeking the views of 
relatives or advocates; however the means by which those relatives were selected and 
approached is unclear.  They may have been chosen by the service, which might result 
in a more complimentary sample than might have been achieved through random 
selection.   
Some inspectors relied upon observation of staff-resident interactions.  In some 
cases, inspectors were able to only obtain limited information from service users, 
although no reflections on why that might be the case are offered in the reports.  In 
several cases neither the service user nor their advocates or relatives are spoken with by 
inspectors, and no reason is given by the author of the report for this shortcoming. 
STUDY B4: ENFORCEMENT ACTION TAKEN BY CQC 
CQC has statutory powers to take enforcement action against health and social 
care services who do not comply with their essential standards.  CQC supplied the 
following information about the number of times they had taken different kinds of 
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enforcement action against different kinds of providers (FOIA #9).  Information is for the 
period April 2010 – February 2012 for the NHS and October 2010 and February 2012 for 
the other sectors. 
Table 6 Enforcement actions by CQC, 2010-2012 
 
Social Care 
Organisation 
Independent 
Healthcare 
Organisation 
NHS 
Healthcare 
Organisation 
Total 
Warning notice 
487 17 14 518 
Cancellation of 
registration 
15   15 
Impose a condition 
18   18 
Suspension of 
registration 
3   3 
Urgent imposing 
condition 
 1  1 
Fixed penalty notice 
1   1 
Vary a condition 
12   12 
Prosecution 
1   1 
Simple caution 
3   3 
  
In response to a further question about how often enforcement activities related to 
different essential standards, CQC provided this data for April 2010-March 2011: 
Table 7 Compliance actions undertaken by CQC for different essential standards, 2010-
2011 
Essential standard 
Type of 
compliance 
action 
Number of 
actions 
4: Care and welfare of people who use services 
Impose a 
condition 
2 
 
Warning 
notice 
3 
7: Safeguarding people who use services from 
abuse 
Warning 
notice 
2 
9: Management of medicines 
Warning 
notice 
3 
12: Requirements relating to workers 
Warning 
notice 
1 
16: Assessing and monitoring the quality of service 
provision 
Warning 
notice 
1 
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STUDY B5: LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN REPORTS ON 
CAPACITY 
The Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) investigates complaints into local 
authorities and care providers.  A site search of the LGO website922 produced several 
investigation reports which referenced the MCA or associated terms such as ‗capacity‘, 
‗best interests‘ and ‗consent‘.  The search is not exhaustive as many LGO investigations 
are not published, however the results give a flavour of the LGO‘s approach to issues 
around capacity and consent.  A summary of the reports, and their relationship to 
capacity, are as follows: 
Bristol City Council 2011 (09/005/944):  
Mrs Johnson, an elderly lady with dementia, was resident in a care home 
rated ‗poor‘ by the CSCI/CQC.  A CQC inspection found that residents 
were being raised as early as 5.30am, were not being assisted by staff 
when they wanted to be, and were being left wet or soiled, unattended 
and at risk.  The placement was partially funded by the council.  After a 
‗safeguarding‘ investigation by the council, Mrs Johnson was moved to a 
different ‗Unit‘ operated by the provider; her family were not informed of 
the move.  Following a ‗particularly appalling incident‘ Mrs Johnson‘s son 
sought to move her to an alternative care home which cost more, 
believing he must pay a third party contribution towards the cost.   
Mr Johnson complained to the council, who concluded that Mrs Johnson‘s 
personal care needs had not been met for several months, but concluded 
they had taken appropriate action to safeguard her.  The LGO found 
Maladministration.  It held that whilst the Council‘s investigation had 
attributed responsibility for poor care standards to the provider, ‗As the 
commissioner of the service that Mrs Johnson received... the Council was 
responsible for the poor service received.‘  Citing s6 HRA and positive 
obligations arising under Article 3 ECHR, the LGO noted that social 
services ‗are obliged to use their powers to protect vulnerable adults from 
abuse‘.  The investigation found that the Council did not carry out a 
mental capacity assessment when it moved Mrs Johnson to a different 
unit.  It stated ‗Councils should take their responsibilities under The 
Mental Capacity Act seriously... the Council‘s actions critically overlooked 
the rights of Mrs Johnson to have her individual needs considered, it 
denied the family the opportunity to make best interest representations on 
her behalf at the earliest opportunity and overlooked considering whether 
advocates should have been involved... This too amounted to 
maladministration.‘ 
Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council 2004 (02/C/17068):  
Mrs Jefferson complained that the Council had failed to find a suitable 
placement for her son, Andrew Taylor,923 after a Mental Health Tribunal 
                                               
922 
A site search using Google (―site:www.lgo.org.uk‖) was used on the recommendation of the 
LGO as there is a current problem with their internal search engine for searching reports.
 
923 
Not their real names
 
329 
 
had found that he should be transferred out of a secure adult psychiatric 
ward to an appropriate placement as soon as possible.  Mr Taylor had 
epilepsy and Fragile X Syndrome; his mother claimed that ‗there were no 
facilities in the hospital for patients with a learning disability, staff were not 
familiar with the needs of people with an autistic spectrum disorder, her 
son was constantly heavily sedated and his right to liberty was violated.‘  
The LGO found ‗a catalogue of errors‘, including failure to properly 
conduct a community care assessment and to prepare him for a return to 
the community from a special school.   
Mr Taylor had been sectioned shortly after returning from the special 
school because of his behaviour and, according to the LGO, ‗because of 
the Council‘s refusal to fund a placement that would have met his needs, 
he remained for 18 months in a locked adult psychiatric ward whose 
provision was totally unsuitable.‘  The prioritising of budgetary 
considerations prolonged his detention in hospital.  The LGO found 
Maladministration.  The case occurred before the MCA was passed, and 
capacity is not mentioned, but the report does cite Articles 5 and 8 ECHR, 
and point towards the important role of local authority social services in 
obviating the need for detention in hospital. 
Leeds City Council 2011 (10/012/561) 
Ms B was estranged from her mother, but learned that she was in a care 
home and unlikely to live long, and sought to visit her.  Ms B‘s brother 
made allegations to the care home and the Council that a visit from Ms B 
would upset his mother.  The care home told Ms B she was not permitted 
to visit.  The Council officer was told by a service manager to assess Ms 
B‘s mothers‘ capacity to make a decision about the visit; as the officer had 
felt unable to personally assess her capacity she had made an urgent 
referral to an IMCA to conduct the assessment.  The referral took several 
weeks, and by the time it was completed Ms B‘s mother had had a stroke 
and was no longer able to recognise or communicate with her daughter.   
The LGO found maladministration which ‗deprived Ms B and her mother 
of the opportunity to speak with each other before they were separated 
forever by death.‘  The LGO noted that capacity assessments are usually 
conducted by the person who must make a decision on somebody‘s 
behalf, although specialists can be used for more formal 
assessments.924  It also noted that the purpose of an IMCA ‗is to help 
particularly vulnerable people who lack the capacity to make important 
decisions‘.  Having cited Article 8 ECHR, the LGO stated ‗Relatives and 
friends have the right to visit and see each other without undue 
interference and the right to respect for family life is enshrined in law.‘  
The LGO found it was maladministration to prevent Ms B from visiting the 
home.  It commented ‗It is no mitigation to say that the delay in arranging 
to assess Mrs B was because the Mental Capacity Act was new – there 
was no need for a ‗specialist‘ assessment.‘ 
                                               
924 
In fact, although a specialist such as a doctor may conduct a formal assessment, it is still the 
responsibility of the person making the substituted decision to use this as evidence to come to 
their own assessment.  Legal responsibility for assessing capacity cannot be delegated, although 
evidence to assist with assessment can be sought. 
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Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Manchester City Council Annual 
Review: 2010’ 
The review described a case where a complainant to the LGO suffered 
noise nuisance from a neighbour who had ‗significant mental health 
problems‘.  The LGO criticised the council for not having a protocol with 
the mental health trust who supported the neighbour, for delaying taking 
possession proceedings in relation to the neighbour and not encouraging 
the housing trust to take such action.  The LGO ‗considered that the 
council was preoccupied with the neighbour‘s mental capacity when this 
was a matter for the Court and this contributed to the delay in taking 
action.‘ 
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust and 
Newcastle City Council 2011 (08/003/256) A joint investigation by the 
HSO and LGO925 
Mr J was an ‗active, outgoing and sociable man‘ with Down‘s Syndrome 
who lived independently in rented accommodation with his wife with local 
authority arranged support from The Coquet Trust.  He was admitted to 
hospital for a 5-6 week assessment owing to concerns about his declining 
health and skills, but remained in hospital for seven months, including five 
months where he was declared fit for discharge.  When he was 
discharged it was into ‗inappropriate locked accommodation‘.  He 
remained in that accommodation until he died, ten months later.  The 
complaint was brought by Mr J‘s brother.   
The Ombudsmen found that the NHS trust should have documented their 
view of Mr J‘s capacity to consent to admission to hospital, and continued 
to review his capacity to consent to inpatient status during the following 
months ‗in line with the guidance issued following the Bournewood 
case‘.926  The NHS Trust contended that Mr J was happy in the hospital 
and made no attempt to leave; this was disputed by his brother and the 
Ombudsmen pointed out that in any case ‗the fact that an individual might 
not have tried to leave did not mean they were not being ‗detained‘.‘927  
The Ombudsmen observed that the NHS Trust ‗had clearly given Mr J 
and his family the impression that only they (the NHS Trust) could say 
when Mr J could leave the hospital‘,928  and had failed to involve his family 
appropriately in care planning or to ‗to appreciate the full importance of Mr 
J‘s family in his life‘.929  The Council were criticised for failing to support 
Mr J‘s wife to visit him more than once a week,930 and for the ‗astonishing 
and absurd‘931  situation that in order to secure appropriate housing in 
order to leave hospital, Mr J was expected to use a choice-bidding system 
which required him or a nominated person to bid for advertised properties.  
This system was not explained to his family, no relative or professional 
were invited to bid on his behalf, and two offers that were eventually made 
                                               
925 
Also published as: Local Government Ombudsman and Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman (2011).
 
926 
Ibid, [88]
 
927 
Ibid, [89]
 
928 
Ibid, [90]
 
929 
Ibid, [92]-[93]
 
930 
Ibid, [97]
 
931 
Ibid, [100]
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were refused without any consultation with either Mr J or his family – after 
which no further offers were forthcoming.   
The council attributed the lack of further offers to Mr J‘s failure to bid, a 
response which the Ombudsmen found ‗outrageous and indefensible. It 
entirely ignores the question of Mr J‘s capacity to act on his own 
behalf‘.932  They concluded that ‗the Council‘s failure to review regularly 
and record why Mr J was being effectively detained in unsuitable, locked 
accommodation, and their failure to take appropriate and urgent action to 
find suitable permanent accommodation, were so serious as to amount to 
service failure.‘933  They wrote ‗in failing to take timely and appropriate 
action to find permanent suitable accommodation for Mr J and his wife, 
the Council were not just failing to act in Mr J‘s best interests, but failing to 
ensure that Mr J‘s human rights were adequately safeguarded.‘934  The 
Ombudsmen did not, however, uphold complaints against the care 
provider, on the basis that ‗it seems to us that Coquet Trust staff did what 
was reasonably possible within the time allocated to them.‘935 
North Yorkshire County Council 2005 (04/C/06322) 
Mrs Talbot complained that the Council failed to ensure that her brother, 
Mr Mitchell, received adequate care.  Mr Mitchell had Multiple Sclerosis, 
heart disease and eczema, and lived alone.  Following an assessment, 
home care was arranged.  Home care workers expressed concern about 
Mr Mitchell‘s relationship with a woman whom they said drank 
excessively.  His sister became more concerned about his care, and 
desired a multidisciplinary meeting to discuss this. A Council officer did 
not arrange such a meeting as ‗He did not want people having 
discussions  about  him  and  she  would  not  arrange  such  a  meeting  
without  his consent‘.  Mrs Talbot investigated residential care options for 
her brother, and in a meeting with a consultant Mr Mitchell apparently 
agreed that he needed to be in such a setting.  Mrs Talbot informed the 
Council officer that Mr Mitchell‘s GP and consultant support supported 
such a move, but the officer doubted the Council would fund such a 
placement and did not contact them.  The officer reported that Mr Mitchell 
told her he did not wish to move into residential care or leave the town 
where he lived.  The officer eventually sought a medical and mental 
health assessment from Mr Mitchell‘s GP, but he died before it was 
arranged.   
The LGO criticised the Council for failing to communicate to Mrs Talbot 
that a multidisciplinary meeting did not take place because it was not what 
Mr Mitchell wanted, and for failing to obtain information from Mr Mitchell‘s 
GP or conduct a proper review.  However, Mrs Talbot‘s complaint about 
the reluctance of the Council not to pursue residential care options was 
not upheld, stating ‗I appreciate that she believes that gentle persuasion 
by the Council would have brought him round to the idea of residential 
care but the evidence suggests he was resistant to this and there is no 
evidence that he was incapable of making such decisions for himself.‘  
According to the LGO, the council had not got the wrong balance between 
                                               
932 
Ibid, [102]
 
933 
Ibid, [103] 
934 
Ibid, [105] 
935 
Ibid, [106]
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‗his wishes and the risk that he was prepared to take in his own care 
arrangements with his sister‘s understandable wish to protect him.‘  The 
LGO‘s report does not explicitly mention mental capacity (although it does 
talk about ‗capability‘), best interests or the MCA, which had been passed 
in April that year although it had not come into force. 
St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council and 5 Boroughs 
Partnership NHS Trust 2011 (Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman and Local Government Association, 2011) 
Mr B lived independently in the community and ‗had a long history of 
involvement with mental health services‘ including detention under the 
MHA and suicide attempts.  He received support from cleaners, a support 
worker and a care co-ordinator, who was a community psychiatric nurse 
and who administered medication to him fortnightly.  Mr B‘s cousin had 
attempted to alert the NHS Trust and the Council to concerns about 
hygiene and Mr B‘s health.  He was eventually admitted to hospital with 
malnutrition, dehydration and was eventually diagnosed with a bone 
marrow cancer which led to his death.  Mr B‘s cousin complained that a 
psychiatrist had prescribed inappropriate drugs for depression instead of 
responding to his poor physical state; that he had not been supported to 
claim appropriate welfare benefits; care plans were not implemented; no 
one responded appropriately to developing risks to his physical and 
mental health; and that consequently he had ‗lived in squalor and pain‘ 
and been admitted to hospital too late for treatment for his cancer to 
extend his life.  The Ombudsmen did not uphold the complaints regarding 
the psychiatrist or support to claim benefits, however they found that ‗the 
Trust and the Council had failed in their joint responsibility to manage and 
implement Mr B‘s care plans and to take adequate account of developing 
signs that he was at risk.‘   
The Ombudsmen explicitly considered the MCA, which they described as 
‗a statutory framework to empower and protect vulnerable people who are 
not able to make their own decisions‘.  The Council and the Trust had 
denied fault, stating that ‗Mr B was a long standing, voluntary patient with 
capacity, entitled to reject assistance, which he did.‘  The Ombudsmen 
were critical that ‗There seemed to have been an assumption that Mr B 
had at all times the capacity to make decisions in relation to his day-to-
day life‘, without his capacity being formally ‗tested‘.  A nursing adviser 
who advised the Ombudsmen described care workers as ‗working in a 
culture which emphasised the individual‘s right to live in the way they 
chose‘, and the community mental health services team were described 
elsewhere as having ‗a strong sense that people had a right to live in the 
way they chose.‘   They commented that although concerns had been 
raised about Mr B‘s capacity, they were never pursued within the 
framework of the MCA, and concluded ‗The reality was that whereas Mr B 
might have been able to choose what he wanted to eat from a menu when 
in hospital, his mental state meant that he could not prioritise his physical 
needs against, for example, his desire to buy children‘s toys.‘  The nursing 
adviser recommended the use of guardianship936 to enable care workers 
to be more ‗assertive‘ about access for cleaners and to ensure ‗that Mr 
had access to basic appliances such as a telephone, cooker and washing 
                                               
936 
Presumably under s7 MHA
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machine.‘937   The LGO observed that although the community mental 
health team had a good understanding of the MHA, it ‗did not always 
consider the potential to use the Mental Capacity Act 2005 when the 
threshold for use of the Mental Health Act 1983  was not met‘, and 
community psychiatric nurses tended to think that capacity had to be 
assessed by a psychiatrist.   
Torbay Council 2012 (10/002/564) 
Mr Castle 938  issued a complaint against Torbay Council for issuing 
bankruptcy proceedings against him for a council tax debt of £2,248 
without having proper regard to his personal circumstances, including his 
mental health.  Mr Castle lived alone, and – having been made redundant 
– lived off savings and income from his band.  In 2006 he followed a ‗a 
gradual descent into chronic introspection‘ and ‗mental instability‘; he 
ceased opening letters, and ‗used the back door to access the property 
and stayed out of sight if callers came.‘  Bailiffs sent by the council were 
unable to gain access to the property, and reported to the council the 
accumulated post on the doormat and cobwebs over the door.  Feeling 
that Mr Castle would not respond to committal proceedings, the Council 
initiated bankruptcy proceedings to recover the debt.  The man who 
served the bankruptcy petition on Mr Castle, ‗had some doubts‘ about him 
and was unable to ‗reach a view on whether Mr Castle was being evasive 
or was in fact suffering illness.‘  A bailiff recalled that Mr Castle was 
suicidal, and a note on a Council solicitors‘ file noted concerns about his 
mental health.  The Council established that social services had no record 
of contact with Mr Castle,939 and made an appointment for him with the 
Citizen‘s Advice Bureau.  A bankruptcy order was made, of which Mr 
Castle became aware when he was visited by the trustee in bankruptcy.  
Mr Castle took out a loan against his property and cleared the £2,248 
debt to the Council and a £3,940.99 debt to a utilities company, but 
incurred additional costs of £24,000 due to the bankruptcy action.   
The LGO found in an earlier report that ‗the Council was at fault in failing 
to conduct and document a full review of the case in light of the 
information it received that Mr Castle was possibly suicidal‘ and 
recommended compensation of £25,000.  The Council refused to pay this 
compensation, stating that ‗he made a considered decision not to pay his 
council tax and that this is evidenced by his statement more than a year 
after the bankruptcy proceedings that he left unopened mail on the floor to 
give the impression nobody was at home.‘  The LGO countered that 
‗There is no evidence that Mr Castle was capable of dealing with his own 
affairs at the time of the recovery action or that bankruptcy was a 
considered decision taken in the knowledge of potential mental illness 
after the due weighing of all pertinent facts.‘  The LGO noted that it was 
not the investigator‘s role to assess Mr Castle‘s capacity under the MCA, 
but commented that ‗he was not dealing with his affairs at all‘ and that 
                                               
937 
Requiring access to ‗basic appliances‘ is not one of the essential powers under guardianship, 
although perhaps it is considered an implied power if access is required for persons to install such 
equipment.
 
938 
Not his real name
 
939 
There is no record of whether the social services department followed this up with a community 
care assessment, as would have been required under s27 NHS and Community Care Act 1990 if 
it appeared to the Council that he suffered from any mental disability.
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despite concerns that Council did not ‗take steps to establish evidence of 
capacity.‘  The Council argued that in the absence of evidence on 
incapacity it was duty bound to recover the debt, but the LGO responded 
that given the information the Council did have a failure to reconsider 
bankruptcy proceedings amounted to maladministration; it reiterated its 
call for compensation. 
Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council 2006 (04/C/17057) 
Mrs Walker signed an application for a renovation grant for her home, 
which had been declared unfit to live in by the Council, whilst she was 
detained in a psychiatric hospital.  The Council could require repayment of 
the grant if the home was sold within five years of taking it out; it had 
previously been three years but the law had changed.  When Mrs Walker 
came to sell her home, her daughter believed that as three years had 
expired the grant would not have to be repaid, however due to the legal 
change the Council sought to recover the grant.  Mrs Walker‘s daughter 
requested that the Council exercise its discretion not to require repayment 
of the grant.  The social worker who had taken the application form to Mrs 
Walker in hospital could not recall the visit, nor explaining the extended 
repayment period to her.  The Council stated that Mrs Walker had signed 
the forms during a period of lucidity, but it was unable to provide records 
to support that.  The Council said it was the social worker‘s responsibility 
to ensure she was capable of understanding the form, but the social 
worker said that although she might have understood the information, 
even when she was well ‗she would have been unable to retain 
information and use it.‘   
The LGO found maladministration by the Council in not ensuring Mrs 
Walker understood the extended repayment period, by officers always 
recommending that the discretion not to repay the grants is not exercised, 
and by officers advising Councillors that a person‘s mental state is not 
relevant to discretionary waivers of grant repayments.  The MCA had not 
come into force at the time of this report, but the LGO notes ‗The fact that 
Mrs Walker had severely impaired mental capacity to the point of being 
hospitalised at the time means that the Council should have made 
particular efforts to ensure that she understood every aspect of what she 
was agreeing to and signing.‘ 
Worcestershire County Council 2011 (09/013/172) 
Mrs Nash had dementia and lived on her own in her home.  Her 
stepdaughter complained that an in-house home care agency of the 
Council had failed to provide adequate care, and that the Council had not 
assessed Mrs Nash‘s needs after she had been admitted to a residential 
home for the purpose of such an assessment.  Neither had there been an 
assessment when, subsequently, Mrs Nash had been admitted to hospital 
after she had over-exercised and over-dressed in hot weather.  As a 
result, her health deteriorated and she was unable to return home and 
moved into residential care.  The LGO found maladministration on the 
basis that ‗The Council failed to carry out adequate risk assessment or 
care planning; failed to communicate to care workers the limits of Mrs 
Nash‘s capacity and care workers in turn failed to bring repeated 
instances of Mrs Nash placing herself at risk in hot weather to the 
attention of Council Managers.‘   
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The LGO investigator found that although home care workers and Council 
officers ‗agreed that Mrs Nash lacked insight into her condition‘ they had 
not intervened, for example to open a window on a hot day, as ‗they had 
to take into account Mrs Nash‘s wishes.‘  The Council expressed concern 
that such interventions might have increased the chances of care 
breaking down.  In response to a complaint from Mrs Nash‘s 
stepdaughter, the head of Adult Social Care had stated that care workers 
were not in a position to ‗force individuals to comply‘ with requests to 
dress more appropriately, or empty the fridge of out of date food.  The 
Council later accepted ‗a need for the Council to routinely consider the 
need for capacity and risk assessments as part of the care planning 
process‘.  The LGO found that maladministration where ‗while it was 
clearly known to the Council that Mrs Nash lacked capacity always to take 
decisions in her best interests, the Council did not communicate this to 
the care workers who would deliver her care.‘  The LGO concluded that 
whilst training on capacity was given to Council staff, ‗it is worrying that 
the Council has not reflected sooner upon whether more intervention 
could have been attempted in this case.‘ 
STUDY B6: STATISTICS ON USE OF COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 
Data source: For information on complaints to the LGO (FOIA #10).  For 
information on complaints to the Commission for Social Care Inspection (FOIA #11). 
Table 8 Complaints and enquiries about Adult Care Services received by LGO 
 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2001/12* 
 
868 
   
not assigned  
1035 990 250 
Council: assessment  
1 127 238 
Council: care plan   
40 77 
Council: charging   
97 179 
Council: DFG   
30 80 
Council: direct payments  
1 40 97 
Council: domiciliary care  
1 34 64 
Council: independent living   
11 31 
Council: non-regulated provision   
7 13 
Council: other  
2 105 310 
Council: other regulated provision   
10 10 
Council: residential care  
1 66 128 
Council: safeguarding   
45 106 
Council: shared lives   
3 0 
Council: transition from children‘s services   
0 12 
Council: transport   
3 39 
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Direct payments: domiciliary care   
1 2 
Direct payments: independent loving   
0 1 
Direct payments: other provision   
0 2 
Direct payments: residential care   
2 2 
Provider obo council: domiciliary care   
18 13 
Provider obo council: independent living   
4 1 
Provider obo council: other provision   
2 3 
Provider obo council: residential care   
45 46 
      
Private: domiciliary care  
1 6 15 
Private: independent living   
1 2 
Private: other provision   
5 27 
Private: residential care   
46 84 
Private: shared lives   
1 0 
TOTAL 868 1042 1739 
1832 
Care provider total**  
1 128 191 
Local authority total**  
6 621 1391 
 
*Only partial data is available for 2011-12; correct up to February 2012. 
**These data are incomplete, as not all complaints about adult care services were 
‗assigned‘. 
STUDY B7: COMPLAINTS TO THE LGO REGARDING THE 
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY SAFEGUARDS 
Data source: Reproduced with the kind permission of the Local Government 
Ombudsman, (FOIA #20).  
In response to a request about whether the LGO could investigate complaints 
and award compensation in connection with the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) 
the LGO kindly shared three examples and published the following response: 
The LGO cannot generally pursue a complaint where a remedy exists by 
way of an alternative remedy.  Someone arguing that they are being 
unlawfully deprived of their liberty would have a right to approach the 
Court of Protection and the availability of that ―legal remedy‖ would take 
the matter outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.  The Ombudsman 
cannot direct that a Deprivation of Liberty authorisation is flawed and 
should be terminated, only the Court can do this.  If the Court makes such 
a determination, but awards no compensation [either because it cannot, 
will not or just forgot to address the issue] it would not be right for 
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someone to ask the Ombudsman to address the alleged shortcomings in 
the Court of Protection procedures. 
That said, deprivation of liberty issues do fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsmen and while the Ombudsmen is not able to bring a deprivation 
of liberty to an end they are able to consider complaints about how 
deprivation of liberty has been handled and there is no reason why 
recommendations should not include payments of compensation although 
any such recommendations are unlikely to be at the kind of levels courts 
would operate to. 
CASE 1 – 10 013 715 (―DOROTHY‖) 
A case where a DoL application was not made promptly and the care 
home‘s/council‘s approach to restrictions placed on the complainant and her mother was 
flawed. 
Dorothy was admitted to a care home in February 2005. Her daughter Melinda 
kept in touch with her regularly. In May 2008, Melinda raised concerns about Dorothy‘s 
care and a safeguarding investigation resulted. The allegations Melinda made centred 
around poor manual handling, poor care and bullying by staff. The safeguarding 
investigation took into account all of the issues around Dorothy‘s care which included 
concerns the care home had about Melinda‘s disruptive behaviour when visiting – she 
would often shout and get angry. 
In June 2008, Melinda‘s visits to her mother were restricted. This was because 
the home felt Melinda‘s behaviour distressed staff and residents and was detrimental to 
her mother‘s wellbeing. A variety of conditions were imposed at different times 
(Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards did not come into effect until April 2009). 
In April 2009, Melinda raised more complaints with the council about her mother‘s 
care. Another safeguarding investigation ensued which was inconclusive. It was clear the 
relationship between the staff and Melinda had broken down. In June 2009, Melinda‘s 
solicitors wrote to the council and asked on what basis, in light of the new DOLS 
legislation and associated Code of Practice, the Council believed it had the authority to 
prevent Dorothy from moving to a new care home. No response was received. In July 
2009, a safeguarding meeting was held in the home and, following that meeting, Melinda 
said she was prevented from leaving the home by the home manager who was 
threatening and harassing her. No safeguarding investigation was launched as Melinda 
was not a vulnerable adult. 
In August 2009, the council‘s safeguarding advocate raised the possibility that a 
deprivation of liberty might be occurring in respect of Dorothy. He advised that the 
council should carry out a mental capacity assessment. A further meeting was held in 
September 2009 where it was again suggested that a DoL authorisation was required. In 
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October 2009, the home sought a standard DoL authorisation and granted themselves 
an urgent authorisation. A standard authorisation was granted in November 2009. 
The LGO decided that the original restrictions should have been managed by a 
suitable risk assessment demonstrating the need for controls and the reasons why. This 
risk assessment should have been periodically reviewed to ensure the actions were both 
required and justified as time passed. The home was also criticised for not issuing a 
formal warning to Melinda before curtailing her visits. 
In June 2009, Melinda‗s solicitors wrote to the supervisory body (the local 
authority) raising the issue of DoLS but they should have written to the managing 
authority – the care home – who was responsible for seeking the authorisation. It was a 
further four months before the local authority advised the manager to seek an 
authorisation and a further five months before the appropriate request was made. 
We concluded the approach taken between June 2008 and October 2009 was 
flawed. We found fault with both the care home and the council. The council has ultimate 
responsibility for the care provided to Dorothy as it was funding the placement. It was 
decided that it should have done more to ensure its own staff and the staff in its 
contracted services were better trained in such matters. We went on to criticise how the 
DoL assessments were conducted in this case. This criticism included the best interests 
assessor determining who would be the most appropriate person to act as the ‗relevant 
persons representative‘. However, DoL guidance states that the best interests assessor 
should first establish whether the relevant person (ie Dorothy) has the capacity to select 
a representative and, if so, ask her to do so. If the relevant person selects an eligible 
person, the best interests assessor must recommend that person to the supervisory 
body for appointment. 
It was concluded that certain actions would follow to ensure a robust assessment 
and proper periodic monitoring of the arrangements in place. 
CASE 2 – 10 010 739 (―MRS JONES‖) 
A case where the DoL decision taken was not the ‗least restrictive‘ option. 
Mrs Jones complained to the LGO about the fact that her sister, Mrs Davies, was 
not allowed to return home after an admission to hospital. Additionally the council 
prevented her from moving her sister to another care home of her choosing. 
Mrs Davies has a degenerative and congenital condition called Huntingdon‘s 
Disease. She was living with and being cared for by her sister until October 2006 when 
she was admitted to hospital. The admission was triggered by the district nurse finding 
her on the floor. She was covered in bruises from other falls and had an infection. Mrs 
Davies told staff on the hospital ward she did not want to return to the care of her sister 
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Mrs Jones. She told others, however, that she did want to return. A multidisciplinary 
discharge meeting was held. Mrs Davies‘ other sister Mrs Weston was asked to attend 
the meeting as she has power of attorney. It was decided that the flat Mrs Jones lived in 
was unsuitable and that she was unable to give the level of care required. The option of 
Mrs Davies returning to the flat with a care package was explored but thought to not be 
viable. Mrs Davies was admitted to a nursing home. 
In early 2007 Mrs Jones was also diagnosed as having Huntingdon‘s Disease. 
She was suffering from common complications such as poor grip, reduced mobility, 
slurred speech and memory difficulties. Doctors also had concerns about impulsivity and 
lack of judgement. Mrs Jones never accepted that she could not care for her sister Mrs 
Davies. She was unhappy with the care Mrs Davies received in the nursing home at 
times. Mrs Jones continued to deteriorate and had problems swallowing. She was 
reluctant to accept help from social services. The records show that Mrs Davies and Mrs 
Jones missed each other‘s company a lot. In 2009 the care home placed restrictions on 
Mrs Jones visiting following some difficulties between her and the carers. After this she 
was told she could not visit unaccompanied. Some meetings were held at which 
Mrs Jones stated that she wanted to live in a care home with her sister. 
Mrs Jones moved from her small flat to sheltered accommodation and Mrs 
Davies was able to visit her there. At this time Mrs Davies began asking to go back and 
live with Mrs Jones. This resulted in an application for a Deprivation of Liberty 
authorisation. It was granted as Mrs Davies lacked capacity and Mrs Jones was not up to 
the challenge of providing the level of care required. In addition, Mrs Davies‘ needs could 
not have been met in sheltered and supported living accommodation.  Both sisters were 
upset about the authorisation. An IMCA and People‘s Voice advocacy group was 
involved. 
Eventually Mrs Jones made a formal complaint to the council about the detention. 
In its response the council said Mrs Davies needed expert care and Mrs Jones would not 
be able to provide that. The council also said Mrs Davies was settled now and her 
consultant‘s view was that her needs were best met at the care home. The authorisation 
expired after six months and another was made and granted. In the second authorisation 
it is noted that both sisters voiced a preference for being together. It was however 
deemed in Mrs Davies‘s best interests to remain where she was. The council said it 
would support the sisters spending as much time together as possible. Mrs Jones 
condition continued to deteriorate and records indicate that she may need residential 
care very soon. 
The LGO decided that we would have expected the council to assess whether 
the sisters could live together in a home that could cater for the needs of both. In not 
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exploring that option the arrangements may not be the least restrictive. The council 
agreed to a multi-stakeholder meeting to begin the process of dealing with the sisters‘ 
assessments and begin planning to accommodate them together for as long as they 
wish. 
CASE 3 – 10 010 398 (―MISS KERR‖) 
A report on a case where both local authority and care provider had little 
understanding of the proper process for getting authorisation. 
Please note at time of writing this report has not been published. Some detail 
may be subject to change by the Ombudsman up until publication date. 
Miss Kerr has a condition called hydrocephalus and has developed dementia. 
Before her admission to residential care Mr Wayne cared for her himself and managed 
her finances. Shortly after her admission to the care home Mr Wayne started to complain 
to the Care Quality Commission, the police and the local authority that the care home 
would not allow him to take Miss Kerr out, they were overdosing her on her prescribed 
medication and had stolen £3,000 from her account. He also made allegations of abuse 
and neglect. These issues were looked into by the Council but, other than that the care 
home had overcharged Miss Kerr (and this had been refunded) the other allegations 
were unfounded At the same time the council became increasingly concerned about 
Mr Wayne‘s behaviour towards Miss Kerr. He was observed to make her do strenuous 
exercise and walk her for extended periods of time to get her to reduce weight. He also 
removed food from her and undertook ‗reminiscence therapy‘ despite not being trained to 
do so. He made allegations to the police that the home was trying to murder Miss Kerr by 
overfeeding her. 
Multidisciplinary meetings were held to ensure that the care Miss Kerr was 
receiving, Mr Wayne‘s involvement and the decisions being taken by everyone were in 
her best interests. It was agreed that conditions and restrictions be imposed on Mr 
Wayne. His visits were considered to serve his own interests rather than hers. The care 
provider said Mr Wayne breached the conditions and the multidisciplinary team 
concluded that it could no longer be sure that Miss Kerr was benefitting from her contact 
with Mr Wayne. It was agreed that he would be banned from visiting Miss Kerr. Mr 
Wayne believed that he was banned because he raised complaints. He said he did not 
break any conditions he had been informed about. In our findings we did not uphold Mr 
Wayne‘s complaint in this regard but we did find fault with the way the council and the 
provider managed the situation. 
The council failed to provide the care home manager with correct advice when 
she asked if an application should be made for a Deprivation of Liberty authorisation. 
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The council also decided that an injunction was not necessary to prevent Mr Wayne from 
seeing Miss Kerr. However, paragraph 8.28 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that 
a court decision might be appropriate where someone suspects that a person who lacks 
capacity to make decisions to protect themselves is at risk of harm or abuse from a 
named individual. The Code of Practice and subsequent cases have reinforced that it is 
the responsibility of the state, in this instance the council, to bring such, or indeed any 
unresolved dispute about significant issues to court. This is what should have happened 
in this case at the time. 
The council also failed to consult Mr Wayne in its best interests assessment 
although it had an obligation to do so. The best interests assessment that was done only 
considered whether it was in Miss Kerr‘s best interests to continue to live in the care 
home. It did not consider the relationship between Mr Wayne and Miss Kerr and the 
impact of the restrictions/ban. 
It was also found that the care home had overcharged Miss Kerr £3,000 and this 
had been refunded. 
The care home manager was also at fault for not making an application to the 
council for a Deprivation of Liberty authorisation at the time at which it suspected that a 
DoL may have been taking place. Instead she asked the social worker what she should 
do and was told it was not applicable. It is for the DoLS team to decide if a DoL is 
occurring and it should have been asked to assess the situation at the earliest 
opportunity. The manager should have granted the home a seven-day urgent 
authorisation and applied for a standard authorisation to be considered which would 
have allowed an independent assessment to be made. 
The council‘s legal department was also at fault for not pursuing a possible 
injunction and for not suggesting that the court of protection be involved. 
When the LGO received the complaint we sent Letter 1 – letter to managing 
authority concerning unauthorised deprivation of liberty to the home manager. This still 
did not trigger the correct response and the home manager argued with us that the 
council had said it was unnecessary. When the application was finally made it was not 
done properly. It did not involve Mr Wayne and did not assess the key issue of whether 
contact with Mr Wayne was in Miss Kerr‘s best interests. 
 In our remedy we asked the care provider to: 
 provide training to all of its home managers in Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguarding procedures. 
We also said the council should: 
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 apologise to Mr Wayne 
 pay him £250 for having to pursue the case 
 liaise with the care provider and ensure suitable arrangements are made 
to prevent any recurrence 
 review the practice and training requirements of its other care providers 
 review its own staff‘s learning needs, and 
 inform the DoLS team of this report and findings. 
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APPENDIX C – SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIALS ON THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT  
C1 COURT OF PROTECTION 
Data source: Court of Protection reports (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2010; 
2011).  The MCA regulatory impact assessment anticipated there would be 200 health 
and welfare cases each year (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2005: [42]). 
Table 9 Applications, orders and deputies appointed by the Court of Protection, 2007-2010 
 
2007 
(Oct-
Dec) 
2008 2009 2010 
Property and affairs applications received 
3814 18697 17068 18360 
Property and affairs orders issued 
2153 15269 13641 15534 
Health and welfare applications received 
39 1164 1531 1283 
Health and welfare orders issued 
2 140 182 218 
Property and affairs deputy appointments 
170 8155 9982 9437 
Health and welfare deputy appointments 
0 83 112 106 
Application to discharge deputy (P no longer lacks capacity) 
 2 
 
Table 10 Number of hearings in the Court of Protection, 2009-10 
 
2009 2010 
Archway  
473 473 
Regional 
783 783 
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APPLICATIONS FOR PERMISSION FOR WELFARE MATTERS  
Data on applications for permission kindly shared by Senior Judge Lush; graphs 
reproduced940 from an article published elsewhere (Series, 2012a). 
Figure 10 Relationship of applicant to P 
 
 
Figure 11 Success rates of applications for permission by relationship of applicant to P 
 
  
                                               
940 
With kind permission of Jordan‘s publishing.
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Figure 12 Applications for permission received by P's diagnosis 
 
Figure 13 Success rate of applications with known outcome by diagnosis of P 
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C2 INFORMATION ABOUT COURT OF PROTECTION VISITORS 
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN 
Data source: Response to a FOIA request for information from the OPG (FOIA 
#18).  The information from the OPG is as follows: 
Visitors are appointed under a Lord Chancellor contract and are contractors 
rather than civil servants. Section 61 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that: 
...a person cannot be a special visitor unless they are a registered 
medical practitioner or appears to the Lord Chancellor to have other 
suitable qualifications or training, and appears to the Lord Chancellor to 
have special knowledge of and experience in cases of impairment of or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain. 
General visitors need not have a medical qualification.  In addition to the above visitors 
there are 3 permanent general visitors who are civil servants and operate under s58 of 
the Mental Capacity Act as opposed to Section 61.941 
Table 11 Number of Court of Protection Visitors in England, by region, as of October 2012 
Region 
Special 
Visitor 
General 
Visitor 
South West 
1 6 
South East 
2 14 
London  
3 9 
East of England 
0 4 
West Midlands  
1 8 
East Midlands  
1 5 
Yorkshire/Humber 
1 2 
North West  
1 7 
North East 
0 5 
Wales  
1 4 
TOTAL 
11 64 
 
C3 OFFICE OF THE OFFICIAL SOLICITOR 
Data source: Annual reports of the Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee (Office 
of Court Funds Official Solicitor and Public Trustee, 2008; 2009; 2010; Office of the 
Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee, 2011; 2012). 
                                               
941  
More detailed information on the recruitment process for Court of Protection visitors is 
available in the information supplied by the OPG, see the link to the third party website hosting 
the request.
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Figure 14 Number of Court of Protection welfare and deputyship cases involving the 
Official Solicitor 
 
  
2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Total number of new 
cases: Court of Protection 
welfare
0 176 268 304 358
Total number of cases in 
hand: Court of Protection 
welfare
42 191 368 425 582
Total number of cases in 
hand: deputyships
44 38 34 35 33
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C4 PROSECUTIONS UNDER S44 MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
Data source: Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA #3; #4) 
Table 12 The number of prosecutions initiated by the CPS under s44 MCA or s127 MHA 
 
Data refers to the number of prosecutions which reached a hearing in the magistrates 
courts; outcomes are not recorded. 
C5 INDEPENDENT MENTAL CAPACITY ADVOCACY SERVICE 
Data source: Annual reports of the IMCA service (Department of Health, 2008c; 
2009c; 2010d; 2011b).  Also Freedom of Information Act 2000 request for data on s39D 
IMCA for the 2009-10 (FOIA #13). 
In total there were 5179 IMCA referrals in 2007-8 (32% of impact assessment 
predictions), there were 6582 in 2008-9, 9173 in 2009-10 and 10730 in 2010-11.  For the 
years 2009-11 these also included figures for DoLS IMCAs, the total number of non-
DoLS IMCA referrals for 2009-10 was 7959 and there were 9061 for 2010-11.  Referrals 
to represent adults with learning disabilities make up approximately 20-22% of all IMCA 
referrals. 
  
 
2007
-08 
2008
-09 
2009
-10 
2010
-11 
2011
-12 
2012
-
2013 
(to 
24 
July 
2012
) 
s44 Mental Capacity Act 2005 9 43 101 191 177 
77 
s127(1) & s127 (3) Mental Health Act 
1983 Not 
requested 
7 12 6 15 
s127(2) & s127(3) Mental Health Act 
1983 
0 1 0 2 
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Figure 15 Breakdown of IMCA referrals 2007-11 
 
Table 13 Number of formal complaints and Court of Protection proceedings initiated by 
IMCAs, 2009-11 
 
2009/10 2010/11 
Total number of formal complaints 
14 13 
Number of formal complaints as % of total number of referrals 
0.15% 0.12% 
Complaints against the local authority 
8 9 
Complaints against the health authority 
6 4 
Cases where IMCA referral led to application to Court of Protection 
6 4 
Number of Court of Protection proceedings initiated by IMCAs as % 
of total number of referrals 
0.07% 0.04% 
 
2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11 2007-8 2008-9
All groups
Learning disabilities 
only
DoLS 1214 1669
Unknown 585 771 613 602 149 152
serious medical treatment 675 968 1316 1630 221 387
change in accommodation 3047 3496 4087 4530 532 582
care review 191 387 617 751 38 77
Adult protection/safeguarding 681 960 1326 1548 150 210
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C5 APPLICATIONS UNDER THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 
SAFEGUARDS  
Data source: Consultations, impact assessments and official statistics for the 
deprivation of liberty safeguards (Department of Health, 2005a; 2007b; NHS Information 
Centre for Health and Social Care, 2010a; 2011d; 2012f). 
Figure 16 Number of DoLS applications per year - predicted and actual data (England) 
 
OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON DOLS ACTIVITY, 2009-2012 
Data source: This is a breakdown and graphical depiction of data given in the 
supporting tables of the official statistics collected by the government on the deprivation 
of liberty safeguards (NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2010b; 2011e; 
2012f). 
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Figure 17 Number of applications granted and refused for care homes and hospitals, 2009-
2012 
 
Figure 18 Durations of authorisations granted by care homes and hospitals, 2009-12 
 
Care 
home
Hospital
Care 
home
Hospital
Care 
home
Hospital
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Authorisations refused 2954 906 2,891 1,140 3,511 1,539
Authorisations granted 2439 858 3,817 1,134 4,697 1,646
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2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Care home Hospital Care home Hospital Care home Hospital
Length of authorisation 0 to 90 
days
995 573 1481 881 2,111 1,460
Length of authorisation 91 to 180 
days
728 170 1171 165 1,378 195
Length of authorisation 181 to 
270 days
371 67 570 57 728 174
Length of authorisation 271 to 
364 days
237 29 307 19 324 19
Length of authorisation 365+ 
days (Cumulative Total)
154 19 385 33 531 47
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Figure 19 Qualifying requirements not met for deprivation of liberty applications from care, 
2009-12 
 
 
USE OF THE THIRD PARTY REFERRAL MECHANISM FOR CONSIDERATION OF 
WHETHER CARE AMOUNTS TO A DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 
Data source: Local authority responses to the question ‗In how many instances 
has the deprivation of liberty assessment process been triggered by a third party 
contacting the supervisory body about a possible unlawful deprivation of liberty?‘ at 
November 2010 (FOIA #29).  This was fourteen months into the operation of the DoLS. 
Table 14 Number of times a third party or CQC alerted local authority supervisory bodies 
to a possible unlawful deprivation of liberty (April 2009 – November 2010) 
 
3rd Party Requests 
to supervisory body  
CQC alert supervisory body to 
possible unlawful deprivation of 
liberty  
Total 
165 24 
Highest number received by 
a local authority 25 
9 
Care 
home
Hospital
Care 
home
Hospital
Care 
home
Hospital
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Age requirement not met 2 0 9 10 0 1
Mental health requirement 
not met
44 18 32 33 41 37
Mental capacity requirement 
not met
299 79 259 142 287 197
No refusals requirement not 
met
8 2 20 5 27 3
Eligibility requirement not met 85 127 80 168 113 254
Best interests assessment not 
met
2544 680 2,488 781 3,042 1,047
Authorisations not granted but 
best interests assessor advises 
DOL is occurring 
116 52 51 27 58 35
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
353 
 
Lowest number received by a 
local authority 
0 0 
Median number of 
requests/alerts for local 
authorities 
0 0 
Mean number of 
requests/alerts for local 
authorities 
1.375 0.2 
Number of local authorities 
responding to this question 
120 120 
Number of local authorities 
responding zero 
requests/alerts 
67 112 
 
APPLICATIONS TO THE COURT OF PROTECTION CONCERNING 
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY  
Source: FOIA requests (FOIA #15; #16; #29). 
Table 15 Identity of applicant in DoLS appeals brought between April 2009 and January 
2011 
  
 Section 16 MCA  Section 21A MCA  
Advocates /IMCAS 
3  2  
Local Authority 
24  3  
Nursing Home 
1  1  
NHS Body 
0  2  
Applicant in person 
5  8  
Solicitor* 
23  14  
Total 
56  30  
*It was not possible to break down data on solicitors for P, R and other parties. 
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Figure 20 Number of appeals against detention under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, April 
2009-September 2011 
 
Table 16 Number of DOLS court cases local authorities have been involved in (FOIA #29) 
0 Court cases 
101 
1 Court case 
12 
2 Court cases 
7 
7 Court cases 
1 
Total number of court cases 
33 
Number of local authorities responding to this question 
121 
C6 PUBLIC FUNDING FOR COURT OF PROTECTION CASES 
Details of arrangements for public funding for legal advice and representation in 
the Court of Protection taken from guidance provided by the Legal Services Commission 
(LSC 2011c; b; a; 2012a; b).  As of 1 September 2012942 many elements of the 
controversial Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) 
came into force, which may have a significant effect on public funding for many areas 
that affect people who ‗lack capacity‘ (Official Solicitor, 2011).  Nevertheless, the core 
requirements for funding for Court of Protection litigation have remained intact, although 
financial eligibility requirements are more stringent.  This information, whilst now out of 
date, is provided to give an indication of the types of access to justice barriers connected 
                                               
942 
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 1) 
Order 2012 SI 2012/1956
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with funding for litigation that existed under the regime before LASPO.   If anything, the 
situation will have worsened since LASPO came into force. 
C6.1 PUBLIC FUNDING FOR S15 AND S16 MCA MATTERS  
Subject to other requirements, funding for legal help is available for making 
Lasting Powers of Attorney and advance decisions where the client is aged over 70 or is 
a disabled person within the meaning of s1 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Legal 
Services Commission, 2011b: 383). 
Subject to other requirements, funding for legal help, help at court and legal 
representation in the Court of Protection is available for litigation concerning the following 
matters: 
 a person's right to life, 
 a person's liberty or physical safety, 
 a person's medical treatment (within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 
1983), 
 a person's capacity to marry, to enter into a civil partnership or to enter into 
sexual relations, or 
 a person's right to family life.943 
The LSC (2011b: 28.3 [6]) comment: 
Many welfare cases concern accommodation issues which will not as 
such fall within the scope of the authorisation. However accommodation 
cases will be within scope where they concern P‘s family life. This is likely 
to be the case where either the issue is whether or not P should remain 
with his or her family or where a change of accommodation would have a 
serious impact on contact between P and his or her family. Cost Benefit 
criteria may also be an important consideration in such applications. 
The LSC (2011b: 383-4) must be satisfied that it is necessary for a person to be 
represented at an oral hearing, or other parties such as a person‘s immediate family.  In 
deciding whether or not cases fall within the category of serious health and welfare 
matters, the LSC will take into account case law, including that which was previously 
heard under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.  The LSC note that guidance 
issued by the Official Solicitor (2001) says that ‗any serious treatment decision where 
there is a disagreement between those involved and those close to P, where the 
treatment proposed may involve the use of force to restrain P or otherwise may be 
resisted by P or where there are doubts and difficulties over the assessment of either the 
                                               
943 
This is preserved by Part 3 Schedule 1 LASPO 
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person's capacity or best interests should be referred to the court.‘ 944   The LSC 
comments that ‗Many, but not all, cases within that guidance will also come within the 
terms of the authorisation‘.   
In considering whether or not to fund legal representation for parties other than 
‗P‘ the LSC would consider (amongst other factors) their interest in the matter and the 
case they wish to put forward.  In general, the LSC: 
...will only grant Legal Representation if the applicant wishes to put 
forward a new and significant argument which would not otherwise be 
advanced. As a rule there should not be more parties separately 
represented before the Court than there are either cases to put or desired 
outcomes.945 
Cases must also satisfy merits criteria to qualify for public funding: 
Cases before the Court of Protection are likely to be considered under the 
general Funding Code. The most important criteria will often be prospects 
of success. Many (but not all) of the cases which come within para.6 of 
the authorisation also fall within the test of Overwhe1rning Importance to 
the Client' as defined in s.2.4 of the Funding Code. For cases of 
overwhelming importance to the client the requirement is to have at least 
borderline prospects or achieving the outcome desired by the applicant. 
For this purpose in relation to applications on behalf of the family of ‗P‘ the 
issues will be treated as of overwhelming importance to the applicant if 
they are of overwhelming importance to ―P‘s‖. 
Applicants for public funding are also subject to a financial eligibility test (Legal 
Services Commission, 2012a; b).  At the time of writing, an applicant‘s gross income 
must not exceed £2657946 and their disposable income must not exceed  £733 per month 
after allowances are made for dependants and employment expenses, and other 
allowances including: tax; national insurance; maintenance paid; housing costs; child-
care incurred because of work; and criminal legal aid contributions.  People in receipt of 
certain passporting benefits947 would satisfy the income test. 
There is also a test of disposable capital.  If a person‘s disposable capital 
exceeds £8000 they will not qualify for legal aid.  The value of a client‘s main or only 
dwelling which he is living in would be taken into account unless the property itself is the 
subject matter of the dispute.  The property would be valued at the amount it could be 
sold for on the open market, and the amount of any mortgage or charges registered 
against the property should be deducted up to a maximum deduction of £100,000.  In 
                                               
944 
This is the LSC‘s paraphrasing of the OS‘s guidance, not the phrasing used by the OS himself. 
945
 p385 
946 
A higher gross income cap applies to families with more than four dependent children. 
947 
Income Support, Income Based Job Seekers' Allowance, Income Based Employment and 
Support Allowance or Guarantee Credit. 
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addition, the first £100,000 of the value of a client‘s interest after making deductions for 
any mortgages must be disregarded.  The LSC (2012b) give some worked examples: 
 
The applicant has a home worth £215 000 and the mortgage is £200 000: 
Value of home: £215 000 
Deduct mortgage up to maximum allowable: £100 000 
Deduct exemption allowance: £100 000 
Amount to be taken into account in assessing financial eligibility: £15 000 
In this example, the client is ineligible. 
More complex rules apply for owners of multiple properties.  The Official Solicitor has 
noted that the capital disregard rules can be extremely problematic for his client‘s, who 
may not be in a position to release equity from the value of their property or to sell the 
property and move (Pitblado, 2012).  The LSC (2011b: 386) comment: 
Cases before the Court of Protection are generally subject to the usual 
financial eligibility rules for CLS funding. Neither the Lord Chancellor nor 
the Commission have any powers to waive eligibility levels or 
contributions in such cases. 
C6.2 PUBLIC FUNDING FOR APPEALS AGAINST DETENTION UNDER S21A 
MCA 
Public funding for legal advice and legal representation of detainees and the 
‗relevant person‘s representative‘ is not subject to any financial eligibility test to bring an 
appeal against a deprivation of liberty authorised under Schedule A1 MCA if the appeal 
is brought under s21A MCA.948  However, this ‗gold plated‘ legal aid is only available for 
people detained using Schedule A1 – the DoLS.  People deprived of their liberty outside 
of the DoLS, for example subject to an order of the Court of Protection under s16 MCA, 
would still be subject to both the means and merits tests described above.  Third parties 
wishing to mount a challenge to a detention under the DoLS who are not P‘s appointed 
representative, would also not qualify for this ‗gold plated‘ legal aid and would be subject 
to the means and merits tests described above. 
A related difficulty occurs where a dispute over deprivation of liberty – even that 
authorised under the DoLS – arrives in court by way of a public authority seeking a 
declaration or order under s15 or s16 MCA.  In such cases, because the hearing would 
not be under s21A MCA, and although it may consider identical issues, a person would 
not be entitled to ‗gold plated‘ legal aid as they would if the case were brought by 
themselves of their representative under s21A MCA.   Sometimes it can be difficult to 
                                               
948  
r3(ea)The Community Legal Service (Financial) Regulations 2000, as amended by r5 
Community Legal Service (Financial) (Amendment) Regulations 2009.
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distinguish which welfare issues fall to be considered under s16 MCA and s21A MCA.  In 
some cases, although case has arrived in court under s21A MCA a judge might 
terminate the authorisation under Schedule A1 and replace it with an authorisation from 
the court under s16 MCA.  In such circumstances, it can be difficult to persuade the LSC 
that anything beyond the first hearing constitutes a s21A MCA appeal for the purposes of 
securing ‗gold plated‘ legal aid (Ruck Keene et al., 2012d).  Recently Charles J directed 
that such proceedings should continue to be considered proceedings under s21A 
notwithstanding any s15 or s16 MCA declarations or orders.949 
Even if bringing an appeal against their detention is of overwhelming importance 
to a person, it might not satisfy the LSC‘s requirements of at least ‗borderline prospects 
of success‘.  This may cast doubt on what funding might be in place for cases like A v A 
Local Authority & Ors 950  where the court emphasised the importance of not simply 
‗rubber stamping‘ deprivation of liberty authorisations in situations where all 
professionals and family members were in agreement as to a person‘s best interests yet 
they themselves continue to object (Ruck Keene and Butler-Cole, 2011). 
                                               
949 
Re HA [2012] EWHC 1068 (COP) 
950 
[2011] EWHC 727 (COP)
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